Hurricane Sandy. Sector New York Marine Transportation System Recovery Unit. After Action Report. Prepared by LT Hillary Allegretti,

Transcription

1 Hurricane Sandy Sector New York Marine Transportation System Recovery Unit After Action Report Prepared by LT Hillary Allegretti, CDR Linda Sturgis & LCDR Anne Morrissey

2 Introduction: Sector New York MTS-RU The information contained in this report captures the preparation and execution of the duties of the Sector New York (SECNY) Marine Transportation Recovery System Unit (MTS-RU). The SECNY MTS-RU was able to safely and efficiently re-open the Port of New York/New Jersey to ensure minimal impact to the flow of commerce into the third largest port in the United States following the largest hurricane to ever hit the east coast. Ample preparation and cooperation from Port Partners including NOAA, the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey, Sandy Hook Pilots, APM Terminals, and many others, resulted in the expeditious and safe re-opening of the port to bring critical assets to the citizens of New York, New Jersey and New England. The Marine Transportation System Recovery Unit The function of the MTS-RU is outlined in the Area Maritime Security Plan Section Normally, post-incident recovery of the MTS after a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) or other incident that results in an extended port closure will be coordinated through the Captain of the Port/Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (COTP/FMSC), other government agencies, and relevant portions of the private sector within the context of the NIMS and ICS structure. Within the ICS structure, the MTS-RU functions under the Planning Department. The resources and personnel that would enhance the operations of the SECNY MTS-RU were identified and acquired well in advance of the 2012 hurricane season. The MTS-RU lessons learned from Hurricane Irene, which affected northern New York state and New England in August 2011, improved the SECNY MTS-RU s response to Hurricane Sandy. Twelve to Six Months Prior to Hurricane Sandy: Under the leadership of Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Anne Morrissey, the MTS-RU members within the Waterways Management (WWM) Division, including Boatswain s Mate First Class (BM1) Michael Lehansky and Mr. Jeffrey Yunker, acquired necessary resources such as laptops, copiers, printers, wireless hot spots and phones to create the MTS-RU Go Kit. Several of these key items were funded by First Coast Guard District. The Go Kit would prove to be critical in establishing communications throughout the port when the power and phone lines were damaged following the storm. Personnel with the appropriate operational knowledge that would augment the MTS-RU were also identified and trained in the functions and duties of the MTS-RU and the use of the Common Assessment & Reporting Tool (CART). Two members outside of the WWM Division, Lieutenant (LT) Hillary Allegretti of SECNY Marine Inspections and Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) Joseph Castro of SECNY Shore Side Compliance-Facilities Branch attended the Coast Guard District One MTS-RU training in Portsmouth, NH in April Mr. Yunker was also in attendance. This training, hosted by District One MTS-RU Coordinator, Mr. David Waldrip, proved invaluable for understanding the potential obstacles and challenges in re-opening a port following a significant incident like Hurricane Sandy. Mr. Yunker worked with BM1 Lehansky - 1 -

3 and began populating the SECNY Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) in CART. The EEIs included all critical Aids to Navigation (ATON), navigable waterways, bridges, Coast Guard Regulated and Public Access Facilities and the port itself. Keeping the EEIs current in CART as information flowed into the MTS-RU before and after the hurricane increased the situational awareness of senior leaders in the Coast Guard and painted a clearer picture of the status of the port and its recovery. One Week Prior to Hurricane Sandy: When it became apparent that Tropical Storm Sandy was gaining strength and projected to make landfall somewhere in the tri-state (NY/NJ/CT) area, SECNY and the WWM Division ramped up hurricane port preparations. On Friday, October 26 at approximately 1500 local time Hurricane Condition (HURCON) Whiskey was set. The same information was being broadcast by the SECNY Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) and was also published on the Coast Guard s Homeport website. HURCON Whiskey requires vessels over 500 gross tons to either depart the port or submit a plan for remaining in port. Additionally, tugs and barges are also required to depart or submit a mooring plan for approval by the COTP. The Marine Inspections Division approved over 130 mooring plans. The first MTS-RU teleconference (telecon) was held at 0800 on Saturday, October 27. Typically the participants of the MTS-RU telecons included representatives from the Coast Guard, NOAA, Port Authority of New York/New Jersey (PANYNJ), Labor, Maritime Pilots-Sandy Hook Pilots (SHP), Container and Petroleum Terminals, Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE), Maritime Administration and Tug and Barge operators. The goal was to have a representative from each sector of the marine transportation system; he or she represented the entire sector rather tha individual companies. The purpose of the MTS-RU teleconference was to maintain clear, open lines of communication with port partners to keep the pulse on exactly what aspects of the marine transportation system required more attention and which were operational and selfsustaining. The battle rhythm for teleconferences during Hurricane Sandy recovery operations was twice daily at 0800 and By Sunday, October 28 Sandy had strengthened and was now a Category 1 Hurricane with sustained winds over 70 knots. At least four meteorological models predicted that Hurricane Sandy would make landfall between Atlantic City, NJ and Westchester, NY. HURCON Condition Yankee was set throughout the port at approximately 1011 local time. HURCON Yankee requires all vessel over 500 gross tons to depart the port or have a COTP-approved mooring plan for remaining in port, evacuates all anchorages and limits only one barge per commercial mooring buoy. At this time local governments began directing the mandatory evacuation of residents in Flood Zone A. Some members of the MTS-RU that were evacuated moved into the Unaccompanied Personnel Housing (UPH) at SECNY. Hurricane Sandy Makes Landfall: On Monday, October 29 Hurricane Sandy was poised to bring unprecedented destruction to the metropolitan area of New York City and the Jersey Shore; Sandy s diameter exceeded 1,000 nautical miles. BM1 Lehansky, Mr. Yunker and LCDR Morrissey shifted MTS-RU operations - 2 -

4 from Waterways Management Spaces to the Tampa Room, a conference room on the third deck of SECNY. Items from the MTS-RU Go Kit including stand-alone laptops, printer/copier and wi-fi hotspots were connected along with one additional laptop linked up to the 50 inch LCD TV used displayed CART. Charts labeled with the major cargo and petroleum facilities, ATON and waterways for the AOR were hung on the walls for situational awareness. To provide limited communications capability during a potential hurricane power outage, the VTS Electronics Material Officer (EMO) ran a temporary connection from the Sector Command Center s emergency generator power feed to the Tampa Room. This provided power for non-standard laptops, wi-fi hotspots, one printer/copier, one lamp, and numerous cellular phones. HURCON Zulu was set at 0708 and effectively closed the Port of New York/New Jersey to all vessel transits into or out of the port. All New York City roadways, bridges and tunnels were closed and bus and subway service was stopped at 1900 local time. Hurricane Sandy made landfall around midnight the evening of Tuesday, October 30 approximately five miles southwest of Atlantic City. Along with sustained winds over 70 knots, Sandy brought an unprecedented storm surge. The surge of nine to eleven feet was exacerbated as landfall corresponded with high tide. A record-breaking 32.5 foot wave crashed inside New York Harbor. Members of the MTS-RU, including Ensigns (ENS) Lauren Gainor and John Cataldi, were called into the SECNY Command Center to help field the Search and Rescue calls coming from people trapped inside their homes by rising water. There were so many calls coming in from people who were drowning inside their own homes. I got three calls from the same man who just kept saying that the water was getting higher and he needed help. They just handed us the phones and told us not to promise the people that we were coming to get them. ENS Lauren Gainor MTS-RU Member, October 30, 2012 Commander (CDR) Linda Sturgis, SECNY Prevention Chief and Port Recovery Officer, watched the destruction of the port from the Command Center cameras that recorded live video footage throughout the AOR. It was like someone took a lawnmower and just plowed through everything in the path. You could literally watch the storm surge come over the breaker wall. CDR Linda Sturgis Port Recovery Officer, November 3, 2012 At some point during the night, SECNY lost power. Only the Command Center radios and phones were on the circuit powered by the emergency generator on base. Power and phones to the Sector would not be restored until Thursday, November 1. Port Assessment and Recovery Begins: Tuesday, October

5 The initial reports of the damage to the port began flowing into the MTS-RU. The MTS-RU was receiving emergency power for three laptops and three phone lines; there was no access to the Coast Guard s internal computer network (CG WSIII) or normal Coast Guard Outlook accounts. To work around this issue, the MTS-RU created a Gmail account as another portal for information exchange. The SHP used two of their vessels with CG and NOAA personnel on board to conduct initial waterway and ATON assessments of all major commercial waterways. During those assessments, containers were identified in the water in the vicinity of New York Container Terminal on the Kill Van Kull and Red Hook Container Terminal on the Buttermilk Channel. PANYNJ reported that power to all five of the major container terminals was down. This was also confirmed by Mr. Mark Hanafee of APM terminal in Newark, NJ. Mr, Hanafee added that even after power is restored at least eight hours of equipment testing and assessment would need to be conducted prior to receiving a vessel for cargo operations. SHP reported seeing containers in the water in the Upper Bay. All the major petroleum facilities, including Conoco Phillips 66/Bayway and IMTT Bayonne, reported power loss and at least some dock damage or flooding. ACOE reported their field office, Caven Point, had been demolished by the storm but they retained the ability to conduct post-storm surveys. Their capacity to process the survey data was limited due to the damage of their facilities. LT Brent Pounds, NOAA Navigation Manager for the Northeast Region, and Mr. Kyle Ward, NOAA Navigation Manager for the Southeast Region, arrived prior to the storm and served as key members of the SECNY MTS-RU. After the hurricane, NOAA s Navigation Response Team-2 (NRT-2), NRT-5 and THOMAS JEFFERSON (TJ) were en route to begin surveying the port using multi-beam and side-scan sonor. The surveys were determined to be critical due to reports of containers in the water and a high potential for other major debris in the waterways. The NRT-2 and NRT-5 are small craft launches and the THOMAS JEFFERSON is a 208-foot ship with berthing for 36 NOAA commissioned officers, crew and scientists. TJ also has two launches also equipped with side-scan sonar. LT Pounds and Mr. Ward coordinated all channel surveys conducted by both NOAA and Army Corps survey assets. NOAA Channel Survey Tasking Channel Segment Priority Verrazano Narrows & Anchorage Channel 1 Hudson River up to Pier 88 (Manhattan Cruise Ship Terminal) 2 Sandy Hook Channel (New Jersey) 3 Global Container Terminal Berth & Port Jersey Channel 4 Gravesend Anchorage (Bay Ridge, Brooklyn) 5 Anchorage # 23 & 24 6 Buttermilk Channel (Red Hook Container Terminal) 7 Kill Van Kull 8 Newark Bay (New Jersey) 9 Arthur Kill *as permitted by oil spill 10 Raritan Bay (New Jersey) 11 Bay Ridge Anchorage 12 Chapel Hill Channel 13 Anchorage #21 14 Reports also came into the MTS-RU of oil spills (quantities unknown at the time) at three major petroleum facilities along the Arthur Kill in northeast New Jersey: Conoco Phillips 66/Bayway, Kinder Morgan Incorporated (KMI) Carteret and Motiva Sewaren. The damage assessment to - 4 -

6 these major suppliers also indicated that the Colonial and Buckeye Pipelines were both inoperable. Further, at least 13 feet of flooding was reported in the tank farms of Linden, NJ resulting in significant damage to the 50,000 gallons-per-minute saltwater-cooled pumps, making cargo operations to tankers, barges and trucks impossible. CART was updated to reflect all EEIs (facilities, ATON and waterways) as Not Available/NA. The cruise ship NORWEGIAN GEM reported that her stores were low and reaching critical levels. On the shore side, New York City Economic Development Corporation reported that Manhattan Cruise Terminal s Pier 88 was ready to receive the vessel. The Captain of the Port determined that the cruise ship could enter port after surveys were conducted of the waterways from sea to the Manhattan Cruise Terminal. This survey work received the highest priority. Multiple Coast Guard assets including Coast Guard Cutters (CGC) KATHERINE WALKER, HAWSER and WILLOW, all ATON-servicing platforms, were mobilized to put critical ATON back on station and continue post-storm ATON assessments. The MTS-RU worked with SECNY Logistics Coordinator, LT Ken Sauerbrunn, to locate facilities undamaged by the storm to receive the cutters. All ATON discrepancy reports were received by BM1 Lehansky, who coordinated with the cutters to begin repairing and re-stationing the critical aids the following day. Of the 142 critical ATON listed in CART, only 12 were found discrepant. Calls from the New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and the Mayor s office added pressure to get passenger ferries running. Hurricane Sandy caused widespread flooding in many of the subway tunnels connecting Brooklyn to Manhattan as well as the tunnels between New Jersey and Manhattan. The closure of all subways and ferries was severely impacting the economic system of the City of New York. The New York Stock Exchange, which had been closed Monday and Tuesday, was scheduled to re-open for normal business hours by Wednesday. Passenger ferry operator New York Waterway (NYWW) was contacted and indicated that, with permission from the Captain of the Port, they could begin operating between Weehawken, NJ and Lower Manhattan. This offered some relief as the New Jersey Light Rail PATH trains, which transport some 10,000 passengers in the morning commute hours, was also not running due to flood damage. Using reports from both SHP and NYWW, the MTS-RU recommended to the COTP that NYWW be allowed to operate in the approved routes during daylight hours only at a reduced speed with lookouts onboard. Coast Guard personnel would ride along the next morning to observe operations and prevent overcrowding of the vessels. Many additional salvage reports were flooding the MTS-RU; tug operators were reporting shipping containers aground and in the high traffic channels. SHP, upon completion of their harbor assessment, struck an unknown submerged object in the middle of the anchorage channel and had to return to homeport. The JOHN B. CADDELL, a single-hull oil tanker built in 1941, was reported aground on Front Street, Staten Island. The SECNY Vessel Assessment Group began coordinating with salvage groups in the area to stabilize derelict vessels and minimize pollution within the port. NOAA assets were deployed to begin surveying the harbor for underwater objects. LCDR Morrissey coordinated with LT Pounds to identify 14 segments of the - 5 -

7 harbor, anchorages, and rivers that would require surveys. These segments were prioritized based on economic impact to the port and the necessity to get vessels transiting the harbor as soon as safely possible. Later that evening, LT Pounds and Mr. Kyle Ward of NOAA received confirmation from NRT-5 and NRT-2 that no anomalies in data had been discovered in the first sections surveyed, including Lower and Upper Bay and the Hudson River up to Pier 92. Wednesday, October 31 The morning MTS-RU telecon was conducted via mobile phone; power and landlines were still not operable. The Coast Guard reported no significant damage to the areas surveyed north of the George Washington Bridge on the Hudson River. NOAA s NRT-5 commenced surveys within the Verrazano Narrows and adjacent anchorages as NRT-2 and THOMAS JEFFERSON were still en route. ACOE also reported that the vessel DOBRIN would be supporting channel surveys although finding fuel and a suitable launch site were proving to be logistically challenging. Container and petroleum facilities still reported having no power but were employing labor to begin clean ups in anticipation of power restoration by the weekend. New York Container Terminal (NYCT) on Staten Island, NY and Red Hook Container Terminal in Brooklyn, NY were the only two container facilities reporting missing containers; however, assessing the lost inventory would be nearly impossible until power was restored. PANYNJ indicated that the shore side operations, primarily truck traffic, would be ready before pier side operations to begin moving cargo that was shipped prior to the storm by means of trucks. Three additional Coast Guard personnel arrived in the morning to assist the MTS-RU. LT Whitney Griffin of Sector Boston s Contingency Planning Division, LTJG Terence Leahy of District One s Prevention Department (dpw) and ENS Elizabeth Morris of Sector Northern New England s WWM Division. LT Griffin paired with ENS Gainor to both monitor the MTS-RU Gmail account for incoming information as well as keep CART EEIs and Report Summaries current. LTJG Leahy, a prior enlisted Marine Science Technician Second Class (MST2) and ENS Morris were directed to begin tracking the shipping containers reported aground and in the channel. The two worked with the Marine Environmental Response Unit Leader, Marine Safety Technician Chief Petty Officer (MSTC) Michael Goglia, to assess any containers that might contain hazardous material.. The oil spills in the Arthur Kill further impacted the weakened MTS. Petroleum vessels arriving in the Port of New York/New Jersey normally transit the Kill Van Kull (KVK), turn left and enter the Arthur Kill (AK) to dock at the major facilities to offload products like gasoline and diesel. The first spill, approximately 3,360 gallons (80 barrels) of product at the Phillips 66/Bayway facility, was reported contained with hard boom. Farther south, the KMI Carteret facility reported 10,000 gallons (238 barrels) of biodiesel in the water from a tank that had been lifted off its foundation and severely damaged in the storm. Last and farthest south along the AK, Motiva Sewaren reported 394,800 gallons (9400 barrels) of product in the water. Due to the complex nature and immense area of the spills, the Coast Guard s Atlantic Strike Team was - 6 -

8 deployed to respond and coordinate with over 150 contracted personnel to begin cleaning up the sensitive marine environment along the AK. Thursday, November 1 The official opening of the port with restrictions (Post HURCON Yankee) was for passenger ferries on Thursday morning. NYWW ferries began shuttling passengers between New Jersey and Lower Manhattan at All critical ATON that was reported as discrepant had been rectified by Coast Guard assets. However, the need to get gasoline into the port immediately was grossly apparent to the entire MTS-RU; morning headlines featured gas station lines up to five hours long in parts of New York and New Jersey. Residents forced to evacuate, unable to return home, were commuting longer than normal from distant relatives homes, hotels and shelters. Additionally, with New York City subway service still not at full capacity more people were driving; the tunnels still being pumped and repaired resulted in widespread gridlock in the city. It was recommended to the COTP that barges and tugs with petroleum products only be allowed to transit the harbor based on the initial assessments of the SHP and NYWW ferry operators. Other than scattered debris fields there did not appear to be major obstructions in the channels for non-deep draft vessels. This was approved and published in the Homeport website and announced on marine VHF channels again through VTS. The VTS provided the MTS-RU with hourly updates to the barge traffic, including destination and product quantity; many of the barges were bound for New Haven, Boston and Long Island. These barges not only supply local residents but also transport petrochemical products to other parts of the northeast, so Hurricane Sandy s impact was impacting the region beyond the NY/NJ metro area. Additionally, all vessel traffic north of the George Washington Bridge was opened to relieve the gas shortage in cities along the Hudson River such as Newburgh, Kingston and Albany. There was still no indication of when power would be restored to the major petroleum facilities along the KVK. The MTS-RU had been reaching out to individual facilities to assess the extent of their damage and was now working to find alternative solutions to the gas crisis. One initial plan was to lighter from tank ships to barges and then move the barges to piers that were undamaged, such as at APM Container Terminal. Barges could then conduct over-the-top transfer to individual fuel trucks, a process in which the product is taken directly from the barge to the truck, eliminating the facility altogether. The plan was not implemented, as there were too few barges and trucks available to bring the necessary amount of gasoline to the region. Using reports from the facility operations manager, LTJG Castro discovered that IMTT Bayonne had minimal damage to its docks but badly needed power restored to begin testing critical cargo operations equipment. IMTT Bayonne was uniquely positioned away from reported containers in the waterway near New York Container Terminal and the three oil spills in the AK, making it the most viable option to receive large gasoline-filled tankers first. Although IMTT is a bulk-in bulkout facility, meaning it can only offload cargo to barges and not trucks, it was the best option to begin the flow of gasoline and diesel back into the port

9 LT Hillary Allegretti contacted LCDR Brian Moore, Coast Guard Liaison to the FEMA National Response Call Center (NRCC) in Washington D.C. to coordinate the appropriation of a generator for IMTT. A teleconference with the Department of Energy (DOE), ACOE and FEMA helped clarify both the urgent need for the generator as well as which agency would provide the equipment. Ultimately it was decided that the ACOE would send a team to assess the site Friday morning. Coordination between the U.S. Navy and the ACOE survey boats ensured safe berthing for USS WASP, SAN ANTONIO and CARTER HALL at Naval Weapons Station Earle (NWSE). These vessels brought humanitarian aid to the residents of New York and New Jersey and also assisted in offshore High Interest Vessel (HIV) boardings of foreign-flagged vessels destined for the port. HIV boardings are normally carried out by the SECNY maritime law enforcement division; however, most personnel were already responding in other capacities to the hurricane. Friday, November 2 Three cruise ships with over 10,00 passengers were the first deep draft vessels permitted to enter the Port of New York/New Jersey following Hurricane Sandy: NORWEGIAN GEM, CARIBBEAN PRINCESS and BRILLIANCE OF THE SEAS. This could only be accomplished with close coordination between SECNY and NY/NJ Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) whose agents were also working to return to pre-hurricane operations. Sandy wreaked havoc on the regional headquarters in Lower Manhattan as well as individual terminal computers and processing equipment. NOAA surveys of the Hudson River, East River, Gravesend Anchorage, and Anchorage 21C were complete with more scheduled throughout the day including Buttermilk Channel, KVK and Newark Bay. The Post-HURCON Yankee advisory, published at approximately 1332 local time, opened the port to all commercial vessel transits with the exception of the AK south of the Goethals Bridge (due to ongoing pollution recovery), Bay Ridge and Red Hook Channels (due to submerged containers near Red Hook). All commercial vessels with an approved berth at a facility or with permission to lighter had to coordinate movement with VTS. Additionally all recreational vessels seeking safe haven were permitted to transit the port. Staten Island Ferry was able to resume limited operations. Two slips were available at the Manhattan/Whitehall and Staten Island/St. George terminals but without electricity to power the elevators it could not accept passengers on wheelchairs. Inspected passenger vessels, including Statue and Circle Line Cruises, were also granted permission to operate by the COTP. Still, as each day passed without power and gas, tension within the port continued to grow. A nor easter predicted to bring high winds, rain, sleet and snow to the devastated region was adding insult to injury; preparations for heavy weather in the port commenced, though significantly less than those required for a hurricane. The MTS-RU promulgated a Coast Guard Advisory Notice to notify mariners of the approaching storm.. SECNY s power was now fully restored and CG WSIII was back online. The MTS-RU continued to liaise with FEMA for the IMTT generator but the process was slow as it proved - 8 -

10 difficult to even get the ACOE assessment team to the site with highway traffic and the fuel shortage. Even after the ACOE site assessment team arrived it determined that it could not provide a generator of the size or specifications to recover cargo operations. MTS-RU members made continuous phone calls to individual petroleum facilities and determined that by Friday morning, ten out of 35 facilities south of Albany were accepting barge and truck transfers; none of the bulk tanker facilities were operational. By now the highest levels of government were trying to assess the timeline for getting the petroleum facilities back to fully operational but without any updates on power restoration it was only speculation. Under the direction of President Obama, the MTS-RU appointed three liaison officers (LNOs) to make site visits to each of the DOE Big 12. The DOE Big 12 were the bulk petroleum facilities supplied by either the Colonial or Buckeye pipelines or had the capacity to conduct cargo operations with tanker vessels. The purpose of the site visit was to assess how much product each facility currently had and when they could resume transfer of petroleum products. The LNOs were also paired with SECNY Facility Inspectors who were more familiar with the facilities and personnel. Initial contact with the facility managers indicated that the information the government requested was actually proprietary; most were not eager to share it. The DOE Big Twelve Facility LNO SECNY Inspector IMTT Bayonne CDR Antonellis MST2 Shepard BP Carteret CDR Antonellis MST2 Shepard Hess Port Redding CDR Antonellis MST2 Shepard Phillips 66/Bayway CDR Lattanzi MSTC Dore Phillips 66 Tremley Point CDR Lattanzi MSTC Dore Motiva Sewaren CDR Lattanzi MSTC Dore KMI Carteret CDR Leonard MK2 Gliddon KMI Perth Amboy CDR Leonard MK2 Gliddon KMI Staten Island CDR Leonard MK2 Gliddon Buckeye Perth Amboy CDR Leonard MK2 Gliddon Citgo Linden CDR Leonard MK2 Gliddon Nu-Star Linden CDR Leonard MK2 Gliddon As the LNOs and Inspectors met with facility representative, the information was sent directly to CDR Sean Carroll, the LNO Coordinator for District One. Transitioning the Port from Recovery Back to Normal Operations: Saturday, November 3 NOAA survey vessels completed all requested channel surveys and received new tasking. They completed surveys of Bay Ridge Channel and Red Hook Channel, and then focused on areas where visual and survey data indicated the potential for sunken containers: Governor s Island and surrounding waters, Bay Ridge Flats and the East River. The MTS-RU continued to update Port Partners and government officials regarding the status of petroleum and container facility openings. LT Griffin and ENS Gainor created a simple Microsoft Word document that captured the status of all petroleum and container facilities, opened and closed, as well as notes on when the facility may re-open and what damage it - 9 -

11 incurred from the storm. In addition to facility information, the information sheet captured vessel arrival information from the Ship Arrival Notification System (SANS). All inbound petrochemical, cruise and container ships were included for the awareness of upper level Coast Guard and government officials. This information sheet was published four times a day at approximately 0700, 1100, 1430 and Sunday, November 4 MTS-RU Port Partners were eager to report that power had been restored overnight to major container terminals and that equipment tests were underway to determine storm damage. APM and Maher Container Terminal in Elizabeth, NJ opened the gates of the facility to truck traffic to begin moving containers out to their destinations, which had stopped before Hurricane Sandy made landfall back on Monday evening. Since not all power had been restored there were some issues with the traffic signal lights, but facilities worked around it by employing traffic directors at major intersections. The 1630 MTS-RU Port Facility and Vessel Arrival Status Sheet indicated that 35 of the 65 petroleum facilities throughout the entire SECNY area of responsibility were at least partially or fully available. This included IMTT Bayonne (on generator power, though not one supplied by FEMA/ACOE), KMI Carteret, BP Carteret and Phillips 66/Bayway of the DOE Big 12. The port continued preparations for the impending nor easter that was predicted to have sustained winds between knots and gusts upwards of 50 knots. Monday, November 5 (Veteran s Day) and Beyond LTJG Castro continued to call individual petroleum and container facilities to keep CART EEIs and the Port Facility and Vessel Arrival Information Sheet up-to-date and to capture any changes. Some facilities that were reported online with generators were now offline and others had received power back over the weekend. Six of the seven container terminals in the Port of NY/NJ were now reported to be partially or fully available and all were accepting vessels for cargo operations. LT Allegretti contacted the majority of Public Access Facilities (PAFs) and Passenger Vessel Terminals. Most of the PAFs incurred minor damage and were only waiting for power to be restored to their respective substations. One of the largest passenger ferry terminals, Seastreak New Jersey in Atlantic Highlands, NJ had been demolished by the storm. However, Seastreak was conducting a hydrographic survey through a private surveyor of their waterway and had contracted a deck barge and temporary gangway to load passengers and begin transporting them to Lower Manhattan once the nor easter passed. The Hoboken Train Terminal (also known as Lakawanna Terminal), which is perhaps NYWW s busiest terminal because it is a hub for ferries, buses and the NJ PATH train, was deemed a critical asset for restoration by the President. ACOE worked with NYWW to ensure the proper equipment was provided so that ferry service resumed on Monday

12 By Wednesday, November 7 five containers had been recovered by a contracted salvage company Resolve Marine Group. Three additional containers were reported as high priority for removal in the vicinity of Riker s Island, another near Governor s Island and four other low priority containers that were discovered by the survey assets but were submerged. All were well out of the way of the major shipping channel and posed no immediate threat to vessel traffic in the port. As terminals and facilities came back online following power restoration, MTS-RU operations slowed significantly. On Thursday, November 8, the Sector New York MTS-RU demobilized and recovery duties were handed back to their rightful owners within the SECNY construct. These duties included vessel traffic management to VTS, facility status updates and individual damage assessments to the Shore Side Compliance Branch, vessel salvage to the Marine Inspectors, and ATON, waterway and bridge updates to Waterways Management. Conclusion: The destruction caused by Hurricane Sandy to the Port of NY/NJ was unimaginable; the landscape and people were changed forever. However, with persistent preparation and the ability to see gaps in resources and personnel, the SECNY MTS-RU was able to recover the marine transportation system and restart the supply of critical goods, including petroleum, back to the port five days after Hurricane Sandy made landfall. With clear vision and communication both internally and with Port Partners, who worked tirelessly to get their facilities operational, the SECNY MTS-RU can offer many lessons learned for effective, efficient and safe port recovery