Appendix E Aircraft Operators

Transcription

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2 Appedix E Aircraft Operators Geeral Each aircraft operator is ivited to review ad prioritise the proposed actio pla for implemetatio. The followig guidace material is provided to assist i that implemetatio. Safety Iformatio Sharig Recommedatio Aircraft operators are ecouraged to participate i safety iformatio sharig etworks to facilitate the free exchage of relevat iformatio o actual ad potetial safety deficiecies. Exchagig safety iformatio is providig compaies with huge safety beefits. It allows them to lear ot oly from their ow experiece but also from the experiece of others. Havig direct cotact with other stakeholders allows compaies to get first had iformatio. Direct cotact also provides the opportuity to ask specific questios ad commuicate o specific issues without losig precious time. There are several ways of participatig i safety iformatio exchage. A compay may elect to: Set up safety iformatio exchage agreemets with other compaies Set up safety iformatio exchage agreemets with ANSPs or other stake holders Register with iteret safety iformatio exchage like Skybrary, UK CAA, etc Joi oe of the existig safety iformatio sharig etworks like EVAIR, IATA-STEADES, Flight Safety Foudatio Become a member of associatios like ERA, AEA, IATA who will provide the compay with very useful ad valuable iformatio Flight Data Moitorig Recommedatio The aircraft operator should iclude ad moitor aircraft parameters related to potetial ruway excursios i their Flight Data Moitorig (FDM) program. Europea regulatio requires aircraft operators to establish ad maitai a accidet ad flight safety program which icludes a flight data moitorig programme (FDM) for aeroplaes i excess of kg. The flight path parameters moitored by this system should iclude parameters closely related to the risk of ruway excursio such as: Ladig: Deep ladig a certai distace behid the glide slope touchdow poit Short ladig touchig dow before the glide slope touchdow poit Log flare a ladig flare which takes more tha a certai umber of secods from e.g. 15 ft above the ruway to touchdow Moitor spoiler deploymet durig ladig Late flaps settigs ca be associated with rushed approaches Late ladig gear selectio ca be associated with rushed approaches Tail ad crosswid Stabilised approach criteria of the compay, evet if ot met at the specified gates Threshold crossig height Excess speed over the threshold Use of reverse thrust Use of brakes High speed exits from ruways Performace aalysis e.g. to trigger alerts to the Aerodrome Operator for abormally low frictio measures. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

3 Appedix E Aircraft Operators Takeoff: Use of reverse o rejected takeoff Use of brakes o rejected takeoff Nose wheel steerig used at high speeds Ruway distace remaiig after rejected takeoff Crosswid ad tailwid FDM should be used as a predictive tool to idetify safety hazards i flight operatios. I the scope of a Safety Maagemet System (SMS) the data from the FDM should be used to set safety performace targets. It is also a very valuable tool to debrief flight crews. Data ca be extracted from the FDM database ad ca be used i a de-idetified maer i flight crew safety courses as case studies. This practice has a great learig effect ad helps to raise awareess o differet issues amog the pilot commuity. Flight Crew Traiig ad Ruway Excursio Recommedatio The aircraft operator should iclude ruway excursio prevetio i their traiig program. This traiig should be doe usig realistic scearios. Flight crew traiig should cotai traiig o the risks ad prevetio of ruway excursios. Ideally this traiig should be provided i classroom/computer Based Traiig ad i the simulator. Data for the traiig should be idetified through the safety data collectio process of the aircraft operator s SMS. The followig list gives some examples of data sources: Ruway excursio toolkits from the idustry e.g. ICAO / IATA/Flight Safety Foudatio Ow reportig programme FDM data Compay procedures Safety Iformatio Exchage Programme with other aircraft operators I house icidet ad accidet reports Exteral icidet ad accidet reports Safety cofereces ad meetigs Iteratioal safety programmes etc. The safety promotio part of the SMS should also be used to distribute data ad raise the crew s awareess o the prevetio of ruway excursios. Lessos leared from past icidets or accidets ca easily be distributed usig the followig safety promotio tools: Memos Iteral Safety Joural Feedback o icidet reportig Safety Itraet Site briefigs Presetatios i courses etc Airlie specific issues as well as de-idetified data from the FDM program should be icluded i the recurret traiig programme, ad used to build simulator scearios (evidece based traiig). The traditioal way of flight crew traiig ad testig cosist i a 6 mothly OPC alteratig with a combied LPC/OPC. This method is very prescriptive ad does t allow for aircraft operator specific traiig ad testig. This is why various aircraft operators have adopted the ew Alterative Traiig ad Qualificatio Programme (ATQP). For the OPC this programme allows the testig to be doe i a realistic flight eviromet (LOFT style) based o failures or evets that were experieced by the aircraft operator istead of the formal prescribed items i the OPC. Evets ad sceario s related to ruway excursio ca be easily icluded. This system allows the aircraft operator to trai ad test their flight crew accordig the specific ature of their operatios. Techical Solutios to Prevet Ruway Excursios Recommedatio The aircraft operator should cosider equippig their aircraft fleet with techical solutios to prevet ruway excursios. 52 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

4 The ladig phase beig very complex does ot leave much metal capacity to make complex istataeous calculatios; so basic rules of thumb must be used. Automated systems provide istataeous iformatio such as predicted stoppig poits to the pilots therefore improvig their decisio makig. Use of the Head up Guidace Systems for all approaches may help the pilots i their decisio makig. Most Head up Guidace Systems provide for a 3 slope idicatio, idicate the flight path ad have a guidace lie for the touchdow poit. Usig HGS for all approaches may assist the pilots to fly stabilised approaches. This is especially true for visual approaches whe o vertical guidace (e.g. ILS, PAPI, VASI etc) is available. Most HGS systems also have the feature to show the ruway remaiig after touchdow. Data-Lik systems Recommedatio The aircraft operator should cosider equippig their aircraft fleet with data-lik systems (e.g. ACARS) to allow flight crews to obtai the latest weather (D-ATIS) without oe pilot leavig the active frequecy. The use of data-lik systems allows the flight crew to obtai curret weather iformatio without oe pilot losig situatioal awareess. It also allows a improved follow-up i a rapid chagig weather eviromet. The use of data-lik systems should be clearly documeted i the compay procedures. The procedures should also cotai limitatios o phases of flight durig which data-lik systems should ot be used aymore (e.g. durig the fial approach phase). Collaboratio with ANSP Recommedatio The aircraft operator should report to the ANSP if approach procedures or ATC practices at a airport prevet flight crew from complyig with the published approach procedure ad their stabilised approach criteria. It is importat to uderstad that stabilised approach criteria must be followed ad that, if the ATC clearace does ot allow these criteria to be followed, the pilots have the right to refuse the clearace. Refusig a clearace should be doe as soo as possible (e.g. as soo as the pilots recogise that the stabilised approach criteria will ot be met) to allow the ATC cotroller to review his/her traffic sequecig. Some examples of clearaces which may lead to ustabilised approaches are: Iappropriate speed cotrol Delayed descet istructios Late ruway chages Short cuts vectorig etc NOTE: I some istaces the ATC cotroller may ot be able to adhere to stadard procedures due to uforesee circumstaces (e.g. weather). Airlie procedures should cotai cotigecy procedures for these situatios i order to allow their pilots to safely lad the aircraft. However, it eeds to be clear that these cotigecy procedures should ot become the stadard. Pilots should proactively report ay ATC clearace which is ot i lie with their SOPs. I the scope of the SMS this will allow the Safety Maager to idetify egative treds ad take appropriate actios. Appropriate actios are: Reportig problems to the respective ANSP Checkig if compay SOPs are correct Idetifyig airports/approach procedures with potetial risk Proactive meetigs with respective ANSPs to tackle specific issues Feedback to crews to raise awareess, lessos leared Iclude specific issues i compay safety traiig Exchage of data with other stakeholders (e.g. EVAIR, IATA-STAEDES or other aircraft operators i the scope of the Safety Iformatio Exchage Programme) Aircraft Operators should seek active cooperatio with Local Ruway Safety Teams of the airports i their route etwork. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

5 Appedix E Aircraft Operators No Stadard Maoeuvres Recommedatio The aircraft operator should esure the importace of a stabilised approach ad compliace with fial approach procedures is icluded i briefig for flight crews. The commader should ot accept requests from ATC to perform o-stadard maoeuvres whe they are coflictig with the safety of the flight. Flight crews are ofte cofroted with ATC clearaces or istructios they are ot comfortable with. Examples of this are: Cotrollers givig a tight base-tur Cotrollers askig to keep the speed up Cotrollers askig to expedite vacatig the ruway Cotrollers givig late ruway chages etc. These clearaces are ofte well iteded but do ot always take ito cosideratio the high workload o the flight deck durig the last miutes of the flight. They might eve lead pilots to accept a clearace which will make the safe operatio of the aircraft a challege. Pilots may be reluctat to refuse ATC clearaces. There are may differet reasos for this: Pilots do ot kow that they are allowed to refuse a istructio Pilots might ot realise which situatio they are beig pushed ito Pilots do ot wat to offed the cotroller by refusig the istructio Cultural issues might give the ATC istructio the status of a order Felt or real commercial pressure to accept short cuts The deviatio has become the stadard etc. Oe thig should be clear to all flight crew they shall refuse ay ATC istructio which is coflictig with the safety of flight. I the scope of aircraft operators SMS it is importat that crews uderstad the importace of reportig these issues. Safety maagers will eed data i order to be able to address these issues. Havig eough data will allow the safety maagers to address these issues to the respective ANSP. A good practice for aircraft operators is to regularly meet with the ANSP at differet airports ad discuss issues which tured up. Very ofte these issues are based o misuderstadigs (e.g. I thought pilots liked the short cuts we provided to them) or simply o the lack of kowledge about the limitatios ad procedures of each other (e.g. request to reduce speed ad icrease descet rates, or late desced clearace give to the pilots, whereas pilots do ot uderstad that the clearace is offered due to airspace restrictios/costraits). Meetigs with the ANSP are a very proactive way of icreasig the uderstadig of each other. The kowledge gaied durig these meetigs should be dissemiated to all crews i order to raise their awareess o discussed issues. This will eable the crews to kow about safety issues at differet locatios ad thus be prepared for the uexpected A good idustry practice is to have a exchage programme betwee ANSPs ad aircraft operators i place. Meaig that cotrollers will be allowed to do familiarisatio flights i the flight deck or i a flight simulator ad that flight crews will visit the ANSP facilities. This will help to raise the uderstadig of each other s work costraits. 54 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

6 Ruway Chage Recommedatio The Commader should ot accept a late ruway chage uless for safety reasos. A briefig ad if eeded flight maagemet computer (FMC) preparatio must be completed (e.g. before leavig the gate or startig the fial approach). Late ruway chages are a issue both for takeoff ad for ladig. Late ruway chage for takeoff Late ruway chage for ladig A late ruway chage for ladig, if ot aticipated by the crew, will lead to a icrease i workload for the flight crew. Flight crews should ot accept a ruway chage uless a briefig, icludig the go-aroud for the ew ruway, performace calculatio ad FMC preparatio ca be safely completed i due time. Ideally the ruway chage should ot be accepted below FL100. Crews should ot start a approach util all of the above is completed. Issues which might arise if all of the above is ot completed before startig the approach are: A late ruway chage before takeoff, if ot aticipated by the crew, will lead to a serious icrease i workload for the crew. Crews should ot accept a ruway chage uless a briefig, performace calculatio ad FMC preparatio ca be safely completed i due time. NOTE: Oe crew member will eed to be head dow to make all the chages required i the setup of the radio ad avigatio equipmet. This should ot be doe while taxiig. Durig taxi both pilots should direct their full attetio to the movemet of the aircraft o the airport. Rushed ad ustabilised approaches Wrog radio ad avigatio settigs for approach Flyig the wrog approach Not iterceptig the cleared approach i time. This is especially critical o airports with parallel ruway operatios Flyig the wrog go-aroud route Errors i performace calculatios which might lead to ruway excursios Discrepacies i the stored FMC data leadig to crew cofusio etc. Issues which might arise from this are: Crews followig the wrog taxi route Crews overlookig other traffic Ruway icursios Discrepacies i the stored SID i the FMC leadig to crew cofusio or SID violatios Errors i performace calculatios which might lead to ruway excursios etc. Cosideratio should ot oly be give to reprogrammig the ew departure route ad the correspodig settig of the radios but also to performace calculatios. This is especially true if the late ruway chage icludes or is a departure from a itersectio. Where a aircraft is equipped with Flight Maagemet Systems (FMS) capable of storig two flight plas, this feature should be used whe the crew is preparig the arrival ad there is a possibility for oe of two differet ruways to be assiged for ladig. The flight pla o stby ca be easily activated without a sigificat icrease i workload. ANSP ofte try to use the optimal ruway cofiguratio as log as possible for capacity reasos. While the surface wid might still be withi the limits the wids at altitude are ofte well beyod these limitatio makig it harder for flight crew to stabilise their aircraft. I this case flight crew should ot be reluctat to ask for a more appropriate ruway; clearly statig that this is for safety reasos; eve if this meas delayig the approach. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

7 Appedix E Aircraft Operators WEATHER Curret Weather versus Forecasted weather Recommedatio The Commader, shortly before takeoff ad ladig, shall verify that the actual weather coditios are similar or coservative compared to the weather data used for the takeoff performace calculatios ad the i-flight ladig distace assessmet. Flight crews should check that the wid ad ruway coditios give with the takeoff or ladig clearace is cosistet with the oe used for the performace calculatios. At the actual time of arrival weather coditios ca be differet from the oes used at time of dispatch or eve from the time at which the approach briefig was performed. Flight crews should pay special attetio to sigificat chages i wid directio ad or ruway surface coditios. Flight crew shall check the latest weather iformatio before their i-flight ladig distace assessmet is doe. If sufficiet time remais ad cockpit duties allow it, crews shall always try to get the latest available weather iformatio just prior to startig the approach. If durig the approach the crews feel that the weather coditios have chaged they may seek clarificatio o the actual coditios with the ATC cotroller. NOTE: I headwid situatios, to facilitate the cross-check, performace calculatios, ca be doe with zero headwid so that the presece of ay headwid will be coservative. CROSSWIND OPERATIONS Operatios i crosswid coditios ot oly require specific hadlig techiques, but also require good kowledge ad strict adherece of the applicable crosswid limitatios. Uderstadig Crosswid Limitatios Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish the Aircraft s Crosswid Limitatios with specific guidace o the ruway coditio ad the gust compoet. Specific guidace should be published o how flight crews should use the value of the wid gust. The maximum recommeded crosswid values also deped o the ruway surface coditio. Clear guidace should be give o the ifluece of this ruway surface coditio or reported brakig actio o the recommeded values. The aircraft maufacturers publish maximum recommeded crosswid values. Aircraft Operators should give clear guidace to their flight crews o how these values should be used. Some operators cosider these maximum recommeded values as actual aircraft limitatios. Wid for takeoff ad ladig: 56 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

8 Example Airbus A320 family code Ruway coditio Deceleratio Ad Directioal Cotrol Observatio Reported Brakig Actio Max Crosswid (Gust icluded) 1 6 Dry - Dry 38kt Damp Wet 33kt 5 3 mm (1/8 ) or less of Slush Dry Sow Wet Sow Brakig deceleratio is ormal for the wheel brakig effort applied. Directioal cotrol is ormal Good 29kt Frost 4 Compacted Sow (OAT at or below -15 C) Brakig deceleratio ad cotrollability is betwee Good ad Medium. Good to Medium 29kt Slippery whe wet 3 Compacted Sow (OAT at or above -15 C) More tha 3 mm (1/8 ) depth of: Dry Sow max 130 mm (5 ) Wet Sow max 30 mm (1 1/8 ) Brakig deceleratio is oticeably reduced for the wheel brakig effort applied. Directioal cotrol may be oticeably reduced. Medium 25kt 2 Betwee 3 mm (1/8 ) depth of : Water max 12.7 mm (1/2 ) Slush max 12.7 mm (1/2 ) Brakig deceleratio ad cotrollability is betwee Medium ad Poor. Potetial for Hydroplaig exists. Medium to Poor 20kt 1 Ice (cold & dry) Brakig deceleratio is sigificatly reduced for the wheel brakig effort applied. Directioal cotrol may be sigificatly reduced. Poor 15kt 0 Wet ice Water o top of Compact Sow Dry Sow or Wet Sow over Ice. Brakig deceleratio is miimal to oexistet for the wheel brakig effort applied. Directioal cotrol may be ucertai. Nil - 1 I case of AUTOLAND, max crosswid limited to 20kt Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

9 Appedix E Aircraft Operators Flight Techique i Crosswid Operatios Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish specific guidace o takeoff ad ladig techiques with cross wid; ad/or wet or cotamiated ruway coditios ad the correct use of the ose wheel steerig. Appropriate traiig must be provided. Takeoff Techique: Due to differeces i flight techique betwee fly-bywire ad covetioal aircraft oly geeral guidace is preseted. Aircraft maufactures publish specific guidace i the Flight crew Traiig Maual. Iitial ruway aligmet ad smooth symmetrical thrust applicatio result i good crosswid cotrol capability durig takeoff. Rollig takeoff procedure is strogly advised whe crosswids exceed 20 kots or tailwids exceed 10 kots to avoid egie surge. Especially o wet or slippery ruway coditios special attetio should be paid to esure the egies are spoolig-up symmetrically. Light forward pressure o the yoke or side stick icreases ose wheel steerig effectiveess. Ay deviatio from the ceterlie durig thrust applicatio should be coutered with immediate smooth ad positive cotrol iputs. Approach Techique: Aircraft Maufacturers cosider several factors such as aircraft geometry, ailero ad rudder authority whe recommedig a crosswid approach techique. This ca be the wigs-level or crabbed approach, the steady sideslip approach or a combiatio of both i strog crosswid coditios. I lie with stadard operatig procedures, discoect the autopilot at a appropriate altitude to have time to establish maual cotrol of the aircraft well before the de-crab phase ad flare. Ladig Techique: Especially o wet or cotamiated ruways a firm touchdow is recommeded to miimise the risk of aquaplaig ad esure a positive touchdow. Whe touchig dow with residual crab agle o a dry ruway the aircraft automatically realigs with the directio of travel dow the ruway. This is ot happeig o a wet or cotamiated ruway. Residual crab agle o the ruway has also some implicatios whe reverse is selected. I the case that a lateral cotrol problem occurs i high crosswid ladigs, pilots must reduce reverse thrust to reverse idle ad release the brakes to correct back to the cetrelie. This will miimise the reverse thrust side force compoet ad provide the total tyre corerig forces for realigmet with the ruway cetrelie. 58 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

10 TAKEOFF Workig with the Flight Maagemet Computer (FMC) Recommedatio The aircraft operator should esure their stadard operatig procedure (SOP) requires the flight crew to perform idepedet determiatio of takeoff data/crosscheck the results. The aircraft operator should esure their Stadard Operatig Procedures iclude flight crew cross-checkig the load ad trim sheet ad performace data iput ito the Flight Maagemet Computer (FMC). Traditioally the dispatcher will provide the Flight crew with the load ad trim sheet or loadig form cotaiig all the loadig iformatio. I some istaces the flight crew will have to complete the load ad trim sheet maually. I this case the compay should provide procedures for the pilots to idepedetly crosscheck the data before it is beig used for performace calculatios. The ext step will be to use the data either to be etered ito the EFB or to do the performace calculatios o paper. Performace calculatio usig the EFB The iformatio from the load ad trim sheet may be etered i the loadig module of the Electroic Fight Bag (EFB) to obtai the weights ad trim settigs for takeoff. This data is the used i the performace module to geerate the takeoff performace data. It is highly recommeded that each pilot perform his ow calculatio ad the crosscheck it with the other pilot s result. I case where a class 1 EFB is used for the performace calculatio each crew member must be provided with oe EFB to esure proper idepedece of calculatio ad crosscheck. The calculatio should be doe prior to receivig the fial load ad trim sheet whe the actual load ca be ascertaied with reasoable accuracy to avoid errors due to time pressure ad hurry up sydrome. Performace calculatio usig paper versio The iformatio from the load ad trim sheet is the used to determie the takeoff performace data. This data will be writte dow o the compay documetatio ad shall be crosschecked by the other crew member. The performace data are the iserted by oe pilot ito the performace page of the FMC ad agai carefully checked by the other pilot. I both cases the flight crew should also check the reasoableess of the takeoff referece speeds ad thrust settig; which ca be challegig for flight crew operatig i a mixed fleet eviromet. As a backup, techology providers should develop a system that automatically checks the data etered ito the FMC for cosistecy betwee the take of parameters (e.g. Take Off Securig (TOS) by Airbus). This data isertio is usually doe just before departure whe the flight crew is exposed to various distractios. The Operator s CRM traiig should provide threat ad error maagemet guidace o how to mitigate the threats posed by these distractios. Special guidace should also be provided for cabi crew ad hadlig agets ot to disturb flight crew while they are performig data isertios or briefigs. Flight crew traiig is based o moitorig ad respodig to the attaimet of takeoff referece speeds, but they have little huma meas i detectig reduced or degraded takeoff acceleratio util approachig the ed of the ruway. Techology providers have a importat role to develop systems that provide alerts to the flight crew whe the actual acceleratio is too low to allow a safe takeoff, example Takeoff moitorig (TOM) by Airbus. Furthermore the FDM programme should be used to idetify issues i relatio to performace calculatios, slow acceleratio etc. I the scope of the SMS promotio ay issues discovered should be fed back to the crews to raise their awareess ad share the lessos leart. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

11 Appedix E Aircraft Operators The Rejected Takeoff Decisio Process Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish the rejected takeoff decisio makig process. Appropriate traiig should be provided. Takeoff speeds are key elemets i a safe takeoff. They are moitored by the pilot o-flyig (PNF or PM) V1 is called by the PNF/PM or by the aircraft system; Vr is called by the PNF/PM. The most importat speed rage for failure maagemet is just before V1, the maximum speed at which a rejected takeoff ca be iitiated. There must be a clear policy about which pilot may call a STOP or GO o takeoff, as well as who will make the STOP actios. To help the decisio maker i his task, the takeoff roll is divided ito a low ad high speed segmet. Typically the threshold is betwee 80kots ad 100kots, below this speed the aircraft s eergy is low ad a rejected takeoff is cosidered low risk. Above this speed the aircraft s eergy is high ad a correctly executed rejected takeoff is cosidered critical. The essetial supportig ad moitorig task of the pilot o flyig should be emphasised. This icludes: Moitorig of thrust parameters Moitorig the speed tred Perform timely stadard callouts Detect ad/ idetify ay abormal coditios Moitor the use of ALL brakig devices Traiig: The rejected takeoff maoeuvre is a madatory item i the Operators Proficiecy Check (OPC), so flight crews are traied ad assessed o the maoeuvre o a regular basis. However this assessmet is mostly focussed o the correct executio of the maoeuvre ad ot o the decisio makig process. It is strogly recommeded that recurret traiig ad checkig, ad especially commad upgradig courses, also iclude simulator exercises that require the flight crew to detect ad idetify abormal situatios that are ot the result of a clear ad distict loss of thrust, such as: Egie stall Tyre burst close to V1 Available Ruway Takeoff flaps Certified performace Dry ruway Field leght limit weight Egie fail V EF Go V 1 Reject V R Trasitio complete Full stoppig o reserve 35 ft Airlie Policy: Aircraft Operators must defie the policy, procedures ad required task sharig for a rejected takeoff. It should iclude the decisio makig process for a STOP or GO evet ad the task sharig betwee the Commader ad First Officer as well as the PF ad PNF/PM. Nose gear vibratios Bird strike at high speed Wid shear or ueve aircraft acceleratio Opeig of side widow Istrumet failures Flight cotrol issues 60 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

12 CRUISE I-flight assessmet of ladig performace Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish ad provide traiig o the compay policy regardig i-flight assessmet of ladig performace. Flight crew must be advised whether compay ladig distace data relates to ufactored or operatioal distaces. I the case of ufactored distaces the compay should provide the safety margi to be used i ormal ad abormal coditios. While most flight crew are familiar with the dispatch requiremets o ladig performace which are based o u-factored actual ladig distaces (ALD), multiplied with a regulatory factor, they should be made aware that some maufacturers are basig their ew i-flight ladig performace o factored Operatioal Ladig Distaces (OLD). Aircraft Operators should provide uambiguous ladig performace iformatio to their flight crew. The dispatch calculatio usually yields results i weight limitatio ad ot ruway legth required. Givig results i ruway legth required for dispatch calculatios has two advatages: it requires the crew to be aware of the ruway legth available at the destiatio airport ad it is possible to compare it with the i flight ladig performace that gives results i legth also. Due to the variatios of published ladig performace data, aircraft operators must clearly iform their flight crew if the calculatios are made usig factored or ufactored ladig distaces. This may iclude declarig the followig: weather coditios ca be accepted for the ladig to be safely performed. It is importat to take ito accout the aircraft status ad the latest weather iformatio available. The flight crew should assess the weather with a coservative strategy i particular cocerig the ruway coditio ad the wid compoet. As a example if the ATIS states ruway i use 33 RWY dry, wid 250/10 gustig 25, visibility 9999 Viciity RaSh, cloud sct 2500 sct 3000 Cb, temperature 32/25, QNH 1009 The crew has two optios either they take the actual weather that gives RWY dry, o wid compoet, or they take the possible sceario of a shower passig o the ruway whe they will be ladig i.e. ruway wet (or cotamiated) ad a wid compoet of 5 to 10kt tailwid. The first optio is the more favourable case but does t prepare the crew for the decisio to be take i case of weather deterioratio o short fial. The secod optio will allow the crew to assess whether the ladig ca be made safely or ot (what is the max tailwid ad the ruway coditio he ca accept) i this worst case. So if o fial ATC gives: ruway wet ad 230/ 15 gustig 20 clear to lad ruway 33, the decisio to lad or ot will be based o soud performace calculatio i the secod optio ad o guesswork i the first optio. Specific guidace should be provided for wet or cotamiated ruway coditios ad for failure cases. Whilst Europea regulatio makes a geeric statemet regardig the eed to assess the ladig performace i flight; Aircraft Operators should publish a SOP regardig the i-flight ladig performace assessmet as part of their approach preparatio whe: what level of reverse thrust was assumed, the assumptio of the wheel brakig, if the data was factored or ot, what was the air distace allowace i the data. The i-flight assessmet of ladig performace calculatio should be made usig coservative wid compoet ad ruway coditio accordig to the latest weather report ad forecast available to the crew to kow what Ladig o wet or cotamiated ruway Weather deterioratio sice dispatch Chage of ladig ruway I-flight failure affectig ladig performace Etc. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

13 4.5 Appedix E Aircraft Operators APPROACH Ruway ad Approach Type Selectio Recommedatio Whe acceptig the ladig ruway the Commader should cosider the followig factors: weather coditios (i particular cross ad tailwid), ruway coditio (dry, wet or cotamiated), ioperable equipmet ad aircraft performace. Except i coditios that may favour a o precisio approach, whe more tha oe approach procedure exists, a precisio approach should be the preferred optio. Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish guidelies o the use of autolad whe low visibility procedures (LVP) are ot i force. Flight crew that practice automatic ladigs without LVP i force should take ito accout status of the protected area for the Localiser sigal. Flight crew should fully brief such practice maoeuvres, i particular, readiess to discoect the autolad/automatic rollout fuctio ad lad maually, or go-aroud. Maual flyig skills: Geerally aircraft operators ecourage the use of the highest level of automatio appropriate to the phase of flight or the airspace i which the flight is beig coducted i order to reduce crew workload ad icrease situatioal awareess. However it s recogised that to maitai the proficiecy of maual flyig skills flight crew should fly the aircraft maually o a regular basis whe appropriate. Whe a pilot is flyig the aircraft maually it icreases the flight crew workload ad requires more coordiatio betwee the pilots. The itetio to fly the aircraft maually should be briefed i advace together with ay iteded use of partial automatio (e.g. auto thrust). Automatic Ladig: Aircraft operators who are authorised to perform low visibility operatios (LVO) geerally maitai the rececy of their flight crew with a recurret traiig program i the simulator. However iitial type ratig coversio geerally requires a automatic ladig to be performed durig lie traiig. Flight crew should be aware that the ILS sigal is oly protected from possible iterferece whe low visibility procedures (LVP) are i force at a airport ad that these operatios may compromise the regular flow of traffic/ sequecig. Permissio to coduct a traiig flight e.g. CAT II/III traiig approach i good weather must be requested by the aircraft operator as advised i the AIP. ATC may reject such a request or iterrupt the curret procedure accordig to the traffic situatio at the time. Aircraft operators stadard operatig procedure should give the miimum weather coditios ad ILS performace allowig a autolad to be performed without LVP i force. Flight crew should be aware ILS iterfereces ca cause udesirable autopilot behaviour at low altitude. Flight crew should therefore be ready to discoect the autopilot ad go-aroud or lad the aircraft maually where the stadard operatig procedure advises doig this i case of iterferece or malfuctio. Choice of approach type: The commader shall cosider all relevat factors i choosig the appropriate approach type. Whe it is appropriate ad available a precisio approach should be the preferred optio. This is based o the fact that the vertical profile of a approach with a electroic glide path is more straight forward to follow ad verify tha the vertical profile of a o-precisio approach. Stabilised approach Recommedatio The aircraft operator must publish Compay Criteria for stabilised approaches i their Operatio Maual. Flight crew should go-aroud if their aircraft does ot meet the stabilised approach criteria at the stabilisatio height or, if ay of the stabilised approach criteria are ot met betwee the stabilisatio height ad the ladig. Compay guidace ad traiig must be provided to flight crew for both cases. 62 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

14 It s well accepted throughout the idustry that a prerequisite for a safe ladig is a stabilised approach. This geerally meas: The aircraft is o the correct lateral ad vertical flight path The aircraft is i the ladig cofiguratio Thrust ad speed are stabilised at the approach value The ladig checklist is completed. All of these requiremets eed to be fulfilled at the stabilisatio height i order for the flight crew to cotiue with the approach. Although the stabilised approach priciple is well accepted ad kow throughout the pilot commuity adherece to the priciple is ot always perfect. Flight crew are still cotiuig to lad from u-stabilised approaches. How ca aircraft operators improve the adherece of their flight crew to the stabilised approach priciple? Awareess campaig: to improve the buy-i from flight crews, ay ew Stadard Operatig Procedure (SOP) should be itroduced with a kid of awareess campaig to explai the philosophy behid this ew SOP. Examples of icidets or accidets that could have bee preveted with this SOP would certaily stregthe its case. Stadard Operatig Procedure: a well-defied SOP regardig the stabilised approach priciple must be published i the compay Operatios Maual. This should iclude: Criteria of stabilised approach: they must be clearly defied ad easily assessable by the flight crew. Examples could be: Correct lateral ad vertical flight path: aircraft withi +/- 1 dot vertical path ad localiser. The aircraft is i the ladig cofiguratio: o more chages to a differet flap settig due to uexpected wid chage i approach Thrust ad speed are stabilised at the approach value: thrust should be stabilised at its ormal approach value or certaily above idle. Speed should be withi certai limits of the fial approach value (e.g. -5/+10 kt).note that the use of a Auto Thrust System (ATS) for approach ad ladig ca modify the previous recommedatios. The Operator should also specify whether it is possible to use the ATS without autopilot for approach ad ladig. If it is possible, the Operator should promote the use of ATS i maual flyig as it may reduce the pilot workload i moitorig the speed ad adjustig the thrust therefore freeig metal capacity for situatioal awareess. This may also prevet aircraft carryig excess speed over the threshold; (see later) The ladig checklist is completed: This will allow the pilot flyig to fully focus o his flyig duties ad the o-flyig pilot to focus o his moitorig duties (see later) Defiitio of stabilisatio height: the followig values are accepted throughout the idustry: i VMC 500ft above the airfield elevatio ad 1000ft i IMC coditios. Note that some operators use oly oe value whatever the weather coditios are. This ot oly simplifies the operatig procedures but also simplifies the verificatio process. (see later) Check of stabilised approach criteria at stabilisatio height: The most ofte reported reaso is that the flight crew was ot aware of beig ustable at the stabilisatio height. This could be preveted by a proper check at the stabilisatio height, similar to a height check at the outer marker or DME fix. This check would preferably be iitiated by a auto callout (e.g. oe thousad ) by the aircraft system. Actios at stabilisatio height: Whe passig the stabilisatio height, the PNF/PM makes the compliace check ad calls out the result (for istace stable / ot-stable ); the PF has oly the choice betwee two possibilities; cotiue the approach or discotiue it, usig the appropriate call out i.e. cotiue or go-aroud. I case the approach is ot stabilised, the PF must iitiate a go-aroud maoeuvre. Actios i case of de-stabilisatio below stabilisatio height: while previous SOP protects agaist high eergy or rushed approaches this SOP cocers destabilisatio after passig the stabilisatio height. Usually this is a trasiet coditio ofte caused by chagig wid velocity or directio. Provided the PF ca rejoi the stabilised approach criteria the approach may cotiue. Durig the later stages of the flight (below 500ft) the PF s focus shifts from iside the flight deck to outside. He will start lookig for the visual refereces he eeds i order to cotiue the approach beyod the DH. Now the moitorig task of the PNF/PM becomes paramout Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

15 Appedix E Aircraft Operators ad he should call out ay deviatios from the stabilised approach criteria: Excessive Localiser or vertical path deviatios; Excessive speed deviatios Vertical speed greater tha 1000ft/mi Excessive pitch Excessive bak agle The PF must ackowledge this call ad make positive corrective actios. The questio remais at which positio must the aircraft ultimately have regaied its stabilised criteria before a go-aroud must be iitiated? Oe sceario could be as the aircraft passes the threshold, just before the flare maoeuvre is iitiated. Cosiderig the complexity of the ladig maoeuvre the PF is task saturated at this time ad may ot have the required capacity to make complex judgemet calls e.g. to mitigate the risk of tail strike. Furthermore as he has maaged to come this far he will ot be very go-aroud mided aymore. The PNF who is performig the moitorig duties has the spare capacity ad he should his use his judgemet to assess the correctios made by the PF will be i time to allow for a safe ladig. If he cosiders this it ot the case he should call for a go-aroud which must be followed by the PF. This philosophy has cosequeces for the decisio-makig process ad CRM; traiig is eeded to eable the PNF/PM to cosistetly judge the situatio ad takes the proper decisio o short fial. Flight crew must acquire the visual referece at the miima ad maitai it. If at ay time durig a approach oe of the flight crew members is ot sure about the safe outcome of the ladig a go-aroud must be iitiated or called for. It must be highlighted that this optio remais available util the aeroplae touches the groud ad up to the selectio of reverse thrust. Verificatio of compliace: this step is very importat to idicate that compliace with this SOP is vital ad o-egotiable. Verificatio ca be made usig meas such as a FDM system ad air safety report i lie with ICAO Safety Maagemet Systems practices. Due to the relatioship betwee ustabilised approaches ad ladig accidets ad icidets, it is i the iterest of the flight crew to obtai a debriefig i accordace with the FDM protocol siged betwee maagemet ad pilots. De briefig of results: compay publicatios should regularly iclude compliace levels ad re-iterate the importace of compliace with the stabilised approach criteria. This should be cotiued util this priciple is well established i the safety culture of the compay. Actios i case of late loss of visual referece: As evideced by a evet durig a ight time ladig i 2008, visual refereces may be lost durig the fial phase of a approach eve whe sufficiet visual cotact with the ruway was available at decisio height. I this evet, both pilots became visual with the ruway betwee 300ft ad 200ft, ad at the decisio height of 200ft had more tha sufficiet visual refereces to cotiue the approach. It was oly whe the aircraft desceded through 20ft AGL durig the flare that it etered a area of fog. Both pilots lost sight of the ruway edge ad ruway lights became a glow illumiatig the fog. At this poit the PF made some iadvertet rudder iputs that caused the aircraft to drift sideways util oe mai gear left the paved surface. The crew iitiated a go-aroud ad after just 4 secods of groud cotact the aircraft was airbore agai, although they were uaware that the mai gear had rolled o upaved groud. Mior damage was caused to the ruway edge lightig ad the mai gear assembly. The low visibility had ot bee reported i the ATIS or by the tower. There was o ruway cetrelie lightig, ad ruway edge lights were ot istalled as per ICAO Aex 14, too far from the ruway edge, frosted ad misaliged. This icidet highlights the ecessity for airport facilities to be i accordace with ICAO Aex 14 provisios, for the accurate ad timely reportig of chages i the coditios, icludig RVR, ad for the preparedess of pilots to perform a go-aroud whe ecouterig sigificat loss of visual cues eve late i the approach ad up to deploymet of the thrust reversers. Ref. books/452.pdf Go-aroud Decisio Makig A primary opportuity to prevet a ruway excursio is i the decisio makig of the pilot to go-aroud or cotiue a takeoff oce at or approachig V1, however it is relatively 64 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

16 ucommo for a flight crew to call for a go-aroud, i the order of 30% of go-aroud maoeuvres are called by Flight crew. Go-aroud is a ormal but rarely performed procedure, statistics show that a flight crew member may perform a go-aroud durig i-lie flyig oly a few times a year. Traiig i the simulator to perform uprepared as well as prepared go-aroud maoeuvres should be doe regularly usig various scearios. GO-AROUND Policy ad Pilot o flyig duties Recommedatio The aircraft operator must publish the compay policy, procedure ad guidace regardig the go-aroud decisio. It should be clearly stated that a go-aroud should be iitiated at ay time the safe outcome of the ladig is ot assured. Appropriate traiig should be provided. Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish a stadard operatig procedure describig the pilot o flyig duties of closely moitorig the flight parameters durig the approach ad ladig. Ay deviatio from compay stabilised approach criteria should be aouced to the pilot flyig usig stadard call outs. Flight crew i commercial aviatio have bee traditioally traied ad tested to execute a go-aroud whe they lack the required visual refereces at the Decisio Height (DH). While this offers good testig of the executio of the maoeuvre the ivolved decisio makig process is straight forward. Numerous Icidets ad Huma Factors studies have revealed that oce a idividual has selected a particular course of actio, it takes very compellig cues to alert them to the advisability of chagig their pla (tuel visio). This is why the role of the pilot o-flyig is so importat. Not oly his moitorig task is importat, but he has more spare metal capacity ad has a more objective view of the flight. If he s ot cofidet with the safe outcome of the approach ad ladig he should call for a go-aroud. This would be a logical call if the pilot o-flyig is the commader, but it could be a much more difficult call if it would be a first officer. The philosophy that either pilot ca call for a go-aroud is vital ad should be a importat item i the compay s CRM traiig. Especially lowexperieced first officers should be traied to be assertive whe faced with commaders refusig to take their suggestios o board or displayig tuel visio. To help flight crew i their decisio maagemet various check heights ad calls have bee itroduced: The Outer Marker/ fixed distace check The stabilisatio height 100 Above / approachig miimum Miimum Compliace with all the flight parameter tolerace at oe gate meas the flight ca cotiue util the ext gate where agai a assessmet shall be made. It should be emphasised that the flight crew should ot become complacet whe a gate is passed successfully. I fact they should be cotiuously prepared for a go-aroud util the poit of o retur the selectio of the reverse thrust. Aircraft Operators with aircraft without reverse thrust should defie their ow specific policy. Traiig o go-arouds should be provided i the simulator ad i the classroom. Very ofte crews are ot aware that they are flyig a u-stabilised approach. Usig real case studies helps to raise the uderstadig of the potetial risk for a ruway excursio after a u-stabilised approach. Crews should ot be allowed to fly u-stabilised approaches durig their simulator traiig. Durig simulator traiig istructors should put the same emphasis o followig the go-aroud procedures tha i the real world. Flight crews are traditioally traied to perform a go-aroud at miima ad this procedure is well mastered by most pilots. However, most of the go-arouds do ot happe at miima. It is thus importat to iclude differet go-aroud scearios ito the traiig. A ope reportig culture i the scope of a SMS will help to idetify precursors to wrog decisio makig. De-idetified icidets should be used as examples durig recurret traiig. This helps to show that icidets/accidets do ot oly happe to the others. A ope policy o go-arouds shall be implemeted, makig go-aroud a ormal procedure ad ot a abormal issue. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

17 Appedix E Aircraft Operators Where do we lad? Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish the stadard operatig procedure regardig a touchdow withi the appropriate touchdow zoe ad esure appropriate traiig is provided. While still i IMC coditios flight crew are expected to follow the localiser ad glide slope idicatios. Whe trasitioig to VMC coditios the PF is gradually shiftig his or her attetio to the visual approach idicator or to the ruway ad the touchdow poit; still usig their istrumets as a backup. Threshold Mai Gear Path VASI Glide Path Mai Gear Touchdow (No Flare) Aim poit Threshold to Touchdow 1,000 ft. 3 Bar VASI (oly) VASI Lights The PAPI or VASI provides visual descet guidace iformatio durig the approach. They are visual projectios of the approach path ormally aliged to itersect the ruway at a poit 1,000 or 1,800 feet beyod the threshold. Flyig the PAPI or VASI glide slope to touchdow is the same as selectig a visual aim poit o the ruway adjacet to the VASI istallatio ER 737 Model Visual Glide path (degree) Flaps 30 airplae body attitude (degrees) Mai Gear over Threshold pilot eye height (feet) Mai gearheight (feet) threshold to mai gear touchdow poit-o flare (feet) /3.6 49/50 34/33 651/ ER Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

18 The positio of the ruway ad the touchdow poit o the widshield are very importat ad should become a referece value for the pilot. Ay deviatio from the approach profile should be recogised by the pilot ad correctios made. Visual aim poits versus gear touchdow poit differeces icrease as glide path agle decreases as i a flat approach. For a particular visual approach, the differece betwee gear path ad eye level path must be accouted for by the pilot. Systematically makig log ladigs or steep approaches would mea differet positios of the ladig ruway o the widshield ad dilute the value of this visual referece as a backup for profile deviatios. Beig stabilised o the profile ad havig the ruway i sight, pilots ca already make a projectio of where their flight path will itersect with the ruway; this projected visual touchdow poit should be the Aimig Poit Markig ormally resultig i the Mai Ladig Gear touchig dow o the secod touchdow marker which is at 300 metres. This techique esures that the ladig complies with the assumptios made by the performace calculatios: stabilised 3 profile, appropriate threshold crossig height (TCH), ad approach speed. Crews should be made aware of the differet existig touchdow zoe markigs durig their iitial ad recurret traiig. Iitial ad recurret traiig should iclude special or uusual operatioal requiremets at specific airports i the compay s etwork (e.g. dowdrafts/updrafts due terrai, shiftig wids, ad visual illusio iduced by arrow/wide ruway or ight operatios). Aircraft Operators must publish a Stadard Operatig Procedure o the area where the touch dow must be achieved or a balked ladig must be iitiated. This could be the touch dow zoe (first 1000m) or 1/3rd of the ruway, whichever is less. Traiig o the use of the Head Up Guidace System, if istalled, should be made durig groud courses to assure ladig withi the appropriate touchdow zoe, with practical traiig beig coducted durig simulator sessios. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

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20 Ladig Performace The parameters affectig the ladig distace are published i the Flight Operatios Maual. Flight crew should have a good uderstadig of the sesitivity of the ladig distace to these parameters i order to make soud go-aroud decisios. The followig data shows the effect of relatively mior deviatios from a baselie calculatio of ladig distace for a wet ruway. The referece coditio is a reasoably attaiable performace level followig ormal operatioal practices o a omial wet ruway surface. The referece QRH data o the bar chart below is based o: 1500 foot touchdow VAPP=VREF+5, 5 kot speed bleed off to touchdow Sea Level, Stadard Day (15 C) No wid, o slope Recommeded all egie reverse thrust Brakig Actio Good, cosistet with FAA wheel brakig defiitio of a wet o-grooved ruway. It ca be see from this graphic that i geeral the dispatch ladig distace is coservative eough to absorb some deviatio from the expected coditios. However, whe eough deviatios from the referece coditios come together the dispatch ladig distace or actual ruway available may ot be adequate. Wheel brakig may be reduced o the wet ruway because of questioable ruway coditio due to rubber build up, polishig, or puddlig due to heavy rai or poor draiage. The followig chart shows the same iformatio as above, but assumig a Brakig Actio Medium ruway which is cosistet with data that has bee see i some overru accidets ad icidets where the ruway s maiteace coditio is i questio. The vertical lie represets the dispatch requiremet that is 1.92 times the dry ruway capability of the aeroplae. Each bar as you go dow the chart demostrates the cumulative effect of the operatioal variatio listed. I overru icidets, you usually see a umber of factors that cotribute to usig up the margi available, especially if the ruway has worse wet ruway frictio capability. You ca see from the chart above if the ruway is a questioable wet ruway you ca very quickly use up the etire margi i the dispatch wet ruway calculatio. The ladig phase beig very complex does ot leave much metal capacity to make complex istataeous calculatios; so basic rules of thumb must be used. Fully automated system will provide istataeous iformatio to the pilots therefore improvig their decisio makig. However it is very importat for the flight crew to get the aeroplae o the groud at the right poit ad at the right speed to esure there is the greatest amout of distace remaiig to absorb thigs the pilot does ot have cotrol over such as ureported tailwid or late wid shifts from cross to tail or worse tha expected ruway frictio capability, etc. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary

21 Appedix E Aircraft Operators Use of all stoppig devices Recommedatio The aircraft operator should publish the Compay Policy regardig the appropriate use of all stoppig devices after ladig ad esure appropriate traiig is provided. Recommedatio Flight crew should use full reverse o wet/cotamiated ruways irrespective of ay oise related restrictio o their use uless this causes cotrollability issues. It is importat that the applicatio of all stoppig devices icludig reverse thrust is made immediately after touchdow without ay delay. Brakes/Auto brake: Selectig a auto brake level meas selectig a deceleratio rate rather tha a brakig effort. Selectig reverse thrust with a auto brake level will ot icrease the deceleratio effort o a dry ruway, assumig groud spoilers/ speed brakes are exteded; it will simply reduce the eergy applied to the brakes. O slippery ruways, the target deceleratio associated with the selected autobrake level may ot be achievable with brakig aloe, i which case reverse thrust use is essetial for stoppig the aircraft eve with autobrake. Groud Spoilers/Speed brakes: Groud Spoilers primarily reduce the lift ad icrease the drag. Reducig the lift icreases the weight o the wheels thus improves the brake performace. The effect of the groud spoilers is eve greater o wet or cotamiated ruway where brake performace is already less, ad risk of aquaplaig is icreased. Groud spoilers are usually automatically exteded, ad their automatic extesio should be moitored by the pilot o-flyig. If they do ot exted, a call out should be made ad where possible, they should be exteded maually without delay. Reverse thrust: Impact o brake egery usig rev thrust with autobrakes Data source: The Boeig Compay Selectig reverse thrust o a dry ruway provides miimal additioal deceleratio with maximum maual brakig ad o additioal deceleratio with auto brakes. The deceleratio effect of thrust reversers is more effective at high speed, so the selectio should be doe as soo as possible, geerally at mai ladig gear touchdow. The reverse thrust should be maitaied util the stop is assured. It is also importat to uderstad that if the reverser is stowed early, the reapplicatio of reverse thrust from forward idle ca take up to secods to reach effective reverse thrust level (depedig o the aircraft type); however, the reapplicatio from reverse idle will take oly 3-5 secods to reach a effective reverse thrust level. Like the groud spoiler extesio selectio of the reverse thrust should be moitored by the pilot o-flyig. Ratio of stoppig forces Data source: The Boeig Compay 70 Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary 2013

22 However, whe ladig o a ruway with poor brakig actio, the effect of reverse thrust ca make a dramatic differece. The ext figure shows whe usig max maual brakig, thrust reversers are additive. The figure shows that the deceleratio due to drag has remaied the same for all ruway coditios, but the deceleratio from reverse thrust has icreased sigificatly while brake efficiecy has decreased due to slippery ruway coditios. Aircraft Operators should make sure their SOP iclude the required techiques for bouce recovery. This recovery techique should also be icluded i the iitial ad recurret traiig, especially for traiig captais. I case of a light bouce a typical recovery techique would require the pilot to maitai the pitch attitude (ay icrease could cause a tail strike) ad allow the aircraft to lad agai. Special attetio should be paid to the icreased ladig distace. If the remaiig ruway legth is ot sufficiet a rejected ladig ca still be iitiated util the selectio of the reverse thrust. I case of a high bouce, a ladig should ot be attempted as the remaiig ruway legth might ot be sufficiet to stop the aircraft. A rejected ladig iitiated from this positio would typically require the pilot to apply Takeoff go-aroud (TOGA) thrust ad maitai the pitch attitude ad cofiguratio util the risk for a tail strike or secod touchdow has disappeared. The the ormal go-aroud techique ca be used. It is importat to use full reverse o a wet/cotamiated ruway irrespective of ay oise or evirometal restrictios. Bouced Ladig Recovery Recommedatio The aircraft operator should iclude specific recovery techiques from hard ad bouced ladigs i their traiig program. Boucig at ladig usually is the result of oe or a combiatio of the followig factors: Oce a rejected ladig is iitiated, the flight crew must be committed to proceed ad ot retard the thrust levers i a ultimate decisio to complete the ladig. O oe occasio the commader took cotrol ad iitiated a go-aroud after his first officer iadvertetly made a bouced ladig. After the go-aroud iitiatio the aircraft touched the ruway agai triggerig the takeoff cofiguratio warig. This activatio was ot expected by the commader ad made him chage his mid to stop the aircraft. This resulted i the aircraft comig to a stop very close to the ed of, i this case, a very log ruway. Ruway excursios, impact with obstructios ad major aircraft damage are ofte the cosequece of reversig a already iitiated rejected ladig. Excessive sik rate Late flare iitiatio Power-o touchdow Wid shear or thermal activity Etc. Europea Actio Pla for the Prevetio of Ruway Excursios - Released Editio Jauary