Measures for Earthquake-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes around The Tokyo Bay

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1 Measures for Earthquake-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes around The Tokyo Bay Masanori Hamada Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan 2016/1/12 International Symposium on Natural and Technological Risk Reduction in Industrial Parks (NATECH 2016) 1

2 Contents 1. Damage to industrial facilities caused by past earthquakes and tsunamis 2. Earthquake and tsunami risk of industrial complexes around the Tokyo Bay 3. Measures and challenges for earthquake and tsunamiresistance enhancement of industrial complexes 2

3 1. Damage to Industrial Facilities Caused by Past Earthquakes and Tsunamis Damage by soil liquefaction in soft reclaimed lands Fires of oil tanks caused by long-period components of earthquake ground motion Damage caused by tsunamis 3

4 Inclination and Subsidence of Tanks caused by Soil Liquefaction (The 1995 Kobe Earthquake) 4

Earthquake) Tank yard in Kobe (Aerial photo taken

5 Ground Displacements of An Artificial Island in Kobe Caused by Soil Liquefaction (The 1995 Kobe Earthquake) Tank yard in Kobe (Aerial photo taken two days after the earthquake) Ground displacements(cm) 5

6 Liquefaction-Caused Damage to Oil Protection Wall (The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake) 6

Epicenter of the earthquake and observation points of earthquake ground motion 0-500 0 20 40 50 60 80 (s) 100 100 (cm/s) 200 Observed

7 Fires of Oil Tanks Caused by Long-Period Components of Earthquake Ground Motion(1) (The 2003 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake) 100 (cm/s 2 ) 0 < Tomakomai > Tomakomai Hiroo Epicenter (cm/s 2 ) 500 (6~8 S )long period component (s) < Hiroo > 0 50km Epicenter of the earthquake and observation points of earthquake ground motion (s) (cm/s) 200 Observed accelerations Hiroo:0.3s Tomakomai:6~8s Fires of oil tanks period (s) Velocity response spectra (h=0.5%) 7

Fire of Oil Tanks Caused by Long-Period Components of Earthquake Ground

Measures Recommended by the Fire Defense Agency to Prevent Oil Tank Fire

emergent fire fighting to prevent large fires (ⅲ) Reinforcement of

8 Fire of Oil Tanks Caused by Long-Period Components of Earthquake Ground Motion(2) The 1964 Niigata earthquake The 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, Turkey Measures Recommended by the Fire Defense Agency to Prevent Oil Tank Fire (ⅰ) Lowering oil surface to avoid the overflow (ⅱ) Preparation of emergent fire fighting to prevent large fires (ⅲ) Reinforcement of floating roofs to avoid sinking into the oil (ⅳ) Reinforcement of oil protection wall 8

9 Damage to Oil Refinery and Fires on Sea Surface Caused by Tsunami(The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake) Fire of oil refinery Drift of fuel tanks Fires on sea surface 9

10 Horizontal Movement of Oil Tanks (The 2004 Sumatra offshore earthquake, Indonesia) Three oil tanks were floated by floodwater and transported about 300m from their original locations (Banda Ache, Sumatra, Indonesia) 10

2.Earthquake and Tsunami Risk of Industrial Complexes Around the Tokyo Bay Artificial Islands Reclaimed from the Tokyo Bay Edo Rv. Sumida Rv. Tokyo 7 8 Tama Rv. 6 Tokyo Bay 5 Chiba 4 3 2 1 Yoro Rv.

11 2.Earthquake and Tsunami Risk of Industrial Complexes Around the Tokyo Bay Artificial Islands Reclaimed from the Tokyo Bay Edo Rv. Sumida Rv. Tokyo 7 8 Tama Rv. 6 Tokyo Bay 5 Chiba Yoro Rv. Mizue Artificial Islands in Kawasaki City Chidori 多摩川 Tokyo Haneda Airport Ukishima 東京湾 Yokohama ~ 1946~1965 ~1945 Water Depth < 3m Years of Reclamation 東扇島 Central Disaster Management Center for the Greater Tokyo Mizue & Chidori area were reclaimed before1945. Ukishima area was reclaimed from 1946 to1965. (Source) After S. Kaizuka 0 10 km 11

An Artificial Island in The Tokyo Bay, Seawall Structure, Soil Condition and Assessment of Soil Liquefaction LW H.W.L.+2.0m L.W.L.+0.0m 8.1m 1.5m 0.75m 1.3m 4.

12 An Artificial Island in The Tokyo Bay, Seawall Structure, Soil Condition and Assessment of Soil Liquefaction LW H.W.L.+2.0m L.W.L.+0.0m 8.1m 1.5m 0.75m 1.3m 4.2m Anchorage Filled Sand N 5 :Boring Points 0 500m 10.0m Steel Sheet Pile Sandy soil predicted to liquefy 10.0m Sandy Soil N=10~15 An Artificial island in Tokyo Bay Existing quay wall, soil condition and assessment of soil liquefaction Clay N=3~5 12

8m 8~ 9m 9~ 10m 10~11m 11~12m 12~13m 4m 4m Horizontal

13 Assessment of Soil Liquefaction and Its Induced Ground Displacements Thickness of liquefied soil 5~ 6m 6~ 7m 7~ 8m 8~ 9m 9~ 10m 10~11m 11~12m 12~13m 4m 4m Horizontal Displacement of Seawalls Horizontal Displacement of Ground 13

Standard 0 5 10 15 20 (period) (s) Predicted Velocity-Response Spectra by the Tokai and Tonankai Earthquakes

14 Assessment of Overflow of Oil from Floating Roof Tanks (By the Tokai and Tonankai Earthquakes) Industrial Complex around The Tokyo Bay 200 cm/s (Response Velocity) 150 Kawasaki (6~7s) Chiba(8~10s) National Standard (period) (s) Predicted Velocity-Response Spectra by the Tokai and Tonankai Earthquakes Number of Tanks and Oil-Overflowing Tanks in The Tokyo Bay Diameter of tanks Number of tanks Number of tanks (overflowing) 14

15 Tanks for Oils, Chemical Products and Poisons around the Tokyo Bay Yokohama Kawasaki Chiba Tank for storage of poison 15

Diffusion of Crude Oil in The Tokyo Bay (Committee for assessment of earthquake damage in the Tokyo Bay area, Ministry of land, infrastructure and transport) Diffusion Area on the third day Tokyo Oil

16 Diffusion of Crude Oil in The Tokyo Bay (Committee for assessment of earthquake damage in the Tokyo Bay area, Ministry of land, infrastructure and transport) Diffusion Area on the third day Tokyo Oil Flow-out Point Tokyo Diffusion Area on the third day Oil Flow-out Point Kisarazu Kisarazu Kanagawa Pref. Kurihama Ichihara Chiba Pref. Kanagawa Pref. Kurihama Ichihara Chiba Pref. Kanaya Iwai Daily Wakes of Ships (about 200 ships per day) Kanaya Iwai Tateyama Tateyama (a)summer season (b)winter season Flow-out Point;Keihin Canal Volume of Crude Oil;12,000kl Wind Velocity ; 5m/s 16

17 12 LNG and Oil Power Plants around The Tokyo Bay Oil Thermal Power Station LNG Thermal Power Station 17

3.Measures and Challenges for Earthquake and Tsunami- Resistance

against soil liquefaction and its caused ground displacement

Pile Wall 10(200) 10m 5(100) 5m 14(280) 14m 10(200) 10m 4D(Pile

18 3.Measures and Challenges for Earthquake and Tsunami- Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes Reinforcement of Seawalls against soil liquefaction and its caused ground displacement Continuous Wall Soil Improvement Pile Group Existing Wall Sheet Pile Wall 10(200) 10m 5(100) 5m 14(280) 14m 10(200) 10m 4D(Pile Space) 6D( Pile Space ) * D: Diameter of Pile (Model for Experiment) 18

19 Reduction of Horizontal Displacements of Seawall and Ground by The Reinforcements Seawall Ground displacement Steel Sheet Pile Wall Soil Improvement Liquefied Soil Horizontal Displacement (m) 水平変位 (m) No Countermeasure Pile Group 4D Steel Sheet Pile Wall Soil Improvement Pile Group 6D 護岸からの距離 (m) Distance from The Seawall 19

Protections for Industrial Facilities against Tsunami

Chidori Ukishima Mizue 2~5m(Water Depth) Assessment of

Protection against Floating Objects and Prevention of

and Tsunami Steel Sheet Pile Wall Protection of Coastal

20 Protections for Industrial Facilities against Tsunami 2~5m (Water Depth) Steel Pile Steel Sheet pile Tank Chidori Ukishima Mizue 2~5m(Water Depth) Assessment of Floodwater Depth at Keihin Industrial Complex Measure of Protection against Floating Objects and Prevention of Lift-up by Floodwater Implant Levee against Earthquake and Tsunami Steel Sheet Pile Wall Protection of Coastal Dike by Steel Sheet Pile Protection of Coastal Dike by Steel Sheet Pile 20

Measures of Tsunami Protections for Nuclear Facilities [Overview of Hamaoka

Osaka Nagoya (the estimated Tsunami height: 15m) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station

wall Emergency response headquarters Tonankai Earthquake Nankai Earthquake

Protection Measures of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant A double-door configuration

illustration) Steel Frame Wall (with 18 m height) Watertight door in the

21 Measures of Tsunami Protections for Nuclear Facilities [Overview of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant] Tokyo Fresh water supply source Power supply vehicle Osaka Nagoya (the estimated Tsunami height: 15m) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Tokai Earthquake Fire engines and pump vehicles Watertight door Protection wall Emergency response headquarters Tonankai Earthquake Nankai Earthquake Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant and Earthquake Sources along Nankai Trough Tsunami Protection Measures of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant A double-door configuration for doors attached to the external walls of buildings (conceptual illustration) Steel Frame Wall (with 18 m height) Watertight door in the internal side Reinforced door on the external side Watertight Door Attached to External Wall of Buildings 21

22 Basic Principles of The Fundamental Law for National Land Resilience 1. Save Human Life 2. Prevent Critical Damage to Functions of The Nation and Local Communities 3. Minimize Loss of People s Property and Public Infrastructures 4. Smooth Recovery and Reconstruction 22

このイメージは現在表示できません Policy by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(2013~) Northern Tokyo Bay Earthquake, Earthquake Resources along the Nankai Trench, and Locations od Petroleum Complexes 100km

Height of Flood Flow of Assessment of Damage to Petroleum Complexes by Future Earthquakes Soil Condition Survey for Assessment of Soil Liquefaction Assessment of Soil liquefaction of Artificial

23 このイメージは現在表示できません Policy by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(2013~) Northern Tokyo Bay Earthquake, Earthquake Resources along the Nankai Trench, and Locations od Petroleum Complexes 100km Tokyo Bay Okinawa Kyushu Chugoku, Shikoku Osaka Bay Ise Bay Northern Tokyo Bay Earthquake The revision to the Google map The Earthquake Resources along the Nankai Trench Okinawa Evaluation of Tsunami Height of Flood Flow of Assessment of Damage to Petroleum Complexes by Future Earthquakes Soil Condition Survey for Assessment of Soil Liquefaction Assessment of Soil liquefaction of Artificial Islands Assessment of Stability and Deformation of Quaywalls Assessment of Ground Displacement Assessment of Damage to Petroleum Complexes due to Earthquake Motion, Soil Liquefaction, Ground Displacement and Tsunami 23

Recommendations for Earthquake-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes 1. Earthquake-resistance enhancement in larger areas(whole areas of manmade islands and bay areas ) 2.

24 Recommendations for Earthquake-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes 1. Earthquake-resistance enhancement in larger areas(whole areas of manmade islands and bay areas ) 2. Strong leadership by the national and local governments 3. Public investment for private industrial facilities 4. Share of disaster risk information among industries and local communities 5. Assessment of the impact of damage to industrial complexes on the national economy and societies : Private Coastal Dike : Public Coastal Dike Private and public dikes along the Keihin canal 24

Challenges to a Sustainable Society in Japan

Challenges to a Sustainable Society in Japan 18 NOV 2007 Yasumitsu Watanabe Shimizu Corporation 1 CONTENTS 1 Construction Market in Japan 2 Recent Climate Change 3 Predicted Natural Disasters and Countermeasures