If you have any questions concerning the documents, please do not hesitate to contact me or one of my colleagues.

Transcription

1 9/11 Personal Privacy M A Y E K B R OWN R W E & M A W March 26,24 /.. OVERNIGHT MAIL Mr. C.S. Brinkley National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 31 7th Street, SW Room 5125 Washington, D.C. 247 Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw IIP 19 South La Salle Street Chicago, Illinois Main Tel (312) Main Fax (312) Susan Nvstrom Ellis '---.. Direct Tei I Direct Fax (312) ' Re: Response to Commission's Requests to United Air Lines. Inc. Dear Mr. Brinkley: On behalf of United Air Lines, Inc., I enclose documents which contain information requested in the Commission's Questions For the Record. These documents are listed on United's Sixth Index to the Commission which is attached to this letter. Please be aware that there is sensitive security information contained in the enclosed documents. It is our understanding that only those Commission members and staff persons who have signed the appropriate non-disclosure form from the Transportation Security Administration are authorized to review materials containing sensitive security information. If you have any questions concerning the documents, please do not hesitate to contact me or one of my colleagues. Sincerely, Susan Nystrom Ellis Enclosures cc: Michael Feagley, Esq. Jeffrey Ellis, Esq. Loretta Redmond, Esq. Brussels Charlotte Chicago Cologne Frankfurt Houston London Los Angeles Manchester New York Palo Alto Paris Washington, D.C. Independent Mexico City Correspondent Jauregui, Navarrete, Nader y Rojas, S.C. Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LIP operates in combination with our associated English limited liability partnership in the offices listed above.

2 ifayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP Mr. C.S. Brinkley March 26, 24 Page 2 Ricks Frazier, Esq. John Midgett, Esq.

3 3/26/4 United Air Lines Inc.'s Sixth Index to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States CONTAINS SSI DATE AUTHOR RECIPIENT DESCRIPTION REQUEST NUMBER FROM 2/3/4 BATES NUMBER YES 2/23/24 Average no show rates for flights 175 and 93 in the year 21 QFRs and UASSI YES 9/11/21 UA Flight 175 Flight Plan Forecast QFR UASSI YES VIZDIZ(aircraft routing information) for aircraft UA 6212(F aircraft) QFR UASSI YES 2/24/24 Explanation of load factors in week of September 11th in years Additional QFR 1 UASSI1-3298

4 Flight 175 BOSLAX Flight 93 EWRSFO Month No Show Rate 19% 17% 26% 15% 13% 13% 17% 13% 23% 34% Pre 9/1 1 Post 9/1 1 Month No Show Rate 11% 13% 15% 1% 1% 11% 11% 11% 18% 38% % 14% 1% % 13% 14% *Please note that the flight numbers were not constant all year long. The information was gathered from the flights with the closest departure time of flights 175 and 93. WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASSI1-3292

5 flfln BOSDD CHI58,CMIVPUA $4 44 /KE.U UAL BOS LAX PART 1 OF 1 PARTS fifi 175-liaEPOi BDS l 2/3iZi LAX ISlfrZ/ill&P *** RLS 1 *** IFR & l /M612Ll«CHI58 ~-3«15:3-5/5:38 ON TARGET UAL175 6/B76 /E 469 BOS PI RT; FMCS NO +.4 (P? BOS.. GLYDE.. BAF. J77. SAX. J3. VHP. Jl 1C?. BUM. J134. DRK- J1O- TMP. PDZ4 LAX/53S :NRP (SKYPATH) BURNOUT 5-1? PCT flfl HOLD ALTERNA1 EXTRA PPL CLEARED / 5&4 5:38 //X 6 :17 T :15 CIS/BR 7 :13 OMT 53NM WC& FLdS<3 : 9 1:11 <R&V 64) : 34 ft ft I NM S3'^^ '7/32 75/ 7 ( CLB RCA 5? SAX AIR UHP STL us & & *b* 543~ f BOS P '*2 4 S nnn BUM 19 S '' ICT la _LBL cut GUP JLfrZ_ S 7 _5_ Q S &gi as i?ir.' 58 R DRK « TNP 167 3b POD LL Ifli LAX 13 5e 7-.i ; 41 55S 32 MSI WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASSH-3293 FfiPK

6 : : ; : ' tz>5j 17 4 S971 S; i S.,473 MS 3 M79 MS M78 FL C 31 4 FL SAX AIR i VHP * <; BUM ICT LBL i-4 1 -nzks < E73&-+7 STL C!M FL l DRK TMP 63^ S 6 > 7"'Zil 5«336-1 S78S7-S5+S C»i-i * J nr,nr. PQSBD: 672-SS9 CAT 1 AUTOLfiNDS t<64-ei B7feV- ATLANTIC OPS 6 - VIDSG SYSTEM (DVB) 648-1? Pit-1 ANOMALY PLI INDICATOR AUTOLAND RkPORTING ai PILOT DEFERRALS WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION NEED flpu HIGH ALTITUDE START PER f-m PAGt 6-18 <57/67 CHIDD KEVIN RUDDY (PRINT) -MIM CODE C 3- DOM J 7S-U END OF PART 1 EISIR 11* UASSI1-3294

7 :-M: VIZDIZ/ 6212/ / / AIRCRAFT SYS VISIT HEADER DISPLAY TA CHK PTT ARVL-FLT-DT-TIME DPTR-FLT-DT L/O D? PTT-SEQ BOS 2SV* 67419: SEP SEP 1: FO 67414: SEP SEP 1: JFK 2SV* 6748: SEP SEP 45: =5 2SV* 6748:4 17-7SEP SEP 11: SFO 6742: SEP SEP 1: JFK 2SV* 67397:6 14-6SEP SEP 1: LAX 1SV 67392: SEP SEP 1:29 3 JFK 67387: SEP SEP 3: LAX 1SV 67382: SEP SEP 1: JFK 67377: SEP SEP 1: SFO 3SV* 67372:25 5-4SEP SEP 12: JFK 67366:58 1-4SEP SEP 1: VIZDIZ/ 6212 / AIRCRAFT SYS VISIT HEADER DISPLAY STA CHK PTT ARVL-FLT-DT-TIME DPTR-FLT-DT L/O DF PTT-SEQ LAX 2SV* 67362:6 11-3SEP SEP 11: JFK 2SV* 677:1 1-2SEP SEP 25: LAX 2SV* 672: SEP SEP 11:5 JFK 67347:15 2-1SEP SEP 1: SFO 2SV* 67342:31 JFK 67336: AUG AUG SEP AUG 6:3 : AX 2SV* 67331: AUG AUG 12: K 67326: AUG AUG 1:4 SFO 2SV* 67321: AUG AUG 11:11 JFK 67316: AUG AUG : LAX 67311: AUG AUG :25 1 LAX 3SV* 67311: AUG AUG 14: VIZDIZ/ 6212/ / / 4299 AIRCRAFT SYS VISIT HEADER DISPLAY STA CHK PTT ARVL-FLT-DT-TIME DPTR-FLT-DT L/O DF PTT-SEQ JFK 6736:5 2-28AUG AUG 1:9 1 SFO 2SV* 6731: AUG AUG 8: JFK 67295: AUG AUG :39 1 SFO 2SV* 67289: AUG AUG 14: JFK 67284: AUG AUG 1: LAX 2SV* 67279: AUG AUG 6: SV JFK 67275: AUG AUG 2: LAX 1SV 67269: AUG AUG 1:5 JFK 2SV* 67264: AUG AUG 8: LAX 1SV 6726: AUG AUG 1:41 JFK 2SV* 67255: 6-23AUG AUG 9: MRilffipPS&Ig?; efei^:*sfrss^b^ WARNING T THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ON SENSITIVE SECURITY $3 INFORMATION O jt> vizdiz/ 6212/ / / AIRCRAFT SYS VISIT HEADER DISPLAY _- ~^t" T. '" ' VT" T-I IT,?" T^T1-1 r* *- rjtit cr?n UASSI1-3295

8 67249:59 FK A1* 67244:15.AX 1SV 67239:22 FK 3SV* " 67228: : 9-23AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG 9-23AUG 89-22AUG :51 12:55 2: AUG 9: AUG 1: AUG 5: WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASS/1-3296

9 FK 67213:42 AX 2SV* 6728:37 FK 6723.: 15-2SV* 67197: :53 8-2AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG 8-2AUG 11-19AUG 2-19AUG AUG :51 12:32 :47 8:47 : LAX 1SV 67218:4 VIZDIZ/ TA AX?K AX DS.AX?K??K AX FK AX CHK-- PTT 2SV* :6 J :57 2SV* : 15~ :5 3SV* : :47 2SV* : :21 2SV* :37 2SV 1SV 6212/ 67141: : ; :37 / / 4281SL6 AIRCRAFT SYS VISIT HEADER ARVL - FLT - DT - TIME DPTR-FLT-DT L/ DF 29-17AUG AUG 13: 14 1 ~ 8-17 AUG AUG 1: y- 1 SAUG -~2 3"8 ' 8-17AUG 11: AUG AUG 1: AUG ~ " AUG 1: AUG AUG 1: AUG AUG 13: AUG AUG 1: AUG AUG 6: AUG AUG AUG 94-13AUG 2: 6 1: 3 DISPLAY PTT-SEQ 'IZDIZ/ 6212/ :A CHK 2SV* 1SV _X 1SV K 2SV* D- S 3SV* K 2SV* < 1SV PTT 67131: : : : :4 6716: : : : : :6 6776:14 / / AIRCRAFT SYS VISIT HEADER ARVL-FLT-DT-TIME DPTR- FLT-DT L/O DF 16-12AUG AUG 7: AUG AUG 1: AUG AUG 6: AUG AUG 2: AUG AUG 1:12 23-lOAUG-OOrO 2-11AUG 6: AUG AUG 2: AUG AUG 1: AUG AUG 8: AUG AUG 2: AUG AUG 13: AUG AUG 1:23 DISPLAY PTT-SEQ WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASSI1-3297

10 T EXPLANATION OF LOAD FACTORS Load factors for the week of September 11 in the years do not significantly vary. Load factors may vary due to time of year, economic conditions, cancellations and fare sales. *note - a/c types changed from and vice versa fairly frequently difference in load factor could change by 3-5% as the 757 had 8% more seating capacity than the 767 BOS-EWR 8 EST time frame Year Dep Time Start Date 7-Sep 5-Sep 4-Sep Average Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue End Date Sep Sep Sep EWR-SFO 8 time frame Year /8* 8 Start Date 7-Sep 5-Sep 4-Sep Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat «46.7 Sun Mon Tue End Date " 2.3 [Average Sep 12-Sep 11-Sep ' 8 dep effective Fri. 9/8/ '* 91.2% L/F may have been unusually high due to flight cancellation on the afternoon of Mon 9/11/ Does not include 9/12/ WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

11 Explanation of Calls Recorded in the Operations Command Center and Crisis Management Center on September 11,21 On 9/11/1, the only calls from the Operations Command Center ("OCC") that were recorded were those to or from the dispatchers. No other calls coming into or out of the OCC were recorded. No calls in the Crisis Management Center ("CMC") were recorded (including the Dispatch seat in the CMC). Following the events of 9/11/1, the FBI asked United to listen to the recordings of the calls to and from the United dispatchers to see if any of them were calls to or from Flights 93 or 175. United employees listened to the recordings and determined that none of them were calls to or from Flights 93 or 175. The FBI did not request a copy from United of any of the recordings of dispatch calls made on 9/11/1. These recordings subsequently were overwritten per United standard procedure concerning the retention of such recordings and are no longer available. WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASSI

12 Explanation of What Calls Into/Out of SAMC Were Recorded on 9/11/1 On 9/11/1, the only calls from crew members on Flights 93 and 175 were Star fix calls on the GTE Airfones. The Star fix calls went to SAMC in San Francisco, California. On 9/11/1, none of the calls into or out of SAMC were recorded by United because the telephone system was not set up to record calls. The aircraft with tail numbers N612UA and N591UA did not have satellite communication equipment and therefore no one could have called from those flights using SATCOM. Air Inc. records calls from the radio on UA flights. There were no radio calls from Flights 175 and 93 and therefore, there were no recordings to or from those flights. WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION ««o>i UASSH-32894

13 Explanation of SAMC Phone Records for Calls to United WHO On September 11, 21, phone calls from the United San Francisco Service Aircraft Maintenance Center ("SAMC") to United World Headquarters ("WHQ"), including the Operations Command Center ("OCC"), traveled over a Private Line Circuit (or tie-line). United paid a flat monthly charge for calls made over this tie-line. Calls over this tie-line traveled through MCI's transport network into SBC's Centrex service, but did not go through the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and no usage-based billing was created for these calls. United did not keep any records of calls that left SAMC and no call-by-call detail reporting was created for calls made over this tie-line. Incoming calls to WHQ traveled through the Centrex system, United's private phone system which was operated by SBC. Thus, the calls made from SAMC to the OCC on September 11, 21 traveled over the tie-line and entered the Centrex system. Calls through the Centrex system did not go through the PSTN, and no call-by-call detail was created for these calls. Because of the manner in which United's phone system was set up, United does not have, and never has had, any call-by-call records showing what time the calls were made from SAMC to Rich Miles in the OCC on September 11,21. United has asked SBC for any Centrex records concerning calls made from SAMC to the OCC on September 11, 21 and has been told that it does not have any records concerning these calls. UASSI13696

14 Explanation of Ed Ballinger's Communication With Flights During Period From Z (9:19-9:33 eastern) According to interviews with Chad McCurdy, the dispatcher who was assisting Ed Ballinger on September 11, 21, and the ACARS records of messages sent and received by Ed Ballinger on that day, United believes that during the time between approximately 1319 Z and 1333 Z (9:19-9:33 eastern), Ed Ballinger was doing the following: (1) Ed Ballinger was checking the status of his assigned flights from a printed out list of aircraft numbers by reviewing messages from the flights and confirming the flights locations. As of 1319 Z, he began to send out a "beware any cockpit intrusion" message to his flights. That message was sent to Flight 93 at approximately 1323 Z. A message from Flight 93's Captain had already been received by Ed Baliinger at 1321 Z. Mr. Ballinger continued to check on the status of his assigned flights by cross referencing the printed list of flights with the messages received from those flights. He checked off each individual flight on his list and its status with the assistance of Chad McCurdy. In addition to the message from Flight 93 stating "Ed cofirm [sic] latest mssg plz Jason1' sent at approximately 1326 Z, Mr. Ballinger received responsive messages from 1 other flights which either requested clarification about his initial "beware any cockpit intrusion" message or acknowledged receipt of such message. (2) Then, as a matter of efficiency and speed, instead of sending individual responses to the flights be received messages from in response to his initial "beware any cockpit intrusion" message, Ed Ballinger changed the text and format of his initial message to read as his "high security alert" message and sent this second message to his flights. UASSI13697

15 September 24, 21 EdBallinger CHIDD Mike Rarbw Mike Winter CHIDD EXODD September 11.2QOJ! Please accept this sincere expression of gratitude for the fine performance you turned in during th* disaster on that tragic day. Above all, you were affected most. At no time, lias anyone had to endure witnessing, over and over, on the overhead monitors, on news broadcasts, in newspapers and journals; the destruction of n flight for which they were responsible. Ed, as the events unfolded, you performed your job expertly and in a manner that even the 2/2 vision of hindsight, can't fine fault. I can't imagine the thoughts and emotions you feel being so deeply and personally involved with a tragedy of such epic proportions Your professionalism, skill and calm demeanor gave strength to those around you and to all the flight crews flying that day. Your contribution will never be.measured because there is no scale that can measure such a significant contribution, made under such trying circumstances. Thank you again. Sincerely, Cc: Personnel File Joe Vickcra Manager-Domestic DD Ops. UASSI13698

16 July 16,24 United Airline Inc.'s Tenth Index to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States CONTAINS SSI DATE AUTHOR RECIPIENT DESCRIPTION BATES NUMBERS NO GTE/Verizon Spreadsheet of information concerning Starfix calls from UA Flight 175 and UA Flight 93 on 9/1 1/1; created by GTE/Verizon and given to United UASSI YES Chart of ACARS Messages From United Dispatch; Messages from Aircraft To Ed Ballinger and Chad McCurdy; and Messages To Flights 93 Sorted By Time From Z UASSI YES Chart of ACARS Messages To/From Ed Ballinger and Chad McCurdy and To/From Flights 93/175 Sorted By Time From Z UASSI NO Explanation of SAMC Phone Records for Calls to United WHQ UASSI NO Explanation of Ed Ballinger' s Communication with Flights During Period From Z (9: 19-9:33 eastern) UASSI1 3697

17 July 16,24 1 NO 9/24/21 Joe Vickers (United Manager- Domestic DD Ops) Ed Ballinger (United Dispatcher) letter commending Mr. Ballinger on his fine performance of his duties on 9/11/1 UASSI NO United's response to the Commission's request concerning the timing of certain events on 9/1 1/1 (produced on 7/13/4 to the Commission) UASSI

18 Description: -United Airlines-Flrte Attndnt ACCOUNT: CALL START TIME DATE HH:MM ZONE / 11-Sep 11-Sep 11-Sep 11-Sep 11-Sep 8:32 INT 9:31 ET 9: ET 9: ET 9: ET PHONE NUMBER SV CALL <-- B ILLING I NFORMAT ION --> <AIR> TY WINS ACCES-$ MIN-$ TAX-$ TOTAL-S AC/ID VO VO VO VO VO UA5X91. UA5X91. UA5X91. UA5X91. UA5X91 11-Sep 11-Sep 8:52 ET 8:56 ET VO VO UA6X12. UA6X12 *CO=Data; DA^Data; FA=Fax; UF=Uplink Fax; UV=Uplink Voice * *VO=Voice; FE=Fee for Additional Uplink Aircraft Number UASSI13695