APPENDIX A. Abbreviations and Acronyms

Transcription

1 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX A Abbreviations and Acronyms 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

2 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AAPS A320 AC AS AY ACAS Australian Airspace Policy Statement Airbus A320 aircraft Advisory Circular Alice Springs Albury Airborne Collision and Advisory System Act Airspace Act 2007 ADS-B A/G/A AGL AIP AIRPROX Airservices ALARP Ambidji AMSL ANSP APP APP (R) APP (P) ARM ASIR ASD ATS Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Air Ground Air Above Ground Level Aeronautical Information Publication Air Proximity Event Airservices Australia As Low as Reasonably Possible The Ambidji Group Pty Ltd Above Mean Sea Level Air Navigation Service Provider Approach Radar Approach Control Procedural Approach Control Airspace Risk Model Air Safety Incident Report Air Situation Display Air Traffic Service 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

3 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP ATC ATSB B717 B737 BOS BUR CH CAR CASA CASR CBA CEN CPA CTA CTAF CTR DAP DAH DHC-8 DME DTI E-170/190 ENR ERSA ESIR FAA FN Air Traffic Control Australian Transport Safety Bureau Boeing B717 aircraft Boeing B737 aircraft Breakdown of Separation Burnett Sector Coffs Harbour Civil Aviation Regulation Civil Aviation Safety Authority Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Cost Benefit Analysis Centre Closest Point of Approach Controlled Airspace Common Traffic Advisory Frequency Control Zone Departure and Approach Procedures Designated Airspace Handbook de Havilland Canada (Bombardier) DHC-8 aircraft Distance Measuring Equipment Directed Traffic Information Embraer E-170 or E-190 aircraft En-route En-Route Supplement Electronic Submitted Incident Report (Airservices) Federal Aviation Authority (United States) Frequency Number 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

4 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP FIR FIS FL FT FTC GA GNSS GP GPS GRN HB HM HUO ICAO IFR INS J41 LL LLZ LMA LOSA LT MK MATS Metro MIL MLJ Flight Information Region Flight Information Service Flight Level Feet Failure to Comply General Aviation Global Navigation Satellite System Glide Path (component of Instrument Landing System) Global Positioning System Grafton Sector Hobart Hamilton Island Huon Sector International Civil Aviation Organisation Instrument Flight Rules Inertial Reference System British Aerospace Jetstream J41 aircraft Lower Limit Localizer (component of Instrument Landing System) Alms Sector Loss of Separation Assurance Launceston Mackay Manual of Air Traffic Services Fairchild SW4 Metroliner aircraft Military Military Low Jet 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

5 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP MSA MSL NAS NM NOTAM OVN OAR PC PHA PSR PT PTO RI RK RIS RNAV RNP RPT RWY SU SDE SF340 SFC SMC SME SSR SWM Minimum Safe Altitude Mean Sea Level National Airspace System Nautical Mile Notice to Airmen Ovens Sector Office of Airspace Regulation Personal Computer Preliminary Hazard Identification Primary Surveillance Radar Passenger Transport Passenger Transport Operations Runway Incursion Rockhampton Radar Information Service Area Navigation Required Navigation Performance Regular Public Transport Runway Sunshine Coast Service Delivery Environment Saab 340 aircraft Surface Surface Movement Control Subject Matter Expert Secondary Surveillance Radar Swearingen/Fairchild Metroliner 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

6 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP SWY TAAATS TAAM TCAS TCU TMA TOR TSAD TW TWR UK UL USA UTS VCA VFR VHF VOR WAM YBAS YBHM YBMK YBSU YBRK YCFS YMAY YMHB Swampy Sector The Australian Advanced Air Traffic Service Total Airspace and Airport Modeller Traffic and Collision Advisory System Terminal Control Unit Terminal Area Terms of Reference Tower Situational Awareness Display Tamworth Tower United Kingdom Upper Limit United States of America Unit Tower Supervisor Violation of Controlled Airspace Visual Flight Rules Very High Frequency Very High Frequency Omni Range navigation aid Wide Area Multilateration Alice Springs Hamilton Island Mackay Sunshine Coast Rockhampton Coffs Harbour Albury Hobart 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

7 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP YMLT YSTW Launceston Tamworth 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

8 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX B Bibliography 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix B

9 APPENDIX B BIBLIOGRAPHY Airservices Australia (2010), Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) set. Airservices Australia (2010), Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS). Airservices Australia (2008), Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers. Australian Airspace Policy Statement Australian Airspace Policy Statement Australia and New Zealand Standards Association, AS/NZ Risk Management Standard. Civil Aviation Authority, New Zealand (2010), Aeronautical Information Publication. Civil Aviation Authority, New Zealand (2010), Civil Aviation Rules (CAR) Part 71. Civil Aviation Authority, United Kingdom, (2010), Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Commonwealth of Australia (2007), Airspace Act Commonwealth of Australia (2007, Airspace Regulations Commonwealth of Australia (2005), Air Services Act Commonwealth of Australia (2009), Australian Airspace Policy Statement Commonwealth of Australia (1947), Air Navigation Regulations Commonwealth of Australia (2007), Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Report AR Trends in immediately reportable matters involving Charter Operations Commonwealth of Australia, (1988), Civil Aviation Act Commonwealth of Australia, (1988), Civil Aviation Regulations Commonwealth of Australia, (1998), Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Commonwealth of Australia (2008), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR), Airspace Change Manual. Commonwealth of Australia (2010), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR), Airspace Planning Manual, Sect 9.3. Commonwealth of Australia (2010), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR), Airspace Planning Manual, Sect October 2010 v1.8 Appendix B

10 Commonwealth of Australia ( ), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Risk Management Framework. Commonwealth of Australia ((2009), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, National Airspace System Implementation Group (NASIG), Characteristics Version 5.0. Commonwealth of Australia (2001), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Notice for Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 0108AS, Regulatory Standards for Airspace. Commonwealth of Australia ((2008), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Notice for Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), 0809S, Passenger Transport Services and Cargo Operations Large Aeroplanes. Commonwealth of Australia ((2008), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Notice for Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), 0808S, Passenger Transport Services and International Cargo Operations Smaller Aeroplanes. Commonwealth of Australia (2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR Draft AC (0), Jan 2010, (Guidance for Controlled Airspace Design). Commonwealth of Australia ( ) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR aeronautical studies: Albury; Alice Springs Coffs Harbour; Hamilton Island; Hobart; Launceston; Mackay; Maroochydore (Sunshine Coast); Rockhampton; and Tamworth. Commonwealth of Australia (2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR, Report on the Safety Benefit of Surveillance in Airspace Draft, MJG Aviation. Commonwealth of Australia (2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR, Request for Tender, RFT 09/373. Commonwealth of Australia (2009), Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Aviation White Paper Commonwealth of Australia (2007) Department of Transport and Regional Services, Common Risk Management Framework Det Norske Veritas, (2001), Airspace Risk Quantitative Consultative Methods. German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU) AX /02. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Safety Management Manual, DOC 9859, Chapter 9, Safety Analysis and Safety Studies. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Annex 2, Rules of the Air. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix B

11 International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Annex 11, Air Traffic Services. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 4444 Air Traffic Management. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 9426, Air Traffic Services Planning Manual. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 9689, Manual on Airspace Planning. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 9683 Human Factors Manual. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc (Volume II, Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures). International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), website: Ministerial Direction Nav Canada, (2010), Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Nav Canada, (2010), Canadian Flight Supplement (CFS). Report providing advice to Government on Ministerial Direction Transport Canada, (2010), TP14371, Aeronautical Information Manual, (AIM). United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], (2010), Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], ATC Handbook JO T. United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], ATC Handbook JO United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], Terminal Procedures Publications. United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], Office of Aviation Policy and Plans - Establishment and discontinuance criteria for Air Traffic Control Towers. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix B

12 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX C Consultation 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix C

13 Consultations and workshops Meetings: APPENDIX C CONSULTATION 10 June 2010 CASA Canberra Opening meeting 10 June 2010 CASA Airways & Aerodromes Project briefing 10 June Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Canberra Project Briefing 10 June 2010 Dept of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Canberra - Project Briefing 15 June Airservices Australia, Canberra Project Briefing 15 June Regional Aviation Association of Australia, Canberra - Liaison meeting 16 June 2010 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Bankstown Liaison meeting 24 June 2010 Airservices Australia Melbourne Centre - Data gathering 5 July 2010 Airservices Australia Hobart Tower - Observations 8 July 2010 Airservices Australia Brisbane Centre briefing and data gathering 8 July 2010 Airservices Australia Sunshine Coast Tower - Observations 9 July 2010 Airservices Australia Mackay Tower - observations 18/19 July 2010 Airservices Australia Alice Springs Tower - observations 19 August 2010 CASA CBR Liaison, Correspondence and Questionnaires sent to: Chartair Cobham Aviation Pel-Air Aviation Qantas Airways Qantaslink (Eastern Australia Airlines & Sunstate Airlines) Regional Express Airlines Virgin Blue Airlines Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Australian Federation of Air Pilots Australian and International Pilots Association GAPAN Regional Aviation Association of Australia o All RAAA members Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia Albury ATC Alice Springs ATC Coffs Harbour ATC Launceston ATC 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix C

14 Rockhampton ATC Tamworth ATC Telephone Interviews Direct Air Pel-Air Aviation Qantaslink Virgin 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix C

15 Responses to Questionnaire by Industry Question RPT Operator 1 RPT Operator 2 RPT Operator 3 Passenger Transport Operator 1 Industry Body Representative General Aviation Industry Representative Do you only operate flights into Class D Airports during ATC hours of operation? No Yes No No No No If you operate outside ATC published hours of operation, how often do you do so? Daily n/a Less than 5% of movements Daily Frequently Frequently Does the existing level of service for accessibility to the airport(s) meet your needs? Does the existing level of service for aircraft separation at the airport(s) meet your needs? No prefer Tower available for arrivals and departures Conditional TSAD should be available for radar separation Yes Yes Yes Yes, but availability of ATC reduces pilot workload in the vicinity of the aerodrome. Provision of ATC also is important for current meteorological information. Yes No. The operator does not believe that see and avoid is an acceptable level of safety for fare paying passengers in terminal areas with the traffic level and mix of the 10 specified Class D airports. The use of Class E in the areas is problematic without Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix C

16 other mitigators. Do you think the size of the existing control zones is: Satisfactory the way it is? Too large? Too small? Satisfactory the way it is, but must have Class C steps to and from the aerodrome. Satisfactory the way it is. Too small for the descent profile of this operator s particular type of aircraft. Too small. Prefer to operate in a controlled environment; less experienced private pilots avoid such airspace. Satisfactory the way it is; it would be undesirable for anything smaller. Should be standard FAA dimensions Would the introduction of Class E airspace down to say, 700ft outside tower hours of operation be beneficial to your operations? Only if Class E remains a Transponder environment and is supported by radar or ADS-B surveillance. No, however it is considered that unsurveilled low level Class E airspace provides no benefit to IFR. Does not solve the problem of VFR aircraft. IFR aircraft are already known in G airspace. See and avoid is required. Not beneficial to collision avoidance. Yes, but with surveillance Class E airspace should not be used, particularly below 10,000ft, unless it has electronic surveillance. Not necessarily; VFR aircraft in Class E airspace should not be obliged to have Transponder or to make any radio calls; rather just listen out. Would the introduction of Class E airspace corridors benefit your operations? It would be better than Class G as long as it is a Transponder environment and there is radar or ADS-B surveillance. No many routes flown are subject to diversions due to weather during summer; corridors increase workload for aircrew and controllers. Unsurveilled Class E airspace provides no benefit to IFR. As above. Yes, but only with surveillance. Class E airspace should not be used, particularly below 10,000ft, unless it has electronic surveillance. Not necessarily; VFR aircraft in Class E airspace should not be obliged to have Transponder or to make any radio calls; rather just listen out. Do you have any other comments on any of the above? Class D should be a Transponder only environment. Class D Towers should be equipped with electronic surveillance and controllers trained to use it. VFR should be subject to control. All approaches and holding patterns should be contained within Class C or D airspace. Use of unsurveilled Class E airspace in Asia, Pacific and New Zealand for RPT jet operations. Our observation is the lack of education on airspace matters by pilots. There should be substantial training for all pilots on airspace boundaries and procedures. No Any changes should result in a standardised model for all Class D towers. keep it simple is the best policy 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix C

17 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX D Hamilton Island 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

18 APPENDIX D 1 Hamilton Island 1.1 Tower airspace Hamilton Island Tower airspace consists of the Control Zone (CTR) from the surface (SFC) to 1,000ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL), and four Class D steps out to 22 nautical miles (nm) and to the base of Class C airspace at 4,500ft AMSL to the north and south of the airport. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation. Figure D.1: Hamilton Island airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) coverage is available from the Brisbane ATC Centre above 2,500 feet (ft) within the CTR. The tower has a Tower Situational Awareness Display (TSAD), which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500 and provides radar service above that level. 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Hamilton Island were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

19 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled TOTAL 16,494 12,112 10,885 11,432 Passengers 468, , , ,320 Table D.1: Hamilton Island Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure D.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

20 Figure D.3: Hamilton Island scheduled movements by aircraft type Regular Public Transport (RPT) services are operated by Qantaslink DH8, Virgin Blue B737 and Jetstar A320. There are two scheduled RPT operations outside tower hours each day. There are frequent charter and private aeroplanes and helicopters flying to and from Hamilton Island, as well as transiting flights to Barrier Reef islands that operate outside published tower hours. Tower Hours of Operation Out of hours movements Arrivals (L) Daily QFA2503 Q-Link DH Out of hours movements Departures QFA2504 Q-Link DH Table D.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours 1.4 Tower Hours ATC is provided for jet RPT flights but not for all turbo-prop flights. Current hours of operation are from local, and can be varied by Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). The hours of operation are also dependent on the ferry to and from the mainland as there is no accommodation for air traffic controllers on the island. 1.5 ATC staffing There are currently two controllers who based at the unit, which is in accordance with the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan. There are also Air Traffic Control (ATC) staff rated at Hamilton Island Tower who are based in Mackay Tower to provide management, check functions and leave relief. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

21 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment result concerned preventing infringements of the undershoot area for Runway 14. The CASA Airspace Review of Hamilton Island (July 2009) reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as approximately fatalities per annum can be expected. In addition it is estimated that Hamilton Island has a likelihood of having one mid air collision approximately every 10,707 years with an estimate of 70 fatalities. The Ambidji Study team reviewed the Air Safety Incident Report (ASIR) and Electronic Submitted Incident Report (ESIR) documents submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR). Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. Hamilton Island ASIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination A IRPROX Figure D.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

22 Hamilton Island ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination AIRPROX Figure D.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June Airspace Discussion Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities Hamilton Island Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from the Surface (SFC) to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane ATC Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Aircraft of 3,900ft is currently contained within Hamilton Island Tower s airspace where procedural standards apply. The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as suitable down to 2,500ft. If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft and Centre managed the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established because arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 3,900ft by the Centre. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

23 Figure D.6: Hamilton Island CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Hamilton Island Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 7nm by Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) to the northwest and 9nm to the south east, (in order to encompass Lindeman Island traffic). The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 1,000ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 2,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Hamilton Island if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR This proposal mimics the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft. The National Airspace System (NAS) stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (Lower Limit [LL] 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath. At Hamilton Island there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,500ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

24 The implication of replacing the current Class C and D steps has been qualitatively assessed and is discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside Tower hours This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations. The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 2,500ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary There are currently no low level Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Hamilton Island is 8,500ft. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E En-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations. The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 2,500ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

25 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX E Mackay 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

26 APPENDIX E 1 Mackay Tower 1.1 Tower airspace Mackay tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,000ft AMSL and 3 Class D steps out to 22DME. The base of Class C airspace is at 4,500ft AMSL. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation. Figure E.1: Mackay airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as adequate to the surface at the aerodrome and south; however there is a radar shadow to the north of the aerodrome limiting low level coverage to around 1,000ft north of Mackay. The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and provides radar service above that level. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

27 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Mackay aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA 38,918 34,808 36,217 36,367 Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled ,638 11,300 11,758 TOTAL 51,514 49,438 52,281 52,398 Passengers 850, , , ,740 Table E.1: Mackay Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure E.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

28 Figure E.3: Mackay scheduled movements by aircraft type RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DHC-8, Virgin Blue B737 and Embraer E170/190, Jetstar A320 and Tiger Airways A320. There are at least 3 Passenger Transport flights scheduled prior to published Tower hours involving Embraer E170/190 and DHC-8 aircraft. Cargo flights, training flights, charter flights to the Barrier Reef and passenger and cargo flights to the Bowen Basin are known to operate outside the tower hours of operation. Tower Hours of Operation (L) Sunday to Friday Out of hours movements Arrivals Out of hours movements Departures DJ 600 VB E QF 2511 Q Link DHC QF 2304 Q Link DHC (L) Saturday DJ 600 VB E QF 2511 Q Link DHC QF 2304 Q Link DHC Table E.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours 1.4 Tower Hours ATC hours of operation are from local Sunday to Friday and until 2015 on Saturday. One jet and two turbo-prop RPT flights depart from Mackay at or just after 0630 and therefore prior to the tower opening. All scheduled RPT flights are planned to arrive prior to tower closure. 1.5 ATC staffing There are currently six controllers, including the Unit Tower Supervisor (UTS), at 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

29 Mackay and a seventh controller is expected to arrive in the near future, which will bring the complement in line with the Resource Management Plan. The UTS is also responsible for the supervisory functions at Hamilton Island tower. The current ATC roster contains some shifts of 10 hours, which is the maximum duty limitation time. ATC staff expect that by mid-2011 it will be possible to amend the roster to allow for 7 hour shifts that can be extended to 10 hours if required. 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment result concerned the control area steps to the southwest of Mackay not providing inclusive Control Area (CTA) protection for RPT aircraft flying inbound from Sydney; and also taxiway/runway limitations. The CASA Aeronautical Study of Mackay (June 2010) reported The qualitative risk assessment indicates that the risk curve is at a relative low level. Societal risk levels, which consider severity and frequency, are therefore considered at an acceptable level. The risk assessment, generative interviews, ESIRs and ASIRs including the quantitative modelling results suggest that all reasonable precautionary measures are in place to ensure that operations can continue at present levels. The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices Australia and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. Mackay ASIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination A IRPROX October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

30 Figure E.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010 Mackay ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace Runw ay Incursion TCAS RA Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination AIRPROX Airspace Discussion Figure E.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities Mackay Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from SFC to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane ATC Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The MSA of 4,700ft is currently outside Mackay Tower s airspace. The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as suitable down to the surface at the airport and south; however there is a radar shadow to the north of the aerodrome limiting low level coverage to around 1,000ft north of Mackay. If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft and Centre managed the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established because arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 4,700ft by the Centre. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

31 Figure E.6: Mackay CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Mackay Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 6 DME. The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 1,000ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 2,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Mackay if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft. NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath. At Mackay there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME. The implications of replacing the current Class C and D steps have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

32 1.7.4 Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside Tower hours This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations. The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the surface overhead the aerodrome and at higher altitudes to the north, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary There are currently no low level Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Mackay is 8,500ft AMSL. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E En-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations. The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the SFC overhead the aerodrome, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

33 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX F Rockhampton 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

34 APPENDIX F 1 Rockhampton Tower 1.1 Tower airspace Rockhampton Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,000ft and 3 Class D steps out to 22nm and to the base of Class C airspace at 4,500ft to the north and south of the airport. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation. Figure F.1: Rockhampton airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as adequate to the surface. The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and provides radar service above that level. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

35 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Rockhampton aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA 25,899 23,627 25,209 23,576 Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled 10,817 10,800 11,889 12,118 TOTAL 41,016 38,304 41,542 40,030 Passengers 708, , , ,212 Table F.1: Rockhampton Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure F.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

36 Figure F.3: Rockhampton scheduled movements by aircraft type RPT flights are operated by Qantaslink DH8, Tiger Airways A320 and Virgin Blue Embraer E170/190 type aircraft. There are no RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours. There are known cargo flights by Toll Aviation and Pel-Air that operate Monday to Saturday outside tower hours and ad-hoc charter flights by Peace Aviation, Australasian Jet and Central Airlines. The Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) has a base at Rockhampton and operates at any time, as required. 1.4 Tower Hours Tower hours of operation are from local Monday to Saturday and from 0730 on Sunday. All RPT flights are scheduled to arrive or depart with the published tower hours of operation. 1.5 ATC staffing Rockhampton has an establishment for five controllers, including the Unit Tower Supervisor, who is also required to undertake administrative duties. At present there are only four controllers at the Unit whereas the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan indicates a requirement of 5.5 controllers. 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as also (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment result concerned the requirement to ensure that the new Control Tower is located appropriately to ensure visibility of the runways taking into account any potential runway extensions. The Rockhampton Aeronautical Study (February 2010) commissioned by CASA, reported that The results of the fast time simulation of the airspace around Rockhampton lead to the conclusion that the Class D airspace with the relevant procedures applied will provide sufficient defences against the closest potential conflict pairs identified. The fast time simulation did not show any conflict pairs for operations 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

37 outside the tower hours. This can partially be explained by the fact that the only data available for this time period were the Airservices EUROCAT records. The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. Rockhampton ASIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runway Incurs ion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdown of Separation Breakdown of Coordination AIRPROX Figure F.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

38 Rockhampton ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination A IRPROX Figure F.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June Airspace Discussion Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities Rockhampton Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from SFC to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane ATC Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The MSA of 3,500ft is currently inside Rockhampton Tower s airspace. The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as suitable down to the surface at the aerodrome. If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft AMSL and Centre owned the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established because arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 3,500ft by the Centre. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

39 Figure F.6: Rockhampton CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Rockhampton Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 6 DME. The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 1,000ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 2,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Rockhampton if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft. NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL4500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath. At Rockhampton there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME. The implications of replacing the current Class C and D steps have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

40 1.7.4 Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside Tower hours This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations. The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the surface overhead the aerodrome, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary There are currently no low level Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Rockhampton is 8,500ft. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E en-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations. The implication of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues regarding this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the SFC overhead the aerodrome, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

41 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX G Sunshine Coast 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

42 APPENDIX G 1 Sunshine Coast Tower 1.1 Tower airspace Sunshine Coast Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,500ft and 3 Class D steps out to 20DME and to the base of Class C airspace at 4,500ft from north through east to the south of the airport. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation. Figure G.1: Sunshine Coast airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance The SSR coverage within the CTR was reported as adequate to approximately 1,000ft.The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and provides radar service above that level. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

43 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Sunshine Coast aerodrome (ex Maroochydore) were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA 78,961 79,863 72,064 72,578 Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled TOTAL 86,796 88,375 79,256 79,686 Passengers 868, , , ,205 Table G.1: Sunshine Coast Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure G.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

44 Figure G.3: Sunshine Coast scheduled movements by aircraft type RPT services are operated by Jetstar A320, Tiger Airways A320 and Virgin Blue B737 and Embraer E170/190 aircraft. There is one RPT operation scheduled after Tower hours involving an A320 aircraft. Ad hoc charter, private and training flights are known to operate outside tower hours. Tower Hours of Operation Out of hours movements Arrivals Out of hours movements Departures (L) Daily JQ791 Jetstar A daily Table G.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours 1.4 Tower Hours ATC hours of operation are from local. All RPT flights are scheduled to arrive or depart within the published tower hours of operation, with the exception of an evening A320 departing to Sydney. 1.5 ATC staffing There are six controllers at Sunshine Coast, including a Unit Tower Supervisor, who is also required to undertake administrative functions. There are 6.5 controllers required under the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

45 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment resulted in two recommendations that were common to all Class D locations, being: Recommendation 3 Airservices, CASA (OAR) and industry stakeholders jointly conduct a review of airspace in the vicinity of Class D locations with a focus on providing positive and appropriate control area protection for RPT operations; and Recommendation 4 Airservices, CASA (OAR) and industry stakeholders jointly review airspace configuration in the vicinity of the Class D locations outside the hours of the towers. This is to include, where possible, a standardised base of CTA above the Class D locations. Furthermore, the base of CTA should provide sufficient airspace for all operators (i.e.: IFR and Visual Flight Rules [VFR]) to fly above MSA without the need for an ATC clearance (e.g. Class G). The Maroochydore Airspace Review (April 2009), commissioned by CASA, reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as The current base case is the current Class D Tower with a residual risk of 5,410 years between mid air collision. This is more optimistic than the 1 in 3,866 years given in Table 18, but significantly more pessimistic than the figure of fatalities per 100 years quoted in the Airservices 2008 Class D towers study. The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

46 Sunshine Coast ASIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordiination A IRPROX Figure G.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010 Sunshine Coast ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination A IRPROX Figure G.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

47 1.7 Airspace Discussion Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities Sunshine Coast Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from SFC to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The MSA of 4,100ft is currently inside Sunshine Coast Tower s airspace. The 4,100ft MSA to the west has been used as the most conservative height. The SSR coverage within the CTR was reported as suitable down to around 1,000ft AMSL. If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft AMSL and Centre owned the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established as arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 4,100ft by the Centre. Figure G.6: Sunshine Coast CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Sunshine Coast Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,500ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 8 DME except to the west. The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 1,500ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 2,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Sunshine Coast if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

48 extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft. NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and a Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL4500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath. At Sunshine Coast there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,500ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 20 DME. The implication of replacing the current Class C and D steps has been qualitatively assessed and is discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside TWR hours This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations. The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 1,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary There are currently no low level Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Sunshine Coast is 8,500ft. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E en-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations. The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed in and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues regarding this proposal relate to Brisbane Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 1,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

49 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX H Coffs Harbour 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

50 APPENDIX H 1 Coffs Harbour Tower 1.1 Tower airspace Coffs Harbour Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,000ft and 3 Class D steps out to 22nm and to the base of Class C at 4,500ft to the north and south of the airport. The tower is responsible for Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation. Figure H.1: Coffs Harbour airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance Radar coverage is only available above 6,000ft from the Brisbane Centre. A TSAD provides Coffs Tower with early information about inbound aircraft not yet in Coffs Tower airspace. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and can provide radar services above 6,000ft. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

51 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Coffs Harbour aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA 17,531 18,337 20,501 19,314 Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled TOTAL 28,530 29,123 29,273 27,933 Passengers 343, , , ,116 Table H.1: Coffs Harbour Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure H.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

52 Figure H.3: Coffs Harbour scheduled movements by aircraft type RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DHC-8, Virgin Blue B737 and Embraer E170/190, and Brindabella Airlines Jetstream J41 and Metro aircraft. There are a number of RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours involving Embraer E170/190; Jetstream J41 and DHC-8 aircraft. Training, ad-hoc charter, aeromedical and private flights are also known to operate outside tower hours. Of particular note is parachute jumping activity, which is conducted onto three landing zones: two on the aerodrome and one just south of the aerodrome, towards Sawtell. Whilst the activity can be controlled during tower hours, it continues outside tower hours and has caused concern to be expressed by other operators on the aerodrome. Some operators have queried why such activity is permitted whilst there are scheduled arriving and departing aircraft still pending. Tower Hours of Operation (L) Monday to Saturday Out of hours movements Arrivals FQ 504 Brindabella J Mon-Fri QFA 2118 Q-link DHC Mon - Fri Out of hours movements Departures QFA 2101 Q Link DHC FQ 504 Brindabella J Mon - Fri (L) Sunday DJ 1161 VB E DJ 1161 VB E FQ 504 Brindabella J QFA 2118 Q-link DHC QFA 2117 Q Link DHC FQ 504 Brindabella J Table H.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

53 1.4 Tower Hours ATC hours of operation are from local Monday to Saturday and from 0935 to 1700 Sunday. Scheduled RPT flights depart each morning and evening outside tower hours. 1.5 ATC staffing There are four controllers, including the Unit Tower Supervisor, located at Coffs Harbour. Due to upcoming staff transfers, it is envisaged that there will be only three controllers available from September until new staff are trained and rated. There are 3.5 controllers required under the Resource Management Plan. Airservices Australia intends to combine the Unit Tower Supervisor (UTS) positions at Coffs Harbour and Tamworth in the near future, hence doubling the administrative functions and leaving little time for rostered ATC duties. The new UTS will be stationed at Coffs Harbour however his or her time is expected to be shared between both locations, which in turn could put strain on short term leave relief and potentially cause reduced hours for Coffs Harbour for short periods. 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment reported a concern about aircraft leaving CTA protection when conducting a Runway (RWY) 21 VOR approach. It also contained a recommendation for monitoring passenger numbers to ensure an Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) service is provided when the CASR 139H passenger number criterion is met. The CASA Aeronautical Study of Coffs Harbour (March 2010) reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as the following scenarios were analysed: Base case Class D tower with annual movements 30,560 and conflict pairs; traffic envelope with 30,560 +/- 10%. A Frequency Number (FN) curve diagram was produced that indicated the 10% confidence envelope was situated near the middle As Low as Reasonably Possible (ALARP) line and well below the Scrutiny line. The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

54 Coffs Harbour ASIR Violoation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runway Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdown of Separation Breakdown of Coordination AIRPROX Figure H.3: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010 Coffs Harbour ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination A IRPROX Figure H.4: ESIR by category June 2008 to June October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

55 1.7 Airspace Discussion Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities Changes to the vertical dimensions of the CTR would not affect the current tower area of responsibility. Figure H.6: Coffs Harbour CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Coffs Harbour Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 7 DME except to the west where it is truncated. The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 1,000ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 2,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Coffs Harbour if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft. NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and a Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

56 (LL 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath. At Coffs Harbour there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME. The implications of replacing the current Class C and D steps have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside Tower hours This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations. The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues regarding this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. There is inadequate SSR coverage within the CTR below 6,000ft, and the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary There are currently no low level Class E corridors near Coffs Harbour. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Coffs Harbour is 8,500ft. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E en-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations. The implication of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. As there is inadequate SSR surveillance below 6,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

57 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX I Tamworth 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

58 APPENDIX I 1 Tamworth Tower 1.1 Tower airspace Tamworth Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 3,500ft AMSL and one Class D step to 23nm south up to 4,500ft AMSL. The two Class C steps which extend to 36nm south east are also under the control of Tamworth tower up to 8,500ft AMSL. Outside the tower hours of operation the Class D and Class C airspace below 8,500ft reverts to Class G airspace. Figure I.1: Tamworth airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance SSR coverage is only available above 6,000ft from the Brisbane Centre. The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500ft and receives radar coverage above 6,000ft. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

59 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Tamworth aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA 79,934 80,574 80,310 77,740 Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled TOTAL 86,026 86,288 86,160 83,639 Passengers 102, , , ,392 Table I.1: Tamworth Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure I.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

60 Figure I.3: Tamworth scheduled movements by aircraft type RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DHC-8 and Brindabella Airlines Metro and Jetstream J41 aircraft. There are a number of RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours involving DHC-8, SW4 Metro and Jetstream J41 aircraft. The aerodrome has parallel runways and a single Instrument Landing System (ILS) that cater for the BAe Systems Flight Training Organisation, which conducts training for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Republic of Singapore Air Force and the Royal Brunei Air Force. Other training, charter, cargo, private and aeromedical flights are known to operate outside tower hours. Tower Hours of Operation (L) Monday to Friday (L) Saturday Out of hours movements Arrivals QFA 2008 Q Link DH QFA 2006 Q Link DH Out of hours movements Departures QFA 2001Q Link DH QFA 2001Q Link DH QFA 2007 Q Link DH Sunday FQ 607 Brindabella SWM / J QFA 2006 Q Link DC QFA 2008 Q Link DC FQ 608 Brindabella SWM / J QFA 2007 Q Link DH Table I.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

61 1.4 Tower Hours ATC hours of operation are from local Monday to Friday and from local on weekends. Scheduled RPT turbo-prop flights depart each morning prior to the opening of the tower and at weekends, turbo-prop arrivals and departures occur outside the tower hours of operation. 1.5 ATC staffing There are eight controllers at Tamworth, including the Unit Tower Supervisor. It is envisaged that the UTS position will be combined with that from Coffs Harbour in the near future. The UTS will be responsible for administrative functions as well as maintaining a valid tower rating. There are 7.5 controllers required under the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan. 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment had no significant issues to report. CASA had commissioned an Airspace study to collect collision pairs for assessment (November 2009). This study reported During simulated operations in the (RWY) 12 direction, 14 conflicts were observed involving at least one IFR aircraft in the 75 minute period after the nominal cessation of the ATC Aerodrome control service. Two of these conflicts involved a Closest Point of Approach (CPA) within 2nm and 500ft. For operations in the RWY 30 direction, 11 conflicts involving at least one IFR aircraft were observed in the 45 minutes after normal cessation of the ATC service. Again, two of these conflicts involved a CPA within 2nm and 500ft. The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

62 Tamworth ASIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runway Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdown of Separation Breakdown of Coordinaton AIRPROX Figure I.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010 Tamworth ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination AIRPROX Figure I.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

63 1.7 Airspace Discussion Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities SSR coverage is only available above 6,000ft from Brisbane Centre. A TSAD provides the tower with early information about inbound aircraft not yet in tower airspace. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500ft and can receive SSR information above 6,000ft. The MSA is at 5,600ft which is inside Tamworth s airspace and below radar coverage. Figure I.6: Tamworth CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Tamworth Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 3,500ft AMSL as the aerodrome elevation is 1,334ft AMSL, and lateral dimensions of 9 DME to the west and 11 DME to the south. The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 3,500ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 3,800ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Tamworth if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 3,800ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

64 1.7.3 Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft. NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and a Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath. At Tamworth there is one Class D CTA step with LL of 3,500ft from the CTR to 15 DME north and west and 23 DME southeast. The implication of replacing the current Class C and D steps has been qualitatively assessed and is discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside Tower hours This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations. The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. There is inadequate SSR surveillance within the CTR below 6,000ft and the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary There are currently no low level Class E corridors near Tamworth. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Tamworth is 8,500ft to the east and FL 180 to the west. It is understood that these LL of Class E were selected in order to provide radar surveillance within that particular area of Class E airspace. This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E en-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1200ft AGL at certain locations. The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. As there is inadequate SSR surveillance below 6,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

65 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers THE AMBIDJI GROUP APPENDIX J Albury 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

66 APPENDIX J 1 Albury Tower 1.1 Tower airspace Albury Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface up to 2,000ft AMSL and three Class D steps to 20DME and up to 4,500ft. The three Class C steps, which extend to 30DME to the southwest and northeast, are also under the control of Albury tower up to 8,500ft. Outside the tower hours of operation the Class D and Class C airspace up to 8,500ft reverts to Class G airspace. Figure J.1: Albury Tower airspace 1.2 Electronic surveillance SSR coverage is only available above 8,000ft from the Melbourne Centre. The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Melbourne Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500ft and has radar coverage above 8,000ft. 1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Albury aerodrome were obtained for 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

67 calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March CY 2007 CY 2008 CY months prior to March 2010 GA 19,306 18,936 17,189 16,698 Military Non-Scheduled Scheduled TOTAL 31,028 31,119 29,986 28,281 Passengers 221, , , ,109 Table J.1: Albury Aircraft and Passenger Movements Figure J.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

68 Figure J.3: Albury scheduled movements by aircraft type RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DH8, Regional Express Saab 340, Virgin Blue Embraer E170 and Brindabella Airlines SW4 Metro aircraft. On weekends, there are a number of RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours involving DH8, SF340 and E170 aircraft. Tower Hours of Operation (L) Monday - Friday Out of hours movements Arrivals Out of hours movements Departures (L) Saturday Rex ZL 3186 SF Q Link QFA 2202 DH Rex ZL 3188 SF Rex ZL 762 SF Rex ZL 783 SF Rex ZL 3151 SF Virgin Blue DJ 1181EJ Rex ZL 3187 SF (L) Sunday Rex ZL 762 SF Rex ZL 3151 SF Table J.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours 1.4 Tower Hours ATC hours of operation are from local Monday to Friday, local Saturday and local Sunday. Scheduled RPT services operate within the published tower hours of operation, although on weekends both jet and turbo-prop aircraft arrive and depart outside tower hours of operation. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

69 1.5 ATC staffing There are five controllers at Albury, including the Unit Tower Supervisor, who is also responsible for administrative functions. There are 5.5 controllers required under the Resource Management Plan. 1.6 Risk Assessment The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as and with the addition of radar as (per 100 years). The qualitative risk assessment reported a concern about aircraft holding for RWY25 RNAV approach entering Class G airspace, and also an issue with the location of Restricted Area R368. The CASA Airspace Review of Albury (July 2009) reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as approximately fatalities per annum can be expected. In addition it is estimated that Albury has a likelihood of having one mid air collision approximately every 2,664 years with an estimate of 24 fatalities. The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

70 Albury ASIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runway Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Com ply Breakdown of Separation Breakdown of Coordination AIRPROX Figure J.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010 Albury ESIR Violation of Controlled Airspace TCAS RA Runw ay Incursion Loss of Separation Assurance Go Around Failure to Comply Breakdow n of Separation Breakdow n of Coordination A IRPROX Figure J.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

71 1.7 Airspace Discussion Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities SSR coverage is only available above 8,000ft from Melbourne Centre. A TSAD provides the tower with early information about inbound aircraft not yet in tower airspace. Melbourne Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500 ft and can receive SSR information above 8,000ft. The MSA is at 5,500ft which is inside Albury Tower s airspace and below radar coverage. Figure 7.6: Albury CTR profile Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC 2,500ft. The Albury Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 2,000ft AMSL as the aerodrome elevation is 539ft AMSL with lateral dimensions of 8 NM and truncated to the northwest and southeast. The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 2,000ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 3,000ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. There were no major impediments identified for Albury if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 3,000ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place. 6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J