UAS operations in open and specific categories Workshop on specific category & standard scenarios

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1 UAS operations in open and specific categories Workshop on specific category & standard scenarios Cologne 9 th July 2018

2 Agenda 10:00 10:15 Welcome and status of the UAS regulation 10:15 10:35 introduction to specific category 10:35 12:30 How to perform a risk assessment: safety (SORA) 12:30-13:30 Lunch 13:30 15:15 How to perform a risk assessment: privacy, security 15:15 15:30 Break 15:30 16:00 Process for proposing a standard scenario 16:00 16:30 EASA standard scenarios: introduction and structure 16:30 17:00 wrap up and conclusions Workshop on standard scenario 9 July

3 #easadrones

4 Status of UAS regulation on open and specific categories

5 UAS regulation for open and specific categories Implementing Act on operation and registration Delegated Act on technical requirements Workshop on standard scenario 9 July

6 UAS regulation for open and specific categories Delegated Act on technical requirements June 18 Sept. 18 October 18 Nov/Dec 18 Implementing Act on operation and registration EU commission legislative act Discussion with MS and stakeholders EU Commission inter-service consultation Workshop on standard scenario 9 July 2018 Final approval of New Basic regulation Entry into force of New Basic regulation Final discussion of the UAS regulation Adoption of the UAS regulation 6

7 Introduction to the specific category

8 Risk assessment All operations exceeding the operational limitations defined for the open category shall be subject to a risk assessment considering at least the following elements: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) the characteristics of the area and the conditions under which the operation will be conducted; the class of the airspace and the impact on other air traffic and air traffic management (ATM); the design features and performance of the UAS; the type of operations; the level of competency of the remote pilot; organisational factors; the applicable security and privacy rules; and the impact on the environment. Workshop on standard scenario 9 July

Process carry out risk assessment (using SORA or other

operator Submit application (unless holding a LUC)

standard scenario (STS) available Submit declaration or

9 Process carry out risk assessment (using SORA or other equivalent methodology) National Competent Authority UAS operator Submit application (unless holding a LUC) Acknowledgement of receipt for STS under declaration If standard scenario (STS) available Submit declaration or application (unless holding a LUC) Authorisation for other STS Workshop on standard scenario 9 July

10 Bundesamt für Zivilluftfahrt BAZL Innovation Management Introduction to SORA A risk based approach to drone approvals Lorenzo Murzilli Manager, Innovation and Advanced Technologies Leader of JARUS WG-6

11 JARUS Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems 11

CONOPS, Jacquelyn Erinne, USA WORKING GROUPS

Romanian CAA H Rodenburg, EASA Safety and

Everett Rochon, FAA Ron van de Leijgraaf, NL

Cobo-Vuilleumier, EASA AIRWORTHINESS, Markus

12 CONOPS, Jacquelyn Erinne, USA WORKING GROUPS STRUCTURE FCL K Barker, SACAA S Dumitrescu Romanian CAA H Rodenburg, EASA Safety and Risk Lorenzo Murzilli, Switzerland ORG, OPS Everett Rochon, FAA Ron van de Leijgraaf, NL WG 7 COMMAND CONTROL & COMM, Daniel Cobo-Vuilleumier, EASA AIRWORTHINESS, Markus Farner, Switzerland DETECT & AVOID, Hans Bohlin, Sweden 12

13 WG-6 roster 13

14 WG-6 roster 14

15 WG-4 contribution 15

16 Drones ops approval categories Quelle: EASA 16

17 Risk Assessment for Drone Operation Air Risk TLS OPEN SPECIFIC CERTIFIED Target Level of Safety As number of Mid Air Collisions per flight hour General Aviation Commercial Air Transport

18 Risk Assessment for Drone Operation Ground Risk TLS OPEN SPECIFIC CERTIFIED Target Level of Safety As numbers of fatal injuries on ground per flight hour

19 Semantics 19

20 Semantics 20

21 Semantics ROBUSTNESS = INTEGRITY + ASSURANCE INTEGRITY = SAFETY GAIN How useful is the barrier to improve the safety of the operation? ASSURANCE = PROOF Is the claimed safety gain proven? ROBUSTNESS IS NOT AUTHORITY LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT 21

22 Ground Risk Evaluation 22

23 Intrinsic GRC Intrinsic UAS Ground Risk Class Max UAS characteristics dimension 1 m / approx. 3ft 3 m / approx. 10ft 8 m / approx. 25ft >8 m / approx. 25ft Typical kinetic energy expected < 700 J (approx. 529 Ft Lb) < 34 KJ (approx Ft Lb) < 1084 KJ (approx Ft Lb) > 1084 KJ (approx Ft Lb) Operational scenarios VLOS over controlled area, located inside a sparsely populated environment BVLOS over sparsely populated environment (over-flown areas uniformly inhabited) VLOS over controlled area, located inside a populated environment VLOS over populated environment BVLOS over controlled area, located inside a populated environment BVLOS over populated environment VLOS over gathering of people 7 BVLOS over gathering of people 8 23

24 GRC modifiers FINAL GRC = INITIAL GRC + MODIFIERS 24

25 Ground Risk Evaluation 25

26 The Air Risk Process 26

27 Reason mitigation model (Swiss Cheese) UAS Unmitigated Collision Risk Strategic Conflict Management Strategic Mitigations Mitigations Tactical Mitigations Providence Target Level of Safety 27

28 Air Risk Process 28

29 Determination of Air Risk Class 29

30 Air Risk Process OPTIONAL 30

31 Strategic Mitigations Ops Restrictions 1. Mitigation by Boundary (restricted to geographical volume, e.g. operations within certain boundaries or airspace volumes) 2. Mitigation by Chronology (restricted to certain times of day, e.g. fly at night) 3. Mitigation by Behaviour (restricted by operational predictability by other airspace users), or; 4. Mitigation by Exposure (restricted by time of exposure to risk) 31

32 Example of use 32

33 Strategic Mitigations Procedures & Rules i. Common flight rules (e.g. flight rules, right of way, implicit coordination, conspicuity rules, etc.) ii.common airspace structure (e.g. common airways, procedures, airflow management, etc.) 33

34 Roles and Responsibility The Air Navigation Service Provider plays a key role in application of strategic mitigations to the Air Risk Within a SORA process, interaction with the ANSP, in addition to the NAA, is therefore natural and in many cases mandatory 34

35 Air Risk Process 35

36 Final Air Risk Class and TMPR 36

37 TMPR Levels (extract) 37

38 TMPR Integrity 38

39 TMPR Assurance 39

40 Air Risk Model 40

41 Welcome the SAIL Introduces the concept of Specific Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL) The SAIL is the level of confidence that a specific operation will stay under control 6 SAIL for 6 increasing levels of confidence. The lowest, SAIL I, adequate for operations with low intrinsic risk, the highest, SAIL VI, adequate for high intrinsic risks Increasing number of objectives to be met by the applicant with increasing level of robustness for higher SAIL 41

42 SAIL Determination 42

43 Extract of Safety Objectives (OSO) 43

44 Comprehensive Safety Portfolio In summary, a SORA approval can be granted if and only if an operator has provided: a. Mitigations used to modify the intrinsic GRC (Ground Risk) b. Strategic mitigations for the Initial ARC (Air Risk) c. Tactical mitigations for the Final ARC (Air Risk) d. Containment objectives (Air Risk) e. Operational Safety Objectives (Ground and Air Risk) to full satisfaction of the approving authority (FOCA) 44

45 Final Remarks Too simple or too complex? Too restrictive or too permissive? ANSP or no ANSP? Digital or paper based? 45

46 Questions? 46

47 Minimize collisions by, in order of effectiveness; 1. Decreasing number of aircraft (Proximity) 2. Impose order within system, e.g. decrease randomization (Geometrics) 3. Decreasing relative velocity (Dynamics) 47

48 Qualitative Approach to Air Risk 1. Proximity - The more aircraft in the airspace, the higher the rate of proximity, the greater the risk of collision. 2. Geometry - An airspace which sets or allows aircraft on collision courses increases risk of collision. 3. Dynamics - The faster the speed of the aircraft in the airspace the higher the rate of proximity, the greater the risk of collision. 48

49 Qualitative Approach to Air Risk (the ARC) Risk Factors Proximity Geometrics Dynamics X Operational Factors Flight rules Altitude Airspace Type Underlying Population = Air-Risk Class 49

50 50

51 How to perform a risk assessment (privacy) Presentation from DR Schmidl Presentation from DG Grow

52 How to perform a risk assessment: Security Considerations Joanna P OFFICIAL

53 The security threat Reckless and negligent users - determining the intent. Criminal purposes Terrorism overseas ISR

54 Security considerations pre-flight Reporting Site sensitivity Current airspace restrictions Geo-fencing Signage Cyber awareness

55 Security considerations during flight Secure controller Secure command link Secure downlink Electronic countermeasures (ECM) Situational awareness Communication plan Agreed response procedures Reporting Command & Control Jamming GPS Spoofing

56 Security considerations post flight Secure storage of information (images, videos) Secure storage of the UAS Secure destruction Forensic management Reporting Learning from incident

57 Next steps Further stakeholder engagement: 1. Engage with wider EU security partners to expand ideas. 2. Engage with policing to develop wider security requirements (incl. advice on reporting lines and forensic management). 3. Engage with cyber experts on cyber vulnerabilities. Develop thinking on security considerations for Member States. Develop thinking on security considerations for different scenarios which might increase the security risks (i.e. drone fleets for delivery of items).

58 Discussion Questions? Discussion: Are the current security proposals feasible? Any additional security considerations?

59 Process for proposing a standard scenario

60 Who can propose a standard scenario All individuals, companies, operators, model clubs etc.. National Competent Authority Scenario valid only for the nation Propose AltMoc AMC Scenario valid in all MS EU associations (industry, operators, model etc) Workshop on standard scenario 9 July 2018 Decision using EASA rulemaking process 60

61 Prioritisation of a standard scenario Several criteria will be considered Acceptability by EU MS number of potentially interested operators Impact on safety/public health (i.e. carriage of medical aid etc..) feasibility Prioritisation made by EASA after consulting with MS and new Drone Committee of the stakeholder advisory body Workshop on standard scenario 9 July

62 EASA Standard scenarios: introduction & structure

63 Introduction to EASA STS Why Standard Scenarios? To relieve UAS operators and Competent Authorities from the process of discussing the risk assessment and identifying limitations and mitigations A Standard Scenario (STS) is an AMC (to the risk assessment) that already includes limitations and provisions to mitigate the risks to an acceptable level (based on a risk assessment already performed / accepted by the Agency) A EASA STS provides a European-wide and operational risk-based frame where different types of common operations can be fitted Based on ground & air risk operational aspects (e.g. VLOS/BVLOS, over sparsely/congested areas, UA characteristics, airspace used ) and not directly on use cases/applications (e.g. aerial photography, agriculture, inspections ) Relevant for many operations across Europe standard frame for common operations STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 63

64 Introduction to EASA STS What does a STS contain? Operations approval and conditions: STS subject to: Declaration by the UAS operator including a commitment to comply with the mitigations of the STS, or Authorisation issued by the competent authority notifying the requirements to the operator Conditions to remain valid (e.g. validity time) Operational limitations Boundaries that define the STS Level of human intervention (e.g. remotely piloted/autonomous, UAs at a time ) Range limit (from remote flight crew/reference point) Overflown areas (e.g. limitation to sparsely populated areas ) UA limitations (e.g. max. characteristic dimension, KE / MTOM and speed ) Flight height/altitude limit Airspace limitations (e.g. only uncontrolled airspace ) Others (e.g. carrying dangerous goods forbidden) STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 64

Introduction to EASA STS What does a STS contain? Operational provisions Mitigate risks to an acceptable level Ground and air risk buffers, containment (e.g. <E-2/FH) Operator provisions (e.g. ERP, OM, procedures verification, external services ) Training provisions (for remote flight crew, e.

65 Introduction to EASA STS What does a STS contain? Operational provisions Mitigate risks to an acceptable level Ground and air risk buffers, containment (e.g. <E-2/FH) Operator provisions (e.g. ERP, OM, procedures verification, external services ) Training provisions (for remote flight crew, e.g. training objectives ) Technical provisions (for UAS and supporting means) STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 65

66 EASA STS Structure EASA plans to include all STS in a single document EU-STS with the following structure organised in 2 subparts: Subpart A: contains general aspects and provisions, applicable to all STS: Subpart B: contains the set of STS (progressively to be added), including the specific aspects for each STS. Workshop on standard scenario 9 July

67 EASA STS Structure Subpart A: contains general aspects and provisions, applicable to all STS: General aspects on operations approval and conditions General UAS Operator provisions: organisation, SOP (including CONOPS), security, privacy, external services, maintenance, remote flight crew, Operations Manual General remote flight crew provisions: training and qualification (CBTA), fit to operate, visual observers General technical provisions: aspects for safe design, HMI, communications (C3), documentation, References, definitions STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 67

68 EASA STS Structure Subpart B: contains the set of STS (progressively to be added), including the specific aspects for each STS. Declaration/authorisation and conditions Specific limitations and provisions Table including: Operational limitations Operational mitigations Operator provisions Training provisions Technical provisions STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 68

69 EASA STS Structure UAS Operator intending to conduct operations under a STS has to either commit to (declaration) or comply with when notified by the authority (authorisation): Requirements in Implementing Act Part B (Specific cat.) Limitations and provisions in EU-STS Subpart A (General) Limitations and provisions in EU-STS Subpart B STS the UAS Operator is intending to use. STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 69

70 EASA STS First set of STS Initial set may include a couple of STS: Generic STS for BVLOS operations over sparsely populated areas, below 150 m in uncontrolled airspace using UA with KE<34kJ, <3m Since JARUS was working on a generic scenario with that scope, EASA decided to build upon their scenario to benefit from that effort, wider consultation and consistency with SORA. Provisions are rather generic (based on SORA criteria for the corresponding SAIL) more detailed provisions to be part of authorisation process. Detailed STS derived from above one, with stronger limitations (e.g. reduced range, reduced KE ) and more detailed provisions to make it subject to declaration. STS workshop 9 July 2017 Standard Scenarios 70

71 Questions #easadrones

Unmanned Aircraft: Regulatory Framework in the EU EASA team High Level Conference on Drones Warsaw 24 November 2016

Unmanned Aircraft: Regulatory Framework in the EU EASA team High Level Conference on Drones Warsaw 24 November 2016 TE.GEN.00409-001 Achievements after Riga declaration (I) Draft Basic regulation (12/2015):