Japan s Nuclear Crisis

Transcription

1 Japan s Nuclear Crisis

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3 Japan s Nuclear Crisis The Routes to Responsibility Susan Carpenter

4 Susan Carpenter 2012 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6 10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act First published 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number , of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

5 Contents Timeline Annual Average Exchange Rates Acronyms and Abbreviations ix xiv xv Introduction 1 Consequences of the nuclear crisis: agriculture, fisheries 8 Consequences of the nuclear crisis: Fukushima residents 11 Consequences of the nuclear crisis: Fukushima Daiichi workers 12 Information-sharing is not a buzz-word in government agencies 14 Institutional reforms postponed 15 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant: an impending disaster 17 Where does the buck stop? 20 The same old story 23 The routes to responsibility 25 Perceptions of Japan Inc.: busting myths 25 1 Independent Administrative Institutions: In Name Only 28 The push for reforms: the perfect opportunity 31 Reforms according to Koizumi: FILP 35 Reforms according to Koizumi: enthusiastic support from the opposition 36 The privatization of the Japan Highway Corporation: unenthusiastic support from the LDP and the ministries 38 Special Corporations: consequences of amakudari 40 The liquidation of a failed Special Corporation: Government Housing and Loan Guarantee Corporation 41 The image of reform: Urban Development Corporation 42 The image of reform: Japan National Oil Corporation 42 The image of reform: Japan External Trade Organization 43 Manipulation of operations to maintain JETRO 44 The disguise: convincing the Japanese media 46 The disguise: convincing the American media 48 The disguise: convincing Koizumi 48 JETRO s core focus : sowing the seeds of the ministry 49 Holding on to a good thing 50 v

6 vi Contents 2 Amakudari in the Ministries IAIs, Public Corporations, Research Institutes and Affiliated Agencies: the Insidious Side 52 No reforms in sight 54 Manifestations of amakudari: IAI/public corporations 56 Issues arising in research institutes 58 A consequence of amakudari in IAIs: bid-rigging 60 A consequence of amakudari in an IAI: incompetent management of the Social Insurance Agency 61 Scandal and super-amakudari in a government corporation: Japan Post 65 Everything old is new again 69 3 Information-Sharing is Not a Buzz-Word in Japan: Press Clubs Insulate an Insular Political Economy 71 Press clubs: information cartels control the flow of information 72 The whole truth and nothing but the truth 76 Press clubs and Japan Inc Elements Intrinsic to Japan s Political Economy: Interlocking Interests between an Elite Bureaucracy and Big Business 79 Power struggle between politicians and bureaucrats 81 The origins of the power of the bureaucracy and government links with big business 84 The bureaucracy s power defined 87 Collaboration between the bureaucracy and big business: ministerial guidance and mercantilism ( ) 88 Japan s expansion in East Asia, outward investment and the benefits to big business 89 Recession: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and industrial rationalization 92 The alliance between MCI and big business: the birth of administrative guidance 94 The Manchurian Incident 95 The Second World War: the intensification of ministerial powers 97 Enduring changes: corporate culture 98 Reverse reforms and Japan Inc. 98 Small shock, big shock: nuclear energy as a national priority 103 Mechanisms to implement guidance 105

7 Contents vii 5 The DNA of Japan s Post-war Political System: Ultra-conservative to the Core 108 The 1955 system : the moneymen, Nobusuke Kishi/Kakuei Tanaka ( ) 112 Nobusuke Kishi 112 Kakuei Tanaka: the godfather of pork-barrel patronage 114 Shin Kanemaru: post-tanaka moneyman 117 Right-wing ultra-conservative politics: in the family domain 119 Junichiro Koizumi 119 Shinzo Abe 120 Yasuo Fukuda 123 Taro Aso 124 Yukio Hatoyama 126 Ichiro Ozawa: protégé of Tanaka and Kanemaru 127 The Recruit scandal: interpersonal networks of politicians, bureaucrats and big business 130 The Ministry of Defense scandal: interpersonal networks of politicians, bureaucrats and big business 132 The right-wing ultraconservative mind-set continues Yoshihiko Noda (30 August 2011 ) 136 Seiji Maehara 137 Shintaro Ishihara: post-earthquake neo-nationalism 139 Ishihara s ardent admirers: Toru Hashimoto and the Osaka Restoration Group Pork-Barrel Patronage in the Prefectures: the Proliferation of Nuclear Power Plants 143 Pushing nuclear in needy prefectures 147 Fukushima Prefecture 150 Aomori Prefecture 151 Aomori s no. 1 industry: nuclear power 152 The princes of pork-barrel patronage: Kakuei Tanaka and Noboru Takeshita 157 The godfather 157 The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant: the art of pork-barrel patronage 159 The town that can t say no! 161 Noboru Takeshita: bringing home the bacon 163 Shimane Nuclear Power Plant: public works perpetuate more public works 165 Ehime Prefecture: the Takeshita connection 165

8 viii Contents Kato s connections to MEXT and METI: textbook and MOX 168 Ikata Nuclear Power Plant: money, money, money 169 The price of pork-barrel patronage 170 The power of money 172 The power of the state Japan s Nuclear Crisis: the Routes to Responsibility 180 JOYO and FUGEN: trial and error 182 MONJU: more trials and errors 182 Mihama: still more errors 184 Takahama: more errors but more MOX 185 Tokai-mura 185 The blame game 187 Splitting NISA from METI: the image of reform 190 NISA: the tip of METI s nuclear tail 192 METI s nuclear progeny: IAIs, industrial associations and research institutes 193 The end of the line: IAIs, at the very heart of government 194 METI: the creative ministry: the route to the renewable energy industrial sector 196 Don t blame the bureaucrats, blame the system! The Japan System: Indestructible but Destructive 199 Japan s first lost decade 200 The first lost decade : institutional paralysis 201 Japan s second lost decade: institutional paralysis 202 Earthquake tsunami and nuclear crisis: impact on industrial production 205 Impact on sovereign debt: out-of-sight, out-of-mind 210 Political bickering: impact on rapid recovery 212 Too little too late? 214 Japan Inc. is alive and well 218 Back to basics: a variation on the 1955 theme 219 Notes 223 Select Bibliography 234 Index 236

9 Timeline At PM local time Tohoku, Honshu s northeast region, was hit by an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 On the evening of 11 March, the government declared a state of emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. TEPCO workers are unable to reconnect electricity to the cooling system. In the early evening of 12 March a hydrogen explosion occurred in reactor No. 3 and blew the roof off the containment vessel housing reactor No.1. On 15 March two more explosions rocked the plant and a fire broke out in No. 4 reactor. On 17 March, winds carrying mildly radioactive smoke and dust raised radioactivity 30 times above normal levels in Tokyo. On 18 March damage to No. 3 reactor was discovered. 11th of March th of March th of March th of March th of March th of March 2011 Earthquake hits Japan State of emergency at Fukushima Hydrogen explosions at reactor 3 Two more explosions at plant Radioactivity detected in Tokyo No. 3 reactor core damaged ix

10 x Timeline On 10 April a worker from No. 2 reactor was admitted to hospital after he complained of illness. On 12 April NISA raised the Fukushima crisis to a level 7, the same level as Chernobyl. On 14 April TEPCO announced that radiation levels had climbed in reactor No. 4 s spent fuel rods. On 15 April government announced that levels of Iodide-131 found in sea water near the plant had spiked from 1,100 times the previous day to 6,500 times the legal limit. On 30 April the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (HLW) reported that tiny amounts of Iodide-131 had been found in 7 samples of breast milk of women living in Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba TEPCO reports radiation in the seabed near Daiichi rises to 100 1,000 times above the normal levels 10th of April th of April th of April th of April th of April nd of May 2011 Worker from Fukushima in hospital NISA raise crisis level TEPCO announce radiation increase Harmful Iodide-131 levels climb Iodide-131 found in breast milk Radiation in seabed near Daiichi increases

11 Timeline xi On 3 May, TEPCO reported that radiation levels in the seabed near Daiichi had risen 100 1,000 times normal levels. On 5 May TEPCO workers entered No. 1 reactor for the first time since the hydrogen explosion on 12 March. On 9 May, NISA announced that TEPCO discovered that radiation levels in the facility housing No. 1 reactor had reached 700 msv per hour. On 10 May, seven TEPCO workers and two staff from NISA entered No.1 reactor to begin cold shutdown. TEPCO report cesium-131 above 18,000 times government standards detected in seawater near No. 3 reactor. Cracks and holes in No. 3 and 4 reactors a probability. 3rd of May th of May th of May th of May th of May 2011 Radiation in seabed rise Workers enter reactor Radiation levels in No.1 reactor discovered No. 1 reactor shutdown begins Cesium-131 found in seawater near No. 3 reactor

12 xii Timeline NISA reports meltdown of fuel rods in No.1 reactor. Holes and cracks in all reactors delay decontaminations and shutdown. NISA reports meltdowns in No. 2 and No. 3 reactors. No. 3 reactor fuel rods contain 6% MOX fuel. 40 tons of highly radioactive water from No. 3 reactor leaked into ocean. TEPCO reports that the cooling system had been damaged by the earthquake and not the tsunami. TEPCO announces that due to holes in the container vessels caused by the meltdowns, the plant will not be brought under control by the year end. 12th of May th of May th of May th of May th of May 2011 Reports of meltdown of fuel rods in No.1 reactor Reports of meltdowns in No. 2 and 3 reactors Water from No. 3 reactor leaked into ocean Earthquake cause of cooling system damage Power plant unlikely to be under control by end of the year

13 Timeline xiii Timeline courtesy of Lawrence Tait, The University of Edinburgh School of Engineering. Radiation levels outside No. 1 reactor registers 4,000 msv per hour, the highest reading since 12 March. Radiation level from Daiichi was 370,000 tbq, during week of 12 March suggesting meltdowns occurred much quicker than originally thought. The government announces radiation found in soil samples taken in March April 62km from Daiichi. TEPCO reports accumulation of 2,000 cubic metres of highly radioactive sludge by year end. TEPCO announces the start of the release of 100,000 metic tonnes of radioactive contaminated water into the ocean. 3rd of June th of June th of June th of June th of June 2011 Radiation outside No.1 reactor rises NISA reports meltdowns occurred much quicker than expected Radiation found in soil 62km from Daiichi TEPCO estimates amount of radioactive sludge by year end Contaminated water released into the ocean

14 Annual Average Exchange Rates Japanese Yen per United States Dollar [JPY/USD] 2000: : : 124: : : : : : : : : xiv

15 Acronyms and Abbreviations AIST ANRE BOJ BP CHUDEN CPI DBJ DPJ EC EPDC FAZ FBR FDI FEPC FILP FRI GDP GHLC HEPCO IAEA IAI IBJ IMF JAEA JAERI JAPCO JBIC National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology Agency of Natural Resources and Energy Bank of Japan Basic Pension Chubu Electric Power Co. Consumer Price Index Development Bank of Japan Democratic Party of Japan European Commission Electric Power Development Co. Foreign Access Zone Fast Breeder Reactor Foreign Direct Investment Federation of Electric Power Companies Fiscal Investment and Loan Program Fujitsu Research Institute Gross Domestic Product Government Housing Loan Co. Hokkaido Electric Power Co. International Atomic Energy Agency Independent Administrative Institution Industrial Bank of Japan International Monetary Fund Japan Atomic Energy Agency Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute Japan Atomic Power Co. Japan Bank of International Cooperation xv

16 xvi Acronyms and Abbreviations JDP JETRO JFTC JGB JH JHF JNC JNEPA JNES JNFL JNOC JOGMEC JP JPS JPSS Keidanren KEPCO KYUDEN LDP LTCB MAC MCI METI MIC MLIT MOC MOD MOX MEXT MHLW MM Japan Development Bank Japan External Trade Organization Japan Fair Trade Commission Japan Government Bonds Japan Highway Co. Japan Housing Finance Agency Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute Japan Newspaper Editors and Publishers Association Japan Nuclear Safety Organization Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Co. Ltd. Japan National Oil Co. Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Co. Japan Post Japan Pension Service Japan Postal Savings System Japan Business Association Kansai Electric Power Co. Kyushu Electric Power Co. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Long-Term Credit Bank Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation Ministry of Construction Ministry of Defense Mixed Oxide Fuel Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry of Munitions

17 Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii MOF MOFA MOX msv NISA NPL NSC NSK NTT NUMO OECD QE SCAP SDF SIA TEPCO TIRB TODEN TSE UDC UNCTAD URO USTR WTO YODEN Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mixed Oxide Fuel millisieverts Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency Non-performing loans Nuclear Safety Commission Nihon Shimbun Kyokai Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Nuclear High-Level Waste Management Organization Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Quantitative Easing Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Self Defence Force Social Insurance Agency Tokyo Electric Power Co. Temporary Industrial Rationalization Bureau Tohoku Electric Co. Tokyo Stock Exchange Urban Development Co. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Urban Renaissance Organization United States Trade Representative World Trade Organization Shikoku Electric Power Co.