REPORT General Cargo Vessel SOLVITA J8B Grounding on July 11, 2003

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1 REPORT General Cargo Vessel SOLVITA J8B Grounding on July 11,

2 REPORT General Cargo Vessel SOLVITA J8B Grounding on July 11, 2003 Our reference: Maritime Casualty Investigation Division: Sten Andersson, The report can also be read in Swedish on our web-site (Sjöfartsinspektionen/Fartygsolycksutredningar/ Haverirapporter) Reprint permitted provided stating of source SJÖFARTSVERKET SE NORRKÖPING Sweden Phone: +46 (0) Fax: +46 (0)

3 Table of Contents 1. Summary Account of facts The vessel The crew The weather The traffic separation scheme (TSS) in northern Öresund Course of events Course of events up till the grounding Course of events after the grounding Analysis Manning on the bridge Courses and speeds Cause Remarks General recommendation Damages Miscellaneous Influence of alcohol Actions taken in Sweden Action taken by the flag state Results of the investigation Enclosures: Excerpt from nautical charts

4 1. Summary The general cargo vessel Solvita, registered in St. Vincent & the Grenadines, was on its way from Riga, Latvia, to Seaham, England, loaded with packaged timber. When the ship was just north of Helsingborg, Sweden, the Naval Control Öresund noted that it steered strangely before it grounded on the Hittarp Reef approx. 3 M (nautical mile = 1852 metres) north of the port entrance of Helsingborg (see chart excerpt). They called the ship who answered that everything onboard was under control and that she was heading north at 9 knots. When the Swedish Coast Guard went onboard after the grounding, which took place on July 11, 2003, at 2230 h in position N E , the engine control was still at full speed ahead in spite of the fact that the ship had been grounded for quite a while. The Swedish Coast Guard noted that all three officers onboard were severely drunk and police took them into custody. It has not been possible to establish who was in command at the time of grounding. After the Solvita was taken afloat she was brought, with a pilot s assistance, to Helsingborg where inspection was carried out by divers and new officers came onboard. 2. Account of facts 2.1 The vessel Name: SOLVITA IMO No.: Call sign: Port of registry: J8B2235 Kingstown Gross tonnage: 1707 Deadweight: 2703 tonnes Page 1

5 Length over all: Breadth: Draught: Classification society: 73 meters 13.2 meters 5.2 meters Lloyd s Register of Shipping Year built: 1977 Construction material: Propulsion power: Steel 1092 kw Crew: 7 The Solvita was built in 1977 at Bodewes Gruno in Foxhol, Netherlands, for Dutch shipowners and was named Procyon. The vessel was set under Dutch flag, in 1984 she became Irish and in 2000 she was under English flag. In the beginning of 2001 the vessel got its present name and was registered in the ships register of St. Vincent & the Grenadines. In between the ship has also been named Arklow Valley, Rockpoint and Solway Fisher. The superstructure, with crew areas and bridge, was situated in the aft end of the weather deck with the engine room beneath. From the bridge the visibility was very good, since no equipment for loading and unloading blocked the view. A foremast that did not interfere with the view was at the very stem. Nor did the deck cargo, which was stowed three packages high on the hatch covers, hamper the visibility from the bridge, which was located around the centreline of the vessel with a fully 2 metres wide open bridge wing on each side. The navigation equipment was of conventional design. The most interesting instruments, considering the event, was a radar of make Decca Bridgemaster, two GPS receivers, one of make Furuno GPS/WAAS Navigator GP 32, the second one of make Koden GPS Navigator KGP-913 and finally an automatic steering control of make Robertson AP 45. Page 2

6 The engine room was located under the superstructure. The propulsion machinery consisted of an 8 cylinder MWM (Motoren Werke Mannheim AG), which made 1092 kw and was connected to a propeller with fixed propeller blades. The ship s maximum speed was about 11 knots. Ahead of the engine room was the cargo space, which consisted of just one big cargo hold, 49.8 meter long. It was covered with two hatch covers of steel with a length of 21.4 m and 20.9 m respectively and a width of 10.2 m. Under the cargo hold ahead from the engine room was the double bottom, which was divided into tanks for ballast, fuel and fresh water. 2.2 The crew The crew consisted of 7 persons - the master, the chief officer, the chief engineer, one galley steward, one boatswain and two able seamen. They were all Latvian citizens. The master and the chief officer split the watches between them in six hours intervals. Changing of the watch normally took place at 2000 h in the evening and at 0200 h in the night. It was established that the boatswain and the two able seamen shared the look-out task. The chief engineer was on duty. According to him this means that he had to visit the engine room for control of the equipment every fourth hour when the vessel was seagoing. All equipment in the engine room as well as on the bridge seems to have been in good working order. 2.3 The weather At the grounding the wind was west-north-westerly, 4 B with good visibility. The current was weak and southbound. During the night the wind increased to 6 B. The water level, read at the lighthouse Svinbådan 3.7 M from the grounding site, was at midnight 27 cm above mean sea level, sank to 15 cm above but had risen again to 31 cm above at 0400 h. Page 3

7 2.4 The traffic separation scheme (TSS) in northern Öresund Due to heavy traffic in northern Öresund a TSS has been set up in order to separate northbound ships from southbound traffic. The outer boundary for northbound traffic is marked with red coloured buoys, named E7 to E2 counted from the south, showing red light. The corresponding buoys for the southbound traffic are green, named W1 to W7 counted from the north. These buoys show green light. Between the two traffic lanes there is a separation zone about 1 cable length (185 m) wide, which is marked with buoys named M7 to M1 counted from the south. These buoys show white light. The separation zone is not intended for ships traffic. However, when a ship is obliged to cross a traffic lane it shall cross on a heading as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow.. In the southern traffic lane the main direction for northbound traffic is 342 and changes to 313 at buoy M4. The M4 is equipped with a radar function, which means that it gives a signal when hit by a radar pulse. The signal is shown on the radar screen as a Morse symbol going out radially from the echo. The M4 sent the letter T, which in the Morse alphabet is a long signal. The signal is sent once every 30th second. The light house character of the M4 was Iso 2 s, which means that during a period of two seconds the buoy is lit for one second. The traffic separation scheme in northern Öresund is about 10.5 M long. 3. Course of events 3.1 Course of events up till the grounding The Solvita left Riga, Latvia, for Seaham, England, on at 1415 h, loaded with packaged timber in the cargo hold as well as on the hatch covers. Page 4

8 The crossing of the Baltic went smooth and at 2000 h two days later the vessel passed Copenhagen. The continued voyage was watched on radar by Danish authorities since they thought the ship acted strangely. Also the Naval Coast Guard in Malmö were watching the ship on their radar. According to the plot presented by the Naval Radar Information Centre, which was included in the police investigation, the Solvita passed the buoy M4 on the wrong side, which means that the ship for a short period was in the southbound traffic lane. Then her course varied a lot, from 340 to 316, which from the M4 gave the ship an average course of approximately 333, a deviation from the traffic direction of the lane of 20. At 2233 h the Solvita run aground in position N E on the Hittarp Reef, a little less than one nautical mile south of Domsten port. 3.2 Course of events after the grounding The Swedish Coast Guard vessel KBV 048 was instructed to go to the site. On its way out the KBV 048 could hear a pilot-boat from Helsingborg call the Solvita, who claimed not to have any problems. Upon arrival at 2353 h the KBV 048 however found that the vessel was grounded, that the motor was still running and that the propeller was running ahead. Shortly thereafter a reverse manoeuvre was made. At the same time the KBV 048 called the Solvita who answered that there was something wrong with the automatic steering and that the speed was 9 knots. The KBV 048 requested the Solvita to stop the propeller, which was immediately done. At 0025 h two men from the KBV 048 boarded the ship. They found that the master, the chief officer and the chief engineer were severely drunk. It could not be settled who had been on the bridge at the grounding. When the Swedish Coast Guard boarded the ship the radar was found at relative motion north up and the scale was 3 M. The speed 9 knots had been set manually. The two GPSs showed position N E Page 5

9 At 0045 h a pilot boarded the Solvita and one hour later the police came. The chief officer tried to make calculations on the stability of the vessel before taking her afloat, but did not manage. The wind increased from west-north-west and at 0430 h an attempt was made to back off the ground, without success. At the next attempt, 20 minutes later, the vessel turned from 330 to 10. By then also a ship surveyor was onboard. At 0510 h the Solvita was afloat and was taken to the South port of Helsingborg, where she was moored at 0633 h. The police took the three officers into custody. A diver inspection established that the vessel had suffered no damage. New officers came onboard and the voyage continued to Seaham. 4. Analysis 4.1 Manning on the bridge According to the chief engineer the master generally was on watch between 2000 h and 0200 h. The chief engineer was called by the able seaman, who told him that the ship was aground. When the chief engineer came to the bridge only the able seaman was there. The two navigation officers onboard, the master and the chief officer, both claimed that the other one was on watch. The chief officer said that he had left the bridge at 2100 h, when the master and the boatswain were on watch. The master claimed that he had been called by the chief officer who informed that they had run aground. He also claimed that he had been on watch between 1900 and 2300 h. The chief officer had informed him that the grounding took place at 0015 h, but it happened in fact at 2233 h. One of the able seamen on watch was relieved by the boatswain at 1900 h. He was called again at 2330 h, and when he came to the bridge the chief officer was there. The ship was on automatic steering and the able seaman was ordered to change the course when the ship would arrive at a mark Page 6

10 which the chief officer had made in the chart. He also claimed to have changed the course. Five minutes later the chief officer left the bridge since he was tired. After another few minutes the able seaman noted that there was something wrong with the instruments, which he then informed the chief officer. It seems as if the ship was already grounded when the able seaman came to the bridge at 2330 h and had been so for almost one hour. The boatswain stated that he was at the helm on the bridge between 1900 h and 2300 h. When he went to call the able seaman the automatic steering was set. When he left the bridge at 2310 h the chief officer and the able seaman were there. It seems as if none of the persons onboard was aware that the ship had run aground and that the able seaman, almost one hour after the accident, was the first to notice. It has not been possible to settle with certainty who was on the bridge during the evening and night. 4.2 Courses and speeds It is not likely that the bridge has been unmanned. This presumption is based on the radar plot from the Naval Radar Information Centre in Malmö. From the plot can be seen that a number of course changes have been made. This means that the information given by the boatswain regarding the steering may be correct. The course had evidently been changed by someone either at the automatic steering or at the helm. The radar does not have automatic information on speed, for example feeding from the GPS. Therefore the speed of 9 knots has been manually set. This is the speed which was presented on the radar display and which was shown no matter what speed the vessel did in reality. It was also the speed which was mentioned when the Solvita was called on the VHF. The ship was then already aground at a speed which unquestionably must have been 0 knots. It is surprising that the grounding was not noted promptly, since the temperature of the main engine probably has risen notably due to increased Page 7

11 resistance. Higher exhaust temperatures should have activated the alarms, which should have sounded in the engine room and on the bridge. 5. Cause The cause of the grounding was that the officers onboard could not fulfil their obligations since they were under the influence of alcohol. 6. Remarks * Due to the fact that the officers were drunk the ship was run in a way that made authorities suspicious in Denmark as well as in Sweden. * The Solvita passed the buoy M4 on the wrong side and was for a short while also in the southbound lane. * Obviously none of the ship officers were aware of the Solvita s operations. Thus the ship has been a danger to other traffic in the area. * The shipping company did not have a drug and alcohol policy. 7. General recommendation All shipping companies should implement a drug and alcohol policy. 8. Damages So far as it is known there are no damages to persons, environment or the ship. 9. Miscellaneous 9.1 Influence of alcohol Two blood tests were made on the master at 0910 h and 1020 h, about 11 and 12 hours respectively after the grounding. The average value for the first test was 1.77 and for the second one 1.58 permillage of ethyl alcohol Page 8

12 in the blood. Both tests have been reduced by and percentage of alcohol respectively, which means that the concentration of alcohol in the tests with 99.9 % certainty was no less than the two stated results. Two blood tests were also made on the chief engineer at 1030 h and 1130 h, about 12 and 13 hours after the accident. The average value of the tests was 1.99 and 1.84 percentage of ethyl alcohol in the blood. The two tests have been reduced by and percentage of alcohol respectively. This means that the concentration of alcohol in the tests with 99.9 % certainty was no less than the two stated results. Exhalation tests for alcohol were made on the chief officer at 0854 h and 0856 h, about 10.5 hours after the grounding. At that time there was no concentration of alcohol in his exhalation. 9.2 Actions taken in Sweden The police took the three officers into custody when the ship arrived in the port of Helsingborg. Later on the master and the chief engineer were sentenced by the district court to 3 months in jail for serious drunkenness. The chief officer was found not guilty. At estimation of the penalty consideration was taken that the two sentenced to jail most likely will be separated from their positions. 9.3 Action taken by the flag state After having made an International Safety Management (ISM) audit the Administration of the flag state imposed a fine of 1000 USD on the shipping company for not having implemented a drug and alcohol policy onboard. Also the shipping company got a warning. In case of another serious violation they will not be allowed to register their ships in the register of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Administration of Latvia, who have issued the competence certificates for the three officers, have been informed in case they should wish to take any measures. Page 9

13 They have also been informed that the three officers are not allowed to sail in ships registered in the register of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. No endorsements in accordance with the STCW 95 will be issued. 10. Results of the investigation * The equipment onboard seems to have functioned without remarks. * The weather and currents have not caused any problems. * The three officers onboard were severely drunk when the Swedish Coast Guard boarded the ship. * The remaining four persons onboard were sober, in the opinion of the Swedish Coast Guard personnel. * The ship was grounded for almost one hour without anyone onboard being aware of this fact. * It has not been possible to settle who was on the bridge at the time of the grounding. * The accident did not result in any damage. * The ship was refloated and brought to Helsingborg with a pilot onboard. The police took the three officers into custody. Page 10

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REPORT General Cargo Vessel MEG - UBFH - Grounding on October 15th, 2002

REPORT General Cargo Vessel MEG - UBFH - Grounding on October 15th, 2002 2003-01-15 REPORT General Cargo Vessel MEG - UBFH - Grounding on October 15th, 2002 Our reference: 080202-02-17572 Maritime Casualty