High Speed Rail London to the West Midlands and Beyond Supplementary Report. A report to Government by High Speed Two Limited

Transcription

1 High Speed Rail London to the West Midlands and Beyond Supplementary Report A report to Government by High Speed Two Limited September

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3 Contents Page Executive Summary Introduction 9 Chapter 1 Serving Heathrow Introduction Options for Serving Heathrow The Business Case for Heathrow options Wider context Summary and Key Recommendations 37 Chapter 2 Linking HS1 and HS Background A direct link to HS Improved Interchange between Euston and St Pancras Business Case Wider Context Summary and Key Recommendations 53 Chapter 3 Further Work on Route Infrastructure Maintenance Depot Vent Shafts Summary and Key Recommendations 59 Glossary 60 Supporting Documentation

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5 Executive Summary High Speed Two Ltd (HS2 Ltd) was asked by Government to develop options for serving Heathrow from High Speed Two (HS2) and for connecting to High Speed One (HS1). This report presents our advice to Government, and also provides some further development of our recommended Route 3. We have submitted a separate report on refinement of the route north of the Chilterns. Serving Heathrow The issues around serving Heathrow from HS2 are complex, involving wider strategic considerations of aviation and transport policy which affect both where an airport station might be located, and the best way of linking it to the high speed line. A direct high speed link to Heathrow could reduce the number of domestic air feeder services, releasing runway capacity at Heathrow for more long haul flights and strengthening the role of Heathrow as a hub airport. However, high speed rail is best suited to serving high volume long distance flows from city centre to city centre, and it is these passengers that drive the business case for a high speed line. Decisions on how to connect the airport to the high speed rail network therefore need to balance the needs of passengers to and from Greater London with providing a high quality link to attract transfer passengers from major urban centres to the UK s only international hub airport. There is no single right answer. On the location of an interchange serving Heathrow, a station at Iver has the advantage of offering an interchange with the Great Western Main Line (GWML). However, if the strategic objective is to offer an alternative to domestic aviation, an on airport location looks more attractive. Within the airport, in our judgement the high cost and difficulty of constructing a high speed station underneath the Central Terminal Area (CTA) rule it out as a desirable location. With no third runway at Heathrow, this leaves possible locations at Terminal 5 (T5) and a new option on the northern perimeter road, Heathrow North. We have not undertaken a detailed analysis of the pros and cons in terms of access to these locations. However, while T5 would be the more expensive option, it would offer the most direct connectivity for airport passengers, based on existing infrastructure. A station at Heathrow North would be less expensive, but it would require a new People Mover to the airport terminals, potentially as part of inter terminal connectivity plans already under consideration by BAA Airports Ltd (BAA). The options for connecting the Heathrow station to HS2 are a through route via Heathrow, or a loop or a spur off our recommended route, Route 3. We have undertaken further work on a through route via Heathrow, and present two options, one serving Iver and one serving Heathrow North. These options would be in tunnel from Old Oak Common to beyond the M25, and would rejoin Route 3 just south of Brackley. 5

6 Through route Route 3 Loop Spur Figure 1 Options for linking HS2 to Heathrow The density of population in the areas surrounding Heathrow and in west and northwest London means that the loop and spur options need to be largely in tunnel in order to limit the environmental impact. This means that environmental factors in this area are unlikely to determine a decision between these options. All options involve significant infrastructure costs, above those already estimated for Route 3, ranging from an additional 2.5 billion (including risk and optimism bias) for the lowest cost for a spur to Iver, to 5.3 billion for a loop to T5. Demand for direct services to Heathrow from Birmingham and further north on Day One is likely to be relatively small, around 2,800 passengers per day. Given the costs involved, this is not sufficient to make a strong case for a direct link on Day One. The market is, however, likely to change over the coming years, particularly as the high speed network develops and if there are wider surface access improvements to Heathrow. In this light, loop and spur options offer the possibility of making initial provision for a Heathrow link into Route 3, allowing detailed decisions on serving Heathrow to be taken in the context of wider high speed rail and airports policy. While a through route would provide the potential for more frequent services to Heathrow, loop and spur options would be better for London bound passengers. For a station at Iver, the considerations between a through route and a loop appear 6

7 evenly balanced. For a station on the airport, the balance favours a loop or spur. Loop or spur solutions offer greater potential for phased implementation as a high speed network and demand develop. Were it to be decided for strategic reasons to link an on airport station at Heathrow to HS2 from the outset, the best option would be to minimise the impacts on capacity and journey times into Central London by running additional services from Heathrow along a spur and splitting the train on route to serve a number of destinations to the north. This could be done on Day One without displacement of other services on HS2. With a wider high speed network operating at the capacity of the London to Birmingham trunk, operation of a spur would require displacing some services to and from Central London. This could suggest a phased approach to linking Heathrow into HS2, with a link being provided initially via a spur from Route 3, but extended into a loop configuration as the network develops. A station at Old Oak Common would improve access opportunities into London and relieve pressure at Euston. This would not be achieved with a Heathrow station alone. We believe that there remains a case for an interchange at Old Oak Common in addition to an on airport Heathrow station. The case for Old Oak Common in addition to a station at Iver is weaker. Linking HS1 and HS2 Although there are a number of construction and operational challenges to overcome, a short single track link from Old Oak Common to the HS1 portal near Camden could be constructed for around 0.9 billion (including provision for risk and optimism bias), with limited impact on freight and passenger services on the North London Line during construction. It could allow at least three trains per direction per hour to link between HS2 and HS1 (subject to capacity on the North London Line) allowing HS2 services to Kent and the Continent. A dual track link along the same alignment could be constructed for around 1.5 billion including risk and optimism bias. It would have a theoretical capacity of up to 15 trains per hour, although actual capacity is likely to be significantly lower due to conflicts with services on the North London Line and with onward train paths available on both HS2 and HS1. It would also require extensive engineering work in the Camden area, with probable closure of the North London Line for a number of months. Our analysis suggests that the market for HS2 services to the Continent is not high enough to justify frequent dedicated direct international services. Capacity limitations also mean that direct services from cities such as Birmingham and Manchester would also be at the expense of London bound services given the need to separate domestic and international passengers. Running international services from Old Oak Common would provide a more seamless link from HS2 to HS1 than interchanging between Euston and St Pancras and would avoid displacing valuable 7

8 HS2 services from Central London. While a link could also be used for domestic services from Kent to Old Oak Common, Heathrow and possibly to Birmingham and beyond, we believe that the market for those services is comparatively small, and would not make a significant change to the overall business case. On that basis, even under the most optimistic scenarios, a single track link would appear to provide sufficient capacity between HS2 and HS1. A people mover between Euston and St Pancras could provide an alternative way of improving links between HS2 and HS1. It could generate benefits for a wider range of users, sufficient to cover its costs. Indeed, most of its market, and hence the business case to support it, would come from local rather than HS2 to HS1 journeys. Costing around 170 million including risk and optimism bias, it would be significantly less expensive than a direct rail link, but it would provide a less attractive connection. Furthermore, it would have to be an elevated system largely along residential streets and would have a significant impact on local communities. Further Work on Route 3 We have identified a preferred site for an infrastructure maintenance depot (IMD) in the area of Calvert where the Oxford to Bletchley rail link crosses Route 3. If it were decided to adopt an HS2 route via Heathrow, it is likely that the depot would still be in the vicinity of wherever this rail link was crossed by the adopted alignment of HS2. We have also now identified preferred locations for the necessary vent shafts for the London tunnel. We have also identified four candidate areas where shafts would be needed for the Chilterns tunnel if Route 3 is pursued. However, given that a through route via Heathrow would require an entirely different alignment through the Chilterns, we have not progressed to recommending exact sites. 8

9 Introduction HS2 Ltd was established as a Government company to examine the case and develop proposals for a new high speed railway line between London and the West Midlands, and potentially beyond. In March 2010, the Government published HS2 Ltd s report 1, which recommended a preferred scheme cutting journey times between London and Birmingham city centres to 49 minutes. Options were also presented for serving Heathrow via a loop from the preferred route or as a through route, and for a link to HS1 for through services to the Continent. In both cases it was judged that there was not a clear cut economic case for inclusion in the London to the West Midlands scheme. They were not therefore included within our preferred route, Route 3. Figure 2 Route 3 In March 2010 we were asked to refine aspects of the recommended route in preparation for a formal public consultation. In parallel, Lord Mawhinney was commissioned to assess the options put forward for a high speed station at or near 1 HS2 Ltd, 2010, High Speed Rail London to the West Midlands and Beyond, a report for the Department for Transport. 9

10 Heathrow, and to provide advice on when it might be needed and where it might best be situated. Following the General Election in June 2010, we were asked to undertake additional work on the route recommended in the March 2010 report. This report responds to the request to: Develop route options for a direct high speed link to Heathrow, to include options for a loop and a spur from your recommended alignment, and for a through route via Heathrow. This should include: A comparative assessment of the business case for each option, both as part of an initial London Birmingham line, and as part of a wider network; A comparative assessment of the environmental and other impacts of each option; An assessment of the case for maintaining an interchange with Crossrail at Old Oak Common under each option; and An indicative service pattern for how the airport could be served under each option. Carry out an assessment of the options for linking HS1 with High Speed Two (HS2), including analysing the viability and cost of each option. This should cover consideration of the impact of the options for linking to Heathrow, and of the market for services between Heathrow and the Continent. In conducting this work, other than where stated, we have used the same assumptions as those in the March 2010 Report. In parallel to this work, we have been reviewing the assumptions and modelling that informed the March 2010 business case, and consider that in some cases alterations are needed. In particular, we are in the process of revising demand forecasts in the light of revised GDP forecasts from the Office of Budgetary Responsibility. We will continue to refine our business case assumptions in preparation for a strategic public consultation in 2011, when an overall business case will be published. The issues addressed in this report are at the limits of the design of HS2 s models. Our models are designed to provide a detailed assessment of long distance travel across the UK, and to distinguish between multiple locations for possible stations within London. They do not address questions relating to potential demand for short distance travel to Heathrow from London and the South East (and therefore not using HS2). Furthermore our assessment of international travel is a simple stand alone model based on observations of high speed rail across the world. It does not allow the detailed trade offs between capacity, frequency and journey times for an HS2 HS1 link that are possible in our modelling of UK long distance demand. More detailed assessment would require the development of a new modelling framework. 10

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12 Chapter 1 Serving Heathrow 1.1 Introduction Heathrow as part of the UK s transport network Decisions on how HS2 could serve Heathrow need to be taken within the context of the role that Heathrow, as the UK s only international hub airport, and HS2, as part of a developing national high speed rail network, would play in wider transport policy High speed rail is best suited to serving high volume long distance flows connecting major cities; reduced journey times from city centre to city centre with frequent services were the major source of benefits in the business case we presented for high speed rail. A hub airport, meanwhile, relies on good links to major centres beyond its immediate market for transfer passengers to enable it to maximise the range of long haul destinations it can serve. In the case of Heathrow, 35 per cent of its passengers are transfer passengers HS2 has the potential to support Heathrow as a hub airport. Fast links to major cities in the Midlands and further north, at frequencies similar to feeder air services, could make rail a more attractive option for transfer passengers. This might reduce the number of domestic feeder air services to Heathrow, releasing runway capacity at Heathrow for more long haul services, thus strengthening the role of Heathrow as a hub airport. Compared with city to city flows to London, however, the airport market for HS2 is small and will not for the foreseeable future be large enough to justify a high speed line on its own. The strategy for linking Heathrow with a range of cities in the UK by high speed rail services therefore also needs to reflect the broader objectives of serving the key city centre to city centre markets, and to keep open options for future development We have borne this in mind when developing options for serving Heathrow. We have also been mindful that an interchange at Heathrow would not necessarily be used exclusively by airport passengers. An HS2 interchange at or near Heathrow could serve a number of potential markets: HS2 passengers travelling to and from West London destinations; HS2 passengers travelling to and from the Thames Valley; HS2 passengers travelling to and from Heathrow directly; and If a link to HS1 were provided, it could also serve markets from Heathrow and the surrounding area to and from the Continent, and from Heathrow to Kent (these markets are discussed in Chapter 2). 12

13 1.1.5 How each of these markets is served, and their respective benefits and costs are determined, depends on the route alignment, interchange location and service specification. There are three broad options for constructing a link to Heathrow from Route 3: A direct route through the airport where all HS2 trains pass through with some or all trains stopping (requiring rerouting of the southern part of Route 3); A loop off Route 3 where a number of trains divert off and stop at a Heathrow station before rejoining the main route; and A spur off Route 3 where a number of trains divert off the main route and terminate at Heathrow There are also several potential locations for an interchange serving Heathrow, including: A site within the airport complex just west of T5 with links into current airport rail and underground services; A site within the airport complex along the northern perimeter road, described as Heathrow North ; A site to the north of the airport complex at Iver, providing interchange with the Great Western Main Line (GWML), and with a people mover linking it to the airport complex; Old Oak Common, providing an interchange for Heathrow passengers with transfer onto the Heathrow Express or Crossrail, and interchange with GWML services; and For the March 2010 report we also considered a site under the then proposed Terminal 6 (T6) slightly to the north of the current airport perimeter road Service offerings could range from the traditional station stop on a through service where passengers quickly join and alight, handling their own luggage and with a separate rail ticket, through to the provision of dedicated airport trains operated by airlines and integrated into their air ticketing and schedule arrangements, including taking over luggage handling at the originating station There is also a question as to when, as well as how, HS2 should serve Heathrow. Although the initial Heathrow market for HS2 will be small, it will be larger when there is a wider high speed network than when there is simply 13

14 a London to Birmingham high speed line. With both loop and spur configurations the option is available to provide junctions for future development when designing the main route, allowing decisions on the airport link to be taken at a later date alongside decisions on a wider high speed network rather than designing HS2 to serve the airport from Day One. Developing the business case for serving Heathrow The Department for Transport s standard economic appraisal 2 of transport schemes is driven by a variety of factors including journey times, crowding levels and accessibility. In the case of HS2, the business case is driven largely by journey time savings for the main market of passengers to and from Greater London, with reliability and reduced crowding also providing significant benefits. It is inevitable that anything that adds to that journey time, such as deviations or additional stops, will have a negative impact on the business case for HS2 unless it serves another significant market In order to make a robust business case for HS2, any option serving Heathrow must create an attractive, high quality service for airport passengers whilst minimising the impact on the core market of passengers to and from Greater London. For example, although a through route would provide the most frequent services to Heathrow, stopping these long distance services would add to the journey times for the core market from London to the West Midlands and beyond. Loop or spur options, by contrast, do not offer as frequent a service at Heathrow but potentially disbenefit London bound passengers less. They also leave open the opportunity to extend high speed services from the Midlands and the North by HS2 beyond Heathrow to the south or west should plans for a wider national high speed network be developed All the options offer the opportunity in principle to develop dedicated Heathrow feeder services to be operated from the selected airport station to principal cities served by HS2 and, subject to construction of an HS2 HS1 link, cities in northern Europe. Such services could be dedicated to airline passengers with integrated ticketing and baggage handling in a code share operation either by airlines themselves or under contract. Services of this kind might be developed so that trains split to serve two or three different destinations from Heathrow, thus limiting the impact on HS2 s overall capacity. A through route sits least comfortably with this operational approach while a spur is likely to be the most suitable configuration for a dedicated Heathrow Airport service of this kind. 2 Transport Analysis Guidance WebTAG 14

15 1.2 Options for Serving Heathrow HS2 Ltd s March 2010 Report Figure 3 below shows the three main route alignment options for serving Heathrow. Our March 2010 report showed that each of these options considered for developing a high speed link to Heathrow from Route 3 have their own advantages and disadvantages: Figure 3 Heathrow Access options A through configuration would offer the choice either to stop all trains, with a time penalty for all non Heathrow passengers, or to stop selectively. In the case of selective stopping, there would be some impact on capacity. The impact could be minimised by giving timetable priority to through services, but there would then be an additional journey time penalty for those passengers on trains stopping at Heathrow who are actually travelling to and from Greater London. A loop configuration would face the same degree of potential capacity loss as a through configuration, with the points of conflict moved from the immediate vicinity of the (through) station to the junctions on and off the main line. The capacity issues and solutions are identical to those of the through station, except that the journey time penalty for passengers on trains calling at Heathrow who are actually travelling to and from Greater London would be greater. There would be no journey time 15

16 penalty for passengers travelling on those services to and from Greater London which would run direct (i.e. not via Heathrow Loop). A spur solution could offer a lower cost option for constructing a link to the airport but it would mean that, once the HS2 line was operating at capacity, one complete train path into London would be lost for every train serving and terminating at Heathrow. It was judged in March 2010 that the capacity foregone would threaten the ability to provide a reasonable service to Birmingham, or to serve Leeds via the East Midlands and Sheffield as part of a wider network and that the value of this capacity would exceed the cost savings of a spur. Our report in March 2010 therefore favoured a loop over a spur In the March 2010 report, for modelling purposes, we used a Heathrow construct representing an idealised Heathrow location and did not make any recommendations about where a station should be located at the airport itself. Based on the standard economic appraisal we concluded that initially at least the case for an HS2 station at Old Oak Common was stronger than for a station at Heathrow. We noted, however, that if Old Oak Common were pursued from Day One, a station at Heathrow, served either by a loop or a spur, could be built at a later date following the construction of a wider network. Lord Mawhinney: High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow Given that demand for high speed services to Heathrow could increase in the future, Lord Mawhinney was asked by the then Secretary of State to review the options for a high speed interchange at or near Heathrow. In particular, he was asked to advise on whether and when an interchange might be needed and where it might best be situated He concluded, in the context of a high speed rail network extending only to the Midlands, that: At the early stages of a high speed network, there was no compelling case for a direct high speed rail link to Heathrow and, initially, an interchange at Old Oak Common could provide an appropriate connection point to the airport. He also recommended that consideration be given to making the Old Oak Common the initial London terminal for HS2. The case for a through route via Heathrow, at an additional cost of 2 billion to 4 billion, was not supported by the evidence. The case for a direct high speed rail link to Heathrow becomes more persuasive as the network is extended beyond Birmingham, but this 16

17 would only be in prospect after the high speed network had been extended at least to Manchester and Leeds. When linking Heathrow to the high speed network, an interchange at the CTA would be preferable as it would be of maximum utility to the maximum number of passengers, although he recognised that it would complicate the engineering. Further Work on Heathrow In June 2010 we were asked by the Secretary of State to: Develop route options for a direct high speed link to Heathrow, to include options for a loop and a spur from your recommended alignment, and for a through route via Heathrow This chapter builds on earlier work and integrates our reflections on Lord Mawhinney s conclusions. It covers: Interchange locations at Heathrow; Alignments for connecting Heathrow, including a new alignment for a through route; The business case for different combinations of interchange, type of link and service patterns; and Old Oak Common as a terminal. Where to locate an interchange In taking forward our new remit, and with the cancellation of a third runway and a sixth terminal at Heathrow, we have considered an option for a Heathrow interchange at the airport s northern perimeter in the area suggested by BAA which we describe as Heathrow North. In addition, we have continued to consider locations at T5 and at Iver. In the light of Lord Mawhinney s review we have reviewed the scope for providing an interchange at the CTA, which would require a deep underground cavern between the runways. We remain of the view that this deep tunnelled option would be exceedingly difficult and prohibitively expensive. However if future re configuration of the terminals at Heathrow airport were to include partial demolition of the CTA area, then a shallower cut and cover station could come under consideration. 17

18 Hillingdon Slough Iver Ealing Windsor Terminal 5 Heathrow Heathrow North Hounslow Feltham Figure 4 Heathrow Interchange location options While our modelling has not enabled us to undertake detailed comparison of the economic case for each on airport station option, we have considered the strategic considerations around each location. An interchange on the GWML at Iver has the potential to link HS2 better to the current Thames Valley rail network, producing benefits which outweigh the time penalty to GWML passengers to London (although this penalty is greater than when stopping at Old Oak Common since trains would be travelling at higher speed). We have not, however, taken account of the wider connectivity benefit that would accrue if Iver were to be developed as a wider hub interchange However, if the strategic objective of serving Heathrow is to provide an attractive alternative to domestic aviation, with the possibility of dedicated plane substitution services, an on airport interchange becomes more attractive. A station at T5 would potentially offer a better service than Heathrow North to airport passengers since it would be on the site of one of the major terminal areas as well as being better linked to local rail and underground networks for non airport passengers In terms of sustainability: A Heathrow North station would be located at (or just below) ground level within the boundary of the airport lands and would have limited environmental impact. One Scheduled Monument on the site would be affected, but it would be possible to integrate this feature into the design of the site. 18

19 A T5 station would be within the flood zone of the River Colne, although this is likely to be manageable. On a spur, this station could be located just below ground level and compatible with the proposed Airtrack alignment. As a through or loop station, however, T5 would have to be deep below ground if it were not to preclude Airtrack or any other westerly extension of the existing rail and Underground lines. An Iver station would be at or near ground level and would disrupt an important flood zone associated with the River Colne. It would require careful design and provision of flood compensation infrastructure to avoid exacerbating flood risks within the Colne Valley both from the station itself and supporting access road and rail infrastructure. How the interchange could be served In addition to the options identified in developing the March 2010 report, we have developed a number of new options for serving Heathrow including an interchange at Heathrow North, and new spur and through route alignments. These are described in subsequent sections, and the full range of configurations we have considered is set out in Figures 9 11 alongside costs, journey times and other key factors. In summary, however: Through: We have developed two options for a through route, serving either Iver or Heathrow North. An interchange at Iver would provide a marginally quicker rail journey time, has the benefits of a new interchange on the GWML and would be the cheaper option to construct. This, however, needs to be balanced against the additional cost of a people mover and the added time and inconvenience for passengers travelling to the airport. Heathrow North is within the airport perimeter and would also require a shorter people mover. For the reasons given in section below, we did not give detailed consideration to a through route via T5. Loop: Loop configurations would be possible at each of Iver, Heathrow North and T5. Of the loop configurations, Iver would be the lowest cost to construct, at just over 4.1 billion including risk and optimism bias, and would mean the smallest increase in journey times, but would require the people mover and GWML interchange, adding to construction cost and journey times to the airport complex. Heathrow North would cost around 4.5 billion (plus people mover), and T5 would cost around 5.35 billion, although it would be directly connected to one of the principal terminals. Spur: A range of spur options would also be available at all Heathrow locations. Of the three different ways that we considered a spur might be constructed, a partly surface route along the M25 corridor would provide the lowest cost option at 2.5 billion 3 billion including risk and 19

20 optimism bias, saving some 800 million 900 million compared with a fully tunnelled option. It would however, add two to three minutes to the journey time to Heathrow over the other, fully tunnelled, options and it would also have more significant impacts on the local environment It would be possible to make provision for a loop or a spur on Route 3, allowing construction at a later date, for example as part of a wider network to Manchester and Leeds. This would not be possible, however, on a through configuration. In the event that the Day One proposition were to be Route 3 without a loop or spur connection, but with stubs to enable future connection, we would produce new localised Route 3 maps prior to public consultation. The cost of the stubs would need to be estimated and included in the Route 3 cost estimates. Through route options Three variants have been considered for a Heathrow through route alignment. All would be in tunnel from Old Oak Common to Heathrow. Heading from Heathrow towards the West Midlands, the preferred option would continue in tunnel under the M25 turning north west to emerge beyond the Grand Union Canal, continuing at surface level for six miles (ten kilometres) before following the M40 towards Junction two near Beaconsfield. There would then be a ten mile (16 kilometre) tunnel under Beaconsfield to Saunderton before rejoining Route 3 just south of Brackley. Variants, for a fully tunnelled route of about 18.5 miles (30 kilometres) length from Iver to the Saunderton area and a surface route to Junction 2 of the M40, but then fully tunnelled for a length of 12.5 miles (20 kilometres) to Princes Risborough, were also considered. These options were rejected on grounds of higher cost without countervailing additional benefits. The preferred option for a through route is shown at figure 4 below. 20

21 Brackley Route 3 Princes Risborough Beaconsfield Alignments for a through route via Heathrow Figure 5 Heathrow Through Route preferred option In addition to the longer tunnel lengths through the Chilterns, a through station would be a substantial construction. It could be achieved by one of two broad approaches. The conventional one would have two through lines for non stopping trains passing through the centre of the station away from platform edges and sufficiently separated to control the aerodynamic effects of non stop trains passing through at high speed. It would have two island platforms, providing two platform faces for each direction. This arrangement is broadly similar to Lille Europe station. To ensure capacity was maintained, an additional track would be provided for about two miles (three kilometres) before the station to allow stopping trains to turn off the main line and slow down without affecting following services An alternative arrangement, put forward for a through route station at Heathrow North, has the same station and stopping tracks arrangement but removes the through lines from the immediate station environment. This is achieved by placing them on a separate horizontal or vertical alignment past the station area. An example of this approach can be seen at Ashford International in Kent A station at T5 could only be orientated in a north west / south east direction because of the existing rail and Underground infrastructure. This would cause any through route to continue towards London in a long arc around the south of the Heathrow area before heading north east under Hounslow and 21

22 Brentford. The route would be longer than other through routes and would be in continuous tunnel. The additional cost of a through route via T5 (above the cost of Route 3) is likely to be around 6.3 billion ( 2 billion more than Heathrow North) and it would add some six minutes to the journey time of all non stopping services. It was for these reasons, as well as its complexity of construction, that we did not develop a T5 through route further Aside from the flood plain issues referred to in section above, the environmental impacts of through routes serving stations at Iver or Heathrow North would be similar. The extent of tunnels would mean airborne noise effects would be confined to a few residential properties although a small number of dwellings and commercial buildings would be at risk of demolition. The tunnels would pass beneath suburban areas west of London and within the Chilterns, but careful design would ensure they would experience no vibration or ground borne noise from operation of the line The main impacts would be on those areas of surface running beyond Heathrow. The Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) would be crossed for 2.5 miles (four kilometres) at surface level and the Grade II Langley Park Registered Park and Garden and Black Park Country Park would be directly affected. The design would need to allow for four major river crossings and protection of important flood areas and groundwater resources. Land take of approximately 80ha of the best and most versatile agricultural land would also be required. 22

23 Loop options Figure 6 Heathrow Loop options In our March 2010 report we identified possible loop options for all Heathrow locations which could be built either for Day One or later as part of a wider network. The environmental impacts of loop connections would be limited given the extent of tunnelling. A range of loop connections could be made to serve each Heathrow Station site, each consisting of tunnels of varying lengths. These would most likely be associated with temporary disruptive effects during construction. All would pass beneath residential areas to varying degrees but careful design would ensure they would experience no vibration or ground borne noise from operation of the line, although some dwellings and commercial buildings would be at risk of demolition. Spur options Our March 2010 report identified a tunnelled spur option (Spur 1 in figure 7). We have now identified two new spur options broadly on the same alignment along the M25 motorway. One option is entirely in tunnel, whilst the other aims to maximise surface running to provide a more cost effective solution. Both could serve any of the Heathrow stations (as could the spur 23

24 option previously identified). In both cases links with Route 3 would be grade separated to minimise the impact on through train capacity. Figure 7 Heathrow Spur option 1 24

25 Figure 8 Heathrow Spur option 2 (M25 corridor) The environmental impacts of spurs vary depending on whether they are located in a tunnel, where the impacts are similar in nature to the loops described above, or follow a surface route. Each spur option would require grade separated junctions and deceleration lanes at their connections with Route 3, as well open cuttings to house crossover junctions along their respective routes. As a result of these, a small number of dwellings, commercial and community buildings would be at risk of demolition in the Northolt area (option 1) or Ickenham area (option 2 M25 corridor); and, in the case of option 1, approximately 50 dwellings would be at risk in the vicinity of Hillingdon for the junction box. Noise impacts would also be experienced in each of these locations. Further noise and demolition of dwellings would be anticipated in the vicinity of Denham for the M25 surface level alignment, along with impacts to the important flood zone associated with the River Colne. A Possible Phased Approach With demand for high speed services to Heathrow likely to increase as the network expands across the country, we have looked at whether the integration of Heathrow into the high speed network could be phased. Clearly, this is not possible for a through option which would need to be 25

26 constructed for Day One. That is not the case with either a spur or a loop. In both cases the option exists to make initial provision in the form of stubs for a junction or junctions in Route 3, allowing decisions to be taken later on the timing and potentially detailed routing of a link. We also believe that, given the potential largely common alignment of tracks for the loop and spur options to any particular Heathrow station, it would be possible to construct a spur to Heathrow for Day One when demand for services is only likely to support a limited service, which could be extended into a loop configuration if the demand were sufficient at a later date A two stage approach would require conversion of the spur station to a through station and the extension of the route alignment tunnel back to Route 3 in the second stage. To avoid a lengthy closure of the station to enlarge the station box and to allow the spoil from the new tunnel alignment to be taken away, it would be necessary to construct the station large enough at the outset to enable works to be undertaken without major disturbance to operations. It would also be necessary to construct the major structures on Route 3 in the first stage. Therefore, although phasing the development of a loop in this way would reduce the upfront cost, that saving would be limited to the cost of the tunnel from Heathrow back to Route 3. 26

27 Interchange Options for Serving Heathrow Iver Option Additional Capital Cost of Serving Heathrow (including risk and Optimism and Bias) Estimated Journey Time from Heathrow to Birmingham Interchange (mins) Estimated Journey Time Birmingham Interchange to Old Oak Common (mins) Other Key Factors Through 2.92bn Loop 4.14bn (Direct) 40 (Via Heathrow) Spur bn M25 spur, tunnel 3.37bn M25 spur, surface 2.52bn A through configuration would require a long tunnel underneath High Wycombe, and would add around six miles (9.5 kilometres) to the track length and a further three minutes to the journey time from London to West Midlands, or eight minutes for stopping services. Station design and approach would be located in the flood plain of the River Colne permanent structures in the floodplain would have to be limited in size and protection of the station and tunnels would be paramount. Construction would require an Appropriate Assessment under the Habitats Regulation, which requires three years of survey work for Special Protection Area species. The distance from the airport complex means an onward APM system would be needed, which has not been included in these costs. BAA s submission to Lord Mawhinney put the cost of this at 1.6 billion. Figure 9 Costs, Journey Times and Impacts for Serving Heathrow via Iver 27

28 Interchange Options for Serving Heathrow T5 Option Additional Capital Cost of Serving Heathrow (including risk and Optimism and Bias) Estimated Journey Time to Birmingham Interchange (mins) Estimated Journey Time Birmingham Interchange to Old Oak Common (mins) Other Key Factors Loop 5.35bn (Direct) 45 (via Heathrow) Spur bn On a loop configuration, the tight turn required underneath Heathrow airport to return to preferred Route 3 would mean slow running of HS2 trains, adding to the journey time between Heathrow and London. M25 spur, tunnel M25 spur, surface 3.94bn bn Access to other terminal areas would be possible through use of the existing airport transport infrastructure Construction in this area would require an Appropriate Assessment under the Habitats Regulation (see above). Figure 10 Costs, Journey Times and Impacts for Serving Heathrow via T5 28

29 Interchange Options for Serving Heathrow Heathrow North Option Additional Capital Cost of Serving Heathrow (including risk and Optimism and Bias) Estimated Journey Time to Birmingham Interchange (mins) Estimated Journey Time Birmingham Interchange to Old Oak Common (mins) Other Key Factors Through 4.21bn A through configuration would require a long tunnel underneath High Wycombe, and would add around eight miles (13 kilometres) Loop 4.53bn (Direct) 41 (Via Heathrow) to the track length and a further four minutes to the journey time from London to West Midlands, or eight minutes for stopping services. Spur bn M25 spur, tunnel) 3.69bn The Heathrow North site currently has no links to the airport site for passengers, meaning a new APM would have to be constructed although this would not need to be as extensive as for Iver. BAA has suggested the cost might be 0.7 billion 0.9 billion. This has not been included in the costs quoted here. M25 spur, surface 2.84bn Construction in this area might require an Appropriate Assessment under the Habitats Regulation (see above). This would need to be tested with Natural England. Figure 11 Costs, Journey Times and Impacts for Serving Heathrow via Heathrow North 29

30 1.3 The Business Case for Heathrow options The base economic analysis for a Heathrow interchange is contained in our March 2010 Report. We have, however, carried out further analysis to understand better the business case for an HS2 interchange at Heathrow looking at: The comparative business cases for interchanges on the Heathrow complex (assuming easy access to all Terminals) and at Iver on the GMWL, as opposed to the hypothetical best case location used for the March 2010 business case; The analysis of each as a loop (with one in three trains stopping) or a through route (with all trains stopping); A range of options for spur connections; The comparative business case for having a station at Old Oak Common in addition to Heathrow; The effect of a Y network to Manchester and Leeds, and of the proposed Airtrack scheme, on the business case for a Heathrow interchange; and The effect of optimising services on loop and spur configurations. An interchange at Old Oak Common In developing options for a direct link to Heathrow, we were asked to provide an assessment of the case for maintaining an interchange with Crossrail at Old Oak Common under each option The business case for HS2 is largely driven by faster journey times between the centres of London and Birmingham. London is, however, increasingly becoming a city with no single centre, but a number of centres spread across the city including the City, the West End, Westminster and Docklands. While a terminal at Euston provides underground links to most of the important centres in London it is by no means perfect, particularly given the already high levels of crowding on the main underground lines and interchanges An interchange with Crossrail at Old Oak Common would provide an alternative, and in some cases better, link to a number of London s key centres including the West End, the City and Docklands, making for a more seamless journey for HS2 passengers while relieving crowding at Euston and 30

31 its underground links. The station would be constructed so as to allow a simple, direct interchange onto Crossrail to minimise walking distance within the station Stopping HS2 and GWML trains at Old Oak Common would, however, mean a longer journey time by about four minutes for the majority of passengers not interchanging at Old Oak Common. In terms of transport appraisal, the case for an interchange at Old Oak Common is dependent, therefore, on whether the improved links to key London centres, the Thames Valley and reduced crowding at Euston and on the Underground, are worth the additional journey times on HS2 and the GWML, plus the additional cost of construction of the station. (Even without provision of a station, the Old Oak Common site would be used for the launch of the tunnel boring machines for the tunnel towards Euston, meaning that the station box would need to be excavated in any event) The modelling of this balance is sensitive to assumptions on stopping patterns and the relative accessibility of Old Oak Common and Euston. We are conducting further analysis on the accessibility of the station and on stopping patterns on the GWML, but on our current assumptions the incremental BCR of Old Oak Common including an on airport Heathrow station would be around 2:1 if passengers using it experienced a further average benefit equivalent to three to four minutes generalised journey time. We believe this is plausible with further work because of the quality of the interchange offered by Old Oak Common which would allow quicker, easier interchange and, for many, a quicker and less crowded onward journey within London than would be the case from Euston. If Heathrow were to be served by a station at Iver the case for Old Oak Common would be weaker as the Iver station would already provide the GWML interchange. In any event, the specification of a station at Old Oak Common, and the services to it, would need to be reviewed in the light of Ministerial decisions on the timing and nature of provision at Heathrow, in order to optimise the business case Beyond the standard business case considerations, there are strategic considerations favouring provision of an interchange at Old Oak Common. The provision of an alternative to Euston would increase the resilience of the system and, as noted above, help relieve crowding there. If a direct link to Heathrow were not provided in the first phase, Old Oak Common would provide an (albeit less attractive) means of getting from HS2 to Heathrow via the Heathrow Express or Crossrail. There are also opportunities for regeneration of the surrounding area, and possible private sector contributions. There is also the potential to run international services on HS1 from Old Oak Common as a potentially more efficient alternative to direct services for other cities, providing a better interchange for HS2 passengers than would be the case between Euston and St Pancras, and opening up the market for international services from the West of London and Thames Valley 31

32 (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) Although not at this stage considered in detail, enhanced public transport links around Old Oak Common, including incorporating it into London s orbital rail network, would also make it more attractive for HS2 passengers from outside Central London. Such a scheme could also provide an interchange for non HS2 passengers allowing new journey opportunities around West London, the Thames Valley and Crossrail In the light of these considerations we have therefore included the assumption of a station at Old Oak common in the following analysis of options for a Heathrow station. Service Patterns The service pattern we have developed for HS2 is purely for the purpose of developing a business case and should not be taken as our recommendation for a service specification at this stage. For the analysis of through services we have assumed every train stopping at Heathrow; this would ensure no loss of capacity. In the analysis of a loop we assumed that one in three trains would serve Heathrow, with hourly Heathrow services to and from Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool. This is consistent with the frequency that some airlines have suggested would be needed to compete with domestic flights for transfer passengers. The impact of diverting one in three services to a Heathrow interchange on a spur would be to reduce capacity and frequency into Central London by a third. As a consequence it performs significantly worse than either a through route or a loop with this service pattern Given the relatively low levels of demand for Heathrow services, however, we concluded it might be possible to minimise the impacts on track capacity by running trains that join or divide on the way and provide an hourly service to Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool. While in principle this option is available with any form of connection, it best suits a spur offering dedicated Heathrow services. We believe that on Day One, where we assume that HS2 would be operating at less than its full capacity of 14 trains per hour, that level of frequency could be provided without reducing capacity into Central London In the case of a Y network, when HS2 would be operating at its full capacity, delivering an equivalent hourly service on a spur with trains that divide to Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Newcastle and Glasgow would require services to London to be forgone. We modelled this by replacing the two lightest loaded services (one each to Birmingham and Manchester) with two Heathrow services. Our assessment at this stage is only indicative but it does suggest that replacing some London services with Heathrow services 32

33 could add to the benefits, since Heathrow trains serving multiple destinations might achieve better load factors. Benefits of serving Heathrow The benefits of on airport and Iver stations are outlined in Figure 12 and Figure 13 below on the basis of a high speed line to Birmingham. (These give approximate orders of magnitude.) If it were decided to locate the Heathrow interchange on the airport complex, it would deliver estimated benefits to Heathrow passengers of up to 5 million per year These benefits would need to be considered against the effects on HS2 passengers travelling on into Central London and the South East. Those living near Heathrow would enjoy a small benefit as they could join HS2 at the airport station. The much larger number going to central London and the rest of the South East would, however, have a longer journey. A through route would perform worst by a considerable margin, with overall disbenefits of the order of 100 million per year. A loop configuration would reduce these disbenefits to about 35 million. An additional service on a spur would see no disbenefit to Central London passengers and would potentially deliver net benefits. On Day One the strongest case for an on airport interchange is therefore for a spur. Additional Annual Passenger Benefits for an on airport interchange compared with Day 1 scenario, London to West Midlands network ( m, 2009 prices) Through Loop Spur HS2 Heathrow 5m Less than 5m Less than 5m passengers HS2 London 115m 45m 5m passengers Other HS2 10m 10m 25m Passengers Total 100m 35m + 30m Figure With a station at Iver on the GWML, benefits to Heathrow Airport passengers would be lower given the need to travel on to the airport complex. There are, however, potential benefits for passengers on the GWML, with quicker journeys for accessing HS2 on a through route, while stopping penalties for passengers on the GWML into London could be reduced by adjustments to stopping patterns at Old Oak Common. The net impact for a through route would generate disbenefits of the order of 35 million, although this does not include the benefits to GWML passengers who would travel to Iver to get to Heathrow Airport. The scope of benefits for GWML passengers would be 33

34 lower for a loop or spur route as a result of the lower frequency of HS2 services Overall, the benefits of a through and a loop route are of a similar order of magnitude for Iver. Although not specifically modelled, we would expect a spur to Iver to produce small net benefits on Day One, as for an on airport station. Additional Annual Passenger Benefits for an Iver interchange compared with Day 1 scenario, London to West Midlands network ( m, 2009 prices) Through Loop HS2 Heathrow 5m Less than 5m passengers HS2 London 120m 50m passengers GWML 70m 20m passengers Other HS2 5m 10m passengers Total 35m 40m Figure 13 nb: Iver configurations assume that all GWML fast services do not stop at Old Oak Common The analysis suggests that with a high speed line between London and the West Midlands only, the benefits of a direct HS2 link to Heathrow calculated using standard economic appraisal would be insufficient to cover the costs, whether the station was located on airport or at Iver Although a wider network to Manchester and Leeds would increase the number of passengers using HS2 to travel to Heathrow airport, the overall picture is unlikely to change because, although the benefits of serving Heathrow and the GWML markets would be bigger, so would the disbenefits to London bound passengers. In the case of a loop or through route this would mean more passengers experiencing a longer journey time, while in the case of a spur it would mean displacing some services into Central London in order to provide airport services. Old Oak Common as a Terminal Before reaching firm conclusions, in response to Lord Mawhinney s report we looked at whether Old Oak Common could become the London terminal, 34

35 either temporarily until the re development of Euston is complete, or permanently. The capacity of the Old Oak Common site in a terminal configuration is likely to allow a maximum of ten or 11 trains per hour in each direction. This is less than the initial line capacity of 14 trains per hour, and so is insufficient for a permanent solution. However it would be sufficient for the notional service pattern of nine trains per hour (off peak) and 11 trains per hour (peak) used for the Day One business case The current design of Old Oak Common is as a six track platform through station with all high speed trains stopping. If it were to act as the London terminal station for the London to Birmingham phase of HS2, with the aim of boring tunnels to Euston and potentially HS1 at a later date, the following alterations would be required: Construction of a minimum of two turnback sidings to the east of the station, taking over the alignment of the currently planned Crossrail Depot access tracks for the period of construction, thereby severing the Depot; and Development of enhanced highway access south to the A40 Western Avenue and also Northwest to the A40 near Hanger Lane Interchange. Although it would defer the cost of constructing the London tunnel and rebuilding Euston station, estimated to be 2.9 billion including risk and optimism bias, this additional work around Old Oak Common is estimated to cost in the region of 400 million to 500 million, resulting in a net reduction of Day One construction costs of around 2.5 billion The proposals in the March 2010 report would use the Old Oak Common site as the base for boring the tunnels to Euston and potentially HS1, with associated spoil and materials handling through the rail links of the existing site, before the station itself was constructed. If a station had already been built there, the only way the tunnels could be bored subsequently, while keeping the station fully operational, would be by purchasing additional property to the east of the station to create a tunnelling base and taking over the Crossrail depot site itself for materials and spoil handling As a result, it would be necessary to purchase land in order to build the Crossrail depot on a new site. It might be possible to do this to the northwest, in the Park Royal area. We have not, however, examined this possibility in any detail at this stage We have not considered in detail the operational implications of terminating the HS2 service at Old Oak Common. However we note that under our current proposals for Old Oak Common onward journeys would be almost entirely reliant on Crossrail, so the resilience of the system in the event of problems on Crossrail would be weak. 35

36 Were there to be any proposal to retain Old Oak Common as the sole London terminal beyond the Day One network and service pattern, the current station plan would not be adequate. A completely new design on an enlarged footprint would need to be developed. This would extend across the Old Oak Common site and through the Park Royal area towards Hangar Lane, with substantially increased road access and public transport connectivity being required. It might not be possible to achieve this without diversion of the Grand Union Canal Old Oak Common is less accessible for a large number of HS2 passengers from in and around London who would otherwise use Euston to access HS2. Overall this would lead to longer access times for the majority of passengers, and would discourage some passengers who might either chose to travel on other modes, less frequently or not at all. As a result, not serving Euston would result in a loss of benefits and revenues for HS2 which would more than offset the 2.5bn cost reduction. Overall the business case for Old Oak Common as a terminus is weaker than the Day 1 scenario with Euston, and the overall BCR would fall. 1.4 Wider Context In the scenarios that we have looked at, there does not appear to be a business case for providing a direct link to Heathrow on Day One. However, in a policy context seeking to support Heathrow s role as an international hub and provide an alternative to domestic aviation, there may be strategic arguments for linking Heathrow to the High Speed network. With the relatively low level of demand for such a link on a high speed line between London and Birmingham only, the case for a link needs to be considered within the context of wider transport policy and the longer term development of a high speed network. That said, our analysis does suggest that a Y configuration with a link to Heathrow would deliver benefits at least twice as large as the costs In order to make HS2 services to a Heathrow interchange more viable, they would need to serve a number of different markets (such as the wider South East as well as the airport). This tends to support the view of a number of stakeholders. Greengauge 21, for example, suggested classic compatible running through Heathrow by constructing further routes to join the existing rail network to locations to the west and south of London Improved feeder services such as Airtrack to the Heathrow interchange would also improve the overall business case. Other measures which improve surface access to the airport would also be likely to increase demand for HS2 services at Heathrow. This includes road access, which could grow the HS2 market but would also exacerbate the congestion and air quality issues on 36

37 the road network around Heathrow today. Were a link to be constructed to HS1, international services from the Continent and domestic high speed services from Kent could also serve Heathrow, although only by replacing valuable paths on HS An important element of the business case is the additional cost of constructing a Heathrow link and interchange. For the purposes of this report, we have assumed that this would all be public funding. Clearly, however, a link to the high speed network would be of significant value to the airport operator and airlines and a private sector contribution to the costs would reduce the costs to Government The market for Heathrow as an airport and a hub station is likely to change over the years. A through option would be fixed as an HS2 interchange at Day One. Making provision for a loop or a spur in Route 3 would offer greater flexibility, allowing decisions on the best solution to serving Heathrow to be taken at a later date in the light of wider developments. 1.5 Summary and Key Recommendations All Heathrow options come at significant additional cost (at least 2.5 billion additional infrastructure cost). The overall benefits of a Y configuration for a network serving London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds, including provision of a Heathrow link, would be likely to be twice the costs, although the additional benefits of a Heathrow link, calculated using the standard methodology, would not be sufficient to offset the additional costs. However future developments in respect of surface access to Heathrow and wider aviation policy could enhance the case for a Heathrow link A station at Iver would offer the opportunity of an interchange on the GWML, which would increase net benefits, but it would be less convenient for airport users. For a station at Iver the pros and cons of a through route against a loop are fairly evenly balanced An on airport interchange would provide the most attractive interchange for passengers going to and from Heathrow, and is therefore likely to support better Heathrow s role as a hub airport. Of the options considered, a T5 interchange is likely to be more attractive than an interchange at Heathrow North. An on airport interchange would be best served by a spur initially, rather than a loop or through route, to minimise the disbenefit to London passengers. For an on airport station, a loop performs more strongly than a through route While potentially providing the most frequent services, a through route would disadvantage the core market of London bound passengers most. It would also require a decision now on precise location, which could limit 37

38 future opportunities in relation to the development of the airport or surface access to it A spur could provide a lower cost and potentially better Value for Money option on Day One for running dedicated airport services to cities such as Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool using trains which divide along the route. This could be developed into a loop configuration as demand increases, for example with a High Speed network extended to Manchester and Leeds A station at Old Oak Common would improve access opportunities into London and relieve pressure at Euston. This would not be achieved with a Heathrow station alone. If Heathrow were to be served by an on airport station, we believe there remains a case for an interchange at Old Oak Common; if the airport were to be served by a station at Iver the case is weaker. Improved local transport links and the potential for regeneration may add to the benefits of Old Oak Common, and it could serve as an interchange for international services on HS1. It also provides an option for travelling to Heathrow if a direct link is not built in the first phase of the high speed network Although it would reduce construction costs there does not, however, appear to be a case for Old Oak Common to be a terminal station, as the loss of revenues and benefits would more than offset any cost savings. 38

39 Chapter 2 Linking HS1 and HS2 2.1 Background In March 2010 we identified three options for linking HS2 to HS1: A high speed link in tunnel from Old Oak Common to the HS1 eastern tunnel portal at Rainham in Essex (the nearest point to HS1 at which a high speed link could be made); A classic speed link from Old Oak Common to the HS1 tunnel portal near St Pancras, via a tunnel to the West Coast Main Line (WCML) in the Camden area, then along the North London Line corridor (either single or double track) (see Figure 14); and Improved non rail interchange between Euston and St Pancras, potentially using a people mover A high level estimate put the cost of a new high speed link at approximately 3.5 billion (some 5.5 billion to 6 billion including risk and optimism bias) and it was decided not to pursue this option We estimated a dual track classic speed link would cost 810 million, or about 1.5 billion including risk. Although a single track would cost less, it was not at that stage seen as offering the same resilience capability or opportunity for future growth in demand. It was therefore suggested that, if a rail link were to be built, it should be a dual track at conventional speed. We also suggested that the tunnel section would need to be built at the outset as it would be very difficult to return to the Old Oak Common site once the Day One services were running without disabling the Crossrail main depot for an extended period There are clearly strategic considerations at issue in deciding on a link between HS2 and the UK s only existing high speed line. These are not fully captured in the standard economic appraisal of transport schemes that we have adopted. That analysis demonstrated only a relatively small market for trips from Birmingham and further north to the Continent, even if high speed rail were to capture a significant share of that market. We assumed after liaison with those responsible for Security and Border Control that domestic and international passengers could not be mixed for security reasons. In this light it was judged unlikely that there would be enough demand to offer a sufficiently frequent direct service from cities to the North of London to be attractive to even the small market identified. Furthermore, once HS2 was operating at full capacity, non stop trains from places north of London to the 39

40 Continent would reduce the number of trains serving the core market of Central London An alternative scenario was considered of starting some HS1 services to Paris and Brussels at Old Oak Common, treating the latter as a hub for travel to northern Europe and offering higher frequencies. This would enable HS2 passengers to make a more straightforward link onto HS1 than is possible between Euston and St Pancras and as a result there would be higher demand. The need to change trains would, however, mean there was less demand from Birmingham and cities further north than with direct services Overall our assessment was that, under both scenarios using the standard economic appraisal, the demand would remain insufficient to justify the cost of constructing the link and associated interchange expansion to meet security requirements We also suggested further thought should be given to the option for passengers to make a link between Euston and St Pancras using a new people mover. It would be at lower cost than building a rail link and would benefit other passengers looking to transfer between the stations. While it would be a slower and less straightforward interchange than changing at Old Oak Common, this would be compensated to some extent by the extra frequency of services to northern Europe from St Pancras compared with Old Oak Common The report did make clear that the business case for running international services on HS2 would be improved if it were part of a wider high speed network. Furthermore, in line with our remit, we considered only the demand for HS2 services from Birmingham and further north to the Continent. Whilst a link from HS2 to HS1 could theoretically open up opportunities for domestic HS2 services between the west of London and Stratford and Kent, platform or operational capacity at Old Oak Common would, on our current design, be insufficient to deal with any such additional domestic services. Given the likely low level of demand for such services we did not include costs for this additional capacity in the estimates for Old Oak Common. 2.2 A direct link to HS In March 2010 we were asked by the then Secretary of State to continue to explore the options for connecting HS2 and HS1 both by a dedicated rapid transit system and a direct rail link. In June 2010 this was widened, asking us to: Carry out an assessment of the options for linking HS1 with HS2, including analysing the viability and cost of each option, and an assessment of the 40

41 business case. This should cover consideration of the impact of the options for linking to Heathrow, and of the market for services between Heathrow and the Continent. Route Alignment In looking again at options for building a direct link, it was clear that minimising the cost of construction was a key factor in determining whether a business case could be made. On that basis we did not look any further at a high speed link, but continued to develop options for single and dual track conventional speed links: The single track option would create a new single track tunnel between Old Oak Common and the existing Primrose Hill Junction at the point where the North London Line joins the WCML. From there, it would upgrade one North London Line track to GC gauge to operate as a bidirectional route, and then onto HS1. Loops would be constructed to allow trains in opposite directions to pass each other at two points. The journey time would be around ten minutes, providing capacity for a minimum of three trains per direction per hour. We would need to carry out further work with Transport for London and Network Rail to determine the operational feasibility of this option in the light of possible future passenger and freight developments on the North London line and to develop a detailed service specification and infrastructure design. This option is estimated to cost 0.9 billion including risk and optimism bias. 41

42 HS1 Connection Route 3 Figure 14 HS1 connection options 42

43 The double track option would create one single track tunnel between Old Oak Common and the existing Primrose Hill Junction at the point where the North London Line joins the WCML, and a second GC gauge track which would pass through one of the existing Primrose Hill Tunnel bores, creating a double track link. From there, it would upgrade two North London Lines to GC gauge to permit two track operation. This option would provide a theoretical capacity on the link itself of around 15 trains per direction per hour. This could not however be realised in practice due to the other users on the North London line and the train paths available on HS1 and HS2. The work would involve much more alteration to the existing classic rail infrastructure and have a much greater impact on adjoining property than the single track option. As with the single track option, we would need to carry out further work with Transport for London and Network Rail determine the operational feasibility and to develop a detailed service specification and infrastructure design. The estimated cost for this option is 1.5 billion including risk and optimism bias We also looked at a potentially lower cost single track option with a shorter single track tunnel, leaving Old Oak Common and emerging onto the WCML slow lines at Queens Park. From there, the two slow line tracks would be replaced with double GC gauge tracks upto Primrose Hill Tunnel, where a single GC gauge track would be provided through the existing tunnel. It would then join the North London Line as for the other single track option. Although at 0.85 billion including risk and optimism bias it is a slightly cheaper alternative than the other single track option, the complexity of construction would involve significant disruption to existing train services and a corresponding need to compensate the Train Operating Companies (TOC). We have concluded that this option is less attractive than the previously developed single track option We also looked at the possibility of reducing the cost of the classic speed link by reducing the length of tunnel from Old Oak Common. This would involve international services using the proposed HS2 tracks between Old Oak Common and Euston with an underground junction to access the North London line. Two underground caverns would be required for the junction, the scale of which would pose a significant risk of settlement to properties above. This would, moreover, offer only a very limited overall cost saving and there would be potential conflicts of capacity with domestic services. We did not, therefore, pursue this further and focused instead on developing the classic speed link previously presented In each case we believe that the tunnels from Old Oak Common to the WCML would require one or two vent shafts of the type described in section 3.2. We have not looked at potential locations at this stage, but would need to do so before consultation were it decided to proceed with one of these options. 43

44 Constructability of HS1 Links Each of the HS1 link options would provide challenges during construction. Although the single track option has an entirely new tunnel away from railway infrastructure for the majority of its length, further work would still need to be done to the existing North London Line viaduct through Camden. We believe that, if carefully designed and staged, most of this work could be carried out with limited impacts on existing freight and passenger services The double track option would be more complex to construct. More significant works would be required along the North London Line viaduct, including replacement of all bridges, likely requiring a total closure of the line for a period of months. The works necessary to enlarge Primrose Hill Tunnel on the WCML would also mean a period of many months when no trains could use the affected tunnel bore, reducing by two the number of available tracks into Euston, with the associated disruption and need to compensate the Train Operating Companies. Our cost estimate includes a current best judgement of the risks involved We considered whether it might be possible to provide a single track option initially then, if demand increases, add an additional track. The necessary major works needed along the North London Line viaduct, however, would still require closure of the line for a period of months, meaning the same level of disruption as would have been caused as constructing a double track link at the outset. It would also mean that services between HS2 and HS1 could not be run during this period A single track option would have a lower operational resilience than a double track line, leading to a greater risk of delay to services in the event of an incident. This risk would increase the closer to full capacity of the link was actually used. This could also have knock on consequences for the reliability of other services on HS2 and HS1. HS1 Link: Sustainability Appraisal The environmental impacts of either of the two options that have been worked up in detail would be largely similar because most of the above ground tracks would follow a common route between Old Oak Common and the link with the HS1 tunnel outside St Pancras. The dual track option would, however, have a greater environmental impact on the townscape as it would require a widening of the existing viaduct and the reconstruction of railway bridges. It would directly affect the Grade II listed Camden Road Station and, potentially, several listed properties close to the line at Randolph Street. It would also result in more embodied carbon and waste generation. The operational effects of either option, on the basis of the likely service levels 44

45 for the link, would be unlikely to cause significant noise in addition to that currently experienced on the North London Line. Passenger Demand A number of potential markets could be served from a link between HS1 and HS2. Passengers from the Midlands and North of England travelling to the continent who would use high speed rail to travel between cities such as Birmingham and Manchester to Paris or Brussels instead of air; Passengers from Kent and the South East of England who might use domestic services to Old Oak Common or Heathrow; Passengers from the west of London or Heathrow who might use Old Oak Common or Heathrow to access international services (in preference to either air services from Heathrow or rail services to and from St Pancras); and Potential increases in the overall market for international travel as a result of improved rail connections The Route 3 alignment without any links to HS1 would already produce some benefits for international passengers, with faster links between Birmingham and London making HS1 international services from St Pancras more attractive for passengers from Birmingham and beyond. Overall we estimate that this would produce benefits of around 350 million, with up to 3,000 passengers per day using HS2 to connect to onward international services to the Continent. These passengers, and the benefits associated with them, have not, however, been included in the business case for Route Based on forecast levels of air travel demand, we estimate that there is a theoretical market for international services of around 5,000 passengers per day (2,500 in each direction). This would generate benefits of around 1 billion, adding a further 2,000 passengers and 650 million benefits above those delivered without any link. We do not, however, believe that this could be achieved in practice. Capturing this market would require relatively frequent (probably hourly) services between Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow to locations on the Continent, which is unlikely to be viable We expect London bound HS2 domestic trains would be about per cent full on average, carrying around 700 passengers. Comparable loading on international services would make it difficult to justify more than seven direct trains per day. Anything more than this level of service would mean under 45

46 loaded trains and valuable capacity on HS2 into Central London being foregone. Therefore it does not appear feasible, or even desirable, to provide the frequency of service needed to capture the theoretical market of 5,000 passengers per day An alternative, as described in the March 2010 report, would be to provide interchange for international services at Old Oak Common. This would allow fast and more frequent services, both on the domestic and international leg, with up to two or three trains per hour from Old Oak Common to the Continent to be delivered with no impact on the core HS2 users. This would be expected to attract around 4,000 international passengers (a 1,000 increase on the core HS2 proposition), and benefits of 700 million (an additional 350 million). Under current security policy this would require segregated facilities for international and domestic passengers, but we believe that the current platform capacity of the Old Oak Common station would be compatible with this. A Heathrow station could similarly serve as an international interchange Another potential benefit of linking HS1 to HS2 could be to allow direct domestic high speed services from HS1 to Old Oak Common, both to improve access for passengers travelling between Kent and West London, and for HS2 passengers travelling to and from Kent. The likely market for these trips is, however, small. Without the HS1 link, we would expect Route 3 to be used by around 1,000 HS2 passengers each day to travel on to and from locations in Kent. Possibly around an additional 500 passengers would use HS2 as a result of a link. This is perhaps not surprising as these trips would already be reasonably well served: passengers would already have the options of using Crossrail to travel between Stratford and Old Oak Common or walking between St Pancras and Euston Operating domestic HS1 services to and from Old Oak Common would require additional platform capacity, which is not attainable within the footprint we have developed for Old Oak Common. Our estimated costs for the interchange also do not include the additional costs which would be required for running these services through Old Oak Common In addition to improving links from the West Midlands and the North to the continent, a link to HS1 could allow direct high speed rail services from Heathrow to Paris or Brussels, contributing further to Heathrow s role as an international hub and increasing demand for an HS1 link. As an indication of the potential scale of demand for such services, there are currently around 4,500 daily trips by air between Heathrow and Paris (of which 36 per cent interline) and 1,800 daily trips between Heathrow and Brussels (of which 58 per cent interline). Were half of this market, for example, to transfer to international rail services from Heathrow, that would equate to over 3,000 more trips per day using the link, potentially increasing the demand on the link by around 50 per cent. There is also a potential market for HS1 services 46

47 between Heathrow and Kent, although we have not estimated the scale of this market at this stage, or the benefits that it could add to the business case. 2.3 Improved Interchange Between Euston and St Pancras We also looked further at a people mover between Euston and St Pancras, either as an alternative to a direct link, or in addition. Options were considered along three alignments (Euston Road, Polygon Road and Phoenix Road) and at street level, sub surface or elevated (see figure 11). Route alignment We developed a series of routes and transportation options. In summary we concluded that: Street level options would be too disruptive to road traffic; It would not be feasible to provide a link at any level along Euston Road; and A fixed track APM would be the preferred mode of transport We then considered in more detail elevated and sub surface options along Phoenix Road or Polygon Road, north of Euston Road We also closely looked at the option for a travelator but since peak hour demand would be likely to significantly exceed the capacity of a travelator, an APM would seem by far the more practical option. An APM would take approximately two minutes to travel between Euston and St Pancras. Given that there would be an APM in each direction, services would run on a frequency of every two to three minutes. Including loading and unloading time, it would have a maximum capacity of about 10,000 passengers per hour. Constructability of interchange options between Euston and St Pancras At the western end of a people mover link, a sub surface system would originate parallel to Euston station and underneath Eversholt Street. It could not get directly into Euston station because it would conflict with the proposed rail level of the new HS2 tracks and, below them, the Northern Line. A fixed track Automatic People Mover (APM) would also require the construction of an underground station in a large cut and cover box beneath 47

48 Eversholt Street, requiring road closure and diversion of the various bus routes for a period of approximately three years A sub surface route would use cut and cover methodology. This would require installation of piled walls along either edge of the new route very close to adjacent property, making it uninhabitable during construction and possibly permanently. It might also be necessary to demolish some properties were their foundations to be compromised by the piled walls. An alternative to cut and cover would be to use tunnel boring machines but this would require large reception and launch shafts at either end, entailing additional land take, including some of the British Library, probably making it impractical At the eastern end, the alignment would turn to run parallel to St Pancras in the land behind the British Library at a short distance from the station. Because of the existing Thameslink tunnels, it would not be able to run directly alongside the station underneath Midland Road. Overall, the construction cost of a sub surface APM would be approximately 250 million, including risk and optimism bias An elevated option would pass from within the new Euston station, over Eversholt Street and along Phoenix Road, Brill Place or Polygon Road. A continuous roadway exists between Euston and St Pancras along Phoenix Road / Brill Place but not along Polygon Road, where the route would require demolition of some existing housing. Construction would not require the complete closure of the road and any affected utilities could be diverted to the edge of the road. An elevated APM would cost approximately 170 million (including risk and optimism bias). 48

49 Figure 15 People Mover options We would not recommend a sub surface option given the likely impacts of a cut and cover construction methodology on the local community, making the housing along these streets uninhabitable for the period of construction. We therefore went on to consider the environmental impacts of an elevated option only. 49

50 Euston People Mover: Sustainability Appraisal The elevated people mover options on either Phoenix or Polygon Road would have substantial local environmental impacts as they would pass through the Somers Town residential area, which is recognised as a deprived area. The Polygon Road route would require the demolition of residential properties between Purchese Street and Midland Road, as well as land take from two open spaces including an adventure playground and a residential open space. The Phoenix Road Brill Place route would affect a major development proposal for a medical research facility adjacent to the British Library Major visual intrusion would occur for each option, and in both cases the people mover would have to follow immediately adjacent to the upper storey windows of residential properties, schools, local offices and local business premises. Polygon Road is narrower than Phoenix Road Brill Place and the visual effects and proximity of an elevated structure would therefore be more acute. Due to its close proximity to three Grade II listed buildings, the Phoenix Road Brill Place route would affect the setting of these buildings. Both options would also require the removal of established trees, which currently form the green part of the streetscape of the built up Somers Town area Although noise effects could be contained through modern design of the structure and people mover system, the elevated nature and close proximity suggest local properties would be affected by operational noise and vibration for each option. Euston People Mover: Benefits Compared with construction costs of 170 million for the link and setting aside the environmental effects noted above, there appears to be a positive economic case for a people mover link, delivering approximately 225 million worth of benefits for HS2 passengers. It is important to note, however, that the large majority of the benefits would accrue to non HS2 passengers. The business case for the link is only remotely related to the case for HS2. 50

51 2.4 Business Case A summary of the costs, benefits and impacts of the options is presented in Figure 16 below: Cost ( m) including risk and optimism bias Single track Dual Track People Mover (elevated) (APM) Benefits ( m) (PV Benefits over 60 years) In the region of 500m. 225m (for HS2 passengers) Demand A direct link might be used by up to 5,000 international passengers and perhaps 1,000 2,000 domestic passengers to and from Kent Up to 4,000 international passengers per day and a very significant numbers of other passengers. Capacity / A minimum of three Theoretically up to Service every two Service Pattern and, subject to detailed timetable planning, up to five trains per hour in each direction (up to 3,000 5,000 passengers per hour) 15 trains per hour in each direction (or 15,000 passengers per hour) to three minutes, carrying up to 10,000 passengers per hour (APM) Environmental Unlikely to cause Unlikely to cause Significant visual impacts additional noise above that currently experienced on North London Line. additional noise but more significant impact on local townscape & properties. intrusion for local residents. Local properties could be affected by operational noise or vibration. Viability / Most work to North Construction likely Construction delivery issues London Line could be achieved through weekend closures. to require lengthy closures of the North London Line, and disruption to WCML. could be undertaken without major road closure. Figure 16 Costs, Benefits and Impacts of Linking HS1 and HS2 51

52 2.4.2 Aside from sustainability impacts, the strongest case is for a people mover link between Euston and St Pancras reflecting predominantly the case for improved links for local commuters rather than improved links between HS2 and HS1. The estimated benefits would outweigh the costs The incremental costs of all of the rail options we have looked at would be greater than the incremental benefits. Given the constraints on capacity and the relatively low demand for international travel it seems unlikely that there would be a strong case for frequent dedicated international services to each city served by HS2. Instead a better use of capacity would seem to be an international interchange station at Old Oak Common, providing interchange with HS2 services If a rail link were provided, the best option would appear to be a single track link. This would provide sufficient capacity to give a reasonable level of service to Kent and the Continent at the lowest cost. A double track link would significantly add to the cost but there is unlikely to be sufficient demand to justify the additional expenditure. The impact of the additional cost of a single track link on the overall business case for HS2 would reduce the BCR by about 0.1 to Wider context Our latest analysis suggests that there may be a somewhat stronger business case for constructing a direct link to HS1 than previously assumed in March However, it is unlikely that there would be sufficient demand for high frequency of services of any kind along the link to HS1. On that basis, a singletrack link is the most effective way of providing a link to HS Our analysis is based on current assumptions about the development of the rail network and of aviation policy. The demand for services from HS2 to the Continent in the future could be increased by, for example, higher costs of a different regulatory environment for aviation or the further development of the high speed network in northern Europe We have also accepted Security and Border Agency advice that domestic and international passengers would need to be segregated at interchanges and that HS2 international services could not carry domestic passengers. With most demand for HS2 coming from West Midlands to London services, there is unlikely to be a strong case for displacing these services to provide paths for dedicated international services If international and domestic passengers could be mixed with stops at, for example, Old Oak Common and Stratford for accessing London, the business case could be enhanced. Even in those circumstances, however, the market 52

53 for an international service is unlikely to be substantial compared to the demand for services to Central London. 2.6 Summary and Key Recommendations A single track link to HS1 is likely to be sufficient to meet the demand for international and domestic services from HS2 to Kent and the Continent. The estimated cost of it would be around 890 million including risk and optimism bias At this stage there does not appear to be a case for running direct services from Birmingham and other cities to the Continent, and creating an international interchange at Old Oak Common would be a better use of capacity. A Heathrow station could similarly serve as an international interchange. This would, however, not rule out the possibility of running direct services should demand increase Future changes in rail and aviation policy could increase demand in the future. Changes in current security practices, for the purposes of both UK Border Agency and Channel Tunnel security reasons, to enable mixing of international and domestic passengers could also allow more international services from HS2 with less of a detrimental effect on capacity into London. Although we cannot predict such changes, they need to be borne in mind given the challenges associated with attempting to build the link after day one opening A people mover could offer an alternative, lower cost option to improve links between Euston and St Pancras, by bringing benefits to HS2 users but primarily for more local journeys. Engineering and environmental factors, however, restrict options for a people mover alignment to an elevated solution which would have significant impacts on local communities and businesses. 53

54 Chapter 3 Further Work on Route 3 In addition to previously published changes to the alignment we have continued to refine aspects of Route 3. The March 2010 Report also identified the need for an infrastructure maintenance depot (IMD) along the route, and the need for air shafts and intervention shafts on tunnelled sections of the route. We have since done further work on both in relation to Route Infrastructure Maintenance Depot We identified the need for an IMD on HS2 in the March 2010 Report. Its prime functions would be to provide: A base from which all rail based infrastructure activities are resourced and materials supplied for the whole of the London Birmingham line; A central supply point for all engineering (track and overhead line equipment) material that would be required to be delivered to site by rail, as well as strategic materials stocks (e.g. point motor components); and A fuelling, servicing and stabling facility for HS2 rescue and recovery locomotives and on track plant (including GC gauge vehicles which could not travel on the classic network) The depot would need to be located somewhere midway between London and Birmingham for access to all parts of the line. It would also need access to the classic rail network for track maintenance plant and to supply the site with heavy rail components as a more practical and more sustainable alternative to road access. An examination of the route showed that the only area approximately midway between London and Birmingham with appropriate access from the classic rail network would be where Route 3 would cross the line of the Bicester to Bletchley railway, close to Calvert. Any depot would be designed to ensure compatibility with proposals currently under consideration for the upgrade of this line The depot would need to be approximately half a mile (one kilometre) long and metres wide. It would also need to be suitable for 24 hour operation. It would be used intermittently throughout the day and night for low level activities, such as plant maintenance, train formation and material deliveries. The depot would need to be lit constantly, though the light impact would be limited as part of the overall design. 54

55 In light of this, we considered six potential sites for the depot in the area around Calvert, and a further site near Mixbury, some six miles further north, against a number of criteria: Environmental impact to surrounding areas; Railway issues (e.g. amount of shunt moves required); Geographical issues (e.g. undulating terrain); Logistics (e.g. road access); and Costs The site locations in the area around Calvert are illustrated below at figure 17. Figure 17 Potential IMD locations near Calvert 55

56 3.1.5 On that basis, site 2.3 was identified as the most promising because, unlike any of the others reviewed, it was not found to be unfavourable against any of the criteria. The site is adjacent to both HS2 and the Bicester to Bletchley railway line affording excellent access to both lines. It is also sited in a position which minimises impacts on local communities. This recommendation is based on the Route 3 alignment published in March Were it decided to serve Heathrow via a through route, we would need to look at an alternative location. For the reasons noted above, this would be likely to be in the vicinity of where the new HS2 line crossed the Bicester and Bletchley line. 3.2 Vent Shafts For the longer tunnels on HS2, vent shafts would be needed to provide for emergency access in case of incident and fire control purposes. Vent shafts would need to include: Natural ventilation, which also acts as pressure relief; Forced, mechanical ventilation, to operate during maintenance or emergency situations; and Access and egress for emergency services Based on what has been agreed for the London tunnel on HS1, and initial discussions with the London Fire Brigade, we believe shafts for ventilation, evacuation and emergency services access would be required in tunnels in excess of 1.25 miles (two kilometres) in length, and they would need to be located every 1.25 to two miles (two to three kilometres) along the tunnel We have now begun the process of identifying locations where vent shafts would be required. On HS2 this would apply to tunnels between Euston and Old Oak Common, and from the M25 to Amersham. For the Chilterns Tunnel we have assumed that the dimensions of the structure at the head of the shaft would need to be 25x35 metres. This would allow the building to be single storey and therefore less visually intrusive. Given the particular space constraints in Central London we have chosen to assume a smaller London shaft with a head house of 25x25 metres. This would be a two storey building. It would cost around ten per cent more to construct but would reduce the need for above ground land take. There is scope for the structure to be designed to blend with other buildings or with the local landscape. In addition to the shaft, each site would need to be large enough to provide parking provision for emergency vehicles, as well as an emergency muster area. 56

57 3.2.4 We sought to identify suitable locations along the current alignment within a corridor, 200 metres either side of the tunnel centre line, although any sites more than metres from the line would require suitable adjustments to the horizontal alignment of the route. In London sites on existing rail land were considered preferable, but if no viable site existed, brownfield sites, such as light industrial sites with car parking were considered. London Tunnels We determined that three vent shafts would be needed along the London tunnel. The following potential sites have been identified: For the first shaft: Oppidans Road or Adelaide Road; For the second shaft: Alexandra Place West or Boundary Road; and For the third shaft: Salusbury Road (or Coventry Close with a fourth vent shaft) When looking at the sustainability of the sites for the first shaft, we concluded that Adelaide Road would result in far fewer noise and visual impacts than Oppidans Road. While it would require significant land take from a local nature reserve, to which the public is given occasional access, Oppidans Road would require a small light industrial unit to be demolished. It is also a much smaller site which carries risk should the required footprint be larger than is currently expected. On balance, and confirmed by discussions with the London Borough of Camden, we recommend the Adelaide Road option For the second shaft, because the Boundary Road site would require the demolition of a care home, we recommend the Alexandra Place site. Alexandra Place lies adjacent to existing railway land where there is higher background noise currently. However, it would require the demolition of a number of dwellings and commercial uses The Salusbury Road site in the London Borough of Brent is recommended for the third shaft. This site, located within a local authority regeneration area, would displace a car park and light industrial unit and lies adjacent to a railway and main road. If the alternative Coventry Close had been chosen, a fourth site would also be required, which we believe should be avoided if possible In each case, potential noise and visual impacts will need to be the subject of more detailed mitigation proposals. Property and land take issues will need to be addressed through detailed consultations with the relevant local authorities. 57

58 If the shaft locations recommended above are accepted then we recommend that further work be done on the Route alignment to move it approximately 100 metres towards the Adelaide Road and Alexandra Place sites. This would improve the operation of the shafts aerodynamically and reduce distances underground to be covered by the emergency services in the event of an emergency. The recommended locations are shown in Figure 18. Figure 18 Recommended Vent Shaft locations Chilterns Tunnel We believe four shafts would be required along the six miles (9.5 kilometres) tunnel between the M25 and the west of Amersham to provide sufficient ventilation, pressure relief and emergency egress. Potential sites would require highway access, be of sufficient size to accommodate the shaft and seek to avoid significant environmental effects, particularly of visual intrusion, through both positioning and landscaping treatment. We have identified four candidate areas (north east of Chalfont Common, west of Chalfont St Giles, north of Chalfont St Giles and south of Amersham) which meet the outline requirement. There is some flexibility of the exact location, of around 50 metres either side of the route and around 100 metres longitudinally, so it may be possible to consider other locations. If Route 3 is 58