Sea of Åland FSA and FSA database

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1 BaSSy The Baltic Sea Safety Sea of Åland FSA and FSA database Bonn

2 BaSSy - Work package 3 WP 3: Harmonized FSA-process for different areas of the Baltic Sea The Sea of Åland FSA-case FSA database FSA Bornholm Gat with additional risk control options 2

3 Sea of Åland Vessel traffic Accidents Winds and ice Environment Expert workshops Next steps 3

4 UNDERSTEN 8 MÄRKET AISsurveillance 9 UTBÅDAN SIMPNÄSS- KLUBB Passenger ships Tankers Tugs Other vessel types LÅGSKÄR SÖDERARM 2 3 SVENSKA BJÖRN 1 BOGSKÄR 4

Tanker; 479 Tanker; 408 Passenger ship; 90 AISsurveillance Tanker; 337 Passenger ship; 934 Passenger ship; 85 Passenger ships Tankers Tugs Other ship; 1986 Other vessel types SÖDERARM 2

5 Tanker; 479 Tanker; 408 Passenger ship; 90 AISsurveillance Tanker; 337 Passenger ship; 934 Passenger ship; 85 Passenger ships Tankers Tugs Other ship; 1986 Other vessel types SÖDERARM 2 LÅGSKÄR 3 Estimation of annual number and distribution of vessel traffic based on the observed crossings of the reference lines Other ship; 2593 Other ship; 6295 SVENSKA BJÖRN BJÖRN1 BOGSKÄR BOGSKÄR 5

6 AISsurveillance Traffic Relative speed 6

7 Sea of Åland Sea of Åland vessel traffic bound for Finnish ports and the amount of cargo carried vessels 0 cargo passenger vessel passenger/car ferry cargo ferry container ship bulk carrier other dry cargo vessel tanker other vessel passenger vessel passenger/car ferry cargo ferry container ship bulk carrier other dry cargo vessel tanker other vessel In 2005 there were ship movements in the area by vessels bound to or departed from Finnish ports. Statistics from Swedish ports are not yet comprehensive 7

8 Sea of Åland ACCIDENTS 8

9 9

Collisions to the aids to navigation 1978-2006 Tröskeln Västra, 2.10.1986 ms Svanö Damage: helicopter platform broke off Cause: navigational error Tröskeln Västra, 22.11.

10 Collisions to the aids to navigation Tröskeln Västra, ms Svanö Damage: helicopter platform broke off Cause: navigational error Tröskeln Västra, ms Skagenbank Damage: partly cut of Tröskeln Västra, Aros News Damage: collision with the remains Tröskeln Västra, Janra Damage: partly cut off Tröskeln Östra, mv Ibm Sina Damage: partly cut of Cause: strong current, navigational error Tröskeln Östra, ms Finn-Board Damage: partly cut of Cause: navigational error Tröskeln Östra, Autumn 2006 Two collisions Damage to Tröskeln Östra 10

11 Sea of Åland ENVIRONMENT 11

12 Fish farms Environmental sensitivity for oil pollution during summer time 12

13 Sea of Åland EXPERT WORKSHOPS 13

Expert workshops Two expert workshops at VTT Session 1: Sea of Åland Hazard Identification Thursday 16th February 2006 Session 2: Sea of Åland Risk Control Options Friday 17th February 2006

14 Expert workshops Two expert workshops at VTT Session 1: Sea of Åland Hazard Identification Thursday 16th February 2006 Session 2: Sea of Åland Risk Control Options Friday 17th February 2006 Structured brainstorming using computerized group support system Simultaneous and anonymous inputs Voting procedures Fast processing of results Valuable experience for improving the methodology 14

15 Session 1: Sea of Åland Hazard Identification Participants: SMA: Per Ekberg, Markus Lundkvist SSPA: Peter Grundevik FMA: Kari Kosonen, Paavo Wihuri, Olli Holm Fin coast guard: Antti Siltala, Gunnar Silander SYKE: Heli Haapasaari Finstaship: Atso Uusiaho Birka Cargo: Magnus Fröberg VTT: (Tapio Nyman), Sanna Sonninen, Tony Rosqvist, Markus Porthin MeetingSupport.dk: Bo Simoni 15

Session 1: Sea of Åland Hazard Identification ~ 50 direct causes for accidents identified Most important causes: Ships decide to take a shortcut outside the route to save time Leisure boats

16 Session 1: Sea of Åland Hazard Identification ~ 50 direct causes for accidents identified Most important causes: Ships decide to take a shortcut outside the route to save time Leisure boats disturbing the traffic pattern causing incident during summer time Icing with high seas Meeting and overtaking other ships in the narrow ice track may be dangerous Blackout Poor / confusing radar targets (especially on heavy seas) Time schedules force to take additional risks Traffic picture is not "predictable", because there is not TSS's in the area. Vessels don't know automatically, what the other vessel is going to do. Especially in the southern part of the area. 16

17 Session 2: Sea of Åland Risk Control Options Participants: FMA: Kari Kosonen, Bjarne Berndtson, Esa Sirkiä Fin coast guard: Antti Siltala, Gunnar Silander SYKE: Heli Haapasaari VTT: (Tapio Nyman), Sanna Sonninen, Tony Rosqvist, Markus Porthin MeetingSupport.dk: Bo Simoni Focus: External measures that can be enforced by national executive power 17

18 Risk control options Ships decide to take a shortcut outside the route to save time 1.1 SRS can follow that vessels navigate safely 1.2 TSS' in the areas where this is known to happen would force the ships to navigate safely Leisure boats disturbing the traffic pattern causing incident during summer time 2.1 SRS can follow the traffic and inform vessels and coast guard if there are disturbing leisure boats in the area. 2.2 Make new leisure boat fairways to move the boats away from merchant shipping routes Icing with high seas 3.1 Escort towing can help in stability problems. 3.2 Better use of weather service in area as an early warning system on icing Meeting and overtaking other ships in the narrow ice track may be dangerous 4.1 Information about other traffic is available via SRS. Blackout 5.1 Recommendation of notification about the situation to authorities (Finnish and Swedish) 5.2 State ship (emergency tug) in the area (CG) Effectiveness 18

19 Risk control options Poor / confusing radar targets (especially on heavy seas) 6.1 Study the big picture of radar targeting in area. If problems, adjust the aids to navigation (add, remove, change racons etc.) 6.2 SRS should help if the vessel is navigating dangerously, because of false radar targets. Time schedules force to take additional risks 7.1 ISM-code enforced 7.2 SRS should follow the traffic and give warning if there is too risky behaviour. Unpredictable traffic picture, because of no TSS's in the area. Esp. in the southern part of the area. 8.1 Traffic separation systems would probably eliminate many of the near-accident-situations 8.2 Reduce the number of areas where west-east traffic crosses with north-south traffic General Risk Control Options 9.1 The sea of Åland area should be a VTS-area 9.2 TSS + VTS would solve most of the problems (excluded pleasure crafts) 9.3 Enforcing TSS and VTS with air patrolling (like in English Channel) 9.5 Compulsory submitting of actual route info to authorities 9.6 Compulsory piloting on the Sea of Åland Effectiveness 19

20 Most promising risk control options Traffic separation scheme (TSS) Traffic predictability Repels leisure boats from TSS area Prevents vessels from taking dangerous short cuts Possible to reduce crossings (combining Söderarm Marhällan and Söderarm Nyhamn) (not supported by FMA & SMA) Traffic separation scheme and vessel traffic services (TSS + VTS) Monitoring/surveillance of TSS Give remarks to vessels that violate the TSS Vessel traffic services (VTS) and/or Ship Reporting System State ship (CG) in the area ready for emergency tugging in case of blackout Recommended blackout notification to authorities Enforcing TSS and VTS with air patrolling Compulsory submitting of actual route information to authorities Risk (R) magnitude R i = (P i x C i ) P i presents the probability or the frequency of an accident related to the failure l P i = P i(failure) x P i(unsuccessful management C i of the failure) presents the severeness of the accident consequences when the management of the failure has been unsuuccesful 20

21 Ongoing work on Sea of Åland FSA and FSA Case Bornholm Modelling of risk control options (RCOs') to assess their effectiveness (BaSSy toolbox) Defining of the implementation costs of the RCOs' for the costbenefit assessment Further analysis on affects of possible accidents to identify the consequences and costs of these accidents Recommendations to decision makers Development of harmonised FSA methodology as the work goes further 21

22 FSA database The FSA database has the following main functions: 1. Information for coastal states around the Baltic Sea in performing FSAs on their own sea areas 2. Platform for the results of performed FSAs For the first function, the database has to include: guidelines for performing FSA (IMO, harmonized FSA ) the tools for analyzing AIS data (including sample records of AIS data) the BaSSy-toolbox and its manual traffic, ice, wind speed and direction, rain, temperature, fog and height of the sea level statistics or links to relevant data sources data from environmental sensitivity of different areas in the Baltic Sea accident statistics statistics of the consequence costs of accidents. 22

23 FSA database For the second function the database has to include: reports from the performed FSAs complete set of source data used in the FSAs In addition to be presented as text and numerical values the contents of the database should be presented in GateHouse GAD environment. 23

Increasing Maritime Transport, Impacts on Maritime Safety

Increasing Maritime Transport, Impacts on Maritime Safety Int. Seminar on Baltic Maritime Safety Co operation St. Petersburg, Russia, 5. 6.June. 2007 Jorma Rytkönen Contents Maritime Safety Trends and