The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation

Transcription

1 The Effcac a Efforts of Iterest Groups Post Electos Polc Formato Gl S. Epste Yosef Mealem Shmuel Ntza CESIFO WORKING PPER NO. 49 CTEGORY : PULIC CHOICE NOVEMER electroc verso of the paper ma be owloae from the SSRN webste: from the RePEc webste: from the CESfo webste: Twww.CESfo-group.org/wpT

2 CESfo Worg Paper No. 49 The Effcac a Efforts of Iterest Groups Post Electos Polc Formato bstract Ths paper presets a ew moel of terest groups a polc formato the legslature. I our settg, the alrea gve part eologcal prespostos a power strbuto eterme the epecte polc outcome. Our aalss apples to the case of u-eforce or eforce part scple as well as to two-part a mult-part (proportoal represetato) electoral sstems. The terest groups objectve s to fluece the outcome ther favor b egagg a cotest that etermes the fal ecso the legslature. Our frst result clarfes how the success of a terest group hges o the omace of ts eologcall closer part a, geeral, the coalto/opposto blocs of partes uer u-eforce part or coalto/opposto scple. Such omace s efe terms of eologcal clato weghte b power. Our seco result clarfes how the success of a terest group hges o the omace of ts eolog the rulg coalto (part) a majortara sstem wth eforce coalto (part) scple. We the clarf uer what coto a terest group prefers to rect ts lobbg efforts to two partes or the two coalto a opposto blocs of partes uer u-eforce scple rather tha to the members of the rulg coalto (part) uer eforce scple. The lobbg efforts uer u-eforce a eforce part scple are also compare. Fall, we clarf the effect of eologcal prespostos a power o the efforts of the terest groups. JEL-Coe: D7, D7, D74, D78. Kewors: polc formato, poltcal partes, eologcal prespostos, electoral power, post-electos lobbg, eforce part scple. Gl S. Epste ar-ila Uverst 59 Ramat-Ga / Israel epsteg@mal.bu.ac.l Yosef Mealem Netaa caemc College Netaa 4 / Israel ossme@bezeqt.et Shmuel Ntza ar-ila Uverst 59 Ramat-Ga / Israel tzas@mal.bu.ac.l Facal support from the ar Fouato of the Ecoomcs Departmet of ar-ila Uverst s gratefull acowlege.

3 . Itroucto I the post-electos poltcal game, the selecte polc hges o the comple teracto betwee poltcal partes, terest groups a the legslature. The outcome of ths game taes to accout the poltcal a ecoomc costrats that eterme the feasble polc space, the poltcal power a eolog of the partes, the objectves a actos of the terest groups a the mechasm selectg the polc outcome the legslature. The curret stu proposes a poltcal ecoom moel of polc formato the legslature volvg terest groups (lobbes) a poltcal partes, whereb the teracto betwee lobbes s moele as a cotest whch the wer obtas the mplemetato of hs most preferre 'target polc'. Poltcal partes have a gve eologcal presposto towar target polces a are ot strategc plaers the game. Ther power wth the legslature s also eogeousl gve. Wth ths set-up, our frst objectve s to preset a ew stlze moel that shes lght o the cotos that esure the effectveess of a terest group. That s, the cotos for the success of a terest group to fluece the polc outcome ts favor b egagg the lobbg cotest that etermes the fal outcome the legslature. Our seco objectve s to stu the relatoshp betwee the ature of the estg poltcal partes (ther power a eologcal presposto) a the test of the cotest betwee the terest groups as measure b ther eerte efforts. The emprcal sgfcace of the propose moel s llustrate b escrbg a few eamples a stlze facts t ca epla.. outle of the moel a ts objectves Suppose that the feasble polc set clues the target polces of two terest groups. I the post-electos phase o whch we focus, the polc outcome s selecte b the legslature (the electe represetatves who are members of two or more poltcal partes), tag to accout the alrea gve eologcal prespostos a power of the estg partes a the lobbg actvt of the terest groups. Our majortara settg s geeral because t clues both a two-part sstem a a mult-part proportoal represetato electoral sstem. The legslature cossts of two blocs of partes: the rulg coalto that has a absolute majort a the opposto. Note that the rulg coalto a the opposto ma cosst of a sgle part. I case of a two-part sstem, the coalto a the opposto cosst of a sgle part. To facltate the reag, heceforth the term part refers to a sgle

4 rulg (majort) part or a sgle opposto (mort) part as well as to blocs of partes, vz., the coalto or opposto that, geeral, clue more tha oe part. Lewse, the term partes wll refer to the case of two (majort a mort) partes as well as to the coalto a opposto blocs of partes. The eologcal presposto of the estg partes or ther egree of eologcal homogeet s efe terms of the weghts assge to the target polces of the terest groups. These weghts ca be terprete as the proporto of electe part represetatves, heceforth part represetatves, supportg the two target polces of the terest groups. Tpcall part represetatves have smlar vews regarg prmar eologcal mesos. We terpret the polc ssue questo as a secoar ssue, whch s ot ecessarl relate to the eologcal meso that stgushes betwee the estg partes (e.g. the atttue regarg the esrable sze of the publc sector), but to ssues such as the esrable egree of regulatg CO emssos or of regulatg the facal sstem. I other wors, we allow two terest groups to lobb the members of two partes, gve that there are ol two polc optos that o ot relate to the partes platform choces. Ths terpretato justfes our assumpto regarg the possble estece of pragmatc partes whose represetatves at the legslature support the two secoar polc postos. The seco characterstc of the partes s ther power the proporto of seats the legslature cotrolle b the part va ts electe represetatves. pplg the above compoets of the poltcal evromet, t s assume that wthout a terveto of the terest groups, gve the feasble polc space, the polc outcome the legslature s eterme probablstcall o the bass of the eologcal prespostos of the partes a ther power. The raomess the legslature's ecso mag reflects the effect of the probablstc ature of the part represetatves' votg both uer the assumpto that part scple s ot eforce or eforce. Members of the legslature ma ot partcpate the vote because of absece or vote a volatle maer cotrast to ther eclare eologcal sposto. The assume partcular epeece of the polc outcome o the part characterstcs reflects the emocratc ature of the legslature; the applcato of (smple) majort rule uer u-eforce part scple. lteratvel, a multpart proportoal represetato electoral sstem wth eforce part scple, the outcome the legslature hges just o the raom votg of the represetatves who are members of the rulg coalto that has a absolute majort.

5 The actvt of the terest groups s uce b ther ablt a esre to affect the fal polc outcome the legslature. I our moel of polc formato, the terest groups put efforts a egage a lobbg cotest that affects the choce probablt of ther target polc. To eame the effect of the terest groups o the fal polc outcome the legslature, we assume that the polc outcome the legslature epes o the resources recte b the terest groups to the part represetatves a that the effectveess of these resources hges o the support of the part represetatves the target polces of the terest groups weghte b the power of the partes. Uer ths tpe of cotests, we clarf the relatoshp betwee the alrea eterme eogeous part characterstcs a the test of the cotest (the resources epee b the plaers the cotest game, vz., b the competg terest groups). Sce t s aturall recogze that sttutos a terest groups, partcular, matter, we wll eame the effectveess of terest groups b eamg whether ther smultaeous volvemet a cotest chages the selecte polc ther favor. Wthout ther cotest actvt, the raom polc outcome hges just o the power a eologcal presposto of the estg partes. Whe the terest groups tae part the cotest, the polc outcome also epes o ther efforts, amel, the resources the rect to the part members. Our frst objectve s to establsh the ecessar a suffcet cotos for the effcac of a terest group. These cotos ca be use to eterme the relatoshp betwee the tal a fal (before a after the cotest taes place) avatage of a target polc of a terest group. I partcular, we clarf whether a tal avatage of a polc (a pror probablt of selecto hgher tha.5) s ecessarl preserve, or whether such a tal avatage ca be overture. These cotos are eterme, frst, assumg u-eforce part scple. I ths case, the terest groups rect ther lobbg efforts to members of all the partes because ther potetal supporters are usuall members of both the coalto a opposto partes., sce part scple s ot eforce, the potetal support s effectve whe the legslature maes ts ecso regarg the fal polc outcome. We the stu the coto for the effcac of a terest group, assumg eforce part scple. I ths case, lobbg efforts are recte just to the members of the rulg coalto (part) before 3

6 the part le s ece. Gve the cotos for the effcac of a terest group uer u-eforce a eforce part scple, we ca compare the esrablt of eforce a ueforce part scple from the vewpot of the terest groups as well as from the socal pot of vew. I the former case, the probablt of becomg effectve s use as the crtero apple b a terest group. I the latter case, we appl the aggregate efforts curre b the terest groups as the socal welfare crtero. The seco objectve of the paper s to eame the relatoshp betwee the alrea shape part characterstcs (ther power a eologcal heterogeet) a the test of the cotest betwee the terest groups as measure b ther aggregate efforts. I partcular, we focus o partes wth etreme characterstcs that are ofte obtae as equlbrum outcomes moels of electoral equlbrum,.e. smmetrc partes wth covergg eologcal prespostos a polarze partes wth etreme fferet eologcal prespostos. More geerall, for a patter of part characterstcs, we eame the effect of chages the parameters of our moel (the egree of eologcal heterogeet of a part, the power strbuto of the partes a the staes of the terest groups) o the cotestats' efforts (test of the cotest). We also compare the lobbg efforts of the terest groups uer ueforce a eforce part scple. Relatoshp to the lterature Poltcal partes a specal terest groups are basc characterstcs of emocraces. The part eologes, teral composto a poltcal power fluece the polc chose b the legslature. Such polc s also affecte b the actvtes of terest groups, tpcall varous forms of rect lobbg, formatoal lobbg a campag cotrbutos. The fluece actvtes of terest groups are recte both to poltcas competg for power before the electos who are the prospectve rulers or to electe poltcas a alrea fuctog govermet offcals. The lterature o part moelg focuses o eogeous part formato. Lewse, the electoral-competto lterature, the emphass s o the etermato of the part platforms or pre-electos preferre polces a o the secure support of Notce that uer eforce part scple, we ca focus o the members of the rulg coalto because the fal outcome the legslature oes ot epe o whether part scple s eforce or ot eforce o the members of the (mort) opposto. I cotrast, uer u-eforce part scple, the fal outcome the legslature s affecte b the votg of the members of all the partes (coalto a opposto partes). 4

7 voters the competg partes. I our moel the partes are alrea shape a we tae ther eologcal clato or egree of heterogeet as well as ther poltcal power as gve. I the specal terest-group lterature, atteto s recte to the formato of the groups, to the relatoshp betwee terest groups a poltcal partes or to the relatoshp betwee terest groups a the rulg poltcas or bureaucrats, va We (999), Wttma (9). I oe stll growg part of ths lterature, the methoolog of poltcal cotests s use to stu the effect of lobbg a fluece actvtes b terest groups o the ecsos of the rulg poltcas or govermet offcals, Kora (9). For varous attempts to eame publc polc etermato cotests see Epste a Ntza (7). I our moel, the cotest methoolog s apple to eame whether the resources epee b the alrea forme terest groups (resources that are recte to the electe part represetatves) are effectve, amel, whether the are able to chage the polc outcome ther favor. Notce that the partes are assume to be effectve va ther represetatves etermg the ecso of the legslature regarg the fal polc outcome. Our stu combes the effect of the terest groups to that of the partes orer to eame the polc outcome of the legslature. I cotrast to the approach of Grossma a Helpma (), as well as Epste a Ntza (7), we focus o the strategc teracto betwee the terest groups, sregarg the strategc teracto betwee terest groups a polc maers a the strategc teracto betwee the partes or betwee ther represetatves. The effect of the terest groups o the fal polc outcome s eterme through ther effect o the part represetatves, gve the assume relatoshp betwee the eologcal prespostos a power of the partes, the efforts of the terest groups a the ecso of the legslature. The lterature o campag cotrbutos proposes two motves of terest groups: a electoral motve a fluece motve. The former motve oes ot appl our settg because the platforms a the power of the partes are alrea eterme. The latter motve apples our settg, ot because terest groups fluece poltcas' postos, but because the fluece the abltes of the part represetatves to affect the fal polc outcome the legslature. Gve our focus o the post electos phase, our moelg s stctve ts eablg the clarfcato of the role of part characterstcs (power a heterogeet) o the test of the 5

8 cotest betwee the terest groups (the aggregate resources recte to the partes b the cotestats). 3 Fall, our terest groups o ot offer cotget cotrbutos as ecer (983) or Grossma a Helpma (). Ther efforts are ucotoal because the rectl affect ther effectveess the legslature. Whle our moel has ateceets the probablstc votg lterature, rather tha vewg the ecsos of the voters or ther prefereces as probablstc, uste-smth (987), aro (994), Eelow a Hch (98), Coughl a Ntza (98), Itrlgator (973), we assume that the ecsos of the legslature are probablstc. C. Emprcal relevace The propose moel of terest groups' fluece o post-electos poltcs relates to terestg pheomeo ma poltcal-ecoomc evromets a t shoul be teste emprcall. ut cocepts such as eologcal clato of partes a staes of terest groups are rather comple cocepts a ther measuremet ma pose a severe challege. Nevertheless, to llustrate the emprcal relevace of the moel let us focus o the problem of "etremsm"; relgous, ecoomc, poltcal or cultural etremsm of poltcal partes or of terest groups. Sce the e of the Seco Worl War, crease or reuce eologcal polarzato betwee poltcal partes a terest groups ca be observe ma socetes. For eample, eologcal polarzato has apparetl bee reuce regarg ssues such as evrometal polc, reucg the prolferato of uclear weapos or the ee of govermet terveto the regulato of the ecoom a, partcular, the facal sector. However, eologcal polarzato has crease regarg varous relgous ssues, the esrable mmgrato or at-terror polc a, certal, regarg ecoomc polc relate to come or wealth restrbuto. I these cotets two terestg questos arse. Frst, what maes a terest group successful ehacg ts target polc? Seco, what maes terest groups more actve (eert more efforts o lobbg)? The results obtae our tractable moel she lght o these ssues a the relevace of our 3 eese a Felma () have stue the mpact of the fferet Europea a merca majortara legslatve structures o the test of lobbg, applg a moel of formatoal lobbg. For a revew of the lterature o formatoal lobbg, see Grossma a Helpma (). 6

9 fgs s llustrate the scusso followg each of the ma theorems. Emprcal testg of these results s a worthwhle challegg tas.. Part characterstcs a the selecte polc Suppose that the feasble polc set the ecoomc-poltcal evromet clues the polces a, that represet the esrable targets of two terest groups; tpcall passg or rejectg a propose law. Ths s the reaso wh the terest groups are ee b a. The fal polc outcome s oe of these two polces a t s selecte b the legslature as log as the govermet s fuctog. I the post-electos phase o whch we focus, the legslature chooses the fal polc outcome tag to accout the alrea gve electoral power a eologcal prespostos of the estg partes a the lobbg actvt of the terest groups. The strateg chose b a terest group s a o-egatve lobbg effort. The partes are ot strategc plaers the fluece game that we stu. The frst characterstc of part s ts power. Ths power e represets ts relatve stregth the legslature. I a two part sstem,. Recall that the cotet of a mult-part proportoal represetato electoral sstem, a are terprete as the relatve stregth of the rulg coalto a opposto partes. The seco characterstc of part s ts eologcal presposto whch s efe terms of the target polces a of the terest groups. Specfcall, part 's eologcal presposto s efe terms of the weghts a,, that t assgs, respectvel, to polc a polc. The weghts ca be terprete as the proporto of part represetatves the legslature supportg the two polces or the lelhoo that the part represetatves support the target polces of the terest groups. These weghts ca therefore be use to etf the eologcal sposto of part : whe s close to or close to, the part s homogeeous or cohesve; t supports or most of ts members support oe of the polces or. Whe s close to.5, the part s heterogeeous or factoalst; t almost equall supports or ts members almost equall support the fferet polces a. Heceforth the egree of heterogeet of part s measure b. Ths measure rages betwee a.5. Whe part s completel homogeeous, or s equal to 7

10 a. Whe the part s heterogeeous a.5. 4 are equal to.5 a I a emocrac, ecsos the legslature are mae applg a majort rule. If all members of the legslature tae part a ecso, part scple s ot eforce a the value of s larger tha.5, the polc woul become the ecso of the legslature probablt. I practce, a partcular whe a ecso s mae o a secoar ssue, ot all the members of the legslature tae part the ecso a vote accorace wth ther eclare eologcal sposto. Tpcall, t s lel that some of the electe represetatves who are ow supporters of polc o ot tae part the vote or o vote, but a volatle maer cotrast to ther eclare eologcal sposto. So there s a chace that s the accepte polc, espte the fact that s larger tha.5. Hece, applg the above elemets of the poltcal evromet, t s assume that wthout a terveto of the terest groups, the polc outcome the legslature s eterme probablstcall reflectg the partes' e-ate power a ther presposto for a, a. Specfcall, the probablt that polc s selecte b the legslature s equal to p, a, smlarl, the probablt that s the fal polc outcome s equal to. p efto, these two probabltes sum up to. Uer u-eforce part scple, the fal ecso the legslature epes o the votes of the members of all the partes (coalto members as well as those of the opposto members). I ths case, the terest groups ca affect the votg of the members the coalto a opposto a our moel apples. Uer eforce part scple, the polc of the rulg part (coalto) s base o the votg of ts members. Oce a ecso s reache, scple the rulg part (coalto) s eforce a the preferre ecso becomes that of the legslature. I ths case, the terest groups ca affect the votg of the members of the rulg part (coalto) a our moel apples. The actvt of the terest groups s uce b 4 Note that vewg the egree of heterogeet or eologcal presposto of part as a raom varable wth a eroull strbuto wth a probablt of that a part member supports polc, the staar evato of the part's eologcal sposto s. 8

11 ther ablt a esre to affect the fal polc outcome the legslature. I partcular, the terest groups ca put efforts a egage a lobbg cotest that affects the choce probablt of ther preferre polc. Let probablt of polc. Our assumpto o p eote the choce p sregars eplct a etale coserato of the form of lobbg practce b the terest groups, the ett of the part represetatves the legslature to whom resources are recte, as aro (6). Nevertheless, uer u-eforce part scple, t oes tae to accout the vestmet portfolo of the terest groups the represetatves of the two partes, the power of the partes a the eologcal spostos of the partes that jotl eterme a subtle a emocratc wa the fal polc outcome. Uer eforce part scple, we tae to accout the vestmet portfolo of the terest groups the represetatves of the rulg part a the eologcal spostos of these members who eterme b majort rule the ecso of the rulg part a, tur, the ecso the legslature. The wa lobbg etermes the fal polc outcome s assume to be capture b a mofcato of the wel stue logt cotest success fucto aapte to our settg. It shoul be vewe as a shortcut for escrbg the comple emocratc sttutoal evromet that allows raom behavor of the part represetatves. s escrbe above, whe the terest groups o ot tervee, the assume cotest success fucto oes tae to accout the "majort rule" because, uer u-eforce part scple, the ecso of the legslature hges o the power of the partes a the umber of electe represetatves that support the two polces. Uer eforce part scple, the assume cotest success fucto taes to accout the "majort rule" apple wth the rulg part to eterme ts supporte polc whch becomes that of the legslature. Wth lobbg, the cotest success fucto also taes to accout the efforts recte b the terest groups to the part represetatves. ga, uer certat, the crtcal support for a polc a legslature that maes ecsos b smple majort s 5% of the votes. Uer raom votg, each polc s chose some probablt. The crtcal choce probablt for a polc, sa, s.5. I a aalogous maer to smple majort uer certat, the probablt that s chose s assume to be the relatve total support for amog the represetatves of all the partes (the rulg partes) whe part scple s ot eforce (s eforce). Ths probablt s ow affecte b the efforts of the terest groups. 9

12 The terest groups rect resources a, (, ) to the electe represetatves of the two partes uer u-eforce part scple or to the electe represetatves of the rulg part (coalto) uer eforce part scple. The more resources the rect to represetatves of part the hgher the lelhoo that these represetatves wll vote favor of ther target polc. Recall, that eve wthout the efforts eerte b the terest groups, usuall each part has represetatves who support the fferet polces. The total tal support of a polc s represete b the sum of the eologcal prespostos for that polc the two partes weghte b the power of the partes. The efforts of the terest groups affect precsel ths tal support each part of the two polces a elg the aggregate choce probabltes of the two polces the legslature. Notce that ths aggregato fucto allows a ecetralze legslature wth low votg coheso or a parlametar legslature wth strog votg coheso. 5 Suppose the that whe the vestmet of terest groups or at least oe of the partes s postve, the probablt that the legslature approves the polc s gve b: () p Otherwse p p. 6 Notce that the fucto s well efe sce whe the eomator s zero, p p. Furthermore, the efto of ths fucto s aalogous to the efto of Tulloc s (98) lotter cotest success fucto. I the latter case, whe o effort s eerte b the cotestats, ther wg probabltes are equal to.5 ( p our case). We also assume that the margal effectveess of effort eerte b a terest group s ecreasg, that s, < <. Note that whe, b equato (), p p. Ths meas that both partes are ot affecte b the lobbg efforts of the terest groups. The reaso s that such a case beg affecte b lobbg mples currg a ver hgh cost ue to apparet ecle the 5 possble formal ormatve justfcato of ths partcular form ca be base o the aomatc approach of Clar a Rs (998). 6 The assume base cotest success fucto has a ce fouato as a techolog of persuaso base o aesa upatg, see Saperas a Vaa (9).

13 part reputato. crease meas a reuce ecle the part reputato a, therefore, a hgher resposveess to lobbg. The effect of the vestmet of terest group the represetatves of part hges o the parameter a o - the electoral power of part weghte b ts teec to support the polc (whch s catve of ts egree of heterogeet). The effect of the vestmet portfolo of terest group both partes s the sum. smlar terpretato apples to - the effect of the vestmet of terest group the represetatves of the two partes. The total effect of the efforts recte b the two terest groups to all the electe represetatves s therefore represete b. Hece, p specfes the effect of the efforts recte b group to the represetatves of the two partes who support relatve to the total effect of the efforts recte b the two terest groups a to all the members the legslature. Recall that the probablt that the legslature approves polc s gve b a ote that, equlbrum of the lobbg cotest, t s mpossble that a terest group eerts o effort, although t ma rect efforts just to the represetatves of oe part (see footote 6). Let a eote, respectvel, the beeft of terest groups a from ther target polces. The epecte et paoff of the rs eutral terest group from tag part the legslatve cotest s: p () u p a, smlarl, the epecte et paoff of the rs eutral terest group s: (3) u ( p ) p To eame the cotos that gve rse to effectve terest group partcpato the legslatve cotest a to epose the relatoshp betwee part

14 characterstcs a the actvsm of the terest groups (the resources the rect to the partes), we tur to the equlbrum aalss of the cotest. 3. The cotest equlbrum The ecessar cotos for Nash equlbrum of the cotest betwee the two terest groups el the equlbrum efforts of the terest groups recte to the electe represetatves of part j: 7 (4) ( ) j j j a ( ) j j j, ( ) where ( ) a. Wth o loss of geeralt, we heceforth assume that. 8 Notce that a ca be terprete as measures of support of both partes, respectvel, terest groups a terest group. The total equlbrum lobbg efforts of the terest groups that are recte to the partes are equal to: 7 The assumpto that <, guaratees a teror equlbrum, sce the margal prouct of the frst margal ut of effort s fte, whch meas that the best respose s alwas postve. Notce that for the cotest to be meagful, the eologcal presposto of the two partes towars each of the terest groups caot be zero, because otherwse a terest group wll ot have a mpact o the choce probablt of ts target polc that wll be u u alwas equal to zero. The ecessar equlbrum cotos are:, j,, see () a (3). j j Notce that we o ot rule out the possblt that, equlbrum, a terest group eerts efforts, but rect them just to the electe represetatves of oe part, but oes ot vest at all the other part. (4), ths wll happe whe the eologcal presposto of the latter part towar the target polc of the terest group s equal to zero. 8 The beeft of a terest group from wg the cotest represets the fferece ts valuato betwee ts preferre target polc a the alteratve polc. Such fferece ca be terprete as fferece margal cost whch meas that ma also represet a terest group wth ample resources, sa the uclear power lobb, competg wth a lobb wth moest facal capabltes, sa the gree movemet. wth a cotuous acto space o [ ]

15 3 (5) a The total equlbrum efforts eerte the cotest, efforts that ca be terprete as a measure of the cotest test, are therefore equal to: (6) ) ( () a (4), the wg probablt of terest group the uque teror cotest equlbrum (see footote 6) s equal to: (7) p 4. The cotos for terest-group effcac Our frst cocer s to eame the cotos uer whch the volvemet of the terest groups the cotest maes oe of them effectve. terest group s calle effectve f the wg probablt of ts target polc creases ue to ts tag part the cotest. I partcular, terest group s effectve f p p. Recall that uer u-eforce part scple, a are the relatve stregth of the two partes (blocs of partes). I a sstem wth eforce part scple, a rulg part (coalto) j, etermes the fal polc outcome. I ths case j, a the lobbg efforts of the terest groups are recte just to the members of part j. Note that eve whe terest group s effectve, that s, p p <, equlbrum, t wll tae part the cotest a eert postve efforts. The reaso s that the margal prouct of effort s fte, whch

16 mples that the best respose s alwas postve. To avo the possblt that ts wg probablt rops to zero, espte ts effectveess, group eerts some effort esurg that ts wg probablt s postve. The effcac cotos are mportat because the ca epla the cause of success the post-electos competto a, partcular, emprcal ata regarg terest groups' performace as estmate o the bass of tme-seres or cross-secto ata. ccorg to the effcac efto, oe ma woer whether a terest group that s the uerog the absece of a cotest,.e., p <. 5 ecessarl remas the uerog, eve f t s effectve. 9 I other wors, the questo s whether the effectveess of a terest group ca mprove ts status, but caot reverse t (that s, caot chage t from a uerog (before the cotest s hel) to a favorte (after the cotest taes place)). Formall, assumg, wth o loss of geeralt, that p <.5, ca terest group tae part the cotest a be effectve such that t s o loger the uerog, p.5 p? Let us frst preset the cotos uer whch a part s effectve. These cotos epe o whether the terest group valuatos of ther target polces are fferet or etcal a o whether part scple s eforce. The frst result hols assumg u-eforce part scple. Theorem : Suppose that part scple s ot eforce. I the smmetrc stuato where the prze valuatos of the terest groups are etcal,, a terest group (sa ) s effectve f a ol f () there ests a part that s more cle to the target polc tha the other part j ( j ) a () the egree of heterogeet of part weghte b ts power s larger tha that of the other part j ( j j j of group. ). If, the above cotos are suffcet for the effcac The proofs of ths theorem a all other results are relegate to the ppe. For smmetrc cotestats,, the two cotos Theorem are ecessar a suffcet for the effcac of terest group. Smlar cotos are ecessar a 9 The terms uerog a favorte are ue to Dt (987). Recall that, a mult-part cotet, the term part relates to oe of the two blocs of partes: the rulg (majort) coalto a the (mort) opposto. 4

17 suffcet for the effcac of terest group. For asmmetrc cotestats,, however, these cotos are ol suffcet for the effcac of the cotestat wth the hgher valuato of hs target polc, terest group. Note that j mples that j <. That s, coto () esures eologcal promt of to terest group a ths meas that j s closer eologcall to terest group. Coto () esures that.that s, 's egree of heterogeet weghte b ts power s j j j larger tha that of j. If the above two cotos are satsfe, the b Theorem, () If part s less heterogeeous tha part j, < j j, the coto (),, requres that the power of s larger tha the power of j, j j j j. Furthermore, sce s less heterogeeous, the whe combg coto (), oe of the followg equaltes must be satsfe. Ether or j j, whch meas that. 5. We therefore obta the followg j j cocluso: If terest group s effectve a the stroger less heterogeeous part s eologcall closer to ts target polc tha the other part j, the part s closer to ot ol relatve to the other part ( j ), but also relatve to ts clato to the target polc of the other terest group (. 5 ). () If s more heterogeeous tha j, j j, the coto (),, oes ot requre that j. That s, the more heterogeeous j j j part ca be the weaer part, <. j Suppose ow that the absece of a cotest terest group s the uerog. Theorem, f cotos () a () are satsfe, t ca tae part a cotest agast terest group, a be effectve. The followg eample shows that the volvemet the cotest ca be avatageous to such a etet that terest group becomes the favorte Eample : Suppose that 7, 7, 6, 6,. 7,. 3, a. 5. I ths case, before the cotest terest group s the uerog, 5

18 p.45. However, sce cotos () a () are satsfe, a , terest group wll tae part the cotest a crease the probablt of the polc from.45 to.58 (sce ths case,.65 a.55, p.58 ). So the cotest ca chage the ett of the uerog, whch meas that there s o guaratee that the favorte terest group pror to the cotest oes ot tur to be the uerog whe t taes part the cotest. The above reversal s mpossble whe the terest groups share equal staes a both partes are eologcall cle to the tall favorte terest group. I such a case, f terest group s effectve t becomes eve stroger. To sum up, f p <.5, the t s possble that terest group s effectve a.5 p p. However, such reversal the status of terest group s mpossble whe a both a. Theorem relates to terestg pheomeo the poltcal-ecoomc evromet a t ca be teste emprcall. Let us clarf ts relevace a the reaso wh t s ameable to emprcal testg b focusg o the effect of relgous a ecoomc etremsm o the performace of terest groups. I certa coutres, e.g., Ture or Israel, a tre of crease relgous a ecoomc etremsm has bee observe. The former pheomeo ca be measure b the chage the sze or eclare orms of the relgous populato a/or b the chage the prefereces of the terest groups that support legslato that s cosstet wth relgous orms. The latter fact ca be represete b the chage the come or wealth strbuto (the egree of come or wealth equalt) that alters the relatve staes of the rch mort a the poor majort. Oe ma woer about the effect of these tres o the performace of the terest groups that tr to fluece the polc outcome the legslature to be cosstet wth the orms of the relgous mort or ft the goals of the wealth mort group. I our settg, performace of a terest group ca be efe as ts success to atta ts objectves. I ths case ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p <.5, see (7)., whch meas that or 6

19 Theorem shes lght o the effect of etremsm as reflecte the power of the partes a ther eologcal spostos o the success of a mort terest group the post-electos cotest. Let us eame ow a majortara sstem, wth a rulg coalto (part) assumg that part scple s eforce. Wth o loss of geeralt, let the rulg coalto be eote b. Ths meas that. I ths case, the lobbg efforts of the two terest groups are recte just to the members of coalto (part ) orer to affect that coalto ecso (the eforce le) that becomes the fal polc outcome the legslature. Note that regarless of the sze of the postve efforts curre b the terest groups, a terest group caot w the cotest wth certat; t caot esure that a absolute majort of the members of coalto (part ) vote for ts target polc probablt. I ths case the effcac of a terest group hges o ts relatve stae. That s, Theorem : I a majortara sstem wth eforce part scple, terest group s effectve f a ol f. The tuto beh ths result s that whe terest group has the hgher stae, t s uce to vest more tha terest group. I tur, t creases ts wg probablt relatve to the case where the two terest groups o ot egage lobbg the members of the rulg coalto (part). Furthermore, f the absece of a cotest terest group s the uerog, that s,.5, where s the rulg p coalto, t ca become the favorte whe t taes part the lobbg cotest, that s,. Defe as the eologcal bas of to the target polc of p.5 p terest group. The coto esurg ths reversal s the equalt. The reaso s the followg: Sce, b assumpto, s base favor of terest group, < < or <, to become a favorte a couterbalace the tal bas. 5 favor of terest group, terest group has to mae more lobbg efforts tha terest group a ts requre effort s creasg wth the tal avatage of. Ths coto mples that f the absece of a cotest terest group s the favorte, the ts status s ualtere a cotest. 7

20 Iterest group has the cetve to mae the requre effort whe. That s, f ts relatve beeft from wg the cotest a, tur, s suffcetl large. The aalss of the cotest equlbrum uer the majortara sstems uer u-eforce a eforce part scple eables comparso betwee the wg probabltes of a terest group uer the two cases where t rects ts lobbg efforts to the members of all the partes or just to the members of the rulg coalto (part). Ths comparso mples that terest group prefers to rect ts efforts to the members of all the partes (the coalto a opposto partes) f ts support the mort part (bloc of partes) ecees that of the majort part (bloc of partes). That s, Theorem 3: Iterest group prefers to rect ts lobbg efforts to the members of all the partes uer u-eforce part scple rather tha lobb just the members of the rulg part (coalto) uer eforce part scple f a ol f. The aalss of cotest equlbrum also eables comparso betwee the total efforts curre b the terest groups uer u-eforce a eforce part scple. It turs out that aggregate efforts are larger uer u-eforce relatve to eforce scple f two cotos are satsfe: Frst, the balace of cetves s favor of oe of the terest groups both uer u-eforce a eforce scple a, seco, the larger rulg part s favor of that terest group. Formall, Theorem 4: Let the larger part (bloc of partes) be eote b. ggregate efforts are larger uer u-eforce relatve to eforce scple f (), a <, or () <, < a <. ggregate efforts are ofte use as a welfare crtero stues of ret sspato, Tpcall, the are cosere as a measure of the etet of effcec assocate wth the waste mple b at least part of the lobbg efforts. Theorem 4 thus 8

21 specfes suffcet coto for the welfare superort of u-eforce part scple relatve to eforce part scple. 5. Part characterstcs a post-electos cotest test The aalss of cotest equlbrum also eables rect eamato of the relatoshp betwee part characterstcs a the post-electos test of the cotest betwee the terest groups. The part characterstcs, eologcal presposto or heterogeet a power are represete b the parameters, a (, a are rectl obtae from the equaltes a ). The cotest test s measure b the amout of resources recte b the cotestats to the partes, amel b, see (6). Ths test s mportat ot ol because t ma gve a ea about the sze of the lobbg ustr, but because t s ofte cosere as a measure of effcec. I the lterature o electoral competto, etcal a smmetrc (eutral) partes ofte emerge equlbrum of Dows-tpe moels of the electoral game, Dows (957), or equlbrum of electoral competto moels wth specal terest groups, Grossma a Helpma (). That s, our terms, the eologcal prespostos or egree of heterogeet of the partes are etcal a both are equall cle towar the target polces of the two terest groups,. 5. If such a stuato s preserve the post electo phase the cotest o the secoar polc optos o whch we focus, t mples mamal competto betwee the partes the electos whch tpcall results equal probabltes of wg the electos. our et result, such smmetrc (eutral) etcal partes also gve rse to mamal test of the post-electos cotest betwee terest groups wth etcal valuatos of ther target polces, regarless of the post-electos power strbuto of the partes. I such cotests wth mamal test, the choce probabltes of the two possble outcomes are equal, that s, p p. 5. I fact, eve whe, etcal eologes are suffcet to gve rse to a cotest of mamal test, regarless of partes' power strbuto, prove that a. That s, prove that the valuato avatage of terest group s appropratel reuce b the ecrease the support 9

22 of both partes ts target polc, such that the two terest groups become equal compettors that have mamal cetve to vest the post-electos competto orer to fluece the legslature. Sometmes, however, the equlbrum outcome of the electoral game s such that the platforms of the partes are polarze, lesa a Rosethal (), Faul- Oller et.al. (3), Testa (). I our terms, such cases a, that s, the two partes are etremel homogeeous et wth ametrcall oppose eologcal spostos. It turs out that such polarzato also results mamum test of the post-electos cotests betwee terest groups wth etcal valuatos of ther target polces, prove that the power of the partes s etcal. However, the terest groups ee ot be smmetrc. I ths more geeral asmmetrc case, eologcal polarzato results mamal test of the post-electos cotest, prove that. That s, prove that the valuato avatage of terest group s appropratel reuce b the ecrease the power of ts supportg part (part ), such that the two terest groups become equal compettors that have mamal cetve to vest the post-electos competto orer to fluece the legslature. 3 Formall, Theorem 5: If (a) a, or (b) a a, the the efforts recte b the terest groups to the partes are mamal a equal to.5 ( ) a p p. 5. Clearl, b Theorem 5, f a. 5, that s, the partes are etcal a smmetrc (eutral), or,, a the partes have equal power,.5, the, both cases, the efforts of the terest groups are mamal a equal to.5, where. Note that b Theorem 5, the mamal efforts are 3 Several stues focusg o the questo how a cotest shoul be esge to el mamum efforts obtae smlar results that stress the sgfcace of equalzg the actual stregth of the cotestats. See, for eample, Epste et al. () who eal wth two-plaer cotests where the cotest esger wll optmall equalze the cotestats stregth a Frae et al. () who eame -plaer cotests where the esger wll optmall level the plag fel b ecouragg wea cotestats, but ot equalze the cotestats chaces uless the are etcal.

23 creasg the valuatos of the terest groups, a, a the parameter. However, the are epeet of, the asmmetr betwee the valuatos of the terest groups. ccorg to part (a) (part (b)) of Theorem 5, although requres approprate couter asmmetr terms of the partes' eologcal (power) support the target polc - asmmetr agast terest group, orer to esure the mamal test of the cotest, t oes ot affect the value of the mamal efforts of the terest groups. 4 The results erve ths secto prove a smple possble ratoale for the fferet test of lobbg efforts Europea parlametar legslatures relatve to the merca legslature wth low-votg coheso. The geeral ecessar a suffcet coto for mamal test of the cotest betwee the terest groups s:, (see. the proof of Theorem 5), that s, equalt of the cetves of the two terest groups a. These cetves epe o the terest groups' valuato of ther target polces, o the partes' support of these target polces a o the power of the two partes. Usuall the cetves of the terest groups are ot equal, the cotestats' efforts are ot mamal a the terest group wth the larger cetve eerts more efforts tha ts rval. Whe the fferece betwee the cetves of the terest groups s crease ther efforts ecle. Ths s the reaso wh the lobbg efforts the Europea legslature are weaer tha the lobbg efforts the merca legslature; the partes the former are less smmetrc terms of eologcal prespostos a power tha the latter a cosequetl the gap betwee the cetves of the terest groups Europe s larger tha the gap betwee the terest groups' cetves the US. 5 Theorem 5 mples that the cetves of terest groups wth a partcular state are rectl correlate wth ther lobbg efforts. It also mples that the gap betwee the cetves of terest groups 4 Notce that our settg o costrats are mpose o the lobbg efforts of the terest groups as, for eample, Che a Gale (998) or Iarczower a Mattozz (). Ths assumpto mght be plausble whe the captal maret s perfect or whe the staes are suffcetl small. For a scusso o the equvalece betwee the effect of buget costrats a the effect of regulato, see Che a Gale (997). 5 For a fferet ratoale, whch s propose usg a formatoal lobbg moel, see eese a Felma ().

24 fferet states s versel correlate wth the aggregate lobbg efforts these states. Theorem 5 ca therefore be ver useful eplag the observe fferece of lobbg efforts of terest groups wth partcular states a eplag the observe fferece betwee aggregate lobbg efforts fferet states. 6. Itest a effcac of the cotestats Gve the cotos esurg effcac of a terest group a the cotos that esure mamal test of the cotest betwee the terest groups, the questo s whether these separate cotos are terrelate. I partcular, are these cotos terrelate such a wa that mamal cotest test mples uversal effcac whch o terest group ca be effectve? Does effcac mpl that the cotestats' efforts are less tha mamal? I geeral, both cojectures are false. Whe the cotestats' efforts are mamal, t s possble that oe of the terest groups s effectve or that both terest groups are ot effectve. To prove ths clam, let us preset two eamples that llustrate the two possbltes. Eample : Coser the case of etcal eutral partes of equal stregth a smmetrc terest groups, that s, a. 5. I such a case o terest group s effectve because p p. 5. Notce that although p. 5, the terest groups have a cetve to partcpate a cotest that oes ot affect ther tal stuato terms of paoff because of ther mamal epee efforts. p a p, et reuces ther 4 Eample 3: Suppose that the cotestats' efforts are mamal a let, 7, 3 7, 6 mples that 5, 6 a. 5. The suffcet coto for mamal efforts 4 4 a I such a case, p. 5, et <. 5 p. That s, terest group s effectve. 6 The suffcet coto s: Theorem 5 (part a) the ppe. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). For a proof, see the proof of

25 To sum up, mamal cotest test ma, but ee ot elmate the possble estece of effcac eve whe the terest groups are smmetrc,. For such terest groups, we are able to completel characterze the stuatos where efforts are mamal et o terest group s effectve. I such stuatos t s mpossble to have partes that are ot smmetrc ether terms of power or terms of ther eologcal presposto towar the target polces of the terest groups. Some smmetr s ecessar. Formall, Remar: Let. If efforts are mamal a o terest group s effectve, the oe of the followg possbltes must hol:. Regarless of the power strbuto of the partes, the must be eutral a etcal, that s, , a. That s, the partes are equal power a the presposto of oe part towar the target polc of oe terest group s equal to the clato of the other part towar the target polc of the other terest group. ga, as Eample, uer such stuatos the smmetrc terest groups woul partcpate most actvel a cotest that oes ot affect ther target polc a therefore ol reuces ther et paoffs. 7. Efforts sestvt to eologcal heterogeet, poltcal power a valuatos To eame the sestvt of the cotestats' efforts to chages the characterstcs of the partes a the terest groups' valuato of ther target polces, let us retrouce the geeral ecessar a suffcet coto for mamal test of the cotest betwee the terest groups. Ths coto,, (aga, see. the proof of Theorem 5), requres complete levelg of the plag fel, that s, equalt of the cetves of the two terest groups. That s,. Suppose that the cetves of the terest groups are ot equal. I such a case, a chage the characterstcs of the partes that tes to restore 3

26 (further upset) the balace of cetves betwee the terest groups creases (reuces) the test of the cotest; the efforts recte to the partes. If the cetves of the terest groups are equal, the a chage the characterstcs of the partes that upsets the balace of cetves betwee the terest groups wll reuce ther efforts. Relatg to chages of specfc parameters, that s, chages the power of the partes or ther heterogeet, we obta the followg corollares of ths geeral result. 7. Efforts a chages eologcal heterogeet Theorem 6.: (a) Uer u-eforce scple, the efforts of the terest groups (separatel a jotl) are postvel relate to a chage j ( ( ). (b) If groups., the a chage j or j ), f a ol f < j reuces the efforts of the terest Fgure llustrates Theorem 6. focusg o the relatoshp betwee a j. Smlar fgures ca be presete for the relatoshp betwee a j or for the relatoshp betwee a j. The theorem mples that f the balace of cetves s favor of terest group, that s, <, the a crease of the eologcal support of a part terest group, whch tes to restore the balace, creases the efforts of the terest groups (secto Fgure ). If the terest groups are of equal cetves (pot Fgure ), the upsettg the balace betwee them b a chage the heterogeet of a part reuces the cotestats' efforts. 4

27 5 7. Efforts a chages poltcal power Theorem 6. : Uer u-eforce scple, (a) the efforts of the terest groups (separatel a jotl) are postvel relate to a chage, f a ol f ( ). (b) f, the a chage the power of the partes reuces the efforts of the terest groups. That s, f the balace of cetves s favor of terest group (terest group ), that s, ( < ), the a crease the power of a part that s cle towar the target polc of the other terest group (terest group ), whch tes to restore the balace, creases the efforts of the cotestats. If the terest j Fgure - the relatoshp betwee efforts a j < C

28 groups have equal cetves, the upsettg the balace betwee them b a chage the power strbuto of the partes reuces the cotestats' efforts. 7.3 Efforts a chages valuatos Theorem 6.3.: Uer u-eforce scple, (a) the total efforts of the terest groups are postvel relate to a chage f (b) f < a postvel relate to a chage f., the a mea-preservg chage the valuato of the target polces of the terest groups reuces ther total efforts. (c) f, the a -preservg chage the valuato of the target polces of the terest groups postvel affects ther total efforts. That s, b part (a), whe a chage a terest group's valuato of ts target polc tes to reuce the mbalace betwee the terest groups, both terest groups behave more aggressvel a crease ther efforts. part (b), f the terest groups have equal cetves, the upsettg the balace betwee them b a mea preservg chage a (that s, ) s uchage) reuces the cotestats' total ( efforts. smlar result has bee establshe the ret-seeg lterature assumg a Tulloc (98) tpe lotter. Namel, total ret-seeg efforts are reuce whe the cotestats ffer more ther valuato of the prze, see Nt (999) a Kora (9, Ch.3). Fall, b part (c), f the terest groups have equal cetves, the creasg (ecreasg) both a b the same factor, such that s uchage, creases (reuces) the cotestats' total efforts. Theorem 6 ca also be use to she lght o observe chages the etet of lobbg alog tme certa states respose to chages the characterstcs of the partes or the gap betwee the terest groups' valuato of ther target polces. Uoubtel the etet of lobbg has crease substatall ma coutres. I the cotet of the relgous a ecoomc etremsm scusse Secto 4, or the 6

29 cotet of etremsm relate to mgrato polc or reform the peso sstem, Theorems 6 ca clarf the effect of etremsm o the eerte lobbg efforts the post-electos phase. I partcular, over tme, wth the crease of mgrato to Europe a other places the worl, the local populatos evelope eophoba as the have become more afra to lose ther ett a culture. Poltcal partes a terest groups that attempt to ecrease mgrato have become stroger, more etreme a more actve. The relatoshp betwee the observe actvt of terest groups a ther performace a the chage the parameters of the moel that represet etremsm of partes a/or terest groups ca be better uerstoo lght of the above comparatve-statcs results. The comparatve statcs results uer eforce part scple are ualtere. The reaso s that whe a (recall that s the larger rulg part, stea of we get ). 8. Cocluso Gve the post-electos poltcal evromet, whch s represete here b the actual power of the two partes a b ther eologcal prespostos, we have tall focuse o the (ecessar a suffcet) cotos for the success of a specalze terest group to ehace ts objectve, amel, to crease the probablt that the polc cosstet wth ts terest s realze. our frst result, uer ueforce part scple, eologcal promt to a part a the omace of that part terms of egree of heterogeet weghte b poltcal power esure the effcac of a terest group. Ths result has two clear mplcatos. () successful terest group ee ot be "closer" to the stroger part. I such a case, however, the closer part must be suffcetl heterogeeous: amel, allow a large umber of members to share the two fferet eologcal vews. () successful terest group ee ot be "closer" to the more heterogeeous part. I such a case, however, the closer part must be suffcetl strog. We have also establshe the possble reversal of the terest groups' status (becomg a favorte stea of a uerog) whch occurs ue to ther partcpato the cotest a prove a suffcet coto that preclues such reversal. 7