EUNADICS-AV DELIVERABLE (D-N : D36) Scenario definition and design document

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1 EUNADICS-AV DELIVERABLE (D-N : D36) Scenario definition and design File name: EUNADICS-AV-Deliverable_D36.pdf Dissemination level: PU (public) Authors: Florian Lipok, Dieter Meinhard, Fritz Zobl, Kurt Eschbacher Release date for review: 17/Jan/2018 Reporting period: Reviewer: Raimund Zopp, Matthias Themessl, Markus Kerschbaum Final date of issue: 29/Mar/2018 Revision table Version Date Name Comments /Jan/2018 Florian Lipok Draft Version for Internal Review /Jan/2018 Raimund Zopp Internal Review /Mar/2018 Matthias Themessl, Markus Kerschbaum, Kurt Eschbacher, Fritz Zobl Internal Review & KPI adaption /Mar/2018 Florian Lipok, Dieter Meinhard Internal Review /Mar/2018 Florian Lipok, Dieter Meinhard, Matthias Internal Review Themessl, Raimund Zopp /Mar/2018 All Final Version Abstract This deliverable describes the results of tasks EUNADICS-AV WP7 T7.1 (Identification and definition of appropriate hazard scenarios) and T7.2 (Identification and definition of KPIs for simulation and training) and serves as the basis for T7.3 Evaluation and validation exercise. Chapter 2 includes the results of the scenario identification and evaluation research. EUNADICS-AV stakeholders were asked to assess the impact of five of the most EUNADICS-AV relevant scenarios. Chapter 3 describes the potential impact of hazard scenarios on the aviation domain. In chapter 4 and 5, scenario-related critical values and Key Performance Areas/ Indicators are presented, which both are fundamental for the upcoming EUNADICS-AV exercises of WP7. The EUNADICS-AV project has received funding from the European Union s Horizon 2020 research programme for Societal challenges - smart, green and integrated transport under grant agreement no EUNADICS - Contract Number:

2 Executive Summary This deliverable describes the results of EUNADICS-AV work package 7 tasks T7.1 (Identification and definition of appropriate hazard scenarios) and T7.2 (Identification and definition of KPIs for simulation and training) and serves as the basis for T7.3 Evaluation and validation exercise. From the beginning, EUNADICS-AV was set up with a strong co-design element in order to meet the users needs but also in order to get into contact with the relevant stakeholders to facilitate a possible uptake of EUNADICS-AV products after the project duration. In order to assess the relevant hazards for the aviation management and operational sector a basic literature review as well as an extensive user survey was conducted. The investigations were transformed into an impact assessment ranking (i) volcanic ash, (ii) nuclear events, (iii) sandstorms/ dust events, (iv) major/ forest fires and (v) space weather events. Overall, the derived impact factor shows that volcanic ash and nuclear events have the biggest impact on aviation according to the users and stakeholders. Thereafter follows the scenario of sandstorm/dust event due to its relatively high probability of occurrence. The impact of space weather is only considered of high interest for airlines operating in the polar area and thus is not foreseen to be treated in EUNADICS-AV in detail. Major fires are considered predominately as a local phenomenon and do not have that big effect on the aviation domain. As a consequence, the top-rated hazard scenarios (i) volcanic ash and (ii) nuclear events are selected for the EUNADICS-AV tests and exercises in spring Within work package 7 of the EUNADICS-AV project developments and implementations have to be evaluated conscientiously to show which thresholds will be met to ensure an improved operation with the newly developed system. Thus, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are required. A performance indicator or Key Performance Indicator is a type of performance measurement. Thus, KPIs evaluate the success of an organization or of a particular activity in which it engages. Therefore basic relevant KPI s of Key Performance Areas - such as access and equity, capacity, cost effectiveness, efficiency, environment, flexibility, global interobability, predictability, safety or security - are ed for the evaluation and implementation of tests and exercises within the EUNADICS-AV project where the complete reaction chain will be simulated, evaluated and validated. In addition, the potential impact of each respective analyzed scenario (i) to (v) on the aviation domain was analyzed in different crises management phases, serving as one of the key fundamentals for defining both Key Performance Areas and Key Performance Indicators and respective thresholds where possible on a quantitative basis e.g. for fly and non-fly zones were determined. 2

3 Table of Contents Executive Summary... 2 Table of Contents... 3 List of Figures... 4 List of Tables Introduction and overall context Identification and definition of aviation-influencing hazard scenarios Introduction Methodology Volcanic ash Nuclear events Sandstorms / dust events Major/ forest fires Space weather (solar activity) Airborne hazard scenarios and their potential impact on the aviation domain in different crisis management phases Introduction Crisis management phases Scenario-specific impact analysis Scenario impact summary Scenario-related critical values and thresholds Volcanic ash Nuclear events Sandstorms / dust events Hazard Key Performance Areas (KPAs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) Key Performance Areas (KPAs) & Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) Aviation related KPAs & KPIs KPAs & KPIs for the planned EUNADICS-AV exercises Conclusions & ranking of hazard scenarios based on EUNADICS-AV evaluations Annex Annex 1 Additional images

4 List of Figures Figure 1: Overview on EUNADICS-AV work package interactions with specific interdependences of WP 2 and WP Figure 2: Overview of tasks and workflow of EUNADICS-AV work package Figure 3: Overall structure of the... 8 Figure 4: Crisis management phases (ICAO, 2014) Figure 5: Impacted stakeholders, players and spaces (ICAO, 2014, modified) Figure 6: Impact of volcanic ash dispersion on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Figure 7: Impact of nuclear dispersion on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Figure 8: Impact of fires on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Figure 9: Impact of space weather on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Figure 10: Rolls Royce Duration of Exposure versus Ash Concentration (DEvAC) chart Figure 11: An ash exposure dose of 14.4 g s/m3 illustrated on the DEvAC chart Figure 12: Hypothetical ash cloud scenario showing flight plan options between City A and City B staying within the 14.4 mg/m3 limit Figure 13: INES ratings published by IAEA

5 List of Tables Table 1: ICAO aviation-impacting scenarios and hazards (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 2: Scenario evaluation matrix: blank (see Table 23 in the annex for an enlarged view) Table 3: Scenario evaluation matrix: calculation of impact factor for volcanic ash (exemplarily; see Table 25 in the annex for an enlarged view) Table 4: Evaluation result volcanic ash scenario (see Table 24in the annex for an enlarged view) Table 5: Evaluation result nuclear event scenario (see Table 25 in the annex for an enlarged view).. 13 Table 6: Evaluation result of sandstorms (dust events; see Table 26 in the annex for an enlarged view).. 14 Table 7: Evaluation result of major/ forest fires (see Table 27 in the annex for an enlarged view) Table 8: Evaluation result of space weather hazards (see Table 28 in the annex for an enlarged view) Table 9: Specification of crisis management phases (ICAO, 2014) Table 10: Impact of a volcanic ash dispersion on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 11: Decision making in case of a volcanic hazard (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 12: Impact of a nuclear dispersion on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 13: Decision making in case of a volcanic hazard (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 14: Impact of a fires on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 15: Decision making in case of a major fires (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 16: Impact of a space weather on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 17: Decision making in case of a volcanic hazard (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 18: Scenario impact overview (ICAO, 2014) Table 19: Approximate radiation intensity levels at different locations at Chernobyl reactor shortly after the explosion Table 20: Performance Areas and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for aviation defined by ICAO (ICAO ) Table 21: KPIs recommended by CANSO (source: CANSO, 2015) Table 22: Ranking of aviation-influencing hazards based on stakeholder survey (impact factor summary) Table 23: Scenario evaluation matrix: blank Table 24: Evaluation result volcanic ash scenario Table 25: Evaluation result nuclear event scenario Table 26: Evaluation result of sandstorms (dust events) Table 27: Evaluation result of major/ forest fires Table 28: Evaluation result of space weather hazards Table 29: Summary of impacts of all ICAO listed hazards (ICAO, 2014)

6 1 Introduction and overall context Aviation is one of the key infrastructures of our modern world. Even short interruptions can cause economic damages summing up to the Billion-Euro range (primarily airline s revenues and consequential losses to society). As evident from the past, aviation shows vulnerability with regard to natural hazards and there is a significant gap in the Europe-wide availability of real time hazard measurement and monitoring combined with a near-real-time European data analysis and assimilation system. The project EUNADICS-AV aims to close this gap in data and information availability, enabling all stakeholders in the aviation system to obtain fast, coherent and consistent information. One of the specific aims of the EUNADICS-AV project is to identify hazards scenarios which have major impact on the aviation domain and to implement and test specific developments for these hazard case studies. Figure 1 gives a brief overview on EUNADICS-AV work package interactions with specific interdependences of WP 2 and WP 7. While in WP 2 the focus is on identifying hazards and their impacts in general, WP 7 aims at implementing, testing and evaluating EUNADICS-AV developments. Figure 1: Overview on EUNADICS-AV work package interactions with specific interdependences of WP 2 and WP7 6

7 Main tasks of WP 7 are (see Figure 2): (A) Simulation set-up (B) Simulation of crisis reaction chain (crisis event exercises) (C) System testing by a tracer experiment (D) Evaluation and validation of crisis event exercises Figure 2: Overview of tasks and workflow of EUNADICS-AV work package 7 While WP 2 mainly deals with the identification of overall stakeholder/ user requirements and hazard risk assessments, work carried out within this deliverable aims on the one hand at identifying and defining appropriate hazard scenarios and its respective thresholds for the planned tests and exercises and on the other hand at efficiently evaluating the implementations by using Key Performance Indicators. However, this deliverable includes the work of the tasks: T7.1 Identification and definition of appropriate hazard scenarios T7.2 Identification and definition of KPIs for simulation and training. Task 7.1 specifies the scenario focus for the development of EUNADICS-AV products and task 7.2 serves as an important basis for the work to be done in the upcoming simulation and testing activities. 7

8 The is structured as follows (Figure 3): Identification and definition of aviation-influencing hazard scenarios Airborne hazard scenarios and their potential impact on the aviation domain in different crisis management phases Scenario-related critical values and thresholds Scenario-related Key Performance Areas (KPAs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) Figure 3: Overall structure of the In a first step, the potential impact of hazard scenarios on aviation was analysed. Then, these scenarios were evaluated in more detail regarding their impact and relevance for EUNADICS- AV, using the insights of diverse EUNADICS-AV stakeholders. These results serve as a basis for any future development activities within the project. More information about the methodology is stated in chapter 2. Then, for these focus scenarios (volcanic ash, nuclear emissions and sandstorm/dust storms), critical values and thresholds are analysed and summarized serving as a basis for KPI implementations during tests and exercises within the EUNADICS-AV project. 8

9 2 Identification and definition of aviation-influencing hazard scenarios 2.1 Introduction For realizing practical implementations within the EUNADICS-AV project, the identification of hazards which have a significant impact on the aviation domain is of vital importance. Therefore, within work package 2 of the EUNADICS-AV project, intensive work has been carried out to identify the user requirements related to aviation-impacting hazards. Based on this assessment this deliverable will determine the final set of EUNADICS-AV scenarios to be analysed and which will be implemented in the project exercises. In the following, both overall scenario evaluation methodology and work as well as the identification and specification of appropriate EUNADICS-AV hazard scenarios with its impacts on the aviation stakeholders and players are described in detail. 2.2 Methodology The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) specifies in its Crisis Management Framework Document 1 a couple of scenarios which may impact the aviation domain (Table 1, alphabetical order). 1 ICAO Crisis Management Framework Document (EUR Doc 031), 2014, 9

10 Table 1: ICAO aviation-impacting scenarios and hazards (ICAO, 2014, modified) No. Scenario/ hazard 1 Airborne spread of diseases / pandemic 2 Armed Conflict 3 Cyber attack 4 Earthquake 5 Fire 6 Floods 7 Hazardous chemicals event 8 Heavy meteorological situation 9 Industrial action 10 Major failure of Pan European function 11 Nuclear event 12 Security incident 13 Shortage of fuel 14 Threats from space space debris & meteorites 15 Threats from space space weather 16 Volcanic ash The objective of the EUNADICS-AV scenario evaluation was to assess the impact of the scenarios on aviation and in consequence to rate the relevance for EUNADICS-AV to be able to focus on the most relevant scenarios. Therefore, to be able to assess the impact of the given scenarios for aviation, after intensive literature research, a scenario evaluation matrix was designed, which represented the basis for expert interviews. Table 2 exemplarily shows the volcanic ash part of this matrix. For one benchmark event (a major event during the last 35 years), stakeholders evaluated the impact by ticking high, medium or low for the different criteria like capacity, safety or efficiency. 10

11 Table 2: Scenario evaluation matrix: blank (see Table 23 in the annex for an enlarged view) Volcanic ash dispersion Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Eyjafjallajökull 2010 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional maintenance Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) Unit Ash fill in with "x" here fill in the number of events and the unit here The following table exemplarily shows the final matrix for the volcanic ash part: in total 11 experts indicated the respective impact on aviation capacity as high. For the calculation of the impact factor all entries were summed up and an impact factor was calculated where rating high = 3, medium = 2 and low = 1. Thus the impact factor for volcanic ash is calculated as follows: 34 x x x 1= 149, see Table 3. In addition, the interview partners were asked to state the probability (the number of comparable benchmark events in the past 100 years). Table 3: Scenario evaluation matrix: calculation of impact factor for volcanic ash (exemplarily; see Table 25 in the annex for an enlarged view) Volcanic ash Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Eyjafjallajökull 2010 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society 11 1 Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional maintenance Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 1 10 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 1 10 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety 5 6 Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled 10 2 Sum Impact factor 149 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 13 Unit Ash For assessment purposes the study did not solely rely on scientific aspects but also on practical issues. Scientific aspects represent the possibility to measure and model, practical aspects depict the possibility to test and disseminate each scenario A well-defined group of international players and stakeholders as well as partners from the EUNADICS-AV consortium were considered for the expert interviews. As a result, In total, twelve stakeholders filled in the evaluation matrix: 9 airlines 2 ATCs 1 pilot 11

12 From a pre-selection of scenarios, following scenarios were considered relevant and chosen for the expert interviews: Volcanic ash Nuclear events Sandstorms/ dust events Major fires/ forest fires Space weather The results of each scenario evaluation are further explained in detail in the next chapter. 2.3 Volcanic ash Volcanic ash is seen today as the scenario with the highest impact on aviation. As indicated in Table 4, volcanic ash results in more significant impacts on the aviation capacity, aircraft engine, safety and efficiency and less on crew or passenger. One reason for this high impact on aviation is that today s engines are designed to be light, fuel-efficient and thus are more vulnerable for any ash ingestion. Additionally, modern engines do have longer service intervals, allowing ash-related effects to accumulate over longer periods. Airlines do risk assessment before the flight and try to select the most reliable source for this information. Challenges here are diverging information from different sources. During the flight, some crews have to report ash encounters and have to estimate exposure times. After the flight, visual post-flight inspections determine whether a more extensive inspection is required and the aircraft needs to be removed from service. Airlines operations procedures distinguish between day and night operations, as well as over- or underflying of ash clouds. Some airlines also operate between ash layers when their vertical extent is known. Flight through visible ash clouds is prohibited in any case. Project-internally, both the scientific as well as the practical feasibility (technical implementation) are ranked as high. Table 4: Evaluation result volcanic ash scenario (see Table 24in the annex for an enlarged view) Volcanic ash Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Eyjafjallajökull 2010 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society 10 1 Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional maintenance Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 10 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 10 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety 4 6 Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled 9 2 Sum Factor 131 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 13 Unit Ash 12

13 2.4 Nuclear events The scenario of nuclear events shows a similar impact factor as for volcanic ash. This is due to the fact that the impact on passenger and crew is rated higher (see Table 5). In case of nuclear events, the restricted areas are usually not as extended as compared to volcanic ash clouds events, but there are concerns from passengers and crew members to get too close to these areas. The biggest problem seems to find crew accommodation far enough away from areas perceived as critical by the crews. The scientific feasibility for nuclear events is rated rather low, the practical relevance high. However, it was considered important to be able to calculate / simulate / estimate the related impact of the event on the air traffic situation based on the required input meteorological data (event location, wind situation, spreading models, etc.). Table 5: Evaluation result nuclear event scenario (see Table 25 in the annex for an enlarged view) Nuclear event Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Fukushima 2011 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Sum Factor 125 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 2 Unit Radiation cloud 2.5 Sandstorms / dust events Sandstorm is partly seen as an issue for aviation, but also as a local and temporally limited phenomenon, which is relatively well manageable. Different to the previously depicted hazards, sandstorms endanger the take-off and landing instead of the cruise phase. In addition, engine manufacturers do not provide information on critical values. Some airlines have a minimum required visibility of 5 km to conduct a flight in sandstorms. The final decision is always made by the crew. The scientific feasibility for sandstorms (dust events) is stated as medium, the practical feasibility as high with the note that if it would be possible to calculate / simulate / estimate the related impact of the event on the air traffic situation based on the required input data (i.e. thresholds for FLY / AVOID / NO FLY zones, intensity and impact on aircraft components (e.g. engines), etc.). 13

14 Table 6: Evaluation result of sandstorms (dust events; see Table 26 in the annex for an enlarged view) Sandstorm (dust events) Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Cairo (2013/2015) Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 3 6 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 3 6 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Sum Factor 94 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 63 Unit Sand/Dust 2.6 Major/ forest fires While in Europe forest fires tend to be local problems, worldwide e.g. in the United States (California) they tend to be more extensive. In general, major fires are considered to affect the aviation sector if the fire occurs near an airport. During a flight, the smoke and the particles are seen as less relevant at typical flight altitudes, but can occasionally lead to enroute diversion when the source of the smoke smell in the cabin cannot be identified. In this case, a fire located within the aircraft has to be assumed and procedures require a diversion to the closest possible airport for safety reasons, leading to substantial inconvenience for passengers and a high cost impact to the airline. The scientific feasibility for major fires is stated as medium, the practical feasibility as high with the note that if it would be possible to calculate / simulate / estimate the related impact of the event on air traffic situation (distinguishing between airspace users (affected (airline) aircraft) and Search and Rescue (SAR)-flights, Fire-Fighting flights, etc. based on required input data (i.e. thresholds for FLY / AVOID / NO FLY zones; visibility / intensity and impact on aircraft components (e.g. engines), etc.). Results of evaluations are depicted in Table 7. 14

15 Table 7: Evaluation result of major/ forest fires (see Table 27 in the annex for an enlarged view) Major fires Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low California 2016 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society 3 8 Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing 1 8 Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 4 5 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 3 6 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety 4 5 Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled 3 7 Sum Factor 75 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 26 Smoke 2.7 Space weather (solar activity) Concerning space weather, there are mixed opinions on whether this scenario is important for aviation or not (for details see Table 8). It is obvious that airlines that fly in the polar region see this scenario as a lot more relevant than others, as in this area cosmic radiation is channelled by the earth's magnetic field. These airlines have to adapt their routes to e.g. lower flight levels, which has significant effects on flight times and fuel consumption. Some stakeholders find it difficult to assess the direct effects of space weather, while others do not see any impact on their operations at all. Table 8 shows these incoherent opinions. It was mentioned that space weather may significantly affect aviation in respect to signal transmission in the ionosphere (e.g. GNSS). It was obvious that the more stakeholders know about space weather, the more they thought it has an impact on aviation. The US organisation NOAA ( provides warnings, NAIRAS ( is a real-time decision support tool. In general, there is little knowledge and information available for aviation stakeholders. NOAA puts space weather into the following scales: Geomagnetic storms: G1 (minor) G5 (extreme) Solar radiation storms: S1 (minor) S5 (extreme) Radio Blackouts: R1 (minor) R5 (extreme) There have been reported events due to space weather, e.g.: Sweden (November 2015): Failure of ATC of 1,5 hours due to disturbances in the ionosphere. Pacific (2006): Failure of GPS. The scientific feasibility for space weather could not be stated within the project consortium. The practical feasibility was stated as medium, with the note that if it would be possible to calculate / simulate / estimate the related impact of the event on air traffic based on the required input data (i.e. mathematical modelling of impact; intensity, etc.). 15

16 Table 8: Evaluation result of space weather hazards (see Table 28 in the annex for an enlarged view) Space weather Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Quebec Major Blackout 1989 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing 1 7 Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 1 7 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 1 7 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Sum Factor 75 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 4 Unit Power/comms disruption 16

17 3 Airborne hazard scenarios and their potential impact on the aviation domain in different crisis management phases 3.1 Introduction For the purpose of scenario evaluation within EUNADICS-AV, it is important to describe respective scenario impacts in a first step. In the Crisis Management Framework Document 2 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) scenario impacts on diverse stakeholders, players and domains/areas such as airports, ANSPs, flight operations, aircrafts or airspace is evaluated and summarized. This has been developed by the CRISIS Management Framework Working Group under the auspices of EANPG coordinating group (COG) and has been adopted by EANPG following a recommendation by the COG. This crisis management framework covers the ICAO EUR region. It supports crisis management arrangements at the national (e.g. State), sub-regional (e.g. EACCC scope), and regional level (e.g. EUR Region). The ICAO Crisis Management Framework: is built on EACCC arrangements and experience aims to be in line with global ICAO provisions and be used as a basis for pan/intraregional cooperation is built on existing national and international crisis management, arrangements in the EUR Region, aims to propose guidance for States - to help States in enhancing the level of preparedness to threat scenarios, aims to harmonise crisis management approach across the whole European Region. Since the ICAO Crisis Management Framework Document contains a profound summary of airborne hazard scenarios and their potential impact on the aviation domain in different crisis management phases, most of the findings are applicable to the EUNADICS-AV framework. Consequently, subsequent chapters are based on this. 3.2 Crisis management phases Figure 4 and Table 9 depict phases in ATM Crisis Management that may be applied on a national, sub regional, or regional level, in case of a disruptive event. Figure 4: Crisis management phases (ICAO, 2014) 2 ICAO Crisis Management Framework Document (EUR Doc 031), 2014, 17

18 Table 9: Specification of crisis management phases (ICAO, 2014) No. Crisis management phase Description 1 Pre-alert Information is received on an event, which may lead to a possible major disruption to ATM, requiring activation of the crisis management arrangements. 2 Disruption Major ATM disruption that impacts the ATM operations and which may escalate to a crisis. 3 Crisis State of inability to provide air navigation service at required level resulting in a major loss of capacity, or a major imbalance between capacity and demand, or a major failure in the information flow following an unusual and unforeseen situation 4 Recovery In the recovery phase, the operation will go back to normal, and an evaluation of the impact will be finalised. 3.3 Scenario-specific impact analysis Introduction This chapter includes a number of EUNADICS-AV relevant scenarios which may lead to an aviation crisis. Each scenario contains a generic description, impact analysis, and decisionmaking principles. While the impact analysis describes possible impacts in terms of safety, capacity, cost and environment on (1) aircraft, (2) airspace, (3) aerodrome, (4) flight operations, (5) Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), (6) persons, (7) cargo (compare Figure 5), decision making principles provide guidance for aviation or non-aviation stakeholders response in managing the crisis. Figure 5: Impacted stakeholders, players and spaces (ICAO, 2014, modified) 18

19 In the following, the impact of selected EUNADICS-AV relevant hazards events on stakeholders, players and domains/areas are described Volcanic ash Possible impacts on and consequences for stakeholders, players and spaces (see Figure 5) in case of volcanic hazards are summed up in Figure 6 and Table 10. Impact Volcanic ash dispersion contaminating parts of airspace and possibly covering airports Figure 6: Impact of volcanic ash dispersion on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 10: Impact of a volcanic ash dispersion on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Impact on Impact type Description Aircraft Immediate safety of an aircraft Longer term safety and costs affecting the operation of aircraft The malfunction or failure of one or more engines leading not only to reduction, or complete loss, of thrust but also to failures of electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic systems. Volcanic ash contains particles whose melting point is below modern turbine engine burner temperature; these then fuse in the turbine section reducing the throat area and efficiency leading to engine surge and possibly flame-out The blockage of pitot and static sensors resulting in unreliable airspeed indications and erroneous warnings Windscreens can be rendered partially or completely opaque Contamination of cabin air requiring Flight crew use of oxygen masks The erosion of external aircraft components Accumulating damage on aircraft engines resulting in increased fuel consumption and unscheduled engine maintenance downtimes (endoscopic inspections, engine replacement) Reduced electronic cooling efficiency and, since volcanic ash readily absorbs water, potential short circuits leading to a wide range of aircraft system failures and/or anomalous behaviour 19

20 Flight crew manoeuvring for volcanic cloud avoidance may potentially conflict with other aircraft in the vicinity Deposits of volcanic ash on a runway resulting in a degradation of braking performance, especially if the volcanic ash is wet; in extreme cases, this can lead to runway closure The aircraft ventilation and pressurization systems can become heavily contaminated. In particular, cleaning or replacement may be required in response to air cycle machine contamination and abrasion to rotating components, ozone converter contamination and air filter congestion Contamination of other parts of the aircraft Airspace Aerodrome Flight operations Airspace unavailable for flight ops Reduced capacity Aerodrome unavailable for flight ops Reduced capacity Flight cancellation Flight re-routing Flight diversion Flight re-scheduling Flight delay Airspace unavailable for flight ops due to volcanic ash contamination Aerodrome unavailable for flight ops due to surrounding airspace closure Reduced capacity due to unavailable airspace Aerodrome unavailable for flight ops due to volcanic ash deposits on aerodrome surfaces: runway, taxiways, apron Reduced capacity on aerodrome due to volcanic ash deposits on aerodrome surfaces: runway, taxiways, apron Cancellation of flights Re-routing of flights Diversion of flights Re-scheduling of flights Delay of flights ANSP ATCOs workload Increased workload for Air Traffic Control Officers Persons Flight crew health Possible effects on flight crew health Flight crew workload Passenger health Passenger handling Ground personnel health Ground personnel workload Increased workload for flight crew Possible effects on passenger health Effects on passenger handling Possible effects on ground personnel health Effects on ground personnel workload 20

21 Cargo Live stock Possible effects on live stock Goods Possible effects on goods Topics for decision making in case of a volcanic hazard are listed in Table 11. Table 11: Decision making in case of a volcanic hazard (ICAO, 2014, modified) No. Decision making 1 Aircraft Operators will make flight operational decisions based on SRA/SMS approach in accordance with their SRA/SMS qualifications granted by their national authorities 2 State authorities may close airspace in the immediate vicinity of the volcano Nuclear events Possible impacts on and consequences for stakeholders, players and domains/areas (see Figure 5) in case of nuclear hazards are summed up in Figure 7 and Table 12. Impact Nuclear accident resulting in nuclear emissions (e.g. nuclear powerplant) impacting flight operations in the EUR region Figure 7: Impact of nuclear dispersion on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 12: Impact of a nuclear dispersion on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Impact on Impact type Description Aircraft Contamination Contamination of the Aircraft in air and on ground Airspace Aerodrome Airspace unavailable for flight ops Reduced capacity Aerodrome unavailable for flight ops Airspace unavailable for flight ops due to contamination of the air Reduced capacity due to contamination of the air Airport unavailable for flight ops due to contamination of the airport or air around the airport 21

22 Flight operations Reduced capacity Infrastructure Flight cancellation Flight re-routing Flight diversion Flight re-scheduling Flight delay Reduced capacity e.g. due to decontamination Reduced / limited access Cancellation of flights Re-routing of flights Diversion of flights Re-scheduling of flights Delay of flights ANSP People: ATCOs workload Increased workload for Air Traffic Control Officers Infrastructure: access Possible limited access to infrastructure Persons Flight crew health Possible effects on flight crew health Flight crew workload Passenger health Passenger handling Ground personnel health Ground personnel workload Increased workload for flight crew Possible effects on passenger health Effects on passenger handling Possible effects on ground personnel health Effects on ground personnel workload Cargo Live stock health Possible effects on live stock Goods contamination Possible effects on goods Topics for decision making in case of a volcanic hazard are listed in Table 13. Table 13: Decision making in case of a volcanic hazard (ICAO, 2014, modified) No. Decision making 1 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. health authorities) may decide on the airport unavailability for flight operations 2 State authorities, airport authority and/or ANSP decide on the airport s reduced capacity 3 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. health authorities) may make a decision impacting air navigation service provision ability (resulting in airspace unavailability or reduced capacity for flight operations) 4 Aircraft Operators will follow Notice(s) to Airmen (NOTAM) and any additional instructions issued by responsible authorities 22

23 3.3.4 Major/ forest fires Possible impacts on and consequences for stakeholders, players and domains/areas (see Figure 5) in case of major or forest fires are summed up in Figure 8 and Table 14. Impact Fire(s) with substantial smoke production impacting flight operations Figure 8: Impact of fires on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) Table 14: Impact of a fire on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Impact on Impact type Description Aircraft Airspace Aerodrome Flight operations Immediate safety of an aircraft Longer term safety and costs affecting the operation of aircraft Airspace unavailable for flight ops Reduced capacity Aerodrome unavailable for flight ops Reduced capacity Infrastructure Flight cancellation Flight re-routing Flight diversion Reduced visibility due to smoke Smoke contamination affecting cabin air requiring flight crew use of oxygen masks Emergency diversion due to unknown origin of smoke in cockpit and cabin The aircraft ventilation and pressurization systems may become heavily contaminated Airspace unavailable for flight ops due to contamination of the air Reduced capacity due to contamination of the air Airport unavailable for flight ops due to contamination of the airport or air around the airport Reduced capacity e.g. due to decontamination Reduced / limited access Cancellation of flights Re-routing of flights Diversion of flights 23

24 Flight re-scheduling Flight delay Re-scheduling of flights Delay of flights ANSP People: ATCOs workload Increased workload for Air Traffic Control Officers Infrastructure: access Possible limited access to infrastructure Persons Flight crew health Possible effects on flight crew health Flight crew workload Passenger health Passenger handling Ground personnel health Ground personnel workload Increased workload for flight crew Possible effects on passenger health Effects on passenger handling Possible effects on ground personnel health Effects on ground personnel workload Cargo Live stock health Possible effects on live stock Goods (including dangerous goods) Possible effects on goods Topics for decision making in case of a volcanic hazard are listed in Table 15. Table 15: Decision making in case of a major fires (ICAO, 2014, modified) No. Decision making 1 State (non-aviation) authorities, airport authorities and/or ANSP may decide on reduced capacity or on the airport unavailability for flight operations 2 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. environmental & health authorities) and/or ANSP may decide on air navigation service provision limitation (resulting in airspace unavailability or reduced capacity for flight operations) 3 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional instructions issued by responsible authorities 24

25 3.3.5 Sandstorms / dust events The impact of the sandstorm scenario is not dealt with by the ICAO referred above. However, sandstorms and dust storms pose a hazard for aviation. Not only do they drastically reduce visibility, but they also are associated with very strong winds that can seriously affect an aircraft during take-off and landing. Furthermore, engines can be damaged by ingesting sand and/or dust. 3 Generally, dust can have similar effects as volcanic ash, especially in modern jet engines with high hot-section temperatures, causing partial-melting of sand components and their adherence to turbine parts. With sand/dust storms, the erosion effects are, however stronger, potentially reducing engine s lifetime and having detrimental effects on other aircraft systems, too. Since effects of this type of hazard are quite similar to volcanic hazards and is not considered to be implemented in detail within the EUNADICS-AV project, impacts are not listed in detail. Notably, engine manufacturers are treating the maintenance impacts of sand and dust storms in a similar way to volcanic ash impacts Space weather Possible impacts and consequences to stakeholders, players and domains/areas (see Figure 5) in case of space weather impacts are summed up in Figure 9 and Table 16. Impact Solar activity impacting satellite navigation, HF, ground infrastructure (e.g. power supply) and leading to increased radiation Figure 9: Impact of space weather on airspace and airports (ICAO, 2014, modified) 3 Source: and rum-dec2012.pdf 25

26 Table 16: Impact of a space weather on the aviation domain (ICAO, 2014, modified) Impact on Impact type Description Aircraft Immediate safety of an aircraft Immediate safety of an aircraft if satellite navigation or HF impacted Airspace Reduced capacity Reduced capacity aircraft if satellite navigation or HF impacted Aerodrome(s) Reduced capacity Reduced capacity if satellite navigation impacted Flight operations Infrastructure Flight re-routing Flight diversion Impact if equipment is influenced Re-routing of flights Diversion of flights ANSP Flight delay People: ATCOs workload Infrastructure: equipment Delay of flights Increased workload for Air Traffic Control Officers Possible limited access to infrastructure equipment Persons Flight crew health Possible effects on flight crew health Flight crew workload Passenger health Passenger handling Increased workload for flight crew Possible effects on passenger health Effects on passenger handling Cargo Live stock Possible effects on live stock Goods (including dangerous goods) Possible effects on goods Topics for decision making in case of a volcanic hazard are listed in Table 17. Table 17: Decision making in case of a volcanic hazard (ICAO, 2014, modified) No. Decision making 1 State authorities (non-aviation and aviation), airport authorities and/or ANSP may decide on the airport reduced capacity 2 Aircraft Operators will make flight operations decisions based on the available space weather information 26

27 2.6 Scenario impact summary Knowing the influences of hazards is of outmost importance for evaluating the impacts of each individual hazard. This serves as an important basis for defining individual Key Performance Indicators. Table 18 summarizes the impacts of the different hazards (volcanic ash, nuclear events, major / forest fires, space weather) on stakeholders, players and domains/areas. Table 18: Scenario impact overview (ICAO, 2014) Impact on Impact type Volcanic ash Nuclear events Major / forest fires Space weather Aircraft Immediate (crash) X X X Long term (damage) X X X Airspace Unavailable X X X Reduced Capacity X X X X Aerodrome(s) Unavailable X X X Reduced capacity X X X X Infrastructure X Flight operations Cancellation X X X Re-routing X X X X Re-scheduling X X X Diversion X X X X Delay X X X X ANSP People X X X X Infrastructure X X Communications Persons Flight crew workload X X X X Flight crew health X X X X Passenger health X X X X Passenger handling X X X X Ground personnel workload X X X 27

28 Ground personnel health X X X Cargo Live stock X X X X Goods X X X X From this matrix it is obvious that all of these hazards may have significant influence on nearly each of the analyzed stakeholders, players and domains/areas. A summary of impacts of all ICAO listed hazards (Table 1) can be found in 7.1 Annex 1 Additional images, Table

29 4 Scenario-related critical values and thresholds After setting the focus mainly onto the scenarios volcanic ash and nuclear events as outlined in chapter 2 it is important to define critical values and thresholds for these scenarios. They are needed in the course of EUNADICS-AV work package 7 to run and evaluate the system tests and exercises. Since sandstorms / dust events show similar effects as volcanic hazards, critical values and thresholds are listed too. In the following, critical values and thresholds are described in detail for selected EUNADICS-AV hazards and case studies. 4.1 Volcanic ash The first level of critical values for volcanic ash is that aircrafts should avoid visible and discernible ash. This regulation can be found in: ICAO, 2013: International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group 4 EASA, 2015: EASA Safety Information Bulletin, Flight in Airspace with Contamination of Volcanic Ash 5 In 2013, ICAO defined the meaning of visible and discernible ash as: Visible ash is defined as volcanic ash observed by the human eye and not be defined quantitatively by the observer. Discernible ash is defined as volcanic ash detected by defined impacts on/in aircraft or by agreed in-situ and/or remote-sensing techniques 6 In 2010 the ICAO European (EUR) and North Atlantic (NAT) regions introduced a joint VA contingency plan. 7, which defined danger areas: Area of Low Contamination: airspace where volcanic ash may be encountered at concentrations greater than 0.2 mg/m3, but less than or equal to 2 mg/m3. Area of Medium Contamination: airspace where volcanic ash may be encountered at concentrations greater than 2 mg/m3, but less than 4 mg/m3. Area of High Contamination: airspace where volcanic ash may be encountered at concentrations equal to or greater than 4 mg/m3. 4 ICAO IAVWOPSG/7 Report, March 2013: pdf 5 EASA, 2015: R7.pdf? blob=publicationfile&v=2 6 ICAO IAVWOPSG/7 Report, March 2013: pdf 7 ICAO - EUR/NAT Region Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan, EUR Doc 019, NAT Doc 006, Part II 29

30 Besides these guidelines for aviation operations, various international studies and activities, contributed to this research question. Notable examples are the VERTIGO 8 and PROVIDA 9 scientific studies undertaken in European universities, various studies sponsored by the UK Military and NATO plus the NASA/USAF led VIPR-III VA engine test completed in August Engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce also put significant effort into the research of the impact of volcanic ash especially on engines and started do develop a flexible, dose-based avoidance approach. A main result of this effort is the Duration of Exposure versus Ash Concentration (DEvAC) chart, which has been updated many times during research since 2010; The latest version is shown in the following figure. Figure 10: Rolls Royce Duration of Exposure versus Ash Concentration (DEvAC) chart A key conclusion of all research activities is that engine susceptibility to volcanic ash is not purely a function of the ash concentration encountered; the duration of the encounter is important, e.g. a certain concentration may be relatively benign for a short duration exposure 8 VERTIGO is an EC funded ITN research project; see 9 PROVIDA is a loose consortium of universities, research institutions and companies studying the effects of VA on gas turbine engines; see 10 Source: Volcanic Ash and Aviation Rolls-Royce Position, May 2017, 30

31 but quite damaging for long duration or multiple short duration exposures over a number of flights. Effectively it is the volcanic ash dose the duration of the exposure multiplied by the mean ash concentration during the exposure which counts. The pink background regions in Figure 10 are tentative suggestions where combinations of ash concentration and exposure duration could lead to significant flight safety implications. The yellow/orange hatched region is a tentative suggestion where purely economic impacts might be expected. Using a combination of in-service experience, engine test data and mathematical modelling, Rolls-Royce has established for all Trent and RB211 engine types an ash dose equivalent to operating for 120 minutes in an actual ash concentration of 2 mg/m3 will not lead to significant reductions in flight safety margins providing all measures are taken to maximise engine operability margins. Such a dose can be expressed in SI units as 14.4 g s/m3, i.e. operating in g/m3 for 7200 seconds (7200 x = 14.4). Rolls-Royce has also shown that a dose of 14.4 g s/m3 represents an acceptable dose below which there is negligible impact on engine related flight safety margins across the actual ash concentration range of 0.2 mg/m3 to 4 mg/m3. This means that operating for up to 600 minutes in an actual ash concentration of 0.4 mg/m3, or 60 minutes in actual 4 mg/m3, will not lead to significant safety implications. However, it cannot be guaranteed that doses equal to or below 14.4 g s/m3 are acceptable at concentrations substantially greater than actual 4 mg/m3. 11 The ash dose that would represent an unacceptable deterioration in engine related flight safety margins at actual ash concentrations below 0.2 mg/m3 is not known precisely, but evidence indicates that it is so large any exposure to such concentrations will have negligible impact on engine related flight safety margins. Figure 11illustrates on the DEvAC chart a dose of 14.4 g s/m3 across the 0.2 mg/m3 to 4 mg/m3 concentration range. 11 Source: Volcanic Ash and Aviation Rolls-Royce Position, R. Clarkson, May

32 Figure 11: An ash exposure dose of 14.4 g s/m3 illustrated on the DEvAC chart 12 Figure 12 illustrates how an assessment can be made of an engine s potential ash exposure dose in the absence of direct on-board measurements. The figure is a hypothetical example of the type of concentration charts the London and Toulouse Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) might produce for an ash cloud. Shown are three theoretical flight paths for a flight between City A and City B, which traverse the contaminated airspace. To assess whether a dose of 14.4 g s/m3 could have been exceeded it is recommended to assume the entire airspace between the 0.2 mg/m3 and 2 mg/m3 contours was contaminated with ash at an actual concentration of 2 mg/m3 and that between the 2 mg/m3 and 4 mg/m3 contours the actual concentration is 4 mg/m3 everywhere. This is in effect very conservative (see below) but it does permit an assessment of exposure dose to be made. 12 Source: Volcanic Ash and Aviation Rolls-Royce Position, R. Clarkson, May

33 Figure 12: Hypothetical ash cloud scenario showing flight plan options between City A and City B staying within the 14.4 mg/m3 limit 13 It would be generally advisable to produce flight plans and assess potential exposure dose for operations within the contaminated airspace in a similar way to the examples shown in Figure 11. If flight plan examples 1 or 3 were produced, the engines are likely to have sufficient allowable remaining dose (9.96 g s/m3 for Plan 1 and 10.2 g s/m3 for Plan 3) to complete a return flight to City A before an engine inspection is required should the ash cloud still be present; Plan 2 may leave insufficient allowable remaining dose (4.92 g s/m3) for a return flight without first performing an engine inspection. 14 Prolonged exposure to low concentration ash or short duration exposure to high concentration ash may lead to deterioration of flight safety margins. Available in-service and experimental evidence indicates that: Exposure to a cumulative volcanic ash dose equivalent to operating for 120 minutes in an actual ash concentration of 2 mg/m3 (i.e g s/m3), or lower, should not lead to a significant reduction in engine related flight safety margins if all measures are taken to maximise engine operability margins. It cannot be guaranteed that limiting engine exposure to a dose of less than 14.4 g s/m3 at actual ash concentrations greater than 4 mg/m3 will maintain engine related flight safety margins. 13 Source: Source: Volcanic Ash and Aviation Rolls-Royce Position, R. Clarkson, May Source: Source: Volcanic Ash and Aviation Rolls-Royce Position, R. Clarkson, May

34 The ash dose that would represent an unacceptable deterioration in engine related flight safety margins at actual ash concentrations below 0.2 mg/m3 is not known precisely, but evidence indicates that it is so large any exposure to such concentrations will have negligible impact on engine related flight safety margins. Research (especially done by engine manufacturer Rolls Royce) has shown that the dose rate ingested is the relevant parameter when it comes to measuring the impact. Prolonged exposure to low concentration ash or short duration exposure to high concentration ash may lead to deterioration of flight safety margins. 4.2 Nuclear events Currently only limited aviation-specific regulations or guidelines are in place when it comes to nuclear incidents. According to the ICAO DOC 9691 Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds, accidents at nuclear or chemical facilities, in which hazardous materials are discharged into the atmosphere, present a danger to the general public, including those travelling by air, and are already the subject of detailed emergency procedures in States concerned, and regular international tests of the procedures are made. It is not the purpose of ICAO, therefore, to develop separate procedures for aviation, but to ensure that due account is taken of the special needs of international civil aviation, especially aircraft in flight, in the relevant Annexes to the Convention and in international arrangements developed to deal with such emergencies. 15 ICAO Annex 3 contains information on how nuclear release sites should be shown on charts and how information should be promulgated via the SIGMET system. Guidance on nuclear exposure maxima etc. is not to be found in these s. Furthermore, the IAEA Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International 2017 the following response actions by ICAO in case of a nuclear event: 16 Based on information received from the responsible WMO Regional Specialized Meteorological Centre(s) RSMC(s) and the Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre London (co-located with WMO RSMC Exeter), informs/alerts aircraft in flight and aerodromes concerned about atmospheric release; Advises aircraft in flight on possible alternate routes; Activates the IACRNE ad hoc Working Group on Air and Maritime Transportation; 15 Source: ICAO DOC 9691 Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds, 2007: 16 Source: IAEA Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International, 1 st March 2017: 34

35 Provides advice, on request, to States on the effects of contamination/radiation exposure on airline personnel (including flight crews) and passengers, and the movement of passengers and/or cargo through international aerodromes. National authorities of each country are in general responsible for the regulations of the maximum dose rate of radiation, dealt within the national Radiation Protection Ordinance. Respective regulations deal primarily with radiation workers, which are exposed to a higher amount of radiation than the normal population due to their professional activities. This group includes for instance air crews, health professionals working with radiation or technicians working in the industry. The ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommends the following dose limits: Maximum dose rate for single persons: 1 Millisievert per year. It is possible to exceed this limit, as long as the next 5 years the limit of 1 Millisievert is not exceeded. Maximum dose rate for persons occupationally exposed to radiation: 20 Millisievert per year over a period of 12 consecutive months. In exceptional cases, a maximum of 50 Millisievert is permitted, as long as in the 60 following months the effective dose rate of 100 Millisievert is not exceeded. 17, 18 Additionally, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) reports the following recommended limits. 19 Equivalent dose to the lens of the eye: Limit on dose from occupational exposure: 20 msv per year, averaged over defined periods of 5 years, with no single year exceeding 50 msv Limit on dose from public exposure: 15 msv in a year Equivalent dose to the skin (averaged over 1 cm 2 of skin regardless of the area exposed): Limit on dose from occupational exposure: 500 msv in a year Limit on dose from public exposure: 50 msv in a year Equivalent dose to the hands and feet: Limit on dose from occupational exposure: 500 msv in a year Limit on dose from public exposure: - 17 Source: Annals of the ICRP: The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection: 18 Source: Annals of the ICRP: The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection: 19 Source: ICRP, 2017,_ 35

36 The unit Millisievert expresses the biological effect onto humans. It is advisable to use Millisievert as a unit for any EUNADICS-AV product related to nuclear incidents. As a worst-case reference, approximate radiation intensity levels at different locations at Chernobyl reactor site shortly after the explosion in 1986 are shown in the table below: Source: Wikipedia, 2017, 36

37 Table 19: Approximate radiation intensity levels at different locations at Chernobyl reactor shortly after the explosion Location Sieverts per hour Vicinity of the reactor core 300 Fuel fragments Debris heap at the place of circulation pumps 100 Debris near the electrolysers Water in the Level +25 feedwater room 50 Level 0 of the turbine hall Area of the affected unit Water in Room Control room 0,03 0,05 Hydropower Installation 0,3 Nearby concrete mixing unit 0,10 0,15 The dose rates measured in Fukushima were comparable according to respective reports; 21 In Tokyo the dose rate was around 0,8 Microsievert per hour (adding up to 7 Millisievert per year). 22 In the event of Fukushima, the Japan Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) Centre issued a NOTAM dated 15/03/2011. A flight prohibited area has been established with a radius of 30 km around the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima No. 1 power-plant. The Japanese authorities have declared an INES rating of 5 for one of the reactors operated by this powerplant. INES is the International Nuclear and radiological Event Scale published by the IAEA 21 Source: Source: 37

38 (International Atomic Energy Agency). An INES rating of 5 means an accident with wider consequences than local. 23 The INES ratings are shown in Figure 13 below: 24 Figure 13: INES ratings published by IAEA Within this context, the EANPG Programme Coordinating Group analysed ways towards an Improved contingency planning and readiness for nuclear events, presented by EUROCONTROL 25. NUCLEAR14 26 demonstrated shortcomings in the information, 23 Source: EASA, Safety Information Bulletin, 22 March 2011, 24 Source: 25 Source: ICAO European and North Atlantic Office, EANPG Programme Coordinating Group, Paris, 13 to 18 October 2015: MISD1-WP10_RAD%20(EANPG%20for%20Radiation)%20Appendix%20A.pdf 38

39 information flow and decision making criteria for States, Network Managers (NM) and users to enable a controlled and harmonised response by all stakeholders involved in case of a nuclear event, especially when effecting airspace. Based on these results there is an immediate need for improved information and improved guidance to enhance the readiness and appropriate response of all aviation stakeholders in case of a nuclear incident or accident and following main recommendations were derived: Recommended action 1: Develop a comprehensive Concept of Operations for ATM in case of a nuclear disaster, in particular regarding information flows and decision making criteria, including radiological parameters for nuclear contamination of airspace and ground level; Recommended action 2: Develop contamination charts linked to decision making criteria that can be used to support Airspace user and ANSP decision making; Recommended action 3: Mandate expert organisations (i.e. RSMCs) to produce the contamination charts as per recommendation 2 and provide them to all stakeholders (including NM) as per the changed information flow in recommendation 1; Recommended action 4: Develop a guidance to compose the SIGMETs for nuclear contaminated airspace; Recommended action 6: Define acceptable threshold values and procedures for radioactive contaminated airframes on both health and technical aspects (including aircraft engine); Recommended action 7: Decontamination procedures shall include the levels at which the Airline can perform the decontamination with their existing tools and processes, and at which level help from National Authorities should be sought. 4.3 Sandstorms / dust events Sandstorms and dust storms pose a significant hazard for aviation. Besides their consequence of reduced visibility they are also associated with very strong winds that can seriously affect an aircraft in flight, particularly during take-off and landing. Furthermore, engines can be damaged by ingesting the sand and/or dust. 27 Generally, dust can have similar effects as volcanic ash, especially in modern engines with high hot-section temperatures, causing partial-melting of sand components and their adherence to turbine parts. With sand/dust storms, the erosion effects are, however stronger, potentially reducing engine s lifetime and having detrimental effects on other aircraft systems, too. 26 The Network Manager (NM) and the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) exercised the network-wide response in case of a nuclear emergency in Europe (NUCLEAR14); This exercise was conducted on November Source: and 39

40 Emission of sand and dust particles in the air typically have a wind threshold value ranging from about 4 m/s in desert areas to a value close to 10 m/s in semi-arid regions. As a first approximation, and being fully aware that visibility in sandstorms and dust storms may be influenced by the optical characteristics of the aerosols (chemical composition, particle size spectra) and lighting conditions (solar azimuth, background luminance, presence of medium or high cloud), the following thresholds, which are familiar to human observers and automated systems alike, have been suggested in the second meeting of the Meteorological Warnings Group (METWSG), Montréal, 19 to 21 May 2009: VIS < m visibility and gusts of >=20 kt for a "light" sandstorm or dust storm, VIS < m visibility and gusts of >=30 kt for "moderate", VIS < 500 m and gusts of >=40 kt for "heavy" sandstorm or dust storm. Following further discussions, the following recommendation have been included in the Amendment 76 to the International Standards and Recommended Practices, Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation (Annex 3 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation) at the fifth meeting of its 198th Session on 27 February 2013: Sandstorm/dust storm should be considered: 1) Heavy whenever the visibility is below 200 m and the sky is obscured; and 2) Moderate whenever the visibility is: a) Below 200 m and the sky is not obscured; or b) Between 200 m and 600 m The U.S. National Weather Service issues either an advisory or a full-fledged warning. A blowing dust advisory is issued if the visibility is forecast to temporarily decrease to between 1/4 mi (0.4 km) and 1 mi due to wind-borne sand or dust with winds of 25 mph (40 kph) or greater. A dust storm warning is issued if the visibility is expected to drop below 1/4 mi frequently, with winds of 25 mph or greater. The criterion of 25 mph is a minimum; winds frequently range from 40 to 60 mph (65 to 95 kph) in a dust storm Source: 40

41 5 Hazard Key Performance Areas (KPAs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 5.1 Key Performance Areas (KPAs) & Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) Performance measures enable the identification of critical areas and improvement potential for an organization. However, focusing on the wrong areas may lead to the application of inappropriate actions and therefore to unfortunate consequences for the business. Air traffic management is not an exception when it comes to measuring performance. Key Performance Areas (KPAs) are defined as a way of categorizing performance subjects related to high-level ambitions and expectations. Current/ past performance, expected future performance (estimated as part of forecasting and performance modelling), as well as actual progress in achieving performance objectives is quantitatively expressed by means of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). To be relevant, indicators need to correctly express the intention of the associated performance objective. Since indicators support objectives, they should be defined having a specific performance objective in mind. Indicators are not often directly measured. They are calculated from supporting metrics according to clearly defined formulas, e.g. cost-per-flightindicator = Sum(cost)/Sum(flights). Performance measurement is therefore done through the collection of data for the supporting metrics (ICAO ). 5.2 Aviation related KPAs & KPIs Since in aviation domain mainly both security and cost-efficiency are of particular relevance, diverse Key Performance Areas and Key Performance Indicators have been developed and specified. In the following common aviation-related KPAs as well as KPIs are described briefly International Civil Aviation (ICAO) concept The principles defined in the ICAO concept are based on the expectations of the ATM community from the future ATM system. These expectations are interrelated and cannot be considered in isolation. ICAO defines the following Key Performance Areas with its Key Performance Indicators for aviation 29. While safety is the highest priority, the expectations are shown in alphabetical order: 1. Access and equity: All airspace users must have access to the ATM resources needed to achieve operational objectives. Shared use of airspace by the different users must be accomplished in a safe manner. In addition, the global ATM system must ensure equity of all users who require access to a particular part of the airspace or the particular service; 29 Source: ICAO Doc 9883: Manual on Global Performance of the Air Navigation System 41

42 2. Capacity: The global ATM system should exploit its capacity to meet airspace user demands at peak times and locations, while minimizing restrictions on traffic flow. To respond to future growth, capacity must increase, along with corresponding increase in efficiency, flexibility and predictability, while ensuring that there are no adverse impacts on safety and giving due consideration to the environment. ATM system must be resistant to any potential service disruptions and temporary capacity reductions; 3. Cost-effectiveness: The ATM system should be cost-effective, while balancing the different interests of the ATM community. The cost of service to airspace users must always be taken into account when considering proposals for improving the ATM performance and quality of service. Furthermore, ICAO policies and principles regarding user charges should be followed; 4. Efficiency: Efficiency addresses the operational and economic cost-effectiveness of flight operations. In all phases of flight, airspace users want to depart and arrive at the times they select and fly the trajectory they consider optimum; 5. Environment: The ATM system should contribute to the protection of the environment by reducing noise, emissions and other negative impacts; 6. Flexibility: Flexibility addresses the ability of all airspace users to modify flight trajectories dynamically and adjust departure and arrival times, thereby permitting them to exploit operational opportunities as they occur; 7. Global interoperability: The ATM system should be based on international standards and uniform principles in order to achieve the technical and operational interoperability of ATM systems and to ensure homogeneous and non-discriminatory global and regional traffic flows; 8. Participation by the ATM community: Aviation community should be involved in the planning, implementation and operation of the ATM system to ensure that the evolution of the global ATM system at all times fulfils its expectations; 9. Predictability: Predictability refers to the ability of airspace users and ATM service providers to provide consistent and dependable levels of performance. Predictability is of crucial importance for airspace users whose business is based on respect of the predefined schedules; 10. Safety: Safety has the highest priority in aviation and the ATM system plays an important role in ensuring overall safety of air traffic. Uniform safety standards and practices in the field of safety management should be systematically applied within the ATM system. During the implementation of the future global aviation system, safety should be assessed against appropriate criteria and in accordance with appropriate and globally standardized safety management processes and practices; 11. Security: Security refers to the protection of aircraft, people, devices and systems on the ground against threats arising from intentional acts (e.g. terrorism) or unintentional acts (e.g. human error and natural disasters). Adequate security is a fundamental expectation of the ATM community and of citizens. For this reason, the ATM system should contribute to security, and the entire ATM system, as well as the information related to it, should be protected against security threats. Security risk management should balance the needs of the members of the ATM community that require access 42

43 to the system, with the need to protect the ATM system. In the event of threats to aircraft or threats using aircraft, the ATM system should provide the competent authorities with appropriate assistance and information. Table 20 summarizes system wide and user-specific ICAO Key Performance Areas and Key Performance Indicators. Table 20: Performance Areas and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for aviation defined by ICAO (ICAO ) No. ICAO Key Performance Areas ICAO Key Performance Indicators 1 Access and Equity Unsatisfied demand versus overall demand 2 Capacity 3 Cost Effectiveness 4 Efficiency System wide: Number of flights or flight hours and flight distance that may be accommodated. Number of flights, available plane miles etc Airspace: Number of IFR flights able to enter an airspace volume Number of IFR flights able to be present in sectors at any one time (airspace capacity rates) Airport: Hourly number of IFR movements (departures plus arrivals) during low visibility conditions (IMC) Daily number of IFR movements (departures plus arrivals) during a 15-hour day between 7:00 and 22:00 local time during low visibility (IMC) conditions Average daily airport capacity for a group of 35 airports measured as a 5-year moving average Average daily airport capacity for a group of seven major metropolitan areas Average cost per flight Total operating cost plus cost of capital divided by IFR flights Total labour obligations to deliver one forecast IFR flight in the system, measured monthly and year-to-date Percentage of flights departing on-time Percentage of flights with on-time arrival Average departure delay per delayed flight Percentage of flights with normal flight duration Average flight duration extension of flights with extended flight duration Total number of minutes to actual gate arrival time 43

44 exceeding planned arrival time 5 Environment 6 Flexibility 7 Global Interoperability 8 Participation by ATM Community 9 Predictability 10 Safety 11 Security Amount of emissions (CO2, NOx, H2O and particulate) attributable to ATM inefficiency Number of people exposed to significant noise Fuel efficiency per revenue plane-mile Number of rejected changes to the number of proposed changes to the number of flight plans initially filed each year Proportion of rejected changes for which an alternative was offered and taken Number of filed differences with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Level of compliance of ATM operations with ICAO CNS/ATM plans and global interoperability requirements Number of yearly meetings covering planning, implementation and operations Compare delay measures under efficiency Number of accidents normalised to either number of operations or number of flight hours Number of acts of unlawful interference to ATC Number of incidents involving direct unlawful interference to aircraft that require air traffic service provider response Number of incidents due to unintentional factors such as human error, natural disasters, etc., that have led to unacceptable reduction in air navigation system capacity In addition to the ICAO concept, diverse specifications of topic related KPIs are available (e.g. SESAR , CANSO, EUROCONTROL, FAA). However, there are only few organizations in the world which monitor the performance of the ATM system on a global level. The most prominent of these is "CANSO - Civil Air Navigation Services Organization" whose members are the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) which support over 85% of world air traffic. 30 SESAR Guidance on KPIs and Data Collection Version 1 (D85, Ed , 2014) 31 SESAR Joint Undertaking 2016b. Guidance on KPIs and Data Collection Support to SESAR2020 transition. Project B05. Edition SESAR Joint Undertaking 2016b. Guidance on KPIs and Data Collection Support to SESAR2020 transition. Project B05. Edition

45 5.2.2 Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO) concept After a thorough review of current practices of its members as well as the various literature and s related to ATM performance and measurement, CANSO published a called Recommended Key Performance Indicators for Measuring ANSP Operational Performance 33 which specifies 21 operational KPIs that allow ANSPs to track targeted areas of their systems (see Table 21). A detailed comparison and analysis of Key Performance Indicators is provided in SESAR (2017) 34. Table 21: KPIs recommended by CANSO (source: CANSO, 2015) KPAs KPIs Example KPIs from definitions Capacity Declared Capacity Target acceptance rate for a facility or sector Capacity and efficiency Capacity Efficiency Delay Attributed to Capacity Limits Operational Availability Percentage of Demand Accommodated by Facility s Capacity and Actual Demand Total or Average Delay by Airport Total or Average Facility Attributable Delay (Maximum facility service hours minus outage time) divided by maximum facility service hours Efficiency Gate Departure Delay Number of Gate Departure Delayed Aircraft Average of Gate Departure Delay per Flight Average Gate Departure Delay per Delayed Flight Taxi Out Delay Number of Taxi-Out Delayed Aircraft Average of Taxi-Out Delay per Flight Average Taxi-Out Delay per Delayed Flight Calculated Take-Off Time Compliance Calculated Take-Off Time Compliance Number of Early Departures 33 CANSO Recommended Key Performance Indicators for Measuring ANSP Operational Performance. 34 SESAR 2017: Review of current KPIs and proposal for new ones, grant

46 Number of Late Departures Terminal Departure Flight Distance/ Time Efficiency En Route Direct Route Extension Filed Flight Plan En Route Extension Arrival Flight Distance/Time Efficiency Arrival Level Flight Efficiency Arrival Runway Occupancy Time Taxi In Delay Actual level flight time/distance from take-off to 40/100 NM circle Average or Total Actual Flight Distance/Time above that obtained from a great circle benchmark Average of Total Filed Distance/Time above that obtained from a great circle benchmark Total or Average Excess Minutes or Miles by Aircraft Group, Operating Configuration, or Arrival Airport Actual level flight time/distance from 100/40 NM circle landing Average Runway Occupancy Time per Aircraft Category Number of Taxi-In Delayed Aircraft Average of Taxi-In Delay per Flight Average Taxi-In Delay per Delayed Flight Gate Arrival Delay Number of Gate Arrival Delayed Aircraft Average Gate Arrival Delay per Flight Average Gate Arrival Delay per Delayed Flight ATM Attributable Delay Average Flight Time Between City Pairs Delay against a schedule or a filed time that can be attributed to ATM Average Travel Time Between City Pairs Predictability Capacity Variation Difference between the 85th and 15th percentile declared capacity for a facility Travel Time Variation Flight Plan Variation Difference between the 85th and 15th percentile travel time for a phase of flight for a city pair Difference between the 85th and 15th percentile flight plan distance or time for a city pair. 46

47 5.3 KPAs & KPIs for the planned EUNADICS-AV exercises As stated before, for the planned EUNADICS-AV exercises in spring 2019 two hazard scenarios have been selected because of the highest expectable impact: (A) Volcanic ash (B) Nuclear event Table 18 of the scenario impact summary shows that almost all of the stakeholders, players and domains/areas are concerned in case of such a hazard event. For the upcoming exercises and testing activities of EUNADICS-AV it is important to define suitable KPAs and KPIs for each stakeholder or actor, guaranteeing that the selected KPI really measures what it is intended to be measured. Cost factors will be relevant in any scenario, ecological factors won t be important in crisis scenarios, therefore the most probable candidates for meaningful KPIs for EUNADICS-AV will be Cost Effectiveness and Capacity and Safety. However, specific KPIs which are used for evaluating EUNADICS-AV tests and exercises are specified within the respective / exercises report. One of those and the most significant cost KPI is predicted future maintenance cost due the effect of contaminants on airframe and engines of affected flights should be added. Only with this KPI meaningful comparisons of trajectory optimization strategies will be possible. 47

48 6 Conclusions & ranking of hazard scenarios based on EUNADICS-AV evaluations This defines and evaluates relevant hazard scenarios for the EUNADICS-AV project, analyses thresholds and states hazard-related Key Performance Areas and Key Performance Indicators. Scenario evaluation based on expert interview and literature review top-rated volcanic ash and nuclear events as major hazards to be evaluated in detail within EUNADICS-AV. Especially concerning volcanic ash both the potential high impact user perception as well as the already existing scientific basis supports this decision and suggests positive economic and passenger safety and satisfaction impact on aviation by improving the information base for aviation stakeholders. It is thus advisable for EUNADICS to focus on the two named scenarios, starting with volcanic ash. This deliverable shall also serve as base for the exercise activities in WP7, especially by providing relevant thresholds. The most advanced publicly available research on the impact of volcanic ash on aircraft engines is being done by engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce. This deliverable outlines the thresholds relevant for the exercise activities within the EUNDICS- AV project. For these activities work already being done by Rolls-Royce can be used to advance the model further by cooperating. Evaluation results (summed-up impact factor, Table 22) of the stakeholder survey show following ranking of aviation-influencing hazards: Table 22: Ranking of aviation-influencing hazards based on stakeholder survey (impact factor summary) Ranking Scenario Impact factor 1 Volcanic ash Nuclear events Sandstorms/dust events Major fires 93 5 Space weather 86 48

49 The impact factor shows that volcanic ash and nuclear events have the biggest impact on aviation according to the involved expert-users and stakeholders. Thereafter follows the scenario of sandstorm/dust event, which is worth considering within EUNADICS-AV, as it has a relatively high probability. The impact of space weather is only considered of high interest for airlines operating in the polar area and thus is not foreseen to be investigated in more detail in EUNADICS-AV. Major fires are considered as a local phenomenon and don t affect aviation significantly. As a result of this user survey and evaluations, it is advisable for EUNADICS-AV to focus on these scenarios: 1. Volcanic ash 2. Nuclear events 3. Sandstorms/ dust events (effects similar to volcanic ash events) Nevertheless, the following issues have to be mentioned: Major/ forest fires: In the course of the conducted user survey, some major fires in the area of Los Angeles took places, resulting in impact on air traffic. Thus, this scenario has the potential for further research. Space weather: This scenario has been more and more a topic in aviation during recent years. ICAO has released plans on issuing a call for proposals for a Space Weather Center and the EU is planning to apply for this call. As a result of work done within this deliverable, a volcanic ash and nuclear event case study will be prepared and tested in the course of the project internal tracer tests and exercises in collaboration with DLR, the Austrian air forces and various project partners in autumn 2018 and spring Specific KPIs will be compiled for upcoming tests and exercises to evaluating EUNADICS-AV developments implementations comprehensively. Once the detailed workflow and mutual stakeholder interdependencies of the planned exercises are defined, specific KPIs which are used for evaluating EUNADICS-AV tests and exercises are specified within the respective / exercises report. However, as cost factors will be relevant in any scenario and ecological factors won t be as important in crisis scenarios, the most probable candidates for meaningful KPIs for EUNADICS-AV will be Cost Effectiveness and Capacity and Safety. 49

50 7 Annex 7.1 Annex 1 Additional images Table 23: Scenario evaluation matrix: blank Volcanic ash dispersion Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Eyjafjallajökull 2010 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional maintenance Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) Unit Ash fill in with "x" here fill in the number of events and the unit here 50

51 Table 24: Evaluation result volcanic ash scenario Volcanic ash Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Eyjafjallajökull 2010 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society 10 1 Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional maintenance Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 10 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 10 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety 4 6 Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled 9 2 Sum Factor 131 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 13 Unit Ash 51

52 Table 25: Evaluation result nuclear event scenario Nuclear event Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Fukushima 2011 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Sum Factor 125 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 2 Unit Radiation cloud 52

53 Table 26: Evaluation result of sandstorms (dust events) Sandstorm (dust events) Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Cairo (2013/2015) Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 3 6 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 3 6 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Sum Factor 94 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 63 Unit Sand/Dust 53

54 Table 27: Evaluation result of major/ forest fires Major fires Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low California 2016 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society 3 8 Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing 1 8 Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 4 5 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 3 6 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety 4 5 Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled 3 7 Sum Factor 75 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it x Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 26 Smoke 54

55 Table 28: Evaluation result of space weather hazards Space weather Benchmark event Criteria Exemplary indicator Assumed impact (Major event during the last 35 years) High Medium Low Quebec Major Blackout 1989 Impact on aviation capacity (cost) Monetary loss/negative impact on society Impact on aircraft (engine, contamination, etc.) Additional repairing 1 7 Impact on passenger (contamination) Number of people with health effects 1 7 Impact on crew Number of crew members with health effects 1 7 Impact on safety Additional measures taken to maintain safety Impact on efficiency Number of flights cancelled Sum Factor 75 Assumed feasibility High Medium Low Scientific feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to measure and model it Practical feasibility within EUNADICS consortium Possibility to test, disseminate, etc. x Probability of the hazard Number of comparable events (last 100 years) 4 Unit Power/comms disruption 55

56 Table 29: Summary of impacts of all ICAO listed hazards (ICAO, 2014) 56