By a Silken Thread regional banking integration & pathways to financial development in Japan s Great Recession

Transcription

1 By a Silken Thread regional banking integration & pathways to financial development in Japan s Great Recession Mathias Hoffmann Toshihiro Okubo University of Zurich, URPP FinReg, CESifo & CAMA Keio University Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

2 Background What is the role of banking integration in a financial crisis? Theoretically, integration... increases an economy s exposure to foreign bank liquidity shocks... insulates from idiosyncratic shocks to domestic banking system How do historical factors determine the trade-off between integration and segmentation of banking markets? We look at the regional spread of Japan s Great Recession after 1990, exploiting prefecture-level variation in banking integration and local bank dependence Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

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4 Preview of results Cross-regional variation in financial (banking) integration was a key determinant of the transmission of the crisis post-1990 more integrated prefectures more exposed to the property price downturn in the major cities But: FI was good for areas with many small manufacturing firms (SME): internal capital markets mattered: nationwide banks withdrew less strongly from areas with many small manufacturing firms We suggest persistent banking relationships as a driver of de facto segementation in regional banking markets. The Silken thread: de facto segmentation in Japan s banking market can be traced back in history: comparative advantage in silk in the late 19th-century led to a regionally-tiered banking system with close SME-bank relationships. Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

5 The silken thread Figure: City and Regional Bank Lending Shares (pre-1990 ( ) averages) vs. number of silk filatures per head in 1895 Tokyo Yamanashi Osaka Kyoto lending share of City Banks pre 1990 Nara Fukuoka Kanagawa Saitama Miyagi Kagawa Aichi Nagasaki Ishikawa Chiba Tochigi Aomori Tokushima Toyama Hiroshima Fukui Hyogo Yamaguchi Ibaraki Kyoto Okayama Akita Gunma Shizuoka Mie Ehime Kumamoto Hokkaido Niigata Tottori Wakayama Oita Shiga Miyazaki Saga Fukushima Kagoshima Iwate Yamagata Kochi Shimane Gifu Nagano Yamanashi lending share of Shinkins pre 1990 Hokkaido Kumamoto Nara Osaka Tokyo Nagasaki Aomori Hiroshima Fukuoka Shizuoka Hyogo Wakayama Kanagawa Saitama Oita Fukui Fukushima Kagoshima Niigata Okayama Shiga Chiba Yamaguchi Miyazaki Kagawa Kochi Ehime Tokushima Tochigi Iwate Miyagi Shimane Mie Akita Gunma Ibaraki Ishikawa Aichi Toyama Saga Tottori Yamagata Gifu Nagano log # silk filatures per capita in log # silk filatures per capita in 1895 The silken thread: Regional financial integration in 1990 low in areas in with a high share of silk-exporting (reeling) firms in 1895 Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

6 Policy implications Relevant in the context of the Eurozone today Was there too little or too much financial integration in Europe during the banking & sovereign debt crisis? optimal degree of banking integration of an economy depends on the structure of loan demand by local firms: regions with many SMEs that depend on the local provision of bank loans have more to gain from banking integration. local finance may be a poor substitute for finance from integrated banks in a crisis. A cautionary lesson: differences in financial integration can persist in a de iure integrated banking market. For a VERY long time... Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

7 Our story (I): intra-national barriers to capital flows Remark Japan is a centralized country, no major regional differences in banking or financial regulation etc. Broadly similar levels of financial development (e.g. in terms of credit over GDP, bank branches p.c and area) But: a regionally strongly tiered banking system city banks & 1st tier regional banks operate nationwide or at least in severl prefecture 2nd tier regional banks (Sogo (mutual)), industrial cooperative banks (Shinkin) regional lenders to SMEs, regional deposit base, limited or no access to Interbank market Exploit variation in (pre-1990) share of nationwide banks in prefecture-level lending as measure of financial (banking) integration Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

8 Figure: Geographical distribution of Pre-1990 SME importance and financial integration and post-1990 p.c. GDP growth rates Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

9 Theoretical considerations Figure: A stylized interregional banking model Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

10 Empirical framework. Main specification: gdpt k = AggShock t [ α 0 FI k SME k + α 1 FI k + α 2 SME k +... ] +µ k + τ t + ɛ k t (1) where AggShock t = Post1991 t and our theory predicts α 0 > 0. Note: this does not imply that FI is unambigously good. E.g., if integrated banks are hit harder than local banks overall, then α 1 < 0 and the marginal effect α 1 + α 0 SME k can be negative. Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

11 A first look: high/low FI sample split Table: Small business importance, financial integration and the Great Recession Small manufacturing firms and the effect of the Great Recession on prefecture-level output growth rates Panel A: Based on value added SME-measure All Sample split by importance of... prefectures Regional Banks City Banks Regional Banks: Shinkins only high low high low high low Post1991t SMEVA k (-2.04) (-4.04) (-0.19) (-0.25) (-3.82) (-3.03) (-0.70) R Panel B: Based on employment based SME-measure All prefs. high low high low high low Post1991t SMEEMP k (-1.96) (-3.73) (0.01) (-0.02) (-3.78) (-4.06) (-0.64) R The table shows the coefficient α in panel regressions of the form gdp k t = α Post1991t SME k + µ k + τt + ɛ k t + constant where Post1991t is a dummy indicating the period from 1991, SME k is small-business importance andµ k and τt are prefecture-fixed and time effects respectively. Sample period is Cooperative banks include Shinkin banks and industrial credit cooperatives. OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture. Example Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

12 Figure: Cumulative Growth Differential between high and low SME group in two-way sample split (High/Low City Bank Share and High/Low SME share by value added ) Relative cumulative output loss of credit-dependent prefectures worse with low financial integration (red, dashed line). Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

13 Baseline specification: interaction term regs Table: Baseline results interaction terms and robustness I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X FI = FI = FI = FI = Interactions of Post1990t High Regional High City Regional City Regional City Regional High City with... (dummy) (dummy) (share) (share) (dummy) (share) (share) (dummy)...sme k FI k (-2.15) (1.93) (-3.24) (3.78) (-2.15) (1.75) (-2.14) (2.53) (2.24) (1.73)...FI k (1.93) (-1.97) (3.87) (-5.03) (-0.49) (-0.65) (0.21) (-1.96) (-1.66) (-1.35)...SMEVA k (-1.12) (-3.84) (2.72) (-4.06) (-3.64) (-3.51) (-3.80) (-3.97) (-3.97) (-3.56) Controls: X k :...CoreArea (-3.25) (-3.30) (-4.00) (-2.63) (-3.25) (-2.46) (-3.37) (-3.05) (-3.33) (-2.75) R Prefectures Tokio dropped All Tokio dropped All Tokio dropped potential outliers dropped Remarks SME, FI demeaned SME dummy The Table shows results from the regression gdpt k = Post1990t [ ] α0smeva k FI k + α1fi k + α2smeva k + α 3Xt k + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period after 1990 ( ), SMEVAis k small-business importance based on value added, FI k is the measure of financial integration (regional or city bank share in total lending in prefecture k), as indicated in the column heading. µ k and τt are prefecture-fixed and time effects respectively. The vector X k captures prefecture characteristics. In the regressions it is interacted with our crisis dummy Post1990t and contains CoreArea k, a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture. In the regressions in column X, we identify a prefecture as a potential outlier if SME or FI are more than 1.64 standard deviations away from the cross-prefectural mean of the respective variable. This leads us to exclude the following six prefectures: Saitama, Tokio, Gifu, Shiga, Osaka, Nagasaki. Robustness Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

14 Geographical profile Figure: Geographical profile of the interaction between bank dependence and financial integration Hokkaido Aomori Iwate Miyagi Akita Yamagata Fukushima Ibaraki Tochigi Gunma Saitama Chiba Tokyo Kanagawa Niigata Toyama Ishikawa Fukui Yamanashi Nagano Gifu Shizuoka Aichi Mie Shiga Kyoto Osaka Hyogo Nara Wakayama Tottori Shimane Okayama Hiroshima Yamaguchi Tokushima Kagawa Ehime Kochi Fukuoka Saga Nagasaki Kumamoto Oita Miyazaki Kagoshima Prefecture Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

15 Our story (I): financial integration and the spread of the Great Recession Post-1990 growth lower in prefectures with many small (credit-dependent) firms (α2 < 0) high levels of financial integration (α1 < 0). But: SME and FI interact negative effect of FI (or SME) is mitigated in high SME-regions (α 0 > 0) Interpretation in line with model FI increase vulnerability to aggregate shocks but can also provide insulation agains local shocks. SMEs depend on local access to finance and therefore are particularly exposed to local bank shocks. Conditioning on the size of the shock to city and local banks, FI attenuates the effect in high SME prefectures. Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

16 Transmission channel Theoretical model assumes that markets for SME lending are segmented: SMEs borrowing from local banks face higher interest rates In integrated markets, SMEs could switch to city banks and total lending (and GDP) growth should be independent of pre-crisis city bank lending share contrary to our finding We argue that it is the strong relationships between local banks and local SMEs that segment the market. Regional banks have long-standing informational advantage w.r.t. their customer base of small firms. But during a crisis these relationships may be a fetter for SME s: Nationwide banks may be unwilling to lend to unknown, risky customers Regional banks with their locally concentrated portfolio lend to SME s only at less favorable terms. Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

17 Transmission channel: evidence I City banks keep on lending in areas where they have strong ties to SME Table: Prefecture-level lending after 1990 Lending growth Interactions of Post1990t with pre-1991 variables total City Banks Local Banks total City Banks Local Banks total City Banks Local Banks I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX FI=CityBankShare FI = CityBankShare FI =CityBankShare Tokyo&Osaka excluded Tokyo&Osaka excluded AggShockt= log(landpricet)...smeemp k FI l (2.67) (2.61) (-1.27) (0.61) (1.90) (-0.78) (-1.44) (-1.76) (0.57) FI k (-3.91) (-4.60) (-2.21) (-2.39) (-2.56) (-1.44) (3.70) (1.98) (1.08) SME k (-2.65) (-2.47) (1.00) (-1.16) (-1.36) (1.04) (4.34) (2.78) (3.65)...CoreArea (-4.06) (-3.06) (1.04) (-3.76) (-3.20) (1.21) (8.18) (6.80) (3.69) R Memorandum item: Fraction of SME with City Bank as main bank2002 = (tstat=6.49) CityBankShare k R2 = 0.49 The Table shows results from the regression log(xt k ) = Post1990t [ ] α0smeemp k FI k + α1fi k + α2smeemp k + α 3Xt k + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where Xt k stands in turn for total lending (columns I, IV and VII), city bank lending (columns II, V and VIII) and city bank lending relative to regional bank lending (columns III, VI and IX) in prefecture k. Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period after 1990 (i.e ), SME k is our measure of bank dependence (small-business importance), FI k is a measure of financial integration, the pre-1991 ( ) average city bank share in total lending in prefecture k. In the third panel (columns VII IX), the aggreagte shock is given by the land price decline in the core prefectures from?.µ k and τt are prefecture-fixed and time effects respectively. CoreArea is a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is The memorandum item at the bottom of the table reports the regression of the fraction of small firms reporting a city bank as main bank on our pre-1990 measure of financial integration, the average lending share of city banks in a prefecture in Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

18 Transmission channel: evidence II SME-local bank relationships extremely persistent in the silk regions Figure: Silken thread and silken fetters SME share w/o change in bank relationship Tokushima Nagasaki Nara Kochi Shiga Aomori Ehime Fukui Mie Yamaguchi Tochigi Miyazaki Fukushima Iwate Hiroshima Kagawa Saitama Shizuoka Kumamoto Miyagi Okayama Kagoshima Chiba Hyogo Tokyo Osaka Fukuoka Hokkaido Niigata Oita Kanagawa Wakayama Shimane Akita Ishikawa Yamagata Tottori Toyama Gunma Saga Ibaraki Aichi log # silk filatures per capita in 1895 Kyoto Nagano Gifu Yamanashi Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

19 Transmission channel: evidence III Table: Transmission mechanism: ancillary implications of model A: Hold-up B: Exposure to local shocks Tier 2 banks Tier 1 banks All High FI Low FI All High FI Low FI High FI Low FI I II III IV V VI VII VIII Interactions of Post1990t with pre-1991 variables Dependent variable is average loan interest rate FI = CityBankShare Interactions of LocalLandPrice k t with pre-1991 variables Dependent variable is GDPgrowth FI = CityBankShare...SMEVA k Real estate exposure SMEVA k Tier 2 Real estate exposure (2.13) (1.00) (2.02) (-0.59) (0.59) (-2.09) (-2.22) (4.65) Real estate exposure Tier 2 Real estate exposure (0.86) (1.64) (0.42) (0.16) (-1.03) (1.54) (0.89) (-3.70) SMEVA k SMEVA k (-1.52) (-0.80) (-0.67) (1.46) (1.32) (0.97) (-0.64) (2.21)...CoreArea (-3.57) (-2.8) (-1.21) (-1.35) Add l controls LocalLandPricet k (1.44) (0.93) SME k Citylandpricet (1.03) (1.47) R number of prefectures The Table shows regressions illustrating the ancillary implications of the stylized banking model discussed in the main text: hold-up (panel A) and differential exposure to local shocks (panel B). Panel A presents regressions of the form Rt k (Tier) = Post1990t [ ] α0smeva k REE(Tier) k + α1ree(tier) k + α2smeva k + α 3Xt k + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where Tier = 1, 2 stands for either tier 1 (supraregional) or tier 2 (local) banks and R(Tier) k t is the average interest rate charged by banks of the respective tier in prefecture k and REE(Tier) k denotes these banks pre-1990 real estate exposure. Regressions are reported for all (colums I, IV), and for high (low) financial integration prefectures (columns II and III for tier 1 and columns V and VI for tier 2). As before, Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period after 1990 (i.e ), SME k is our measure of small-business importance (based on value added), FI k is our measure of financial integration, the pre-1990 lending share of city banks in prefecture k. CoreArea is a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is Panel B shows the regressions of the form gdpt k = LocalLandpricet k [ α0smeva k REE(2) k + α1ree(2) k + α2smeva k + α3] + α4 CityLandpricet SME k + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where LocalLandpricet k is the log change in land prices in prefecture k and CityLandpricet is the log change in land prices in the core areas and REE(2) k is the pre-1990 real estate exposure of local (Tier = 2) banks in prefecture k. The variables SME and FI are as before. The sample period is In both panels, µ k and τt are prefecture-fixed and time effects respectively. The memorandum item at the bottom of the table reports the regression of the fraction of small firms reporting a city bank as main bank on our pre-1990 measure of financial integration, the average lending share of city banks in a prefecture in Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

20 Our story (part II): silken threads and silken fetters What are the deep sources of prefecture-level differences in financial integration? Cross-prefecture differences in the historical pathways to financial development lead to huge differences in financial integration in We argue that the specific financing needs of the silk reeling industry led to the emergence of a cooperative, regionallly tiered model of banking. [...] We use # of reeling plants (filatures) p.c. at prefecture-level in 1895 as an instrument for the market share of regional banks in the 1980s Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

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22 [...] Silk and finance Silk filatures (i.e. reeling plants) were heavily dependent on working capital: cocoons had to be purchased in the spring, reeled silk could only be shipped to the Yokohama market in the late summer. purchase of cocoons amounted to 80 percent of the operating costs of a silk filature. Silk reelers were located in remote mountain areas and could not usually borrow from (mainly Yokohama-based) city banks. However, export market for silk was concentrated in Yokohama. Local banks in Japan institutional response to this dilemma: local silk reelers associations and Yokohama silk broker had first-hand knowledge of market conditions and of the quality produced by individual silk reelers. This gave them a huge comparative advantage (relative to city banks) in lending to these local SMEs. Shinkin (cooperatives) and Sougo (mutuals) were founded by Silk merchants and by reelers cooperatives. As the silk industry was superseded by other export industries, these local banks preserved their comparative advantage in lending to SMEs. Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

23 Figure: City and Regional Bank Lending Shares (pre-1990 ( ) averages) vs. number of silk filatures per head in 1895 Tokyo Yamanashi Osaka Kyoto lending share of City Banks pre 1990 Nara Fukuoka Kanagawa Saitama Miyagi Kagawa Aichi Nagasaki Ishikawa Chiba Tochigi Aomori Tokushima Toyama Hiroshima Fukui Hyogo Yamaguchi Ibaraki Kyoto Okayama Akita Gunma Shizuoka Mie Ehime Kumamoto Hokkaido Niigata Tottori Wakayama Oita Shiga Miyazaki Saga Fukushima Kagoshima Iwate Yamagata Kochi Shimane Gifu Nagano Yamanashi lending share of Shinkins pre 1990 Hokkaido Kumamoto Nara Osaka Tokyo Nagasaki Aomori Hiroshima Fukuoka Shizuoka Hyogo Wakayama Kanagawa Saitama Oita Fukui Fukushima Kagoshima Niigata Okayama Shiga Chiba Yamaguchi Miyazaki Kagawa Kochi Ehime Tokushima Tochigi Iwate Miyagi Shimane Mie Akita Gunma Ibaraki Ishikawa Aichi Toyama Saga Tottori Yamagata Gifu Nagano log # silk filatures per capita in log # silk filatures per capita in 1895 The silken thread: Regional financial integration in 1990 low in areas in with a high share of silk-exporting (reeling) firms in 1895 Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

24 Panel IV regressions Table: Panel IV Regressions with filatures / head in 1895 as instrument City Regional City Regional City Regional Interactions terms Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks of Post1991t with... All Shinkin All Shinkin All Shinkin SMEVA k FI k (2.15) (-2.18) (-2.08) (1.69) (-1.50) (-1.42) (1.84) (-1.81) FI k (-2.21) (2.00) (1.96) (-1.58) (1.28) (1.28) (-1.86) (1.64) (1.65) SMEVA k (-2.44) (1.80) (1.61) (-1.81) (1.39) (1.20) (-1.92) (1.73) (1.63) Controls no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes relative GDP (0.33) (-0.60) (-2.02) Core (-1.72) (-2.38) (-2.51) (-0.78) (-1.58) (-1.85) Distance to Yokohama (0.93) (1.03) (2.71) R st-Stage F-stat for SME k FI k Post1991t Kleibergen-Paap rank test The Table shows results from the IV regression gdp k t = Post1990t p-value [ α1sme k FI k + α2 FI ] k + α3sme k + α 4 Xt + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where where Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period starting in 1991, SME k is small manufacturing firm importance (value-added or employment based) and Xt is a vector of controls. SME k FI k and FI k are the first-stage fitted values of SME k FI k and FI k using SME k Silk k and Silk k as instruments, where Silk k is the log number of silk filatures per head of population in a prefecture in CoreArea is a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is , t-statistics appear in parentheses. The bottom of the Table reports information on instrument relevance: the F-statistics associated with the first stage regression of the interaction term on all instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) (KP) rank statistics and its associated p-value for the hypothesis of under-identification. The KP-statistics appears in boldface (italics) if it exceeds the Stock-Yogo(2005) weak-instrument critical values of 7.03 (4.58) (see Table 5.2. in Stock and Yogo (2005), for the case of n = 2 endogenous variables and K = 2 excluded instruments), This suggests that the instruments can be taken to be sufficiently strong to ensure a maximal size of no more than 10% (15%) for a nominal 5% size Wald Test on the IV-estimates. Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

25 Summary and outlook Paper studies the regional dimension of Japan s Great Recession: local bank dependence and interregional banking integration interacted in the regional spread of the crisis after The silken thread: regional differences in financial integration are extremely persistent: Comparative advantage in trade (silk) affected the particular pathway to financial development and de facto integration at the onset of the crisis of Silken thread is reflected in extremely persistent banking relationships which may have made it hard for SME to switch to nationwide banks in the trough of the crisis. Relevance for today: state-level segmentation of the US banking market till the 1980s, Regulatory and regional segmentation of banking in Europe today. Even a banking union will not make this segmentation go away! Hoffmann & Okubo () By a Silken Thread Stanford APARC, 1 Dec / 25

26 Part I Appendix

27 Bonus slides Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (27)

28 Data set Panel data set for 46 prefectures (ex Okinawa).... GDP p.c. Lending by type of bank by prefecture, Data on small manufacturing firms by prefecture, employment and value added from the Manufacturing Census. Here focus on SMEs with <300 employees. (This is also the cut-off value for Shinkin membership). Data on number of silk filatures, population etc. in 1895 from various sources Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (28)

29 Our story (I): related findings Low financial integration prohibits cross-prefectural pooling of funds (e.g. through nationwide banks internal capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg; JoF forthcoming)). The pattern of nationwide banks withdrawing from areas where they have low market share is reminiscent of Japanese banks behavior overseas after 1990 ((e.g. Peek and Rosengreen (1997)). Consistent with Evergreening and the Zombie hypothesis (Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008), Peek and Rosengreen (2005)): big banks could have withdrawn from their non-core areas to prop up Zombie firms in their core areas of activity. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (29)

30 An example prefecture City lending share SME share post-1990 average growth 7 Fukushima Yamanashi Nara Fukuoka Back Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (30)

31 Proper interaction term specification Table: Interaction terms and additional controls I II III IV V VI VII VIII Interactions of Post1990t Regional City Regional City Regional City Regional City with......sme k RegionalBankShare k (-2.72) (-2.89) (-3.24)...SME k CityBankShare k (3.12) (3.20) (3.78)...RegionalBankShare k (0.82) (3.04) (3.23) (3.87)...CityBankShare k (-2.38) (-4.56) (-4.15) (-5.03)...SMEVA k (-3.87) (-2.85) (2.19) (-3.55) (2.35) (-3.66) (2.72) (-4.06) Controls: X k :...Lending/GDP (-1.31) (0.60)...CoreArea (-4.00) (-2.63) R The Table shows results from the regression gdpt k = Post1990t [ ] α0smeva k FI k + α1fi k + α2smeva k + α 3Xt k +µ k +τt +ɛ k t where Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period after 1990 ( ), SMEVAis k small-business importance based on value added, FI k is the measure of financial integration (regional and city bank share in total lending in prefecture k), as indicated in the column heading. µ k and τt are prefecture-fixed and time effects respectively. The vector X k captures various prefecture characteristics. In the regressions it is interacted with our crisis dummy Post1990t and contains prefecture-level Lending k /GDP k ( average) and CoreArea k, a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (31)

32 Robustness Back to Baseline spec Table: Robustness interaction terms and additional controls I II III IV V VI Interactions of Post1990t Regional City Regional City Regional City with......sme k FI k (-3.04) (3.33) (-1.23) (2.51) (-2.06) (2.78)...FI k (3.59) (-3.72) (3.61) (0.22) (1.50) (-0.61)...SMEVA k (2.88) (-3.17) (0.80) (-0.79) (1.48) (-0.59) ( ) 2 FI k (-1.96) (-1.61) (-0.30) (-0.44)... ( 2 SMEVA) k (-0.38) (-1.33) (-0.28) (-1.49) Controls: X k :...CoreArea (-0.57) (-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.79)...Share Lowland Areas (0.62) (1.01) (0.62) (0.94)...Share of steep areas (0.44) (0.61) (0.58) (0.45)...Min. distance to core (1.04) (0.91) (1.05) (0.76)...Sectoral Specialization (1.99) (1.59) (2.28) (1.44) Z k t : Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (32) 2

33 Is it financial integration or local financial development? Table: Alternative measures of financial development and financial integration City Bank Lending FI = Total Lending Interactions of Post1990t with pre1990 variables: FD = #Branches Population Area FD = Lending GDP I II III IV FI = CityBankLending GDP City Bank Lending FI = Total Lending Regional Bank Lending FD = GDP...SMEVA k (-3.82) (-3.73) (-0.81) (-4.42)...FI k (-3.89) (-2.28) (-6.76) (-5.55)...SME k FI k (3.00) (1.73) (4.07) (4.52) Regional BankLending FD = GDP FD k (0.54) (-2.09) (1.79) 0.12 SME k FD k (-0.43) (2.61) (-1.31) (0.42)...CoreArea (-2.14) (-3.43) (-4.01) R The Table shows results from the regression gdp k t = Post1991t [ α1sme k VA + α2fi k + α3sme k VA FI k + α5fd k + α6sme k VA FD k + α 7CoreArea k] +µ k +τt+ɛ k t where where Post1991t is a dummy indicating the period from 1991, SME k VAis small-business importance based on value added, and FI k and FD k are the measures of financial integration and financial development respectively as indicated in the column heading. µ k and τt are prefecture-fixed and time effects respectively. CoreArea is a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by prefecture. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (33)

34 A first set of results Great Recession is deeper and more prolonged in areas with many SME s provided financial integration is low. The effect is big: a prefecture with a 20 percent SME share would have 0.4 percent lower annual growth than the country as a whole if its banking sector is weakly integrated with the rest of the country. Financial frictions seem stronger in areas with low (pre-1990) levels of banking integration (low share of universal / high share of regional banks) Lending channel & low financial integration? City banks withdraw lending from areas to which they traditionally have weak ties Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (34)

35 Endogeneity issues Lending shares of regional / city banks might be endogenous as might be small firm importance. But: using pre-1990 data would counter most endogeneity issues. However, using pre-1990 data does not entirely preclude expectational feedbacks: If investment and growth prospects were poor in some areas, the big city banks might have started to withdraw from such regions even before the 1990s. This would lead to a high market share of regional banks. need some instrument for regional bank lending share. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (35)

36 Silk and finance Silk filatures (i.e. reeling plants) were heavily dependent on working capital: cocoons had to be purchased in the spring, reeled silk could only be shipped to the Yokohama market in the late summer. purchase of cocoons amounted to 80 percent of the operating costs of a silk filature. Silk reelers were located in remote mountain areas and could not usually borrow from (mainly Yokohama-based) city banks. However, export market for silk was concentrated in Yokohama. Instead of banks, Yokohama silk export merchants would issue a letter of credit to small reelers who would discount it with his local silk cooperative. These local coperatives had first-hand insihjt into the quality of the output of their members, making them ideal intermediaries of credit. Local cooperatives often were at the origin of regional banks. These banks were purely regional and stayed it for more than a century. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (36)

37 Silk export finance Yokohama merchant would advance credit to a reeler in the form of a documentary bill issued by a Yokohama bank. Reeler would obtain trade credit in the form of an advance on the bill from a local bank. These banks were often cooperative or mutual banks, founded by silk industry associations (Shinkins) or by Yokohama silk merchants. After reeling and shipping of the silk to Yokohama, Yokohama bank would issue a bill of acceptance to the reeler who would use this to discount the documentary bill with his local bank. Regional bank settled payment of the bill with the issuing bank in Yokohama. This system of credit is very much like the system of modern trade finance: ( advising ) bank of the exporter borrows and lends locally. International transactions occur only with the big Yokohama banks, which in turn have links to regional banks around the country. Regional tiering of Japan s banking system goes back to the institutions of silk export finance. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (37)

38 Silk finance: the role of mechanization Huge relative price increase of mechanically vs. hand-reeled silk in the 1890s. Mechanization central in the quality improvement. But increased dependence on working capital it reinforced the separation of cocoon-growing and reeling. Early stages of mechanization: cooperatively organized and centralized second (mechanical) reeling process of (possibly manually reeled) silk. Centralized re-reeling allowed the implemenation of quality control system and the development of internationallly recognized brands. Quality was central in the monitoring of the credit relationship between silk producers and the Yokohama silk merchants: regional banks would provide credit ( advances ) against a documentary bill issued by Yokohama silk merchants. Ultimately, only those producers could continue to export who mechanized early. These also had access to the trade credit and export finance by the Yokohama silk merchants. The others ended up producing mainly for the domestic market. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (38)

39 Mechanized silk filatures in 1895 Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (39)

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41 Silk and modern-day lending shares Table: Modern day (pre-1990) lending and silk filatures Financial Integration Financial Development pre-1990 share in prefecture-level lending by City Banks Regional Banks bank branches population area Lending/GDP All (Shinkin+Sogo) Shinkins only (pre-1990) (pre-1990) filatures / population (log #) (-3.14) (-4.70) (4.22) (4.11) (4.96) (4.53) (0.87) (0.87) (-1.78) (-1.95) (-0.29) Relative GDP (pre-90) (3.32) (-0.18) (-0.24) (1.68) (4.21) (2.88) Core Dummy (2.46) (-0.02) (0.71) (-0.57) (1.88) (1.02) Distance to Yokohama (log) (-1.33) (0.66) (-0.93) (0.74) (1.25) (1.75) City Bank Lending (2.28) R The table shows regressions of modern-day (pre-1990) average prefectural lending shares by bank type on our silk instrument the number of filatures per head of population in a prefecture in The control variables are relative (pre-199) per capita GDP, the (log) distance to Yokohama and a dummy for the core areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (41)

42 The role of mechanization Table: Impact of mechanization on pre-1990 financial integration measures and founding year of first industrial cooperative bank in a prefecture. (log) share in prefecture-level lending by Founding year of first City Banks Regional Banks Shinkin in prefecture All (Shinkin+Sogo) Shinkins only (log) hand filatures (log #) (-1.38) (0.94) (-0.08) mechanized filatures (log #) (-3.35) (2.85) (4.22) (-1.89) output: hand reeled (log tons) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-0.62) (0.66) output: machine reeled (log tons) (-3.76) (2.65) (2.30) (-0.76) R Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes The table shows results from regression of pre-1991 average prefectural lending shares by bank type (left panel) and of founding year of the first industrial cooperative bank (Shinkin) in a prefecture (right panel) on our alternative silk industry instruments: the number of hand-powered and machine filatures at prefecture-level, and the output of hand-powered and machine filatures respectively. Controls are: relative GDP pre-1990, a core area dummy and log distance to Yokohama. Core areas are as described in previous tables. The founding year of the first Shinkin is normalized by 1900 (the year of the enactment of the first industrial cooperative act). We take the logarithm of this normalized measure as our dependent variable. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (42)

43 Panel IV regressions Table: Panel IV Regressions with filatures / head in 1895 as instrument City Regional City Regional City Regional Interactions terms Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks of Post1991t with... All Shinkin All Shinkin All Shinkin SMEVA k FI k (2.15) (-2.18) (-2.08) (1.69) (-1.50) (-1.42) (1.84) (-1.81) FI k (-2.21) (2.00) (1.96) (-1.58) (1.28) (1.28) (-1.86) (1.64) (1.65) SMEVA k (-2.44) (1.80) (1.61) (-1.81) (1.39) (1.20) (-1.92) (1.73) (1.63) Controls no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes relative GDP (0.33) (-0.60) (-2.02) Core (-1.72) (-2.38) (-2.51) (-0.78) (-1.58) (-1.85) Distance to Yokohama (0.93) (1.03) (2.71) R st-Stage F-stat for SME k FI k Post1991t Kleibergen-Paap rank test The Table shows results from the IV regression gdp k t = Post1990t p-value [ α1sme k FI k + α2 FI ] k + α3sme k + α 4 Xt + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where where Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period starting in 1991, SME k is small manufacturing firm importance (value-added or employment based) and Xt is a vector of controls. SME k FI k and FI k are the first-stage fitted values of SME k FI k and FI k using SME k Silk k and Silk k as instruments, where Silk k is the log number of silk filatures per head of population in a prefecture in CoreArea is a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is , t-statistics appear in parentheses. The bottom of the Table reports information on instrument relevance: the F-statistics associated with the first stage regression of the interaction term on all instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) (KP) rank statistics and its associated p-value for the hypothesis of under-identification. The KP-statistics appears in boldface (italics) if it exceeds the Stock-Yogo(2005) weak-instrument critical values of 7.03 (4.58) (see Table 5.2. in Stock and Yogo (2005), for the case of n = 2 endogenous variables and K = 2 excluded instruments), This suggests that the instruments can be taken to be sufficiently strong to ensure a maximal size of no more than 10% (15%) for a nominal 5% size Wald Test on the IV-estimates. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (43)

44 Robustness: X-sectional OLS and IV regressions Table: Cross-sectional Regressions SMEVA (output based) SMEEMP (employment based) City Banks Regional Banks City Banks Regional Banks All Shinkin All Shinkin OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV SME k FI k (1.33) (1.71) (-2.12) (-1.52) (-1.68) (-1.55) (1.12) (1.70) (-2.22) (-1.78) (-1.94) (-1.87) FI k (-2.36) (-2.01) (2.15) (1.50) (1.59) (1.52) (-1.97) (-2.01) (2.18) (1.92) (1.79) (1.90) SME k (-1.79) (-1.94) (1.48) (1.25) (0.79) (1.25) (-1.51) (-1.88) (1.72) (1.43) (1.16) (1.45) Controls Core (-2.73) (-1.06) (-4.58) (-1.99) (-4.79) (-3.73) (-2.89) (-1.32) (-4.87) (-3.36) (-5.03) (-4.42) R First-Stage F-stat for SME k FI k Kleibergen-Paap rank test p-value The Table shows results from the cross-sectional OLS and IV regressions gdppost1990 k = α1sme k FI k + α2fi k + α3sme k + α 4 CoreDummy k + const + ɛ k where gdppost1990 k is average post-1990 ( ) GDPgrowth in prefecture k, SME k is small manufacturing firm importance (value-added or employment based) and FI k our measure of regional banking integration (city bank share, regional bank share, Shinkin share). CoreArea is a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). In the IV-regressions, SME k FI k and FI k are instrumented using SME k Silk k and Silk k, where Silk k is the log number of silk filatures per head of population in a prefecture in The F-statistics below the IV-regression pertain the the test for the significance of instruments in the first-stage regression for SME k FI k. t-statistics in parentheses. The last two rows of the table reports F-statistics associated with the first stage regression of the interaction term on all instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistics and the associated p-value for the hypothesis of under-identification. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (44)

45 Is industry structure endogenous? RZ-approach has been criticized on the grounds that financially constrained regions have a comparative advantage in less finance-dependent industries. Hence, they should specialize in these industries. If this is the case, then we would probably tend to overestimate the aggregate effects of low financial integration. What we need is an exogenous measure of growth expectations / industry structure that is not affected by low financial integration. We turn to the literature on agglomeration externalities (Glaeser et al 1992) to proxy for the importance of knowledge externalities in manufacturing: distance to the main silk regions (as opposed to share of silk industry in local economy). Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (45)

46 Table: Disentangling financial integration & industrial structure Industrial structure Financial Integration Small manufacturing Manufacturing Share pre-1990 lending share by firm share City Banks Regional Banks in GDP in EMP in GDP in EMP All Shinkin distance to most highly mechanized silk regions (log) (-6.28) (-5.41) (-5.05) (-5.26) (-1.35) (-1.46) (-1.07) filatures / population (log #) (2.04) (2.87) (0.31) (1.87) (-4.41) (3.09) (3.60) Core Dummy (-1.68) (-1.61) (-2.03) (-2.32) (-1.96) (1.01) (-0.70) Distance to Yokohama (log) (-2.30) (-2.77) (-1.39) (-1.77) (2.53) (-0.46) (0.37) R The table shows regressions of modern-day (pre-1990) industrial structure (left) and average prefectural lending shares by bank type (right) on our two alternative silk-related variables: the (log) distance to the three prefectures with the most highly mechanized silk industry in 1895 (Kyoto, Nagano, Gifu and Shizuoka) and the (log) number of filatures per head in 1895 and a set of controls. The control variables are the (log) distance to Yokohama (the main silk market), a dummy for the Core areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (46)

47 Table: Panel IV Regressions (both credit dependence and financial integration endogenous) CD = SMEVA CD = SMEEMP CD =Manufacturing Share in GDP City Regional City Regional City Regional Interactions terms Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks of Post1990t with... All Shinkin All Shinkin All Shinkin CD FI k (1.79) (-1.94) (-1.88) (1.98) (-2.06) (-2.03) (1.54) (-1.67) (-1.57) FI k (-1.93) (1.90) (1.86) (-2.08) (2.00) (2.00) (-1.64) (1.65) (1.56) CD (-1.93) (1.83) (1.72) (-2.06) (2.00) (1.92) (-1.68) (1.55) (1.46) Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes R st-Stage F-stat for CD k FI k Kleibergen-Paap rank test p-value [ The Table shows results from the IV regression gdpt k = Post1990t α1cd k FI k + α2 FI ] k + α3sme k + α 4 X k + µ k + τt + ɛ k t where where Post1990t is a dummy indicating the period after 1990, CD k is our measure of credit dependence as indicated in the respective column headings and X k is a vector of controls. CDk FI k and FI k are the first-stage fitted values of CD k FI k and FI k using the log numbers of filatures per head (filatures k ), the (log) distance to one of the three most mechanized silk regions and the interaction between these two as instruments. Control variates are (log) distance to Yokohama and a dummy for the core economic areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures). The sample period is t-statistics in parentheses. The bottom of the Table reports the F-statistics associated with the first stage regression of the interaction term on all instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistics and the associated p-value for the hypothesis of under-identification. Values of the KP-statistics in boldface or italics indicate that the hypothesis of weak identification is rejected. We reject if the asymptotic bias of the TSLS estimator is less than 5% (KP in bold) or 10% (KP in italics) based on the critical values tabulated in Table 5.1. of Stock and Yogo (2005). Since values for our case n = 3 endogenous variables and K = 3 instruments are not directly tabulated, we use the more conservative values for n = 3 and K = 5 which are 9.53 and 6.61 respectively. Stanford APARC, 1 Dec 2015 By a Silken Thread Appendix (47)