The Fifteenth Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG/15)

Transcription

1 RASMAG/15 WP/ /08/2011 International Civil Aviation Organization The Fifteenth Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG/15) Bangkok, Thailand, 1-5 August 2011 Agenda Item 3: Reports from Asia/Pacific RMAs and EMAs READINESS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENTS FOR THE RVSM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE MONGOLIA AIRSPACE (Presented by Monitoring Agency for Asia Region) Summary This paper provides the results of applying the internationally accepted readiness and safety assessment process to the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) implementation in the Mongolia airspace. 1. Introduction 1.1 This paper provides the results of airspace readiness and safety assessments in support of the RVSM implementation in the Mongolia airspace scheduled for 17 November RVSM Readiness and Safety Assessment 2.1 The readiness and safety assessment for the RVSM implementation in the Mongolia airspace is given in the Attachment. The contents of the report include: Introduction Airspace and flight level allocation of Mongolia Summary of traffic data analyses, Result of RVSM readiness assessment, and Results of RVSM risk assessment 3. Actions by the Meeting 3.1 The meeting is invited to note the results of the airspace readiness and safety assessments presented in this working paper and use the findings to support the Go/No-Go decision for the RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia.

2 RASMAG/15 WP/14 ATTACHMENT AIRSPACE SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOR THE RVSM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE MONGOLIA AIRSPACE April 2011 Monitoring Agency for Asia Region Aeronautical Radio of Thailand (AEROTHAI) 1

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION AIRSPACE AND FLIGHT LEVEL ALLOCATION OF MONGOLIA MONGOLIA AIRSPACE FLIGHT LEVEL ALLOCATION BEFORE RVSM IMPLEMENTATION FLIGHT LEVEL ALLOCATION AFTER RVSM IMPLEMENTATION TRAFFIC DATA ANALYSES NUMBER OF FLIGHTS PER DAY TRAFFIC FLOW CHARACTERISTICS OPERATOR AND AIRCRAFT PROFILES FLIGHT LEVEL UTILIZATION RVSM READINESS ASSESSMENT RVSM RISK ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF THE CRM PARAMETERS LHD SUMMARY RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS REFERENCES APPENDIX A: ICAO STATE CODE, CITY CODE, AND OPERATOR CODE APPENDIX B: DETAILED LHD OCCURRENCES IN THE AIRSPACE OF MONGOLIA

4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This document constitutes the reports of readiness and safety assessments, supporting the Go/No-Go decision for the planned RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia on 17 November This report also provides traffic analyses based on collected Traffic Sample Data (TSD) including number of flights per day, traffic flow characteristics, operator and aircraft profiles, and flight level utilization. The report demonstrates that, based on the collected TSD, approximately 99% of the aircraft operations have been conducted by RVSM approved aircraft. Large Height Deviation (LHD) occurrences in Mongolia airspace since January 2010 were examined to estimate the risk for RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia. There were 11 LHD occurrences, accounting for the duration of 144 minutes. Based on the risk estimate, the technical risk satisfies the agreed technical risk target level of safety value of no more than 2.5 x 10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour, but the overall risk estimate exceeds its target level of safety of 5.0 x 10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour mainly due to number of long duration large height deviation occurrences. Nonetheless, with availability of radar coverage since March 2011, there has not yet been any long duration LHD occurrence. The LHD situation should continue to improve given proper radar target monitoring procedure. 3

5 1. INTRODUCTION This report provides the summary of airspace readiness and safety assessments for the RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia Ulaanbaatar Flight Information Region (FIR). The content of the report includes: Airspace and flight level allocation of Mongolia Summary of traffic data analyses, Result of RVSM readiness assessment, and Results of RVSM risk assessment These assessments are conducted based on: One month Traffic Sample Data (TSD) collected from 1 to 31 October 2010, Monthly Large Height Deviation (LHD) reports from January 2010 to April 2011, and RVSM approval records. 2. AIRSPACE AND FLIGHT LEVEL ALLOCATION OF MONGOLIA 2.1 Mongolia Airspace Figure 1 provides a geographical representation of the airspace and route network of Mongolia. 4

6 Figure 1: Airspace and route network of Mongolia 5

7 2.2 Flight Level Allocation before RVSM Implementation Table 1 provides cruising levels depicted from Mongolia AIP dated 10 March Table 1: Table of cruising levels before RVSM implementation 2.3 Flight Level Allocation after RVSM Implementation Based on the AIC series A 02/11 dated 3 Mar 2011, from 17 November 2011, the RVSM will be implemented in the airspace of Mongolia using the RVSM-METER FLAS specified in Annex 2, Appendix 3 b) (see Table 2). It is important to note that ATC will issue flight level clearance in meters. In turn, pilots shall use the Mongolian RVSM FLAS Diagram to determine the corresponding flight level in feet. The aircraft shall be flown using the flight level in Feet. 6

8 Table 2: Cruising levels after RVSM implementation 7

9 3. TRAFFIC DATA ANALYSES This section presents the summary of traffic data analyses based on the collected TSD. The results of the analysis are presented in the following contents: Number of flights per day, Traffic flow characteristics, Operator and aircraft profiles, and Flight level utilization. 3.1 Number of Flights per Day Figure 2 provides numbers of flights per day operating within the airspace of Mongolia for the month of October The average daily flight for this data collection period is 213 flights per day. 250 Number of Flights October Figure 2: Numbers of Flights per Day Operating in the Mongolia Airspace 3.2 Traffic Flow Characteristics The traffic flow analysis in the airspace of Mongolia includes: Top-10 operating airways (Figure 3) Top-15 state pairs (Figure 4) Top-15 city pairs (Figure 5) 8

10 Number of Flights 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1, % of Total Flights 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0 A575 B208 M520 A308 A200 R372 B330 G218 B339 B480 0% Figure 3: Top-10 Operating Airways Number of Flights % of Total Flights 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% Figure 4: Top-15 State Pairs Number of Flights % of Total Flights 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% Figure 5: Top-15 City Pairs 9

11 3.3 Operator and Aircraft Profiles The information regarding the airspace users for the Mongolia airspace includes: Top-15 operators (Figure 6) Top-15 aircraft types (Figure 7) Number of Flights % of Total Flights 12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% Figure 6: Top-15 Operators Appendix A provides the full names of ICAO 2-letter State, 4-letter City codes, and 3-letter Operator codes shown in Figure 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Number of Flights 2,000 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1, % of Total Flights 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Figure 7: Top-15 Aircraft types 10

12 3.4 Flight Level Utilization Figure 8 presents the utilization of flight levels in the airspace of Mongolia based on the October-2010 TSD. Number of Flights 6,000 % of Total Flights 35% 5,000 30% 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% - 0% Flight level (Metres) Figure 8: Flight Level Utilization 4. RVSM READINESS ASSESSMENT This section provides the results of the readiness assessment using the collected TSD and the RVSM approval information from the RMAs databases (Table 3). Note that the criterion adopted by the RVSM Task Force (RVSM/TF) as a prerequisite for the RVSM implementation is that 90 percent of operations between FL290 and FL410 (inclusive) in the collected traffic sample would be conducted by State-approved operators and aircraft after the implementation of RVSM. RMAs Availability Period AAMA Up to June 2011 AFIRMA Up to June 2011 CARSAAMA Up to May 2011 China RMA Up to Mar 2011 EURASIA As of June 2011 EUROCONTROL Up to June 2011 Japan RMA Up to June 2011 MAAR Up to June 2011 MIDRMA Up to October 2010 NAARMO Up to June 2011 PARMO Up to June 2011 Table 3: RVSM Approval Data Source Based on the results of the assessment, it was found that approximately 99 percent of the operations have been conducted by State RVSM approved aircraft. 11

13 Table 4 provides list of aircraft registration operating in the airspace of Mongolia (more than 2 flights in the month of October 2010) without proof of RVSM approval from any RMAs RVSM approval databases. 5. RVSM RISK ASSESSMENT Aircraft State of Number of Registration Registry Flights EK74711 Armenia 7 Table 4: Aircraft without RVSM Approvals This section provides the results of safety assessment for the planned RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia (17 November 2011), using the October-2010 TSD and monthly LHD occurrences since January As envisioned by the Review of the ICAO General Concept of Separation Panel (RGCSP), introduction of RVSM would be safe if: Collision risk due to aircraft height-keeping systems does not exceed 2.5 fatal accidents per 10 9 flying hours, and Collision risk due to all causes does not exceed 5 fatal accidents per 10 9 flying hours. 5.1 Estimate of the CRM Parameters Table 5 summarizes the value and source material for estimating values for each of the inherent parameters of the internationally accepted Collision Risk Model (CRM) to conduct the safety assessment for the RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia. Parameter Symbol Parameter Definition Parameter Value Source for Value T Annual flight hours 94,132 Based on the submitted Traffic E z (same) Same-direction vertical occupancies Sample Data E z (opposite) Opposite-direction vertical occupancies λ x Average aircraft length nm λ y Average aircraft wingspan nm λ z Average aircraft height nm λ h Diameter of the disk representing nm the shape of an aircraft in the horizontal plane P y (0) Probability of lateral overlap Based on average aircraft wingspan Pz(0) Probability of vertical overlap (with planned vertical separation equal to zero) Conservative value used in Western Pacific/South China Sea and BOB RVSM safety ΔV V Average relative along-track speed between aircraft on same direction routes Average absolute aircraft ground speed Table 5: Parameters Estimate in the CRM assessments knots Based on the submitted TSD 480 knots Value used in WPAC/SCS and BOB RVSM safety assessments 12

14 5.2 LHD Summary LHD Reports Based on the received LHD reports, the LHD occurrences between January 2010 and April 2011 in the airspace of Mongolia are summarized in Table 6 as follows. Month-Year No. of LHD Occurrences Associated LHD Duration (Minutes) 12-month Cumulative Occurrences 12-month Cumulative Duration January February March April May June July August September October November December January February March April Table 6: Summary of LHD Occurrences and Duration 13

15 Table 7 summarizes the number of LHD occurrences and the associated LHD duration (in minutes) by cause of the deviation. LHD LHD No. of LHD Category LHD Category Description Duration Occurrences Code (Minutes) A Flight crew failing to climb/descend the aircraft as cleared 2 70 B Flight crew climbing/descending without ATC clearance 1 3 D ATC system loop error; (e.g. ATC issues incorrect 1 21 clearance or flight crew misunderstands clearance message) E Coordination errors in the ATC to ATC transfer or control 3 6 responsibility as a result of human factors issues (e.g. late or non-existent coordination, incorrect time estimate/actual, flight level, ATS route etc not in accordance with agreed parameters) J TCAS resolution advisory; flight crew correctly following 1 - the resolution Advisory M Other this includes situations of flights operating 3 44 (including climbing/descending) in airspace where flight crews are unable to establish normal air-ground communications with the responsible ATS unit. Total (January 2010 April 2011) Table 7: Summary of LHD Causes in the WPAC/SCS RVSM Airspace In light of the above, the LHD occurrences in the Mongolia airspace are summarized as follows: There were a total of 11 LHD occurrences accounting for 144-minute duration between January 2010 and April The total duration was mainly driven by four long-duration LHD occurrences. The four longest duration occurrences (50, 34, 21 and 20 minutes) account for 87 percents of the total duration (125 of 144 minutes). The detailed information of the reported LHD occurrences is provided in the Appendix B LHD Locations and Radar Availability Figure 9 presents the location of the LHD occurrences since January 2010 and the radar coverage at 9000 m (29500 feet). Three radars were installed in March A three-month trial period has been initiated since the end of May 2011 to reduce the longitudinal separation from 150 km (80 nm) to 90 km (50 nm) under procedural control. With availability of radar coverage, the LHD durations are expected to improve. Nonetheless, it is important that radar targets are regularly monitored to avoid long duration LHD occurrences to improve safety. Based on the reports, there has not yet been any long duration LHD since the installation of the three radar sites. In addition, for the airspace where radar targets are not available, it is recommended that communication between ATC and flight crews is established regularly where possible to avoid any long duration LHD occurrences. 14

16 LHD Locations Figure 9: LHD Locations and Radars Coverage at 9000 meter in Mongolia 15

17 5.3 Risk Assessment Results Table 8 summarizes the results of the risk assessment in terms of technical, operational, and total risks for the RVSM implementation in the airspace of Mongolia. The Airspace of Mongolia estimated annual flying hours = 94,132 hours (note: estimated hours based on October 2010 traffic sample data) Source of Risk Lower Bound Risk TLS Remarks Estimation Technical Risk 0.51 x x 10-9 Below Technical TLS Operational Risk x Total Risk x x 10-9 Exceeds Overall TLS Table 8: Risk Estimates for the RVSM Implementation in the Airspace of Mongolia Figure 10 presents the trends of collision risk estimates for each month using the appropriate 12-month interval of LHD reports available since January E-08 Vertical Collision Risk by Type RVSM Implementation in the Mongolia Airspace 1.2E E E-09 TLS for Total Risk Total Risk 6.0E E E-09 TLS for Technical Risk Technical Risk 0.0E+00 May-10 Jun-10 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 Figure 10: Trends of Risk Estimates for the RVSM Implementation in the Airspace of Mongolia Based on the collision risk estimate, the technical risk satisfies the agreed technical risk target level of safety value of no more than 2.5 x 10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour. However, the overall risk estimate exceeds its target level of safety of 5.0 x 10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour. This is mainly a result of long duration LHDs occurred before the availability of radars. To further assist in decision making process, another risk estimation is conducted based on the assumption that radar is an effective preventive measure for long duration LHD occurrences. In this regard, the risk estimate is based on the actual number of LHD occurrences during May 2010 April 2011 with duration being capped at 3 minutes as an effect from radar target availability. The adjusted risk estimate is calculated at 2.20 x 10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour due to all causes. 16

18 REFERENCES 1. Aeronautical Information Circulars, 3 March Aeronautical Information Publication Mongolia, 10 March Manual on Implementation of a 300 m (1,000 ft) Vertical Separation Minimum Between FL 290 and FL 410 Inclusive, International Civil Aviation Organization, Doc 9574, Montreal, March Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel, Seventh Meeting, Montreal, 30 October 20 November 1990, ICAO Doc 9572, RGCSP/7. 5. Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel, Sixth Meeting, Montreal, 28 November 15 December 1988, ICAO Doc 9536, RGCSP/6, Volumes 1 and 2. 17

19 APPENDIX A: ICAO State Code, City Code, and Operator Code 1. ICAO 2-Letter State Code State Code CY ED EG EH LF RK UN UU VH ZB ZM ZS Canada Germany United Kingdom Netherland France Rep of Korea Russian Federation Russian Federation Hong Kong (China) China Mongolia China State 2. ICAO 4-Letter City (Airport) Code State Code Airport Country EDDF Frankfurt Germany EDDM Munich Germany EFHK Helsinki Finland EGLL London-Heathrow United Kingdom EHAM Amsterdam-Schiphol Netherlands LFPG Paris-Charles de Gaulle France LOWW Vienna International Austria RKSI Seoul-Incheon International Airport Rep. of Korea UNKL Krasnoyarsk Yemelyanovo Russian Federation UUEE Moscow-Sheremetyevo Russian Federation VHHH Hong Kong International Airport Hong Kong (China) ZBAA Beijing Capital International Airport China ZMUB Ulaanbaatar-Buyant Uhaa Mongolia ZSPD Shanghai Pudong International Airport China 3. ICAO 3-Letter Operator Code Operator Code Operator Name State of Registry ABW Airbridge Cargo Airlines Ltd. Russian Federation AFL Aeroflot Russian Airlines Russian Federation AFR Air France France ARR Air Armenia Armenia BAW British Airways United Kingdom CAA Atlantic Southeast Airlines United States CAO Air China Cargo China CES China Eastern Airlines China CHH Hainan Airlines China COA Continental Airlines United States CPA Cathay Pacific Airways Hong Kong DLH Lufthansa Germany FIN Finair Finland GEC Lufthansa Cargo AG. Germany KAL Korean Air South Korea KLM KLM Netherlands MGL Miat-Mongolian Airlines Mongolia NWS Nordwind Airlines Russian Federation SBI S7 Airlines (Siberian Airlines) Russian Federation VIR Virgin Atlantic Airways United Kingdom 18

20 APPENDIX B: Detailed LHD Occurrences in the Airspace of Mongolia No. Date Fix Route FL FL Duration Cause/Remarks (dd-mm-yy) Assigned Observed (Min) DARNO A Incorrect coordination from neighboring sector. Neighboring sector forgot to send revision after change of flight level of the traffic MODUM M Incorrect pilot action. Pilot issued clearance for FL8600 from ATC and rode it back correctly, but took FL GINOM A Incorrect Marking of Assistant controller. Assistant Controller confused coordination message with other message URGAM B TCAS RA Climb BAVUT B Incorrect Pilot action/ Possible wrong altitude settings. Pilot issued clearance for FL11600 from ATC and rode it back correctly, but took FL BULAG B Assistant Controller missed to make revision UDA A Pilot execute climb without controller permission MENOR G Read back error. Controller didn t hear when pilot read back wrong level SERNA M Incorrect marking of Assistant controller. Assistant Controller mixed coordination message with other message NIXAL B Neighboring ACC sent revision late, flight data of receiving unit didn t make revision on flight progress strip GINOM A Coordination error. Neighboring ACC didn t make revision 19