Scenario Analysis of Mega Earthquake and Tsunami in Central Japan

Transcription

1 Scenario Analysis of Mega Earthquake and Tsunami in Central Japan IRDR International Conference, Beijing 1 Nov, 2011 Naoki Fujiwara CTI Engineering Co., Ltd. Japan ICHARM International Centre for Water Hazard Risk Management under the auspices of UNESCO 1

2 Forensic Investigation on Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) Meta & Longitudinal Analysis Characteristics of tsunami fatalities and losses Comparison with historical events Critical Cause Analysis Analysis of critical causes for human loss expansion caused by delayed evacuation Preparation of a question list for human loss vulnerability evaluation Scenario Analysis Estimation of damages and losses caused by tsunami of a similar magnitude to GEJET in central Japan. Identification of issues and proposal of measures to tsunami of an unexpected magnitude Proposals to FORIN Template and Questionnaire 2

3 Backgrounds and Objectives Backgrounds In Japan, one single force (hazard level) has been selected as the design level to be considered in disaster prevension plans and to design/implement structural and non-structural measures. On the other hand, estimation of damages in case of hazard level exceeding the design level has rarely been conducted. Objectives Evaluate and analyze the risks of unexpected events. Identify issues of disaster management and risk management in Japan Propose a new approach for unexpected disasters. Outline 1. Characteristics of GEJET 2. Current estimation of damage by large scale earthquake in central Japan region 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake 4. Findings 5. Proposal for Future Disaster Prevention 3

4 1. Characteristics of GEJET Death cause: More than 90% of people lost their lives du to tsunami Population in inundated area by tsunami: 540,000 Number of dead and missing: 20,000 (About 3.6% of total population in inundated area) Crushed by buildings, etc 4.4% Fire 1.1% Source: 2011 White paper on disaster management Tsunami 92.4% Unknown 2% Death causes in GEJET (Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima) Fukushima Miyagi Iwate Higashimatsushima(1,145) Matsushima(2) Rifu(50) Shiogama(21) Tagajou(189) Taihaku ku, Sendai(53) Wakabayashi ku, Sendai(332) Hirono(0) Kuji(4) Noda(38) Fudai(1) Tanohata(31) Iwaizumi(7) Tarou(180) Miyako(362) Yamada(823) Otsuchi(1,397) Kamaishi(1,091) Ofunato(452) Rikuzentakata(1,951) Kesennuma(1,405) Minamisanriku(901) Ishinomaki(3,959) Onagawa(963) Shichigahama(71) Miyagino ku, Sendai(293) Natori(984) Iwanuma(184) Watari(270) Yamamoto(691) Shinchi(110) Soma(459) Minamisoma(663) Namie(184) Futaba(35) Okuma(81) Tomioka(25) Naraha(13) Hirono(3) Iwaki(347) Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011) Dead or Missing 1~9 10~99 100~ ~ ~ 4

5 1. Characteristics of GEJET Tsunami height exceeded twice the height of coastal levees % of people died or missing in inundated area 0~1 % 1~3 % 3~5 % 5~10 % 10 % < (Number of fatalities & missing) / (population in inundated area) Fukushima Miyagi Iwate Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011) Hirono(0.0) Kuji(0.1) Noda(1.2) Fudai(0.1) Tanohata(2.0) Iwaizumi(0.6) Tarou(13.5) Miyako(2.4) Yamada(7.2) Otsuchi(11.7) Kamaishi(8.3) Ofunato(2.4) Rikuzentakata(11.7) Kesennuma(3.5) Minamisanriku(6.3) Ishinomaki(3.5) Onagawa(12.0) Higashimatsushima(3.4) Matsushima(0.0) Shiogama(0.1) Shichigahama(0.8) Sendai(2.4) Natori(8.1) Iwanuma(2.3) Watari(1.9) Yamamoto(7.7) Shinchi(2.4) Soma(4.4) Minamisoma(5.0) Namie(5.5) Futaba(2.7) Okuma(7.2) Tomioka(1.8) Naraha(0.7) Hirono(0.2) Iwaki(1.1) design levee height current levee height tsunami trace height (m)

6 1. Characteristics of GEJET Enormous damage was caused by GEJET. Much of Japan s population, properties and industries are concentrate in central Japan region. What happens if the earthquake of GEJET scale occurs in central Japan region? Scenario Analysis in central Japan region 1) Estimation of affected population using elevation data 2) Estimation of tsunami inundation area using computational simulation model 3) Estimation of economic damage by tsunami Central Japan region GEJET 6

7 2. Current estimation of damage by large scale earthquake in central Japan region Scale of the earthquake (Tokai/Tonankai/Nankai) is M8.7. Number of fatalities by the earthquake is 25,000. Of these, number of fatalities by the tsunami is 9,100. Current estimation of tsunami damage is much smaller than GEJET. Distribution of seismic intensity (Tokai/tonankai/Nankai earthquake, Expert Committee of Cabinet Office ) 7

8 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake in Central Japan 70 percent of the Japan s land is mountainous. Population and properties are concentrated in the coastal area. Main roads and railways connecting main cities are located in the coastal area. They have possibilities to be damaged by tsunami. Traffic of Tomei Expressway: 64,000 cars / day Users of Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen: 370,000 people / day Numerous large-scale manufacturing centers exist along the coast.(ex.toyota) Hasmanako Bay area (Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen) Tokyo Yui area (Tomei Expressway) Nagoya Osaka 8

9 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Based on the experience of GEJET, the assumed tsunami height was set to be 10 m (5 m in the inner-bay area). It was also assumed that number of fatalities equals to 3.6 % of the population in the inundated area. Population of the inundated area is about 13,000,000. It is about 10% of the entire population in Japan. Estimated number of fatalities is about 450, times of the current damage assumption. Population of inundation area: 5M, Death: 0.2M (Aichi, Shizuoka, Gifu and Mie Pref.) 9

10 3. Expected impact of GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Tsunami inundation area was analyzed using a tsunami simulation model. The magnitude of hazard level was set so that the tsunami level becomes about twice the height of the current expected height. (about 10m). Modeling conditions Computational area Tsunami propagation Land inundation calculation Initial water level =deformation From wave source to coastal area Computational grid size is gradually reduced as it gets closer to the coast Linear long wave theory (grid areas of 1350m, 450m, 150m) Non-linear long wave theory (50m grid area) Two-dimensional unsteady flow analysis Deformation is set so that the tsunami height in the coastal area of Tokai/Tonankai/Nankai earthquake deformation becomes twice the current expected height. Tide level Mean spring level of high tide 10

11 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Result of tsunami simulation Hamanako Bay area: 20 minutes after the earthquake m Yui area 12 minutes after the earthquake m Lake Hamanak o Hamamatsu Iwata Yui area Fuji Numazu Shizuoka Estimated height of tsunami 11

12 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Result of tsunami run up simulation (Yui area) 4 m inundation depth in Tomei Expressway which is the arterial highway connecting east and west Japan Route 1 Shizuoka Tomoe River 東海道新幹線 Shimizu Ward Office Yui area Nippon Light Metal AJINOMOTO PHARMACEUTICALS Fuji River Oji Paper Fuji Fuji City Hall Nippon Paper Industries Asahi kasei Nippon Light Metal Tomei Expressway Nippon Paper Industries Tokaido Line MEIDENSHA In Shizuoka City with 230,000 populations, the tsunami arrives about 10 minutes after the earthquake Numazu Numazu City Hall Depth m 12

13 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Result of tsunami run up simulation (Hamaoka nuclear power plant) Tomei-Expressway SUZUKI Sagara factory Makinohara City Hall Depth m Kikugawa Kiku River Makinohara Kakegawa Sekisuihouse Shizuoka factory Route 150 GYABAN Shizuoka factory BRIDGESTONE ELASTECH Daito Chemix MARUEI CONCRETE INDUSTRY Yaizu Suisankagaku Industry MARUEI CONCRETE INDUSTRY Omaezaki City Hall Omaezaki About 3 m inundation depth at Hamaoka nuclear power plant Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station JASDF Omaezaki Sub Base 13

14 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Result of tsunami run up simulation (Hamanako Bay area) Tomei Expressway 4 m inundation depth at Hamamatsu station of the Tokaido Super Express Tenryu River Shinkansen Route 1 Depth m Tokaido Line Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen Lake Hamanako Hamamatsu City Hall YAMAHA Hamamatsu JT Hamamatsu factory Station JR Tokaihamamatsu factory SUZUKI MOTOR Hamamatsu Iwata Kawai Musical Instruments Mfg Iwata City Hall JT Fukuroi City Hall Fukuroi SUZUKI MOTOR 5 m inundation depth of Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen Many disaster prevention facilities and large scale factories are inundated 14

15 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Iwata Hamamatsu Hamanako Bay area Lake Hamanako m 15

16 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Estimated damage and losses Losses caused by transportation interruption at Yui area Economic loss incurred by interruption of the highway at Yui area is billion yen / day *1 Total economic loss is 150 billion yen, assuming a recovery period of four months *2 Losses caused by operation interruption of Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen Economic losses of canceled trips are about 50 billion yen / day, if the Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen operation is stopped *3 About 2 trillion yen in economic losses, assuming a recovery period of one year *4 This only accounts for reduction of consumption activities by travelers. The losses will be enormous if considering their consequential economic impacts. *1 Basic study on impact assessment by blocking road traffic *2 Took four months to recover highway, GEJET *3 Functional evaluation study of alternative of Tokaido Super Express Shinkansen by Hokuriku Shinkansen *4 Affected coastal railways still has not recovered after 7 months after GEJET 16

17 3. Expected damage by GEJET scale tsunami and earthquake Estimated impacts (qualitative estimation) Inundation damages of major factories and offices Direct damage of office supplies, office equipment and machinery building plant Suspension and stagnant of sales and businesses Impact on the entire supply chain including non-affected areas Impacts of inundation of the nuclear power plant Direct damage by collapsed buildings Evacuation of residents if there is the possibility of radiation leakage (200,000 residents within a 20km radius of the plant) Influence of power outage (supplying about 15% of the Central Region of Japan) 17

18 4. Findings Magnitude of damages is well over the current estimation level Casualties (dead or missing) Economic damage Paralyzed urban functions (=> loss of living environment) Paralyzed production functions (=> loss of working environment) Potential impacts currently not assumed in damage estimates became evident Influence of long-term unavailability of arterial transportation lines Spreading of impacts to non-affected areas (economic losses) Delays in emergency activities because of damages to disaster prevention facilities Inundation of nuclear power plants which were considered to be located in a safe location 18

19 5. Proposal for Future Disaster Prevention Countermeasures against unexpected large-scale disasters Robust structures in order to prevent damage Measures to minimize damage (secure shelter, antiflooding, etc) Enhancement of preparedness and training to promote correct understanding and appropriate actions for disasters (prevention of human suffering) Measures to break the chain of damage expansion (concatenation) Ensure redundancy to suppress the spreading of damages (life-lines, supply chains) Planning assistance from non-affected areas for early recovery and reconstruction (base of operations and coordination) 19

20 Thank you for your attention. 20