Outline Agency Model (AM) and Agency Opaque Model (AOM) Market settlement in AM and AOM Dashboards and Reports form AM and AOM

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1 Hotel Pricing Game Page 1 Outline Agency Model (AM) and Agency Opaque Model (AOM) Market settlement in AM and AOM Dashboards and Reports form AM and AOM Based on F. Jaureguiberry and M. Tappata Game The Hotel Game: Pricing Simulations with Opaque and Transparent Channels. INFORMS Transactions on Education 16(1): Slides partially from S. Perera, School of Management, University of Michigan-Flint. The Hotel Game webpage:

2 The Hotel Game Page 2 Single or multi round Each student group represents a hotel Set prices and booking limits for peak & off-peak seasons and others Two games: Agency Model (AM): Own sales + Expedia Agency+Opaque Model (AOM): Own sales + Expedia + Priceline (NYOP=reverse auction)

3 Agency Model (AM): Own sales + Expedia Page 3 Demand Market Clearing Supply Loyal customers Direct sales (own reservation) Booking agency (Expedia) (p H, p L ) Hotels Shoppers

4 Agency + Opaque Model (AOM): Own sales + Expedia Page 4 Demand Market Clearing Supply Loyal customers Direct sales (own reservation) Agency Model (AM) Booking agency Transparent Sales (Expedia) (p H, p L ) Shoppers (Ask H,Ask L ) (b H, r H ; b L, r L ) Hotels Opaque sales (Priceline)

5 Opaque Selling (NYOP) Page 5 Tappate and Cossa (2014) find the average opaque hotel rate discount on Priceline to be approximately 44%. ToE p.27. On average, an opaque booking allows the buyer to obtain a 44% discount with respect to the transparent rate. M. Tappata and R. Cossa Price Discrimination 2.0: Opaque Bookings in the Hotel Industry. Available at SSRN:

6 Hotel Game(s): Timing Page 6 Game login tokens are released 1. Hotels submit their prices for peak (H) & off peak (L) seasons AM game: (pp HH, pp LL ) AOM game: (p H, b H, r H ; p L, b L, r L ) In addition to pp HH, pp LL, Opaque channel {Reduced prices bb HH, bb LL } & Opaque channel {Booking limits (rr HH, rr LL )} 2. Round ends, demand (Q H,Q L ) is realized and markets clear: 2.1 Loyal customers get their rooms 2.2 Opaque market clears 3.3 Transparent market clears 3. Round report is generated and next round starts Game report is generated after the last round

7 AM Game Market Analysis Page 7 Allcustomers θθ 1 θθ Loyal customers Shoppers Direct sales (own reservation) Booking agency (Expedia) 1. Submitted prices (pp HH, pp LL ) for peak & off peak seasons 2. Round starts, demand (Q H,Q L ) is realized and markets clear: 2.1 Loyal customers get their rooms 2.2 Transparent market clears 3. Round report is generated and round ends

8 Analysis of the AM Model without Referring to the Game Page 8

9 Sales to Loyal Customers in AM θθ > 00, ββ = 00 Page 9 Compute total market capacity CC in the market; same in both peak and off-peak seasons nn number of hotels cccccc capacity (the number of rooms) at each hotel CC = nn cccccc Compute total demands QQ HH and QQ LL in the market during the peak and off-peak seasons Ratio of total demand to total capacity is in [αα HH, αα HH ] [αα LL, αα LL ] in the peak & off-peak seasons Let uu HH UU([αα HH, αα HH ]) & uu LL UU([αα LL, αα LL ]) be uniform random variable realizations QQ HH, QQ LL = CC (uu HH, uu LL ) θθ: Ratio of loyal customers to all. If θθ = 1, all customers are loyal No competition. As long as hotel rates are lower than customers willingness to pay vv, each hotel sells to 1/nn of the loyal customers. ToE pp Suppose 0 kk nn hotels quote prices lower than vv, then sales for each hotel is min θθ QQ HH,QQ LL Summary» Typically, kk = nn as all hotels price below the maximum willingness-to-pay Loyal sales is min θθ QQ HH,QQ LL kk Remaining capacity is cccccc min θθ QQ HH,QQ LL kk, cccccc per hotel; The game uses rounding such as round θθ QQ HH kk, cccccc Revenue from loyal customers: pp HH min θθ QQ HH kk, cccccc + pp LL min θθ QQ LL kk, cccccc kk, cccccc No competition in the loyal markets.

10 Capacity & Demand in Transparent Market of AM θθ > 00, ββ = 00 Loyal market has cleared and yielded the remaining capacities (KK HH,ii, KK LL,ii ) at each hotel ii; details later. Each hotel has submitted prices (pp HH,ii, pp LL,ii ) Ex: Peak Season Hotel ii Remaining Capacity KK HH Submitted Price pp HH A B Hotel B Hotel A Peak Remaining Capacity Price Off-Peak Season Hotel ii Remaining Capacity KK LL Submitted Price pp LL A B Hotel B Hotel A Off-Peak Remaining Capacity Page 10 Non-Loyal (transparent) market demand 1 θθ QQ HH, QQ LL at prices less than wtp vv Ex: Peak Transparent Demand Price Off-Peak Transparent Demand

11 Sales to Non-Loyal Customers via an Intermediary in Transparent Market of AM. θθ > 00, ββ = 00 Competition in the non-loyal markets: Lower-priced sells before the higher-priced: Order hotels by price. Page 11 Peak Season Hotel B Hotel A Demand curve Non-Loyal Peak Market Settlement Supply curve 160 Price Off-Peak Season Hotel B Hotel A Demand curve Non-Loyal Off-Peak Market Settlement Supply curve Peak Season 40 rooms of Hotel B sold at $ rooms of Hotel A sold at $110 Off-Peak Season 60 rooms of Hotel B sold at $80 40 rooms of Hotel A sold at $90 Rooms are not sold by the hotels but by an intermediary such as Expedia EEEEEE: Intermediary fee charged for selling each room Ex: EEEEEE = $1/room. Hotel A transparent market revenue: 30 (110 1) + 40(90 1) Hotel B transparent market revenue: 40 (100 1) + 60(80 1)

12 Page 12 An Example of the AM Model by Referring to the Game This example is based on a game played among three student groups at the School of Management, University of Texas-Dallas in 2017.

13 AM Example: Game Settings Page 13 Game information, shared with all students in advance # Hotels: 3= nn, # Rounds: 2 Hotel Capacity Marginal Cost Fixed Cost Same for all hotels 100 $50 $2,500 Market Capacity: 300= CC = nn cccccc Max. Price: $150= vv Expedia Fee: $5 Demand: Total number of consumers in the market Peak Season: Uniformly distributed between 187 and 375 consumers, i.e., UU 187.5,375 = UU 0.6, = UU αα HH, αα HH CC Off-Peak Season: Uniformly distributed between 75 and 225 consumers, i.e., UU 75,225 = UU 0.4, = UU αα LL, αα LL CC Proportion of Loyal Customers: 0.5 = θθ

14 Prices and Demands Page 14 Hotel Peak Rounds Off-Peak Rounds Prices A B C Realized Demand from Uniform Distributions in Round 1 Peak Season: 322 Loyal Market Size=322*0.5=161 ~ 54 for each hotel Off-Peak Season: 191 Loyal Market Size=191*0.5=95.5 ~ 32 for each hotel Peak: UU 0.6, = Off-Peak UU 0.4, = Realized Demand from Uniform Distributions in Round 2 Peak Season: 323 Loyal Market Size=323*0.5=161.5 ~ 54 for each hotel Off-Peak Season: 226 Loyal Market Size=226*0.5=113 ~ 38 for each hotel Peak: UU 0.6, = Off-Peak UU 0.4, = All four demand realizations are above average, favoring expensive Hotel B

15 Sales: Loyal and Non-Loyal (Expedia) Page 15 Hotel Peak Rounds Off-Peak Rounds Sales A B C Peak 1. Remaining capacity 46 for each Peak 1. Market size = = 160 Peak 2. Remaining capacity 46 for each Peak 2. Market size = = 161 Off-Peak 1. Remaining capacity 68 for each Off-Peak 1. Market size = = 95 Off-Peak 2. Remaining capacity 62 for each Off-Peak 2. Market size = = 112 Competition in the non-loyal markets: Lower-priced sells before the higher-priced: Order hotels by price. Hotel Peak Rounds Off-Peak Rounds Sales A B C Peak Season Market size > the total remaining capacity. Everyone sells their remaining capacities. Off-Peak Seasons Market size < the total remaining capacity. R1 Prices: Hotel C 79; Hotel A 84; Hotel B 150. Hotel C sells its remaining capacity; Hotel A sells to the rest. R2 Prices: Hotel A 112; Hotel B 125; Hotel C 150. Hotel A sells its remaining capacity; Hotel B sells to the rest.

16 Profits Hotel Peak Rounds Off-Peak Rounds Overall Profits 1 2 Total 1 2 Total Total Rank A 6,170 7,070 13, ,390 2,761 16,001 2 B 7,270 7,270 14, ,850 4,550 19,090 1 C 7,170 7,270 14, ,300 1,360 15,800 3 Hotel A Peak: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = ( ) = 4, ,292 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = = 3, ,278 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = 4, ,864 2, , , = 6, ,070 = 13,240 Hotel A Off-peak: , = 1, , = ,390 = Hotel B Peak: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = ( ) = 5, ,400 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = = 4, ,370 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = 2 5, ,370 2,500 = 2(7,270) = 14,540 Hotel B Off-peak: , = 3, , , ,500 2,500 = ,850 = 4,550. Hotel C Peak: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = ( ) = 5, ,400 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = = 4, ,370 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = 5, ,324 2, , , = 7, ,270 = 14,440 Hotel C Off-peak: , = ,632 2, , = ,300 = 1,360. Page 16

17 Page 17 An Example of the AM Model by Referring to the Game This example is based on a game played among three student groups at the School of Management, University of Michigan-Flint.

18 AM Example: Game Settings Page 18 Game information # Hotels: 3= nn, # Rounds: 3 Hotel Capacity Marginal Cost Fixed Cost Same for all hotels 100 $50 $2,500 Market Capacity: 300= CC = nn cccccc Max. Price: $150= vv Expedia Fee: $5 Demand: Total number of consumers in the market Peak Season: Uniformly distributed between 187 and 375 consumers, i.e., UU 187.5,375 = UU 0.625, = UU αα HH, αα HH CC Off-Peak Season: Uniformly distributed between 75 and 225 consumers, i.e., UU 75,225 = UU 0.25, = UU αα LL, αα LL CC Proportion of Loyal Customers: 0.6 = θθ

19 Round 1 Prices and Demands Page 19 Submitted Prices by Student Groups in Round 1 Realized Demand from Uniform Distributions in Round 1 Peak Season: 342 Loyal Market Size=342*0.6=205.2 ~ 68 for each hotel Off-Peak Season: 221 Loyal Market Size=221*0.6=132.6 ~ 44 for each hotel

20 Round 1 Sales Rooms sold Page 20 Remaining capacity 32 for each Remaining capacity 56 for each Market size = = 138 Market size = = 89 Competition in the non-loyal markets: Lower-priced sells before the higher-priced: Order hotels by price. Market size is larger than the total remaining capacity. Everyone sells their remaining capacities. Market size is less than the total remaining capacity. Price-order of hotels: Hotel B 80; Hotel C 100; Hotel A 105. Hotel B is the cheapest and sells it remaining capacity first. Then, Hotel C sells to the remaining customers. No customers are left for Hotel A.

21 Round 1 Profits Page 21 Profit calculations for Hotel A Peak season: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = 68 (125 50) = 5,100 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = 32 ( ) = 2,240 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = 5, ,240 2,500 = $4,840. Off-peak season: 44 (105 50) + 0 ( ) 2500 = $80. Profit calculations for Hotel B Peak season: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = 68 (110 50) = 4,080 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = 32 ( ) = 1,760 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = 4, ,760 2,500 = $3,340. Off-peak season: 44 (80 50) + 56 ( ) 2500 = $220. Profit calculations for Hotel C can be checked as well.

22 Round 2 Prices and Demands Page 22 Submitted Prices by Student Groups in Round 2 Realized Demand from Uniform Distributions in Round 2 Peak Season: 192 Loyal Market Size=192*0.6=115.2 ~ 38 for each hotel Off-Peak Season: 220 Loyal Market Size=220*0.6=132 ~ 44 for each hotel

23 Round 2 Sales Page 23 Rooms sold Remaining capacity 62 for each Market size = = 78 Remaining capacity 56 for each Market size = = 88 Competition in the non-loyal markets: Lower-priced sells before the higher-priced: Order hotels by price. Market size is less than the total remaining capacity. Price-order of hotels: Hotel B & Hotel C 120; Hotel A 125. Hotels B and C are the cheapest options and they split the market as they have enough capacity. No customers are left for Hotel A. Market size is less than the total remaining capacity. Price-order of hotels: Hotel B 90; Hotel C 95; Hotel A 105. Hotel B is the cheapest and sells it remaining capacity first. Then, Hotel C serves the remaining customers. No customers are left for Hotel A.

24 Round 2 Profits Page 24 Profit Calculations for Hotel A Peak season: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = 38*(125-50) = 2850 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = 0*( ) = 0 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = =$350. Off-peak season: 44*(105-50)+0*( )-2500 = -$80. You can verify the profits of Hotels B & C!

25 Round 3 Prices and Demands Page 25 Submitted Prices by Student Groups in Round 2 Realized Demand Peak Season: 202 Loyal Market Size=202*0.6=121.2 ~ 40 for each hotel Off-Peak Season: 173 Loyal Market Size=173*0.6=103.8 ~ 35 for each hotel

26 Round 3 Sales Page 26 Rooms sold Remaining capacity 60 for each Market size = = 82 Remaining capacity 65 for each Market size = = 68 Market size is less than the total remaining capacity. Price-order of hotels: Hotel A & Hotel B 115; Hotel A Hotels A and B are the cheapest options and they split the market as they have enough capacity. No customers are left for Hotel C. Market size is less than the total remaining capacity. Price-order of hotels: Hotel C 97.50; Hotel B 89; Hotel A 99. Hotel C is the cheapest and sells its remaining capacity first. Then, Hotel B severs the three remaining customers. No customers are left for Hotel A.

27 Round 3 Profits Page 27 Profit Calculations for Hotel A Peak season: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = 40*(115-50) = 2600 Expedia: Marginal Revenue = 41*( ) = 2460 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = =$2,560. Off-peak season: 35*(99-50)+0*( )-2500 = -$785. You can verify the profits of Hotels B & C!

28 AOM Game Market Analysis Page 28 Allcustomers θθ 1 θθ Loyal customers Shoppers 1. Submitted prices (pp HH, pp LL ), bid prices (bb HH,ii, bb LL,ii ) and booking limits (rr HH,ii, rr LL,ii ) for peak & off peak seasons 2. Round ends, (Q H,Q L ) is realized & markets clear: 2.1 Loyal customers get rooms 2.2 Opaque market clears 2.3 Transparent market clears 3. Round report is generated and next round starts 1 ββ ββ Direct sales (own reservation) Agency Loyal Market Transparent Market Opaque Market

29 Analysis of the AOM Model without Referring to the Game Page 29

30 Capacity & Demand in Opaque Market of AOM θθ > 00, ββ > Loyal market demand θθ QQ HH, QQ LL and settled as in the AM game 2.2. Each hotel has submitted reduced bid prices (bb HH,ii, bb LL,ii ) and booking limits (rr HH,ii, rr LL,ii ) Ex: Peak Season Hotel ii Booking Limit rr HH Submitted Price bb HH A B 8 80 Hotel B Hotel A Peak Capacity for Opaque Price Off-Peak Season Hotel ii Hotel B Booking Limit rr LL Submitted Price bb LL A B Hotel A Off-Peak Capacity for Opaque Page 30 Opaque market demand ββ (1 θθ) QQ HH, QQ LL at prices less than (AAAAkk HH, AAAAkk LL ) a portion of average prices Ex: Peak Opaque Demand Price Off-Peak Opaque Demand

31 Sales to Opaque Customers of AOM θθ > 00, ββ > 00 Page 31 Hotel B Opaque Peak Market Settlement Hotel A Supply curve Demand curve Peak Season 8 rooms of Hotel B sold at $80 6 rooms of Hotel A sold at $ Price Hotel B Hotel A Demand curve Off-Peak Season 12 rooms of Hotel B sold at $60 8 rooms of Hotel A sold at $70 Opaque Off-Peak Market Settlement Supply curve Rooms are not sold by the hotels but by an intermediary such as Priceline PPPPPPPP: Intermediary fee charged for selling each room in opaque market Ex: PPPPPPPP = $2/room. Hotel A opaque market revenue: (70 2) Hotel B opaque market revenue: 8 (80 2) + 12(60 2)

32 Capacity & Demand in Transparent Market of AOM θθ > 00, ββ > Transparent Market Loyal & opaque markets have cleared & yielded the remaining capacities (KK HH,ii, KK LL,ii ) at each hotel ii Each hotel has submitted prices (pp HH,ii, pp LL,ii ) Ex: Peak Season Hotel ii Hotel B Remaining Capacity KK HH Hotel A Peak Remaining Capacity Submitted Price pp HH A B Price Off-Peak Season Hotel ii Hotel B Remaining Capacity KK LL Hotel A Off-Peak Remaining Capacity Submitted Price pp LL A B Page 32 Transparent market demand 1 ββ 1 θθ QQ HH, QQ LL at prices less than wtp vv. Settle the transparent market as in AM... Total Revenue per season = Sum of revenues from Loyal, Opaque & Transparent Markets Total Total Cost=Fixed cost per season + Variable cost (Number of rooms sold) Total Profit per Round = (Total revenue Total Cost) over peak and off-peak seasons

33 Page 33 An Example of the AOM Model by Referring to the Game This example is based on a game played among three student groups at the School of Management, University of Michigan-Flint.

34 AOM Example: Game Settings Game information: # Hotels: 3= nn, # Rounds: 7 Hotel Capacity Marginal Cost Fixed Cost Same for all hotels 100 $50 $2,500 Page 34 Market Capacity: 300= CC = nn cccccc Max. Price: $170= vv Expedia Fee: $5 Demand: Total number of consumers in the market Peak Season: Uniformly distributed between 187 and 375 consumers, i.e., UU 187.5,375 = UU 0.625, = UU αα HH, αα HH CC Off-Peak Season: Uniformly distributed between 75 and 225 consumers, i.e., UU 75,225 = UU 0.25, = UU αα LL, αα LL Proportion of Loyal Customers: 0.5= θθ Proportion of shoppers using Priceline: 0.5= ββ Asking Price Rules for (AAAAkk HH, AAAAkk LL ) Peak Season: 75% of average price Off-Peak Season: 60% of average price CC

35 AOM Example: Demand in 7 Rounds Page 35 Realized demands Realizations from UU 0.625,1.25 *300 Realizations from UU 0.25,

36 Round 1 Submitted Regular Prices & Bid Prices Page 36 Hotel B is over the asking price. Every hotel is over the asking price. 0.75* *102.5

37 Round 1 Booking Limits in the Opaque Market Page 37 Rooms offered through Priceline

38 Round 1 Sales in the Loyal and Opaque Markets Page 38 Round 1 realized demand Peak season loyal = 257*0.5 = ~43 for each hotel Off-peak season loyal = 141*0.5 = 70.5 ~24 for each hotel Rooms are sold to loyal customers first Opaque (Priceline) market clears next Demand: 0.5*(257-43*3)=64 Demand: 0.5*(141-24*3)~34 Hotel A wins the bid but only offered 15 rooms. Therefore, Hotel C gets the rest of the demand. All bids are over the asking price. So, no one sells through Priceline.

39 Round 1 Transparent Market Sales Remaining rooms are sold through Expedia Expedia demand» Peak season: 64 = 0.5 ( ) Page 39» Off-peak demand: 34 ~ 0.5 ( ); rounding glitch: = 140 < 141 # of remaining rooms Peak season» Hotel A: =42; Hotel B: =57; Hotel C: =8 Off-peak season» Hotel A: =76; Hotel B: =76; Hotel C: =76 1. Cheapest: Sells its remaining Gets the remaining 14 customers 2. Second best price: Sells its remaining 8 Hotel C is the cheapest and serves all 34 customers.

40 Round 1 Profits Page 40 Profit calculations for Hotel A Peak season: Loyal: Marginal Revenue = 43*( ) = Priceline: Marginal Revenue = 15*( ) = Expedia: Marginal Revenue = 42*( ) = 2205 Profit = Total Marginal Revenue Fixed cost = =$2,880. Off-peak season: 24*( )+0*( )+0*( )-2500 = -$1,480. You can verify the profits of Hotels B and C!

41 Rounds 2-7 Regular and Bid Prices Regular Prices for Loyal and Transparent Markets Bid Prices Opaque Markets Page 41

42 Rounds 2-7 Booking Limits (Rooms Offered) in Opaque Market Page 42

43 Rounds 2-7 Rooms Sold in Three Markets: Loyal Market, Opaque Market, Transparent Market Page 43

44 AOM Example Profits over 7 Rounds Page 44 Cumulative results

45 Dashboards and Reports Page 45

46 AM Game Dashboard Page 46

47 Game Report Page 47

48 Game Report cont'd Page 48

49 AOM Game Dashboard Page 49

50 Game Report Page 50

51 Game Report cont'd Page 51

52 Game settings and Customization Page 52

53 Hotel Game Summary Page 53 AM and AOM Market Settlements Dashboards and Reports