REPORT. Dry Cargo Vessel OOSTERBRUG PJCQ - grounding in Malmö September 16, Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate

Transcription

1 REPORT Dry Cargo Vessel OOSTERBRUG PJCQ - grounding in Malmö September 16, 2003 Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate

2 REPORT Dry Cargo Vessel OOSTERBRUG PJCQ - Grounding in Malmö September 16, 2003 Our reference: Maritime Casualty Investigation Division: Jörgen Zachau, The report can also be - Sjöfartsinspektionen - read in Swedish on - Fartygsutredningar Haverirapporter (press +) our web-site May be reprinted provided that the source is stated SWEDISH MARITIME SAFETY INSPECTORATE SE NORRKÖPING Sweden Phone: Fax:

3 Table of Contents Summary... 1 Account of facts... 1 The vessel... 1 The chart and the port (see chart enclosure)... 2 The crew... 4 The weather... 4 Course of events... 4 The master s description... 5 The cadet s report... 6 The pilot upon arrival... 6 The pilot at the warping... 6 Agent at the discharge... 7 Agent at the loading... 7 Analysis... 7 The chart... 8 Causes... 8 Damages... 8 Miscellaneous... 9 Recommendations... 9 Remarks... 9 Results of the Investigation... 9 Enclosures: Excerpt from nautical charts Swedish 9211 and British 911

4 Summary In the afternoon of September 16, 2003 the Oosterbrug left berth 901 in Malmö. Its intention was to round the lighthouse, which marked the site of what the master understood to be the unfinished pier being built at the port entrance (see chart extract). The sun was low and dazzled the persons on the bridge. The pier was in fact ready and caused the master instead to bring the vessel to round the lighthouse Malmö Vågbrytarbank. He was disoriented when the reality was not what he expected. Before he had time to realize the actual situation the vessel had passed the fairway and grounded on Råttefällan in position N 55 37',41 E ',91 at about 1720 hours. The reasons for the accident is considered to be inadequate planning and omission to use more than one method for positioning in combination with chart deficiencies, dazzling sun and lack of look-out. Account of facts The vessel Name: OOSTERBRUG IMO No.: Call sign: Port of registry: PJCQ Willemstadt Gross tonnage: 2545 Length over all: Breadth: 88.6 metres 12.6 metres Draught: Max. 5.42, actual F: 5.0 A: 5.8 Classification society: Lloyd s Register of Shipping Year built: 2001 Construction material: Propulsion power: Crew: Steel 1520 kw 7 (6 + 1 cadet) Page 1

5 The Oosterbrug was a dry cargo vessel of conventional type with the cargo hold situated ahead of the engine room. On top of the engine room was the deck house with crew areas and navigation bridge. There was no equipment to block the view, such as cranes, etc. The vessel was registered in the Netherlands Antilles. The vessel had one propeller with fixed blades, connected to a main engine of make MAK, making max 11 knots. The rudder was of a type, which normally could be angled at 35 each way, but in low speed as far as 60. There was also a bow thruster. Equipment on the bridge which is of special interest under the circumstances is an echo sounder Furuno FE-c700, GPS Litton Marine Systems LMX-420 (which automatically gave the position to the radar) and two radar equipments Decca Bridgemaster E Litton Marine Systems (one set at 0.5 M [nautical mile 1852 metres] the other one at 0.75 M), all of which are said to have been operating on the occasion. The steering could be switched between manual and automatic steering. This was the only possibility, i.e. there was no real risk for a mistake. On the occasion the manual steering was connected and both steering gears in operation. All equipments are said to have been in good order and well functioning. On voyage from Lisbon to Lysekil, Sweden, in February 2002 the vessel had got a break-down on the fuel pump and had to berth for repair, but could continue on the same day. The Oosterbrug has since June 2002 had three port state controls but not been subject to deficiencies or detentions. The latest control was carried out in Malmö a few days before the grounding. The Oosterbrug was too short for compulsory pilotage, which is 90 m. Nonetheless the vessel had a pilot upon its arrival to Frihamnen, berth 614, on September 10 and also during the subsequent shifting to Industrihamnen (berth 901). No pilot was on board at departure when the grounding took place. The chart and the port (see chart enclosure) From berth 901 in Industrihamnen the exit leads between two pier heads to an outer harbour basin, Södra Bulkhamnen (earlier called Industrirännan). Page 2

6 The length of this passage is abt. 1 M. In the innermost (eastern) part of this outer harbour basin two lights mark a leading line (082.5 /262.5 ), which in turn shows the middle of the harbour basin. Buoys and beacons mark off the two sides. The western limit of the harbour basin is marked by two buoys (Malmö No. 1 and Malmö No. 2), which also represent the limit of the fairway to Malmö (Centralhamnsrännan = Central Port Channel) on its northeastern side. In order to get out of the port one thus has to turn to starboard to course into Centralhamnsrännan when passing the two buoys. In the northern corner of the outer part of the harbour basin and the northeastern part of Centralhamnsrännan is an area which is being filled up. From the shore, direction north-south abt. 0.3 M from Centralhamnsrännan, there is a breakwater, which runs from abt. 0.2 M north of the passage in Södra Bulkhamnen to abt M to westsouthwest. From there the breakwater on the whole runs straight to the south for another 0.1 M. The outermost part of the harbour bar was completed in 1999, a fact that has been duly reported in Ufs 49/1999 (Underrättelser för sjöfarande = Swedish Notices For Mariners) as notice No. 1297/99. In the chart on board (the British BA 911) this outermost part was marked as being under construction. On the opposite side (the south-western part) of Centralhamnsrännan, outside the demarcation, which consists of green buoys and beacons, commences a shallow part called Råttefällan. Slightly more than 0.1 M further to the southwest there is a breakwater under the surface, which stretches 327. abt M from the shore. It ends at and encircles the lighthouse Malmö Vågbrytarbank, which is situated a good 0.12 M southwest of the fairway. As from 1999 the Swedish Ufs (Swedish Notices For Mariners) are also published in English. The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO, publisher of the British charts) have access to Ufs, for example via the Internet, and use them for corrections in their charts. The chart which was used on board (BA 911) was marked reprinted 1999 and with the latest correction 2002:4437. It was bought in August 2003 for the voyage to Malmö. The corrections were thus made before delivery. According to the home page of UKHO this is the latest issue. None of the corrections on the home page states that the outermost part of Page 3

7 the breakwater is ready. However, the Swedish notices /99 and 1342/99 are included (in the British Notice to Mariners, NMs, 2000:606) i.e. notices which precede and follow, respectively, the Swedish notice 1297/99. The crew The crew was Russian, except for the chief engineer, who was from the Ukraine. The two navigators, the master and the chief officer were on watch six-bysix with relieves generally counted from 1200 hours. The master was on watch in the morning and in the evening, and the chief officer had the other watches. The master was an experienced and skilled officer, but this was his first engagement as a master. He had been on board for three months. The cadet (i.e. deck officer apprentice) had altogether been at sea for twelve months. This was his third vessel and he had been on board the Oosterbrug for 4.5 months. The deck crew, including the master, had been working normal daytime hours during the last days, i.e. between 0700 and 1700 hours, also in the latest 24 hours. The weather The weather was fair and not much wind (less than 3 m/sec. or 2 B) The sun was low and came from almost straight ahead. Course of events The Oosterbrug arrived in Malmö on September 10 with steel products and unloaded at quay berth No The vessel had a pilot upon its arrival. On Friday September 12 the vessel was shifted to quay berth No Then a pilot was assisting too. After having loaded wheat the Oosterbrug sailed at about 1700 hours on the 16th. The intention was to go to Copenhagen for bunkering and then via the Skaw to Villa Garcia de Arosa, Spain. This time the vessel did not Page 4

8 have a pilot, since the master s opinion was that he had been advised by the previous pilots and also by the agents to sail without a pilot the passage out of the port was considered to be simple and uncomplicated. On board there was the British chart 911, which the master had studied before sailing. At departure the bridge was manned by the master and the cadet, who served as a helmsman. There was no look-out on the bridge since the weather was fair and the visibility good. At departure both radar equipments and steering gears were in operation. The master found that the sun, which was low, was dazzling him to the extent that it was not possible to see the colour of the buoys, only the outlines. From the chart he had earlier seen that a harbour bar was under construction and that only the first part was completed. He was under the impression that there would be a lighthouse or a light where the harbour bar then would end. That place was a good spot to round on the way to the main fairway from Malmö. His intention was thus to round the lighthouse and then steer course When getting closer to where the harbour basin widens into the bigger harbour area he was disoriented since he found that the surroundings did not correspond to what he expected. The lighthouse he intended to round was further ahead. Before he could orientate himself in the intense sunlight the ship grounded in position N 55 37',41, E ',91. The bearing and distance to the lighthouse he had intended to round was and 0.21 M respectively. The lighthouse was Malmö Vågbrytarbank. After lightening the Oosterbrug was afloat in the morning four days later. She was towed to quay and could continue her voyage after examination and completing cargo handling. The master s description The master had used a pilot for passage into the port and for the shifting. Both pilots had told him that it was not necessary for the vessel to take a pilot. He felt that they advised him not to take a pilot since it was easy to go without one. He had also talked this over with the two agents engaged and felt that they as well had advised him to sail without a pilot. Before the departure he had checked the chart (BA 911) and it looked good. At departure the cadet was at the helm. Both radars, the echo Page 5

9 sounder and the two steering engines were in operation. There was no look-out since the weather was fair and the visibility good. He was dazzled by the sun in his eyes and could not see the colour of the buoys, only the outlines. He saw a lighthouse, which he expected to be the end of the harbour bar to port, which was not yet ready-built according to the chart. He intended to round the lighthouse and continue out into the outward fairway. When the reality did not look as expected he was disoriented, but there was not time enough in this short distance to find the leading lights which should show the correct course. The vessel grounded at a speed of abt. 7.5 knots. The cadet s report The cadet was at the helm and felt that he could handle this task. The master gave the courses and he, the cadet, steered accordingly. It was quite a normal situation until they grounded. The sun was very intense. The pilot upon arrival The pilot noted that the master was not at all familiar with the port. They did not discuss the departure. The master was aware that pilotage was not compulsory. The pilot assumed that the master intended to use a pilot also at departure, although the matter was not discussed. He did not know that the ship later on was to load in Malmö. As to the rest the master made a good impression the pilot was also on board assisting after the grounding and at the towing. The master s actions showed that he was a skilled and competent seafarer. The pilot told the representative of the shipping company, who arrived after the grounding, that in his opinion the master should not be dismissed. The pilot at the shifting The master asked about the limit for pilotage and got the answer that the limit was 90 m length of the ship. The master then said that he intended to leave without a pilot. The pilot replied that this should not be a problem and that the master could leave without a pilot, if he wished. He also Page 6

10 informed the master about VHF Channel 14 and to report to VTS Malmö just before departure. He considers there is no reason for him as a pilot to act so as not to gain pilotage fees. He got the feeling that the master had not really decided after the shifting whether to use a pilot or not. Agent at the discharge The agent at the discharge had contacts (upon arrival) until the other agent took over. His question if the master wanted a pilot was answered in the affirmative. That was the case also at the shifting to 901 later on. Shipping companies are by routine informed if they must have a pilot or not. The agent has not persuaded the master or expressed any direct opinion whether a pilot should be used or not. Agent at the loading The agent asked whether or not a pilot should be engaged for the departure. The master had decided already the day before that he would not need a pilot but a boatman. He had asked if the master felt sure about this; the master had confirmed. The shipping company bears the costs, but there was no reason to save money for the company. Analysis The master decided exclusively to use the chart as the basis when planning the departure. However, he unfortunately assumed that the harbour bar was not completed in spite of the remark in the chart that the area was being reclaimed. He did not secure the navigation by using an alternative way to determine the position where the course should be altered, for example by using the radar to settle a fixed point by bearing and radar distance other than the pier head. Page 7

11 On board there was also a GPS (Global Positioning System, i.e. a satellite navigator). It was not a more exact DGPS (Differential-GPS) as regards the positioning, GPS offers a less exact accuracy. This fact, and the fact that there were a number of high buildings in the surroundings, implying risks for disturbances, leads to the conclusion that it was reasonable not to rely on that instrument. The intense, low sun in combination with the fact that the reality did not correspond to the view the master had imagined from the chart were the reasons why the master was not able to orientate himself in the short time available. An alternative way to settle the position, as well as an active look-out, would have increased the possibilities to find the correct way out. As regards the information that the master should have been persuaded not to use a pilot there is no reason to doubt that he in fact felt that way. However, it seems odd that pilots or agents should have acted the way the master describes. Most probably the master has misinterpreted possible statements made by the pilots and agents. The chart It is quite obvious that the correction announced by the Swedish chart producer has not been introduced in the British charts. The reason why is not known. If the correction had been introduced in the chart the master s uncertainty about the situation would probably not have arisen. Causes The main reason was that alternative methods for settling the position were not prepared. A contributing reason was the incorrect chart. Another contributing reason was the low and dazzling sun. Damages The vessel was still aground in the evening of the 19th, when lightening was started. The following morning she was afloat and towed to dock. Divers made an inspection and the damages were found to be only paint Page 8

12 scrapings and minor dents in the under-water hull. Furthermore there were small scratches on the propeller, but nothing which needed actions to be taken. Hence the Oosterbrug got OK from the Classification Society and could continue her voyage. Miscellaneous After this occurrence the Swedish Maritime Administration s Chart Division specially notified the British chart producer that the harbour bar is completed. The correction has been announced in the British NMs (Notice to Mariners) 5153 and was published on November 14, Recommendations Navigation should never be carried out by means of one method only. There shall be a look-out on the bridge. An active look-out is a good way to prevent accidents. Remarks It is remarkable that the master had not prepared alternative methods to the chart for settling the position. It is also remarkable that the Swedish correction concerning the construction of the harbour bar had not been announced in the British NMs. Results of the Investigation There was no look-out on the bridge at departure. The sun dazzled the persons on the bridge. The harbour bar, which was ready in 1999, was not marked in the chart used. The master did not use alternative navigation methods for settling his position Page 9

13 Top: The Swedish chart 9211, below the British BA 911. The lighthouse Malmö Vågbrytarbank, the route and the scene of the accident marked in green. X Page 10