Economic and Political Failure in the Ngorongoro: Changing Livelihoods of the Maasai

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1 Economic and Political Failure in the Ngorongoro: Changing Livelihoods of the Maasai Tommy Fang Sophomore College: 2014 Parks and Peoples: Dilemmas of Protected Area Conservation in East Africa Professors Susan Charnley And William Durham

2 Figure 1 Zebra in Arusha National Park in Tanzania Abstract This paper explores the economic and political reasons behind the failure of conservation goals in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. The economic system of Tanzania as a whole and its interaction with the local governments of the Ngorongoro is considered, as well as the political representation and participation of Ngorongoro residents. Ultimately, both are found to play a large role in the failure of the conservation area, illustrating the importance of incorporating people in broader aims of conservation.

3 1.0 Introduction The Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), established in 1959 by the NCA Ordinance, was started in order to (quoted by the current authority s website): Promote the conservation of natural resources, safeguard the interests of NCA indigenous residents, and promote tourism. Today, the park accords to this model by conducting research on plants and wildlife, regulating tourism, and managing natural resources in the park. However, these goals have not come without consequence. The movements and livelihoods of the historically native population of the Ngorongoro, the Maasai, have been severely limited in recent years. A central ethical debate has been if the gains of conservation, if any, offset the disturbances to the lives of the Maasai peoples, and ultimately if the two goals of conservation and protecting peoples are compatible. One of the most extensive studies to date on the Ngorongoro has been by Estes et al In it, she examines the animal populations of several species in the Ngorongoro from the period 1986 to The numbers of 5 keystone species, all prey: Wildebeest, Zebra, Thomson s Gazelle, Grant s Gazelle, and Buffalo declined over this time frame. This indicates a long-term population change. Estes attributed this decline to reduced water availability, roadwork, tourism, and blocking of migratory paths, among other reasons. Most importantly, however, is what these changes signal for the greater conservation goals of the Ngorongoro. Current policies are evidently not working, yet little has progressed in the past decades. Estes cites such policies needing change as a lack of controlled burns (although this has improved in recent years), a shortage of research on the effects of tourism, and crucially, an absence of collaboration with the local peoples to meet conservation goals.

4 Regarding this last point, it is thus important to examine the effects of the park on the inhabited peoples, the Maasai. Historically the Maasai have occupied domains from Mt. Marsabit in Northern Kenya to Dodoma in Central Tanzania (KIG 2014). Today, they occupy a much smaller piece of land primarily centered around the Ngorongoro crater, of which there are around 80,000 Maasai remaining (Lindstrom 2014). Traditionally, the Maasai have been pastoralist, with their primary measure of wealth coming from the number of cows in their herd (Homewood 2006). However, this has changed in recent years since the prohibition of grazing in the NCA in the 1990 s, turning many Maasai into agro-pastoralists (Homewood 2006). This change, along with a slew of unfavorable park policies impacting the Maasai, such as the GMP in 1994 that limited Maasai land use (Narimatsu), has lead to a loss of culture and increase in economic hardship among the Maasai. Researcher McCabe quotes, There are many Maasai families in the NCA who have less than one-half the number of livestock estimated as necessary for a pastoral-based subsistence economy (1992). This number has only risen given the overall increase in poverty in Tanzania, with the national poverty line standing at 28.2% in 2012 (World Bank). In addition to material declines, McCabe also cites a decrease in culture and increased assimilation to Western beliefs among the Maasai, which has been largely attributed to the increased tourism and development in the area (1992). Given the bleak outcomes of both conservation goals and efforts to protect the livelihoods of peoples in the Ngorongoro, the need for change is evident. However, it is important to understand reasons for past failures in order to better develop future policy.

5 The remainder of this paper will examine the reasons behind the failures of the Ngorongoro through exploring the economic and political aspects of the area. 2.0 Hypotheses Two hypotheses are proposed. They are 1) A lack of economic incentive accounts for Maasai opposition to protected area policy in the Ngorongoro and 2) Lack of political participation and influence accounts for the Maasai opposition to protected area policy in the Ngorongoro. These hypotheses will be tested in the following section. 3.0 Methods This paper was conducted primarily through secondary research on existing sources. Observational fieldwork was done in Tanzania, but no experimental data was collected.

6 4.0 Findings Figure 2 Hippopotamus in Ngorongoro Crater in Tanzania Economic Incentive Annually, Tanzania receives $1.6 - $1.9 billion USD in aid (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2009) from four major donors: The World Bank, the E.U., the U.S., and the U.K. On paper, this dollar amount of money should be more than sufficient for the approximately 50 million people living in Tanzania. However, Tanzania s poverty rate as of 2012 was 28.2 percent (World Bank), indicating a huge gap between what is going into the country, and what is ultimately going to the people of Tanzania. Although there is no accurate percentage as to the amount of aid that does eventually trickle down to the intended users of the money, the World Bank accounts for a big loss of aid in a 1999 study claiming, Nearly 40 percent of Africa s aggregated wealth has fled to

7 foreign bank accounts, indicating external corruption as an ironic reversal of funding direction. This, coupled with internal corruption in Tanzania (Cooksey 2010) and an inefficient central bureaucracy system (Therkildsen 2000) where 85% of aid to local Tanzanian governments is channeled through the central government (Dietrich 2011), helps to account for the overall inefficient use of aid in Tanzania in the past decades. More specifically regarding the flow of aid to the Maasai living in the Ngorongoro, it is necessary a priori to understand the Maasai conception of economy and incentive. As mentioned previously, the Maasai come from a background of pastoralism, with much of their wealth being measured through livestock, specifically cattle (Fratkin 2001). This system comprises of what is known as a moral economy. An important aspect of this moral economy is the risk-adversity of the Maasai; that is, their unwillingness to accept policy changes that require great risk, even with a potentially high payoff. Many of the changes the Maasai have made to living and migration patterns in recent years can be explained by this adherence to safe principle. In particular, the transition of the Maasai from pastoralism to agro-pastoralism (to include cultivation) in the Ngorongoro has been a blatant indicator that current policies are not economically friendly (McCabe 1997). McCabe attributes the Maasai change in livelihood as a necessity driven by economic reason, spurred by the lack of funds coming from the central government. In a survey in 2002 (Coast) of 1,545 households both in Kenya and in Tanzania, the Tanzania portion of the study being done in the NCA, economic pressures on the Maasai were seen from several indicators: an increase in cash crops, an increase in population, and an increase in pursuit of economic diversity. Coast cited the large role of

8 economics in the Maasai lives and in the inefficiency of the park s government to address concerns, thus leading to the observed subsistence-driven changes in Maasai lifestyle (2002). Stated by a Saning'o Telele, a Maasai Member of Parliament: The Pastoralist Council people are sucking off this money, life is quite impossible now. Olonyoke, the Pastoralist Council secretary, insisted that the funds were distributed honestly, but that $3 million divided among 50,000 to 60,000 Maasai about $50 per person doesn't make much of an impact. It is not enough money. It is spread too thin (Hammer 2010)." Given the park s ignorance for the economic needs of the Maasai in the Ngorongoro, increasing economic pressure has forced the Maasai to change. Many of these changes are not made with conservation goals in mind, leading to clash between park officials and the Maasai.

9 Figure 3 Safari in Tarangire National Park in Tanzania Political Inefficiency Historically, Tanzania s government has been very centralized (DPADM 2004). Starting in 1995, however, the Local Government Reform Programme was enacted, which started a policy of gradual political, financial, and administrative decentralization. The success of this program, however, has been debated (Mniwasa 2001). Today, Tanzania remains a very centralized state. In regards to the state s managerial policy for the environment and national parks, many of its guidelines are outlined in the Environmental Management Act of 2004, which established the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC). Today the NEMC manages the local-state relationship, working directly with village council members on issues of environmental politics (NEMC 2011).

10 In context of the overall political structure of Tanzania, much of the environmental failures of the country have been blamed on a lack of property right laws, lack of and weak implementation of bylaws, poor enforcement, and weak penalties and incentives (Mniwasa 2001). The Ngorongoro, however, is more unique. Being a conservation area instead of a national park, the Maasai are allowed to live on the land, although their movements are limited and regulated by park authority. The NCA s park authority, established on the park s inception, supports three goals, one of which is to safeguard the interests of indigenous peoples in the area, as previously mentioned. Currently there exists no system for representation of the Maasai in park authority. The status quo policy in the Ngorongoro places several restrictions on the Maasai living in the area without consulting of the local people. The park prohibits grazing in the crater, the crater rim, the Northern Highland Forest, and in some of the highlands (Olenasha 2001). Other unfavorable policies by the NCA include disallowing villagers to register title to lands (which is allowed elsewhere), the park retaining the right to gain and possess lands, and the continuation of the park to ban cultivation as a means of subsistence (Homewood 1991). As a result of this, many individual Maasai have cited conflicts with park authorities concerning land use (Olenasha 2001). In particular, many Maasai have expressed discontent as to the specific policy allowing park authorities to evict or move existing village members, which was enacted without local approval (Olenasha 2001). Action to change this policy, among others, is almost impossible however, given the lack of political voice. Another related aspect of policy concerning the Maasai in the Ngorongoro is that of political participation. Legally, the Pastoral Council was created as a tool to allow for

11 community participation, although the effectiveness of this council has been criticized, as it is heavily controlled by the NCA Authority and is viewed as simply playing the role of an advisory board (Olenasha 2001). From the perspective of the Maasai, the current political system seems complex and confusing. Many Maasai are unaware of the laws under which they are governed (set by the Ngorongoro Ordinance) and local participation to date has been limited to letters sent to specific individuals inviting them to meet with lawyers so as to have an opportunity to make recommendations on potential ordnance revisions (IRG 2000). The low political activism by the Maasai can partially be accounted for by a lack of representation and also simply a general lack of transparency in the current government that incentivizes participation (IRG 2000). The implications of an internal political system that lacks in both Maasai representation and Maasai participation are a loss of rights and unresolvable conflict between park officials intent on regulating the law and locals resistant to dictated policies (Riemer 2008). 5.0 Conclusions The policies of the Ngorongoro have been ineffective in all three of its initial goals. In terms of conserving flora and fauna, pure analysis of numbers has showed a significant decrease in both, with possible problem signs coming from recently increasing trends in tourism. The focus of this study was on the anthropological reasons behind this failure in conservation. First looking at economic explanations, the central bureaucratic system of Tanzania has failed its purpose to distribute aid funds, as indicated by the high rate of poverty in the general populace. The risk adverse nature of the Maasai moral economy in the Ngorongoro thus lacks incentive to cooperate with and support conservation goals

12 that may require economic sacrifices by local people. Instead, many Maasai in the Ngorongoro have adopted lifestyles that are either devoid of conservation goals (such as entering the tourism industry) or might even hurt conservation (illegal grazing or poaching for subsistence) (Conroy). This trend is unlikely to change without significant economic incentives from the government. Second, looking at political explanations, both the political representation and political participation of the Maasai in the Ngorongoro have been very low. On paper, some initiatives have been started to involve community cooperation, but most of these projects have been perfunctory and take roles of small advisory councils. The result has been conflict between the Maasai and park authority, showing the need to involve those ruled by policy with those that are making policy. Addressing the hypotheses, hypothesis one is supported. The Maasai community in the Ngorongoro necessitates economic incentive, and the status quo clearly is not providing. The presence of economic incentive will not necessarily solve the problem, but will change current trends driving Maasai to take actions based on economic necessity, rather than conservation aims. Hypothesis two is tentative. Although two factors of politics were found to be lacking (representation and participation), the introduction of an economic incentive could potentially outweigh a bad political system. The converse, however, is likely not true a good political system without economic incentive is unlikely to succeed, as the Maasai are subsistence based.

13 Figure 4 Sunset in Ngorongoro Crater in Tanzania 6.0 Future The future of the Maasai is unclear. One proposal that could be studied is the policy of direct aid (Therkildsen 1992). Direct aid proposes giving more power to Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOS) in order to circumvent the government bureaucracy and give a higher percentage aid to local peoples (Therkildsen 1992). Direct aid is described as a form of grassroots economics, and is sustainable through a system of evaluations, where only those villages that use money effectively are given more in the future (Therkildsen 1992). In addition, the program is focused around poverty reduction instead of expecting returns on investment (Kinsella 2009). Although not a perfect solution, direct aid does provide an alternative that is able to circumvent both the

14 economic and political problems addressed in this paper and is a promising start for further research. 7.0 Acknowledgements Thank you to Dr. Bill Durham, Dr. Susan Charnley, Clementine Jacoby, Eric Mattson, and the Stanford Alumni Association for helping with the research and field seminar associated with this paper. 8.0 Citations Ayodele, T., Cudjoe, F., Nolutshungu, T., & Sunwabe, C. (2005). African Perspectives on Aid: Foreign Assistance Will Not Pull Africa Out of Poverty. Economic Development Bulletin. Coast, E. (2002). Maasai social-economic conditions: Cross border comparison. LSE Research. Cooksey, B. (2010). Aid, Governance and Corruption Control in Tanzania. Aid Effectiveness. Dietrich, S. (2011). Foreign Aid Delivery, Donor Selectivity and Poverty: A Political Economy of Aid Effectiveness. Estes, R., Atwood, J., & Estes, A. (2006). Downward trends in Ngorongoro Crater ungulate populations : Conservation concerns and the need for ecological research. Biological Conservation, Fratkin, E. (2001). East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Boran, and Rendille Cases. African Studies Review, 44(3), Hammer, J. (2010). Last Days of the Masai? Retrieved September 30, 2014, from Homewood, K., & Rodgers, W. (1991). Maasailand ecology: Pastoralist development and wildlife conservation in Ngorongoro, Tanzania. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press. Homewood, K., Coast, E., Kiruswa, S., Serneels, S., Thompson, M., & Trench, P. (2006). Maasai Pastoralists: Diversification and Poverty. International Livestock Research Institute.

15 International Resources Group. (2000). The Case Of NGORONGORO Conservation Area Ngorongoro District, Arusha Region Tanzania. USAID/Tanzania Report. Kinsella, J., & Brehony, E. (2009). Are current aid strategies marginalizing the already marginalised? Cases from Tanzania. Development in Practice, 19(1), McCabe, J., Perkin, S., & Schofield, C. (1992). Can Conservation and Development be Coupled among Pastoral People? An Examination of the Maasai of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania. Human Organization, 51(4), McCabe, J. (1997). Risk and Uncertainty Among the Maasai of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area in Tanzania: A Case Study in Economic Change. Nomadic Peoples, 1(1), Mniwasa, E., & Shauri, V. (2001). Review of the Decentralization Process and it's Impact on Environmental and Natural Resources Management in Tanzania. Lawyers Environmental Action Team. Musiba, C., & Mabulla, A. (2003). Politics, cattle and conservation: Ngorongoro Crater at the crossroads. Smithsonian Institution Libraries. Narimatsu, J. Environmental Justice Cast Study: Maasai Land Rights in Kenya and Tanzania. Retrieved September 30, 2014, from National Bureau of Statistics. (2012). Key Findings 2011/12 Household Budget Survey Tanzania Mainland. Olenasha, W. Parks Without People: A Case Study of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania. Riemer, R., & Kelder, Y. (2008). The Theory of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects Rhetoric or Reality? The Case of Ngorongoro Conservation Area. Roskilde University Centre. The Myth of "Community Based Wildlife Management" (2001, January 1). Retrieved September 30, 2014, from Therkildsen, O. (2000). Public sector reform in a poor, aid-dependent country, Tanzania.Public Administration and Development, 20(1), Therkildsen, O., & Semboja, J. (1992). Short-term resource mobilization for recurrent financing of rural local governments in Tanzania. World Development, 20(8),