UK CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY FSTD EVALUATION REPORT

Transcription

1 UK Civil Aviation Authority Safety & Airspace Regulation Group Flight Operations FSTD Standards Floor 1NE, Aviation House Gatwick Airport South West Sussex RH6 0YR Tel: +44 (0) Fax: +44 (0) th February 2014 UK CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY FSTD EVALUATION REPORT UK CAA Code (if applicable) EASA FSTD Code (if applicable) : FB-284 : EU-UK / FB-284 Aircraft Type, Class and/or Variant : A Engine Fit(s) Simulated Project No : CFM56-5B4 & IAE V2527-A5 : N/A 1. Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Characteristics 2. Evaluation Details 3. Supplementary Information 4. Training, Testing and Checking Considerations 5. Classification of Items 6. Results 7. Summary 8. Evaluation Team This report is PROVISIONAL / FINAL* (*DELETE AS APPLICABLE) The conclusions presented are those of the evaluation team. The UK CAA reserves the right to change these after internal review. Page 1 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13

2 1 Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) (a) FSTD Operator: Quadrant Systems Ltd. (QSL) {previously Boeing} (b) FSTD Location: Burgess Hill, UK {moved from Boeing at Crawley} (c) FSTD Identification (UK CAA FSTD code / EASA FSTD code): FB-284 / EU-UK/FB-284 (d) FSTD Manufacturer and FSTD serial number: CAE / 2R (e) First entry into service (month / year): December 2000 (Updated in October 2007 to Airbus STD & moved to Quadrant in January 2014) (f) Visual system (manufacturer and type): CAE MaxVue+ WIDE 180 x 40 F o V (g) Motion system (manufacturer and type): CAE 6 Axes Hydraulic (h) Aircraft type and variant: Airbus A Std (i) Engine fit(s): CFM 56-5B4 & IAE V2527-A5 (j) Engine instrumentation: ECAM Flight instrumentation: EFIS FMS: Thales FMS2 Auto-pilot Sextant Std. M11 2 Evaluation Details (a) Date of evaluation: 18 th February 2014 (b) Date of previous evaluation: 2 nd November 2012 (c) Type of evaluation: initial recurrent special (d) FSTD Qualification level recommended: FFS A B C D AG BG CG DG SC FTD 1 2 FNPT I II MCC BITD (e) Technical criteria primary reference document: JAR STD-1A (Amendment 3) (f) Validation Data Roadmap (VDR) ID-No.: RQTG D Issue 5 (CFM) RQTG D Issue 4 (IAE) Page 2 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13

3 3 Supplementary Information Company representative(s) (FSTD Operator, Main FSTD user): FSTD seats available: Visual databases used during evaluation: Other Mr P Masters, Mr D Morris, Capt K Fallon (QSL) Crew, IOS plus 2 observers Gatwick (EGKK) 26L, None 4 Training, Testing and Checking Considerations CAT I RVR 550m DH 200ft CAT II RVR 300m DH 100ft CAT III (lowest minimum) RVR 75m DH 0 ft LVTO RVR 125m Recency IFR-Training / check / Type rating Proficiency checks Autocoupled approach Autoland / roll out guidance / ACAS I / II NO/(V7.0) Windshear profiles available Windshear warning system / predictive windshear / WX-radar HUD / HUGS N/A / N/A FANS NO GPWS / EGPWS NO / GPS ETOPS capability Other (describe) Smoke Page 3 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13

4 5 Guidance material 5.1 Classification of Items UNACCEPTABLE An item which fails to comply with the required standard and therefore affects the level of qualification or the qualification itself. If these items are not resolved or clarified within a given time limit (see 5.2) the UK CAA, may have to suspend, vary, restrict, or revoke the FSTD qualification. RESERVATION An item where compliance with the required standard is not clearly proven and the issue will be reserved for a later decision. Resolution of these items will require either: 1. A competent authority policy ruling or 2. Additional substantiation UNSERVICEABILITY A device, which is temporarily inoperative or performing below its normal level. LIMITATION An item which prevents the full usage of the FSTD according to the training, testing and checking considerations due to unusable devices, systems or parts thereof. RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT An item which meets the required standard but where considerable improvement is strongly recommended. COMMENT Self explanatory. 5.2 Period of Rectification Reference: AMC2 ARA.FSTD.100(a)(1) Initial evaluation procedure point (b) - General Following an evaluation, it is possible that a number of defects may be identified. Generally these defects should be rectified and the competent authority notified of such action within 30 days. Serious defects, which affect flight crew training, testing and checking, could result in an immediate downgrading of the qualification level, or if any defect remains unattended without good reason for period greater than 30 days, subsequent downgrading may occur or the FSTD Qualification could be revoked. Page 4 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13

5 6 Results 6.1 Subjective / Functional A Unacceptable 1 None. B Reservation 1 When the fire handle was pulled, the engine data was lost as power was removed from the FADEC, the engine data was lost, but this returned after the second bottle was fired and the fire was extinguished. It was not clear that this characteristic was correct. C Un-serviceability 1 When the left hand seat pilot was transmitting on HF 1 and 2, this was not received by the right hand seat pilot. 2 Whilst on the ground at Gatwick and Biggin Hill selected on both VOR 1 and 2, No.1 was transmitting Gatwick ATIS and the No.2 was transmitting the Heathrow ATIS, but this transmission referred to runway 05. The original destination was set as Manchester so it was suggested that the ATIS had been corrupted with Manchester information. The Biggin VORs in reality give Heathrow information, but not Gatwick. 3 The first officer s ACP Voice button was inoperative. 4 There was a GPS Primary alert on the left hand ND and RNP was 2 NM and ANP was 4 NM, Subsequently, both NDs had GPS accuracy alerts. 5 The stop bar at 26L at Gatwick was not displayed at A1 when selected on but was visible at adjacent runway entrance M1. The green taxi lights were routing through the stop bar when the stop bars were selected off and terminated short of the stop bar when selected on, but there were no red lights. 6 After landing on 26L at Gatwick in low visibility conditions, it was noted that the stop bar lights were prohibiting access to 26R which was not an active runway. 7 The upper EICAS screen was initially blue at the start of the session and was pulsing with different colours through much of the session and never fully recovered. 8 On the failed start through overtemp. the EICAS procedure never called for the engine master switch to be selected off. D Limitation 1 None. E Recommendation for Improvement 1 All parked aircraft at EGKK had flashing strobe lights that were too bright. F Comment 1 With 13mm of slush selected, the braking performance was severely compromised. 6.2 Objective A Unacceptable 1 None B Reservation 1 None C Recommendation for Improvement 1 None Page 5 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13

6 D Comment 1 Following the relocation of this simulator from Boeing in Crawley, the sound tests have been rebase-lined to reflect the new operating environment. 2 Whist the visuals had given problems following relocation of the simulator; these were associated with power interrupts due to the recent bad weather. These problems had been rectified. 3 Test 4.3.C (CFM) and 4.1.F.2 (IAE) appear to be missing from the QTG, but were in the MQTG. Both were subsequently found in the additional test results section. Test 4.3.F.3, noted as missing from the MQTG in the last evaluation was confirmed as being within the MQTG. 4 The problems previously identified in the yaw dynamics test (4.2.B.3) had been addressed by replacing the side bearings in the first officers pedals. 5 The following tests were run as part of the evaluation: 4.2.B.3, 4.3.C, 4.2.A.9, 4.1.B.2 and 4.1.B.5 in the CFM fit and 4.1.B.2 and 4.1.F.2 in the IAE fit. These were satisfactory. 6.3 Management System (MS) / Compliance Monitoring System (CMS) Note: This section of the report contains an optional (not all sections require completion) record of assurance that Management and Compliance Monitoring Systems are in place and effective, together with any specific compliance issues identified during the evaluation. This section does not constitute a formal CMS audit (as required by the regulations). 1 The most recent CMS audit of this FSTD operator was carried out by a combined team from EASA, FAA and CAA on 4 th July A total of 13 findings had previously been raised in the CAA audit of December 2012 and this evaluation has confirmed that 2 of these findings currently remain Open. Of these Open findings, none are level 1 and 2 are level 2. 2 Although the simulator had changed ownership and had been relocated, the QTG control had remained with the same operator. The first 3 quarters of recurrent tests had been completed in the original location and the 4 th quarter tests had been completed following the installation at Burgess Hill. In addition, additional out of sequence tests had been run following move, focussing on control, motion, visual and sound tests. The move to quadrant should be reflected in the Master QTG title page. 3 No metrics were available for the new location. 4 Since relocation there has been one internal subjective fly-out and one customer fly-out test. The issues raised following the internal fly-out had been addressed and those raised by the operator had, when replicated been either rectified, were being worked on or were awaiting parts for failed items. 5 The operator is entering a contract with CAE to provide a visual scene update service. There no planned updates for the current year. 6 There were escape routes with associated rope ladders to the left and right side when exiting the rear of the cab, but only the right had side (facing aft) had an associated route once on the ground. The operator is considering restricting the exit to this right hand side. 7 Summary Subject to the above, the evaluation team conclude that this FSTD is compliant with the requirements of the Qualification Basis specified in section 2e of this report and recommend that qualification continues to the level indicated in section 2d. Page 6 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13

7 8 Evaluation Team Name Position Organisation Signature Mr D A Law Technical Inspector UK CAA Capt. T Buckland Flight Inspector designated by the UK CAA UK CAA Capt. K Fallon A320 SFI/TRI Quadrant Syst. Ltd Mr D Morris Software Engineer Quadrant Syst. Ltd Approved for the UK CAA:... Name: for FSTD Standards, CAAi Date of Signature.... Page 7 of 7 Template rev 05, 01 Nov 13