REPORT Tanker CT SKY SENG - Colliding with Dry Cargo Vessel RMS VOERDE V2AD8 on 25 November, 2003

Transcription

1 REPORT Tanker CT SKY SENG - Colliding with Dry Cargo Vessel RMS VOERDE V2AD8 on Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate

2 REPORT Tanker CT SKY SENG - Colliding with Dry Cargo Vessel RMS VOERDE V2AD8 on Our references: and Maritime Casualty Jörgen Zachau, Investigation Division: The report can also be found in Swedish on our website: Photos: /Sjöfartsinspektionen/Fartygsolycksutredningar/ /Haverirapporter Reprint permitted provided stating of source MDÖ (Marine District The Sound) SWEDISH MARITIME SAFETY INSPECTORATE SE NORRKÖPING Sweden Phone: Fax:

3 Table of Contents Summary... 1 Account of facts... 2 The vessels... 2 The weather conditions... 5 Course of events... 5 According to CT SKY... 5 According to RMS VOERDE... 7 The working time... 8 Analysis... 8 Course of events... 8 Contact between the ships... 9 The regulations... 9 The working time Causes and factors Causes Factors Underlying factors Recommendations Damages Result of the investigation Observations Miscellaneous Enclosures: 1. Extract from the STCW Code, Section A-VIII/2 part Working time journal of the master of RMS VOERDE 3. "Duty watch time and rest time" of the company of RMS VOERDE.

4 Summary Just after 1100 in the morning of, in fine weather with good visibility, the chemical tanker CT SKY collided with the dry cargo vessel RMS VOERDE in position 52 15'.0 N, '.4 E (in the southern North Sea, abt. 20 M [1 nautical mile = metres] northeast of Noord Hinder) by RMS VOERDE running into the port side of the CT SKY nearly at right angles. The collision occurred since none of the OOWs (officers of the watch) took any steps to avoid it. The reason why RMS VOERDE, which was the vessel to take evasive action, did not give way to CT SKY is not known. CT SKY did nothing to avoid the collision since the OOW failed his duty to keep watch. None of the vessels had a lookout besides the OOW on the bridge. There was no communication between the vessels, neither before nor after the collision. The report reveals that violations to the rest hour regulations on board the RMS VOERDE have been systematic. Page 1

5 Account of facts The vessels Name: CT SKY IMO No.: Call sign: Port of registry: SENG Skärhamn, Sweden Gross tonnage: Length over all: Breadth: Draught: Classification society: Year built: Construction material: Propulsion power: m 15.8 m Present: F=3.75, A=5.45 Det Norske Veritas (DNV) 1981 Trondheim, Norway Steel kw Crew: 14 (by decision minimum 11) CT SKY was built in 1981 at Aker Tröndelag A/S in Trondheim, Norway, for Norwegian buyers and was named BRAGE NORDIC. In the period she was called ALPINE ROSE, and then got her original name back. In 1996 the vessel was bought to Sweden by her present owner and got her present name. Under the name BRAGE NORDIC she had a fire in the engine room in 1990 and a grounding in Under her present name she had a grounding in November 2001, which was investigated by the Swedish Maritime Casualty Investigation Division. CT SKY has been subject to a number of Port State Controls, none of which has resulted in any remarks of importance. No detention has been issued in this connection. Page 2

6 The accommodation areas, engine room and bridge were located aft, and forward of these was the cargo space, divided into 7 centre tanks of stainless steel and 12 wing tanks. The tanks were protected by double bottoms. The bridge was of conventional design with open wings. On both sides of the chart table, in the aft part of the bridge, there were wooden partition walls, which blocked the view from 045 degrees abaft the beam, to astern on each side. The traditional three-watch system was employed. The complement included a master, three deck officers, two engineers, four deck crew, two engine crew and two stewards. All except the master and the chief officer (Swedish) and the chief engineer (Finnish) were Philippine nationals. The propulsion machinery consisted of a main engine of make MAK type 6M551AK, which produced kw. The propulsion propeller was of a variable pitch type, controlled from the bridge. At full speed the ship could make approx knots. In order to make the manoeuvring in port easier CT SKY was equipped with a 268 kw bow-thruster unit forward. With regard to the accident the most interesting equipment on the bridge was two radar units of type Furuno/RDP 106, one was an FR-2110 and the other one FR-2130S, and two satellite navigation instruments, Leica AP Navigator and MK10 DGPS Professional. The automatic steering control was combined with a gyro-compass and a course deviation alarm of type Sperry ADG 3000 VT. Furthermore the navigation aid AIS (Automatic Identification System) SAAB MX 420 Nav. System was installed. At the voyage in question the CT SKY was in ballast and duly manned. Page 3

7 Name: RMS VOERDE IMO No.: Call sign: Port of registry: Flag: V2AD8 Duisburg Antigua & Barbuda Gross tonnage: Length over all: Breadth: Draught: Classification society: Year built: Construction material: Propulsion power: 4.48 (summer) Bureau Veritas (BV) 1999, Tulcea, Romania Steel W Crew: 6 RMS VOERDE was built for her present owner in 1999 at the Romanian shipyard Santierul Naval Tulcea SA in Tulcea. The vessel was involved in a collision in the autumn of RMS VOERDE has been subjected to a number of port state controls, none of which has caused any remarks of importance. No detention has been issued. RMS VOERDE was a general cargo ship with the engine room and accommodation areas aft with the cargo area forward. The vessel was built to carry containers, totally 124 TEU 1, 52 of which in the cargo hold and 72 as deck cargo. RMS VOERDE did not have a bulbous bow. 1 (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units, standard containers) Page 4

8 The ship had a complement of 6, three of which were officers (master, chief officer and chief engineer) and three deck crew. All were Polish nationals. RMS VOERDE was powered by an 8-cylinder Deutz 4SA (KHD SBV 8M 628) engine developing 1500 kw, which could render the ship a speed of knots. There was a bow thruster unit in order to increase the manoeuvrability at low speed. The bridge was of conventional type with open wings, but vertically adjustable in order to facilitate passing under low bridges since RMS VOERDE was adapted to river traffic. All equipment on the bridge was functioning. One radar, two VHF equipments, Navtex and a gyrocompass were available. However, there was no course printer. RMS VOERDE was in ballast on voyage from Gunnes, UK, to Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The weather conditions At the time of the incident the weather was fine, the sky was cloudy but visibility good, the wind was south-southwest force 4 B (7 8 m/sec) and swell about 3 m. Temperature +10 to 11 C, barometric pressure 1013 mbar. The current flew to southwest south-southwest at a speed of approx. 1 knot. Course of events According to CT SKY The master was busy in the office, which was located on the deck under the bridge. On the bridge the chief officer was on watch while the lookout was working on deck. A little earlier the ship had left the traffic separation and the course was abt The ship was on full speed ahead, abt. 12 knots, on automatic steering. The two radars and the satellite navigators were in operation and working well. To starboard were a number of ships, at least 4 of which were in close vicinity and which were plotted (the radar was set at "true motion" and with the trail-function activated). One ship was also noted to port but was not plotted. The distance to the latter was approx. 3 M (1 nautical mile = 1852 metres) and the ship in question was Page 5

9 abt. 045 degrees to port. The second officer was also on the bridge, busy with other duties, but went down just before He did not take part in the navigation, nor did he notice any ship to port. The chief officer found at an early stage that the ship to port went with unchanged bearing compared to that of his own ship, but reckoned upon that the other ship, being to port, would give way to CT SKY and he then concentrated on the ships to starboard. The one to port seemed to be a coaster, which could be expected to come quite close before veering. Just before 1100 the chief officer estimated that the ships to starboard would pass clear and he prepared to set a position on the chart. He then noted that the ship to port had not taken evasive action but come closer and thought that it would soon enough be time for the other ship to give way. He intended to make a quick plot on the chart and then take a look again. Since the plotting required a change of charts he stayed at the chart table slightly more than 5 minutes. Meanwhile he looked now and then to starboard in order to check the traffic, but he did not look to port. On each side of the chart table there is a wooden partition wall, which limits the visibility sideways. Shortly after 1100, after having finished the chart work, the chief officer went up from behind the chart table and checked the starboard side, where everything seemed to be OK. He then looked to the port side and found that the approaching ship had done nothing to give way but was running towards the side of CT SKY. The chief officer quickly considered what steps could be taken but found no alternative better than the other, so he ran to the VHF radio and called the other ship but got no reply. He then run forward again and then the collision was a fact. The time was 1105, position 52 15'.0 N '.4 E. The chief officer then zeroed the manoeuvre control to the main engine. He judged that nobody was on the bridge of the other ship. Just before the accident other members of the crew had noticed the ship and the risk for collision. They noticed that the green light was visible. They tried to shout and call the other ship, but could see nobody on the bridge there. In connection with the collision they observed one person running towards the bridge. The chief engineer in his office heard noise from deck just before the collision and went immediately after the collision to the engine room. He started to sound the tanks together with the first engineer. The first Page 6

10 engineer had noted that the manoeuvre device to the main engine had been set to zero. The rest of the crew took the measures required. The ship hit CT SKY almost straight in the port side, a few metres ahead of the manifold, i.e. just ahead of L/2 (half of the ship's length). After the collision the other ship slid out of CT SKY and to the aft. Soon the ship continued her voyage without contacting CT SKY. According to RMS VOERDE RMS VOERDE was on automatic steering from Great Britain to Rotterdam. The course was 122 degrees, the speed approx. 10 knots, and all equipment on the bridge was functioning. The VHF radio was watched on channels 16 and 01. At around 1000 the master, who was on watch and alone on the bridge, called the Maas Pilot Station and reported their ETA (estimated time of arrival) to Maas Center Buoy at The master was on the bridge all the time and did nothing but navigate. The ship was not in an area with heavy traffic. At around 1100 the master noticed a ship on the radar which was on a northeastern course and which he considered to be overtaking. The radar showed that the other ship would pass M (1 nautical mile = 1852 m) ahead of his ship. Since he estimated that distance to be sufficient he did not contact the other ship. When the other ship had almost passed, it suddenly veered to port. The master immediately stopped engine, but it was too late and the accident was inevitable. The master did not try to alter course or rudder before the crash. The collision hit at an angle less than 45 degrees, close to the other ship's accommodation area. When the ships got apart he could see damages in the hull of the other ship some metre above the waterline. After the collision the master tried to contact the coast guard. He reported the occurrence and informed that RMS VOERDE was able to continue to Rotterdam without assistance. He did not contact the other ship. Via VHF he followed the conversation between the other ship and the coast guard. Then he arranged sounding of the forepeak. His own ship had a damage above the water line. At about 1530 RMS VOERDE was berthed at Vlaardingen, Volcaanhaven, where she was subject to a regular port state control required by the accident. Page 7

11 The working time International rest time regulations in force (the STCW Code - Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping A-VIII/1) state in short that the rest time shall be at least 10 hours in 24, divided into not more than two occasions, one of which shall last at least 6 hours. The rules are drawn up as a minimum requirement and exceptions are in principle not allowed. Nonetheless there were shortcomings as regards fulfilment of the rule in both ships, as regards all crew involved, i.e. chief officer and able-bodied seaman on watch on board CT SKY and the master and deck complement on watch on board RMS VOERDE for a period of 3 4 weeks before the accident. On board CT SKY the infringements of the rule were limited to occasional trespasses, partly by too many working hours, partly by the fact that the rest time periods were not distributed according to the rules. The number of infringements was a little more than one per person per week. Also on board RMS VOERDE the infringements were similarly distributed as regards the able-bodied seaman involved. The rest hours for the master were exceptional, since in a period of 26 days as many as 20 infringements occurred. Analysis Course of events The accounts of the course of events from the two ships involved differ on several points. The three following items are of special interest. According to their report the bridge on board RMS VOERDE is said to have been manned by the master, whereas several crew members of CT SKY claim that the bridge was empty and that they noticed a man running towards the bridge just before the collision. It is possible that the bridge of RMS VOERDE in fact was unmanned. On the other hand that would be remarkable, especially since the traffic in the area is considerable. It is also possible that someone really was on the bridge. To decide from outside with certainty that this was the case cannot be easy, even though it is a small bridge with big screen windows which offer a good view. Page 8

12 Turning to port which the master of RMS VOERDE claims CT SKY to have done is not mentioned in the account of CT SKY s chief officer. It is not likely that such a turn took place. It is fairly common that one gets a feeling that the other ship makes a sudden turn just before a collision. This is probably the case here. The positions stated by the two vessels differ by several nautical miles. However, this is of no importance in this case. Yet it seems as if the information from CT SKY is correct, since that is the one, which is best documented. Contact between the ships After the collision each of the two ships via VHF were in contact with the Dutch coast guard. However, they were not in contact with each other. This seems odd, since it would be a natural thing to exchange information and, above all, to stay close in case the other ship would need assistance, which is not only a code of honour at sea but also stipulated in international regulations (SOLAS Chap. V regulation 10). Obviously RMS VOERDE was the first ship to leave the place. The regulations A lookout in the form of a special lookout person in addition to the officer of the watch (OOW) should in principle be on the bridge at all times. Exception is admitted in daylight, if the situation so permits after careful evalutation. Special consideration shall be taken to traffic density and the proximity to traffic separation systems. The OOW shall, if required for the safe running of the ship, increase the number of watch persons. These persons shall be immediately available. (The regulations of the Swedish Maritime Administration, SJÖFS 1982:4, the STCW Code A-VIII/2 part See enclosure 1.) It is doubtful whether these conditions can be considered fulfilled in the case of RMS VOERDE and CT SKY. The weather was good, as was also the visibility and there were no particular navigational dangers. The traffic density, however, was not negligible and both ships were in proximity of a traffic separation system. It is also questionable if the able-bodied seamen, who should have been lookouts, were so close that each of them could "immediately" have made for their bridge in case the officer had called. (It is not clear where the able-bodied seaman on RMS VOERDE was, but it Page 9

13 can be assumed that he was busy on deck, as was the able seaman on CT SKY). Furthermore, it must of course be anticipated that one sole deck officer on the bridge should also take on the duty of the lookout. This was obviously not the case on any of these ships. Knowing the outcome it can be noted that both ships were deficient in their watch-keeping (rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea). Thus it must be concluded that keeping an active lookout on one or both of the ships would most probably have prevented the accident. The give-way rules applicable in this case are rules in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. According to rule 15 a ship, which has another ship on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way, i.e. RMS VOERDE should have given way to CT SKY. A manoeuvre to avoid collision should have been early and substantial (rule 16). The master of RMS VOERDE claims CT SKY to be the overtaking vessel, but all other details available indicate that CT SKY was in the green starboard sector of RMS VOERDE and that the latter thus was the ship to give-way to CT SKY. A diagram showing course and speed illustrates that this must have been the situation for quite a long time. It can thus be assumed that RMS VOERDE was the one who should have given way to CT SKY. Under these circumstances CT SKY should keep her course and speed according to rule 17. When RMS VOERDE evidently would not give way to CT SKY, the latter should have taken such action as would best have aided to avoid the collision. She should, for example, have given a whistle signal as stated in rule 34. Should an attention signal have been given (at least five short blasts on the whistle), RMS VOERDE would most probably have noticed and fulfilled her duty to give way. Had this been in vain, CT SKY should have given way either by stopping or rather, to avoid misunderstanding, if possible by turning to starboard away from the danger. Both vessels thus have failed in watch-keeping and in following-up the situation. Furthermore RMS VOERDE has breached her obligation to give way to CT SKY, which was on her starboard side. The master of RMS VOERDE has indeed claimed that he had plotted CT SKY and found that they would pass clear, but such a situation must be followed up, especially Page 10

14 since the distance was short, maybe not even beyond the margin of error of the radar. In addition, CT SKY has in fact not taken any steps to avoid the collision, neither by whistle signal, VHF radio nor veering. The radio call made by the chief officer of CT SKY was far too late to be of any importance. The navigation work must not be interfered with by other matters during watch duty, particularly if the officer is alone on the bridge. However, it has become rather usual that officers work with other tasks, e.g. administration, when on watch. In some cases it is even considered necessary in order to satisfy the employer's expectations. It is possible that at least the master of the RMS VOERDE was busy with other things than navigation. That would explain why the situation was not followed-up. The working time On RMS VOERDE infringements to the rules on rest periods were frequent as regards the working hours of the master. There were 20 infringements in 26 days, which must be considered remarkable (see enclosure 2). There have also been other infringements to working hours, but in this case they must be considered systematic. Furthermore it must be assumed that the quantity of working hours in the weeks before the accident must have reduced the capability of the master considerably. Also if using the possibilities to work the maximum hours allowed without breaking the rules of rest hours, the capability may be reduced. Should the working hours be extended even more, and during a long period, as in this case, consequences must be expected. This might also explain why the master of RMS VOERDE did not follow up the situation. The instructions of the shipping company as regards working hours and watch-keeping (enclosure 3) are held in general terms and mainly a copy or a summary of the legislation in force. It should be noted that the shipping company must have been aware of the big divergence between the instructions and the factual working hours of the master. It is indeed possible that the month in question was an exception with more working hours than the average, but there is no indication of this. Even if that was the case, it must be considered to be the duty and responsibility of the shipping company to check the working hours on board. The conclusion of this report is thus that the workload of the master has been far too heavy. Page 11

15 Causes and factors Causes The main cause was most probably that RMS VOERDE for some of the following reasons did not veer to CT SKY: unmanned bridge, fatigue or other occupation than navigation. A contributory cause was that CT SKY, due to lack of lookout, had not taken any measures to avoid the collision. Factors The partition walls, which limited the visibility at the chart table on board CT SKY, were a contributory factor. Navigational aids, such as radar with collision warning, have obviously not been utilized enough. There was no lookout on any of the bridges. Underlying factors The requirement for efficiency in shipping tends to influence when a lookout shall be on the bridge or can work with other things. This may create a conflict between cost efficiency and safety. An active lookout on either or both of the bridges would most certainly have prevented the collision. The workload on board can in some cases cause that deck officers are busy with administrative duties when on watch. This is not allowed and has a negative effect on the safety at sea. Fatigue, which is due to too much work shared by too few individuals, is also a factor which influenced the course of events. Recommendations The shipping companies should intensify their watch-keeping routines and ensure that lookout is kept in a professional way. The shipping companies should guarantee that there are always possibilities for the OOW on board to have a lookout and to increase the watch if needed. Page 12

16 Concrete obstacles such as partition walls or other gear which may obstruct effective watch-keeping should if possible be removed or transferred. The shipping company of RMS VOERDE should look over the size of the crew. The evaluation should consider sea area, number of calls at port, characteristics of the cargo and workload (including paper work) of the complement. It shall be possible to carry out the work onboard within the limits of rest hour regulations in force. The shipping company of CT SKY should offer the ships the resources needed to carry out the work on board within the limits of rest hour regulations in force. Damages CT SKY was damaged on her port side just ahead of L/2, between frames 87 and 102. The port side wing-tank and the port side top wing-tank were damaged and were emptied for existing ballast water. No water ran into the ship since the damage was down to abt. 1 metre above the surface of the water. The loss of ballast rendered the ship a list of abt degrees to starboard. There was no leakage of oil, nor any known personal injuries. The bow of RMS VOERDE was damaged; she also got damages on the starboard anchor and in the forepeak. There was no leakage of oil, nor any known personal injuries. Result of the investigation The weather was good. There was no lookout on any of the bridges. RMS VOERDE did not take evasive action to CT SKY. CT SKY did not take any steps to avoid the collision. The reason why RMS VOERDE did not take evasive action is unknown. The watch-keeping routine was inadequate on both ships. Page 13

17 There were shortcomings as regards adherence to the rest hour regulations. The ships parted without any exchange of information. Observations It is remarkable that the shipping company of RMS VOERDE has not noted the violation of the rest hour regulations and taken measures to guarantee the complement at least the rest hours prescribed by regulations. The violations seem to have been systematic. Miscellaneous It happens that employees are exposed to a pressure (not always expressed) to accomplish more than what is allowed in the regulations in force. The reason why the employee in fact complies with this may be fear not to be included in the regular promotion system or, if it comes to the worst, to loose his job. Also it happens that the employee is very loyal to his employer and for this reason violates the regulations. Both shipping companies have quickly and efficiently supplied information, one by performing an investigation of its own, the other one after inquiry. As regards CT SKY the report is based upon information from the maritime declaration, the inspection carried out by the Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate and the investigation of the accident made by the shipping company. As regards RMS VOERDE the information is based upon the Dutch Coast Guard s interrogation of the ship's master, and information from the shipping company requested via the flag state. Page 14

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