MV Vemaoil XXIII (IMO ) into the anchored vessel MV Duzgit Integrity (IMO )

Transcription

1 Report on the investigation of the collision of the MV Vemaoil XXIII (IMO ) into the anchored vessel MV Duzgit Integrity (IMO ) 21 st August 2016 This report is subject to The Gibraltar Shipping (Accident Reporting & Investigation) Regulations Government of Gibraltar Marine Accident Investigation Office Suite 771 Europort Gibraltar GX11 1AA Page 1 of 14

2 NOTE This report is not intended to be used for the purpose of litigation. It endeavours to identify and analyse the relevant safety issues pertaining to the accident, and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar accidents in the future. Page 2 of 14

3 CONTENTS Page Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms 4 Section 1 - Synopsis 5 Section 2 - Factual Information 6 Section 3 Narrative 7 Section 4 - Analysis 9 Section 5 Recommendation 10 Section 6 Appendices 11 Page 3 of 14

4 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BNWAS - Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System COLREGS International Convention for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea CALDOVREP - Pas de Calais/Dover Strait Report. ECDIS - Electronic Chart Display & Information System GMA - Gibraltar Maritime Administration GoG - Government of Gibraltar GPS - Global Positioning System GRT - Gross registered tonnage IMO - International Maritime Organisation ISM - International Safety Management (Code) Kts - knots (nautical miles per hour) kw - Kilowatts MRCC - Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Mt - metric tonnes OOW - Officer of the Watch PSC - Port State Control SOLAS - International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea UTC - Universal Co-ordinated Time VHF - Very High Frequency All times used in this report are LOCAL times (GMT+2) unless otherwise stated Page 4 of 14

5 Vemaoil XXIII ( IMO ) Collision with vessel Duzgit Integrity (IMO ) - 21/07/ Synopsis At 2350(L) on 21 st August 2016 a collision occurred in Gibraltar Commercial Anchorage in a position 0.3 miles west of the northern entrance to Gibraltar harbour ( Lat N ; W ). The vessel Duzgit Integrity (IMO ) was anchored in this position and receiving fuel oil bunkers from the local bunker barge Vemaoil XXV, which was moored on her port side. The vessel Vemaoil XXIII (IMO ) departed from a berth on the detached mole within the harbour (berth number 54) and exited the harbour via the north harbour entrance heading to a position in the northern anchorage of Gibraltar. The Vemaoil XXIII attempted to pass ahead and to the south of the anchored vessel Duzgit Integrity and experienced a northerly set due to the current. The Vemaoil XXIII failed to clear the anchored vessel and collided with the bow of Duzgit Integrity causing a 3.5 metre hole on her own starboard side of the vessel in way of No.2 and No.3 water ballast wing-tanks. The damage extended below the waterline. Damage to the Duzgit Integrity was minimal with a small crack found on the bulbous bow in way on the forepeak ballast tank. The Vemaoil XXV which was alongside Duzgit Integrity also received very minimal damage to its ships rails due to its movement alongside Duzgit Integrity following the collision. At the time of the collision the Vemaoil XXIII was carrying fuel oil cargo and the Duzgit Integrity was in ballast condition. Page 5 of 14

6 2.1 Factual Information Vemaoil XXIII Flag Malta IMO Type Oil Tanker Built 09/07/1993 GRT 4893 Engine 3089 kw 2.2 The vessel is employed as a bunker barge operating within British Gibraltar Territorial Waters. The vessel is categorised as a harbour craft with the on board Masters each holding Pilot Exemption certificates allowing them to manoeuvre within BGTW without employing the services of a local authorised pilot. Occasionally the vessel will make short international voyages to load cargo products for carriage to Gibraltar. The vessel s cargo was fuel oil and Gas Oil for supply to customer vessels (Bunkers). At the time of the incident the vessels bridge was manned by:- Master in command Chief Officer assisting Master 2 nd Officer acting as helmsman At 2350 hours 21/07/2016 the Vemaoil XXIII collided with the vessel Duzgit Integrity (IMO ) which was anchored in the Western Commercial Anchorage of Gibraltar. Page 6 of 14

7 2.3 A collision occurred in a position Lat N; W in the Western Commercial anchorage of Gibraltar on 21 st August 2016 at 2350 local time. 2.4 The Vemaoil XXIII manoeuvred back into Gibraltar Port with the assistance of a local tug. The bunker barge Vemaoil XXV was ordered to cast off from alongside the Duzgit Integrity and proceed to the north anchorage under its own power with the Master, a PEC holder, manoeuvring the vessel. The Duzgit Integrity was manoeuvred to a berth inside Gibraltar port with a pilot and local tugs in order to assess any damage and conduct preliminary investigations. 3.Narrative At 2050 local time the Duzgit Integrity arrived at Gibraltar pilot station and embarked a pilot who anchored the vessel within the Gibraltar anchorage in a position off the western arm (Lat N; W) with 6 shackles in the water using the starboard anchor. At 2130 the local bunker barge Vemaoil XXV securely moored alongside the vessels port side in order to transfer fuel oil to the Duzgit Integrity. At 2300 the transfer of fuel oil bunkers commenced from the barge Vemaoil XXV. The local bunker barge Vemaoil XXIII operates as a harbour craft within BGTW. The current Master has completed two contracts on this vessel. The first being in 2015 for 6 months and his current contract is for 5 months. The Master has held a PEC (Pilotage Exemption Certificate) for the port of Gibraltar since 10/03/2015 and therefore manoeuvers the vessel within BGTW without employing the services of a local pilot. The Masters current PEC is valid and last renewed 31/12/15. The Master s PEC will be due for renewal 31/12/16. It is not known how many trips/manoeuvres he has carried out this year. At 2200 Vemaoil XXIII berthed at 54 berth on the detached mole within the harbour. The vessel berthed on fenders that were intended for use for a ship to ship operation the following day. The Vemaoil XXIII was unaware of this fact at that time. At 2306 the VTS instructed Vemaoil XXIII that she would be required to move so that the local tug Elliot could collect the fenders on her berth (berth 54) for an STS operation. At 2326 The VTS instructed Vemaoil XXIII that she must move from the berth to the northern anchorage to allow the tug Elliot to collect the fenders on berth 54. At 2342 the Vemaoil XXIII advised Gibraltar VTS that she was underway and departing berth 54. (16 minutes after being requested by VTS with no further communication between). Page 7 of 14

8 The Vemaoil XXIII did not call VTS immediately prior to casting off from the berth, as is normal procedure. At this time there were various other movements within the harbour:- Local Tug Elliot was proceeding to collect the fenders on berth 54. The pilot boat Europa was stopped in the middle of the harbour and a cargo vessel, Norwind had cast off berth 22 five minutes previously and was manoeuvring within the harbour with the intention of exiting the north harbour entrance. VTS requested Vemaoil XXIII to remain in their current position due to other vessel movements. The vessel, Vemaoil XXIII, informed VTS that he was already underway and so permission was granted for him to proceed ahead of the other vessels. VTS made the Master aware of all other movements at that time. The bridge manning on Vemaoil XXIII was Master (in command), Chief Officer (assisting Master and acting as lookout) and second Officer (as helmsman). The Master is a current PEC holder. Hand steering was employed throughout and the bow-thruster was switched on and available. The current at this time was setting in a northerly direction across the harbour entrance and also in the same direction in the northern part of the commercial anchorage. The vessel Duzgit Integrity was lay on a southerly heading to its starboard anchor due to the north going current. Vemaoil XXIII passed through the centre of the north harbour entrance at 2344 on a heading of 348 degrees and a speed of 2.1 knots. Once clear of the entrance at 2347 the vessel altered her course to 295 degrees and increased speed to 3.1 knots. The Master states that he became aware, for the first time, of the strength of the current on departing the north harbour entrance (2344). At 2349 the vessel had increased speed to 4.1 knots on a heading of 291 degrees. At 2350, immediately prior to the collision the vessel had further increased he speed to 5.1 knots on a heading of 282 degrees. According to the ECDIS track the set due to the current was pushing the vessel to the north and towards the anchored vessel Duzgit Integrity. This would be expected. The course over ground varies as the vessel alters course but was approximately 25 degrees different to the actual ships heading due to the effect of the current. At 2350 the Vemaoil XXIII collides with the bow of the Duzgit Integrity. The collision is such that the bow of the anchored vessel contacts with the starboard side of Vemaoil XXIII in way of its ballast tanks No2 and 3 causing a 3.5 metres hole in the external steel shell plating of Vemaoil XXIII. The course of the Vemaoil XXIII showed no significant alteration once the vessel was clear of the north harbour entrance, despite the bridge team being aware of a strong northerly current. (See annex 1 and 2 for vessels ECDIS course and speed) Page 8 of 14

9 At 2351 Vemaoil XXIII reports the collision to VTS and subsequently requests a tug for berthing within the port. At 0050 The Vemaoil XXIII was safely berthed on berth 3 east within the harbour. The Duzgit Integrity suffered a small crack to its bulbous bow in way of its forepeak tank. At the time of the collision the local bunker barge, Vemaoil XXV, was secured on the port side of the vessel Duzgit Integrity. The Vemaoil XXV broke its headline mooring ropes and caused very minor damage to ship side railings on both the Duzgit Integrity and the Vemaoil XXV. The Vemaoil XXV was requested to stop bunker operations and cast off from the Duzgit Integrity. This was complied with and the Vemaoil XXV proceeded to the North Anchorage. At 0206 Duzgit integrity was instructed to make ready its engines and shortly afterwards was manoeuvred by a local pilot and tugs to the inner harbour, where it safely berthed on berth 2 East. There were no injuries reported and no pollution as a result of the collision. 4 Analysis 1) The Vemaoil XXIII had been requested to shift from its current berth by the VTS. It was 16 minutes after the last request at 2326 when the vessel moved (at 2342) Despite this length of time, the vessel failed to request permission prior to casting off its ropes and so was unaware of any potential traffic situations. A more correct and fuller assessment of the manoeuvre would have been possible as a part of the intended passage planning if the vessel had made a formal request prior to actually casting off. It is normal procedure for any vessels casting off from berths or casting off from other vessels to make a request prior to such a manoeuvre. This requirement forms a part of the PEC training and requirements. The proximity of other traffic is not a direct contributing factor to the incident but can be considered as a further complication and distraction to the manoeuvre as carried out by the vessel. The failure to report prior to departing the berth also contravenes local PEC procedures. 2) Vemaoil XXIII manoeuvred clear of the North Harbour entrance but failed to readily appreciate and recognise the state and strength of the current. The Master states that he became aware of the current once he departed the entrance. However the course of the vessel was only altered by a total of 13 degrees, in small progressive amounts, after manoeuvring clear of the entrance, despite the bridge team becoming aware of the effect of the current. 3) The track of the vessel was not adequately monitored by the bridge team of Vemaoil XXIII in order to ensure that a correct allowance was applied to counteract the north going current. 4) The speed of Vemaoil XXIII was at a minimum until it approached very close to the Duzgit Integrity. The slower speed will have contributed to an increased amount of set due to the current. 5) A safer choice of passage plan, given the state of the current, would have been to pass astern and to the north of the anchored vessel Duzgit Integrity. 6) Local bunker barges are, on a daily basis, operating in close proximity of other vessels and berths. Page 9 of 14

10 An element of complacency can creep in to such operations meaning a closer passing distance than would normally be considered prudent and safe. Given the close anticipated passing distance of the Vemaoil XXIII to the anchored vessel an element of complacency is evident. A larger passing distance would have allowed more time to actually assess the true effects of the current and a choice of passage plan astern of the said vessel would have alleviated any risk posed by the north going current. 6 Safety Recommendations:- 1) The Company are to ensure that a system of passage planning is introduced on board vessels. The nature of the local trade allows for complacency and over-confidence. a. A system of briefly discussing the intended passage plan with the bridge team prior to it being executed should be introduced, with feedback from other members of the team being incorporated into any such plan. b. A system of recording that such a plan has been discussed should be introduced -this can quite simply be in the form of a log book entry. Company Response - Passage Plan form revised to meet required actions. Recommendation Accepted 2) The Company to ensure that closer monitoring of on board Bridge team management is introduced by means of regular audits and ship visits. Vessels bridge teams need to be more actively involved and to monitor the track and progress of the vessel and not entirely rely on the Master/PEC holder. Company Response - On board Navigational Audits will be conducted during regular visits henceforth, by Company s Superintendents and/or external qualified 3 rd party Consultants. Recommendation Accepted 3) The introduction of the new Pilot Regulations in March 2016 has greatly improved the process of examination and monitoring of the local P.E.C s. As a means of enhancing the future execution of the new regulations The Gibraltar Port Authority may wish to consider a review of the practicalities of how the regulations are enforced, in particular :- a. A system of monitoring the numbers of trips made by each PEC holder utilising the unique number assigned to each PEC holder. GPA Response - Each PEC Pilot has a unique number which is recorded with every movement on the VTS. Recommendation Accepted b. Design and distribute suitable Trip Log books to current and future PEC holders and applicants. GPA Response We have supplied the Pilot exemption masters with a copy of the tripping log issued by the GPA, where the Captain has to record each trip. Recommendation Accepted Page 10 of 14

11 c. Designate a set period of inspection and signing of each PEC holders Trip Log. GPA Response The PEC holder will be required to bring his records to the GPA once a term for countersigning by GPA staff. Recommendation Accepted 4) Gibraltar Port Authority to give consideration to identifying a safe berth to be utilised in an emergency situation whereby a vessel is taking on water and likely to founder. GPA Response - Discussions have taken place with some options under consideration. However this will be dependent on the dynamics of the incident at the time Recommendation Partially Accepted Alan Cubbin MAICO March 2017 Page 11 of 14

12 6 Appendices COG/ HDG/ C No. Date Time Source Type LAT LON SOG/kn deg T deg T de :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :38:40 ECD001 Ship N W N :34:24 ECD001 Ship N W N :21:14 ECD001 Ship N W N :19:52 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N Page 12 of 14

13 :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :24:56 ECD001 Ship N W N :13:02 ECD001 Ship N W N :11:38 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :54:08 ECD001 Ship N W N :48:20 ECD001 Ship N W N :43:36 ECD001 Ship N W N :41:45 ECD001 Ship N W N :28:06 ECD001 Ship N W N :13:29 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :01:28 ECD001 Ship N W N :00:08 ECD001 Ship N W N :58:21 ECD001 Ship N W N :54:40 ECD001 Ship N W N :51:58 ECD001 Ship N W N :51:30 ECD001 Ship N W N :50:46 ECD001 Ship N W N :49:34 ECD001 Ship N W N :47:44 ECD001 Ship N W N :44:19 ECD001 Ship N W N Page 13 of 14

14 :43:00 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :33:46 ECD001 Ship N W N :21:16 ECD001 Ship N W N :20:16 ECD001 Ship N W N :18:42 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :58:44 ECD001 Ship N W N :43:34 ECD001 Ship N W N :40:20 ECD001 Ship N W N :21:20 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N :22:44 ECD001 Ship N W N :05:07 ECD001 Auto N W N Page 14 of 14