Written evidence from the Federation of Small Businesses (HSR 181)

Transcription

1 Written evidence from the Federation of Small Businesses (HSR 181) The Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) has taken a neutral approach nationally to the development of high speed rail. Small businesses recognise that the UK rail network needs to be upgraded and brought in line with European standards to ensure connectivity with the continent. Having said that the cost of HS2 is astronomical in relation to the amount spent annually on the road network. FSB regions, affected by HS2, will hold differing positions on the economic and environmental impact. Some members hold the view that it will bring economic benefits through speedier journey times to major cities; however, the flipside is that members along the HS2 line will be adversely impacted during and after construction. Only nine per cent of FSB members consider establishing a high speed rail network a priority and in general terms small businesses are moderate users of the rail network, with only four per cent considering trains crucial to their business operation. A further 21 per cent of small businesses state that trains are quite important to them. Only between four and six percent respectively considered train, air travel and bus to be crucial to their business operation. The main reason small businesses are not using rail is the cost. Around half of small businesses say they have been, or will be, negatively impacted by recent rail fare rises. Other businesses have said that the locations they need to visit, often out of town business parks, are not conveniently reached by rail, so they have no choice but to use their car. The majority of small businesses are dependent on their cars and vans for their business operations. Conversely, as many as 72 per cent of small businesses say their car is crucial to their business. Public transport in any form is therefore not likely to replace the use of a car/van for small businesses. The nature of the work carried out by those businesses using a car/van is such that it is not possible to replace the car journey with a public transport journey. Nearly half of small businesses, or 43 per cent, even said that nothing would encourage them to use the public transport network more. The state of repair of roads therefore is a crucial element in creating an environment in which small businesses are able to grow and prosper. Small businesses typically operate their car/van within a 40 mile radius of their base and are more concerned about petrol prices, the state of the road network,

2 congestion on local roads and the rising cost of insurance mainly as a result of damage to their vehicle caused by potholes in roads. Sixty per cent of FSB members say the state of roads impacts negatively on their business. 1 Key messages: The FSB calls on the Government to undertake a full assessment of transport priorities before signing off on the HS2 project. Small businesses are moderate users of the rail network and the main reason for not using rail is cost. Small businesses rely on the road network and six in ten have no choice but to use a car/van for business purposes. June All stats in this response are taken from the FSB Small Business Survey Panel February survey on Infrastructure. The survey had 1739 responses. 2

3 Written evidence from Dr Sandra Tuppen (HSR 182) This paper concentrates on Section 4 in the terms of reference, The Strategic Route. 1. Summary 1.1 The Government claims that its proposed Y shaped high speed rail (HSR) network would deliver a huge increase in rail capacity, ease overcrowding on existing railways, transform the country s economic geography and help to bridge the north south divide. 1 It claims that no other option would match the new high speed network in terms of capacity, connectivity and reliability. 2 However, there is evidence, on the contrary, that the capacity, connectivity and reliability of parts of the UK s north south rail network would actually be compromised by the Government s proposed Y shaped strategic route. 1.2 A key element of the Government s choice of strategic route is its linkage to the classic northsouth rail networks, the West Coast and East Coast Main Lines (hereafter WCML and ECML). The Government s Y shaped route linking to the WCML and ECML has major flaws, and could have a detrimental effect on the rail services of many towns and cities in the Midlands and North of England and in Scotland, leaving some areas with a worse service than before the construction of the line and less well connected to the country s major economic centres. Flaws in the strategy include: the decision to funnel all north south fast long distance services between Scotland and London up and down one twin track line (the trunk of the Y) presenting a serious risk to service delivery and reliability the reliance on unproven technology to deliver the required 18 trains per hour on the trunk of the Y lack of spare train paths on parts of the classic rail network, meaning HS2 classic compatible trains would be competing with existing services for train paths when on the classic network the mixing of high speed trains with regional services and freight on the northern half of the classic network, bring reliability issues and longer journey times for many outside the core Y network potentially fewer seats on the proposed classic compatible trains than many of the trains they would replace (550 seats on HS2 classic compatible compared with 589 on the 11 car Pendolino it would replace) lack of tilt mode on classic compatible trains, which would run more slowly on the WCML than the Pendolinos they would replace 1.3 The Government s chosen strategic route would be detrimental to many in the West Midlands, where under current proposals passengers would have no opportunity to join the network at Coventry or indeed (with one exception) connect with any northbound high speed services at the proposed Birmingham Interchange station. It would also have a negative impact on towns such as Lancaster and Carlisle which would, under the current proposals, lose their fast direct services to London, and also on the busy stations at Milton Keynes and Watford, which would no longer figure on the UK s principal north south rail route. 1 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain s Future. Consultation, Feb. 2011, pp Consultation, p. 12.

4 2. The strategic route 2.1 A key feature of the Government s strategy is that the HSR line should be linked to the classic north south rail networks. In Phase One, the new London West Midlands line would link to the WCML near Lichfield, permitting onward travel to Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow; in Phase Two, there would be links from the arms of the high speed Y network to the WCML north of Manchester and to the ECML north of Leeds. 3 A set of specially designed classic compatible trains would be needed, capable of running on both the new high speed line and, in northern England and Scotland, on the classic rail network. In addition, captive high speed trains would run shuttle services solely on the new line between London and Birmingham (and to Manchester and Leeds in Phase Two). 2.2 It is important to note that these new classic compatible trains would in most cases replace, rather than supplement, the long distance services currently operating over the classic north south rail network. Describing the Day 1 Phase One assumptions on which the case for HSR is modelled, and the services which would transfer to the HSR line and those which would remain, HS2 Ltd state in their 2009 Technical Appendix that For the purpose of this exercise and for the avoidance of doubt, unless stated otherwise, this specification supercedes all existing Virgin West Coast and London Midland services to and from Euston. 4 That this is still the current strategy can be seen from a recent FOI response (FOI10/157), in which HS2 Ltd referred the enquirer to the 2009 Technical Appendix. 5 The draft tender for the next WCML franchise states that it is likely that the first phase of High Speed 2 would fundamentally alter the nature of the InterCity West Coast franchise once operational The Government has published the service assumptions on which its business case is based. 7 It could, of course, be argued that these are just service assumptions, used for demand modelling, and that an operator could in practice vary the stopping patterns. However, the Government s business case, on which the project is being appraised, is predicated on these precise service assumptions. Any additional stops would have a negative impact on journey times, and thus on the Value of Time benefits which are so critical to the Government s business case for HS2. It is therefore important, I believe, to look at the Government s modelled service assumptions and their impact. Its Day 1 scenario is for 3 shuttle services to run each way between London and Birmingham per hour (4 in peak hours) and 6 or 7 classic compatible services to run over the WCML and high speed line: Table 1: Assumed service pattern for Phase One Trains per hour 3 (4 in peak Route Calling at Rail line London Birmingham Old Oak Common (OOC), Birmingham Interchange, HS2 3 Consultation, p. 29. Precise connecting points between the Y and classic lines will be announced later in HS2 Technical Appendix, Dec. 2009, p InterCity West Coast Franchise: Draft Invitation to Tender, May 2011, p West Coast Franchise drafttender invitation/pdf/tender invitation document.pdf 7 Economic Case for HS2, pp

5 hours) Curzon St Birmingham Curzon St 3 London Manchester Piccadilly OOC, Stockport, with 1 p.h. calling also at Wilmslow HS2 + WCML 2 London Liverpool Lime St OOC, Stafford, Crewe, Runcorn (1 p.h.) OOC, Warrington (1 p.h.) HS2 + WCML 1 London Glasgow Central OOC, Warrington, Wigan and Preston HS2 + WCML 1 (peak only) London Preston OOC, Warrington, Wigan HS2 + WCML 2.4 The Government proposes that, aside from the three London Birmingham Curzon St shuttle services, all the above trains would pass non stop through the Birmingham Interchange Station. Having no stop at Birmingham seems odd if the intention is to improve inter urban connectivity. However, if a Birmingham Interchange stop were to be included on long distance services between London and the North, a time penalty of about 6 minutes would need to be added per train 8 and the business case Value of Time benefits would have to be revised down accordingly, potentially weakening the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) significantly. 2.5 The same is true for stations on the northern WCML at which the Government proposes no classic compatible high speed rail services would stop. Stations omitted from the HSR service include Lancaster, Carlisle, Oxenholme and Penrith. Adding stops at these stations would mean that an improved London Glasgow journey time would not be achievable, and that the business case benefits would have to be revised down to take account of longer end to end journey times. The improved journey times for London Glasgow come at the expense of connectivity for other northern towns such as Carlisle and Lancaster. 2.6 On completion of Phase Two, the Government assumes it will be able to run all of the following on the Y network, some of which would also run onto the WCML and ECML classic lines: Table 2: Assumed service pattern for Phase Two Trains per hour, Y route Route Calling at Rail line 3 (4 in peak hours) London Birmingham Curzon St Old Oak Common (OOC), Birmingham Interchange, Birmingham Curzon St HS2 3 (4 in peak hours) London Manchester OOC, Manchester outskirts, Manchester HS2 3 London Leeds OOC, Birmingham Interchange (1 p.h.) OOC only (1 p.h.) OOC, East Midlands HS2 station, South Yorks HS2 station (1 p.h.) HS2 1 London South Yorks HS2 station OOC, East Mids HS2 station HS2 8 HS2 Technical Appendix, p. 5

6 2 Birmingham Curzon St Manchester 2 Birmingham Curzon St Leeds 2 London Liverpool Lime St Manchester outskirts East Mids, South Yorks OOC, Stafford, Crewe, Runcorn (1 p.h.) OOC, Warrington (1 p.h.) HS2 HS2 HS2 + WCML 1 (2 in peak hours) London Glasgow Central Wigan and Preston HS2 + WCML 2 London Newcastle York, Darlington HS2 + ECML 1 Birmingham Curzon St Newcastle East Mids, South Yorks, York, Darlington HS2 + ECML 2.7 Some double counting seems to be in evidence in the Government s HSR Consultation document, where the Government appears to claim that the new high speed line would allow 14 or more extra trains (larger and longer with up to 1100 passengers) to be run per hour, and also that transferring long distance services to the high speed line would free up capacity on the classic lines for new regional services. 9 The 14 or more trains extra trains per hour that would run on the highspeed line cannot both be new services and transferees from the classic lines whose paths would be taken by new local services. 3. Risks of diverting almost all north south long distance services down the trunk of the Y 3.1 The transfer of the bulk of the UK s north south long distance rail traffic from the classic lines to the high speed line for part of its journey presents strategic risks. Funnelling almost all the northsouth long distance services that currently operate over the WCML and ECML down the trunk of the Y is a highly risky strategy. It is proposed that HS2 is a twin track line, not 4 tracked, so if one train fails on the trunk of the Y, or there is overhead line damage, the potential for disruption to what will have become the country s main north south rail route is enormous. If the southern portions of the WCML and ECML are given over to local rail services, it will not be feasible to divert long distance trains back onto the classic network in case of a failure on the trunk of the Y, and in any case the captive high speed trains would not be capable of running on the classic network. 3.2 In order to maintain sufficient services following the diversion of long distance services to the new high speed line, the Government proposes that, in Phase Two, 18 trains per hour would run at peak times, in each direction, along the trunk of the Y. However, the HS2 Technical Appendix states that the 18 train per hour scenario is reliant on anticipated improvements in train control systems and train braking technology. 10 Although these technological developments are not yet proven, the Government s choice of a Y shaped strategic network is reliant on them for delivery of sufficient services to meet demand for long distance services. 11 There appears to be no provision in the Government s strategy for the failure of such technological advances to materialise. This seems a highly risky strategy to pursue. 9 Consultation, p HS2 Technical Appendix, p Economic Case for HS2, p. 61.

7 4. Infrastructure capacity It is not clear how, on the northern half of the WCML, the classic compatible services will co exist with semi fast inter urban services when there are already capacity constraints on the line, for example in the Carlisle area. Network Rail describes the area around Carlisle as one with minimal or no capacity for growth and a Key timetable constraint that determines the timetable elsewhere on the route. 12 Yet it is proposed that a stopping service between Penrith, Carlisle, and Preston should operate in addition to the HS2 classic compatible service, in order to enable those passengers to change, as is proposed, onto the HS2 train at Preston Train capacity 5.1 Long distance captive services between London and Birmingham (Phase One) and London and Manchester and London and Leeds (Phase Two) could utilise larger trains, with up to 1100 seats if two 200m trains were coupled together. However, for most destinations on the northern WCML, only a single 200m classic compatible set could be used without extensive platform lengthening. HS2 Ltd therefore assumes a capacity of 550 seats per train for trains running onto the WCML. 14 From April 2012, 11 car Pendolinos are expected to come into service on the WCML, raising capacity from 439 to 589 seats. 15 For stations on the WCML, other than Birmingham in Phase One, and Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds in Phase Two, which could accommodate double length trains, this potentially means a lower seating capacity than will be available on the 11 car Pendolino, for which investment in platform lengthening will by then have been made. 5.2 HS2 Ltd notes, of their proposed London Glasgow classic compatible services: In modelling these services we identified high levels of demand resulting in some severe crowding during the peak. In reality there would be a number of ways in which to deal with this, which could include a reconfiguration of the timetable or minor upgrades to the route. These options would require further detailed analysis and planning but for simplicity we have modelled 400m long trains on this route. This contradicts their statement that only 200m classic compatible HSR trains could operate on the WCML. The fact that 400m long trains would not be able to stop at WCML stations without major upgrade work (and that platform lengthening to allow 400m trains is unlikely to be feasible at Glasgow Central) does not appear to have been taken into account. 6. Time saving benefits 6.1 The Government claims its strategy of joining the high speed line to the existing network offers the benefit of improved journey times to certain destinations outside the core Y network, by enabling long distance classic compatible trains to travel at high speed on the new line and at regular speeds on the classic network. 16 However, there is a flaw. As HS2 Ltd states, classiccompatible trains would not be able to exploit the maximum classic line speeds on certain sections 12 West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy, Draft, Dec. 2010, p HS2 Technical Appendix, p HS2 Technical Appendix, p Network Rail s RUS 2014 baseline assumes 4 new 11 car Pendolino 390s, and 31 existing 9 car sets lengthened to 11 cars, have been introduced by then. 16 E.g. London to Liverpool, 1 hour 37 mins; London to Glasgow, 3 hours 30 mins (Consultation, p. 20).

8 of the WCML north of Lichfield, as they would not be fitted with tilting equipment. So, over certain WCML route sections, there would be some time lost against today s services In other words, passengers whose journeys include a stretch on the new high speed line would benefit from faster journeys on that segment of their journey. For long distance passengers travelling north of Lichfield (or Manchester in Phase Two), this benefit would be partly negated by the fact that the classic compatible train would travel slower than the Pendolino on the WCML. Those passengers whose journey takes place on a classic compatible train entirely on the WCML, for instance between Preston and Glasgow, potentially face a slower journey than at present and on a smaller train than the 11 car Pendolino. 6.3 HS2 Ltd, in response to FOI 10/169, included the following statement from their engineers: We did some journey time analysis comparing the journey times from Lichfield (as a proxy for the point at which the HS2 route would rejoin the West Coast Main Line) to Glasgow Central. We compared a 125 mph tilting Pendolino with a 110 mph non tilting Pendolino, to measure the worst case with the existing infrastructure. The difference between these two runs was just over 13 minutes (i.e. nowhere near the 30 minutes quoted)...so with some minor modification to the existing infrastructure (little more than changing speed signs) it should be possible to reduce the 13 minute deficit to around 6 or 7 minutes, primarily by increasing the 110 mph limit for non tilting trains to 125 mph on the straighter sections. HS2 Ltd state that As the whole route journey times demonstrate, for London journeys the limited time lost is far outweighed by the savings achieved on HS2. 18 Not everyone using HS2 will be travelling to and from London, however. 6.4 A major factor in the claimed time savings for certain passengers using stations beyond the Y is the fact that that many stations hitherto served by fast trains on the WCML would lose their fast direct services. To achieve a four hour London Glasgow journey in Phase One in the face of a 13 minute deficit on the Lichfield to Glasgow stretch and a 3.5 hour journey in Phase Two, the London Glasgow trains would no longer call at Lancaster, Carlisle, Penrith or Oxenholme. 19 HS2 Ltd envisages southbound passengers from these stations taking a Pendolino, which would connect into and out of the HS2 service at Preston, enabling passengers, if they choose, to change onto the faster HS2 service to London In order for a southbound semi fast Pendolino to connect into and out of the HS2 service at Preston, it would need to arrive before and leave after the HS2 service from Glasgow. HS2 Ltd set out its assumed journey times in Appendix 2 of the Technical Appendix. Although HS2 Ltd state, in FOI 10/157 cited above, that this is a train service specification for demand modelling and not a timetable proposition as such, these are the service patterns and journey times assumed for the consultation and underpinning the business case calculations. Passengers from Carlisle, it is assumed by HS2 Ltd, would on Day 1 have an end to end journey time to London Euston of 3 hours 44 minutes on the direct semi fast Pendolino (compared to 3 hours 12 minutes today). If they changed at Preston onto the HS2 train, they would have a 3 hour 8 minute journey. A similar 17 High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to Government by High Speed Two Limited, Dec. 2009, p High Speed Rail A Report to Government, p In the current modelling, HS2 trains between London and Glasgow would call, during Phase One operation, at Warrington, Wigan and Preston, and after the Y was constructed, at Wigan and Preston only. 20 HS2 Technical Appendix, p. 12

9 increase in direct journey times to London is envisaged on Day 1 for passengers from Oxenholme, Penrith and Lancaster. It is regrettable that the potentially negative impacts of the proposals on some northern towns and cities have not been made explicit in the 2011 consultation documents, and can only be found in archived documents from The pro HSR lobby group Greengauge 21, in their 2009 paper Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain, highlighted some points that should be considered when planning a new HSR line linked with the classic network: First, there is going to be a need for interoperable rolling stock, to be able to run over the West Coast Main Line without losing the journey time advantages that the Pendolino fleet offers. This almost certainly means there is a need for a trainset capable of operating at 320 km/h over new high speed lines and at 200km/h+ in tilt mode. 21 By opting for ultra high speed (400km/h max) on the HSR line, rather than the more moderate 320km/h, HS2 Ltd has seemingly ruled out the possibility of using tilting trains, and therefore journey times on the WCML are worse after the introduction of HS HS2 Ltd acknowledges that some passengers could experience longer or less frequent services particularly those on the Great Western Main Line who would have an extra stop at Old Oak Common or from some stations on the WCML and that some services could see increased crowding with more passengers using rail and Underground services to connect to high speed services. However, they believe that these impacts and the disbenefits they generate are outweighed by the large benefits to be gained by HS2. 22 However, the people receiving the benefits and disbenefits are not one and the same: the Government s current strategic route would see Manchester and Glasgow passengers benefitting from faster journeys at the expense of other northern towns and cities, and Birmingham at the expense of Coventry and other West Midlands towns. 7. Conclusion HS2 Ltd states that the core rationale for considering a new high speed line is the shortfall in capacity. 23 A major question is whether the UK actually needs all the additional capacity that HS2 would provide. However voluble the proponents of HS2 may be, the fact remains that HS2 Ltd itself is inclined to caution on the benefits of such a project. The case for high speed rail rests in part on its relative merits when compared against other options... There may be other options for increasing capacity and lowering journey times on the London West Midlands corridor. 24 Given the amount of public expenditure involved, and the flaws in the Government s strategic Y shaped route outlined above, I would welcome a detailed feasibility study into the Government s proposals for HS2 and an independent assessment of the alternatives before the proposal is taken further. June Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain, p High Speed Rail A Report to Government, p High Speed Rail A Report to Government, p High Speed Rail A Report to Government, p. 33

10 Written evidence from the seven statutory Scottish Regional Transport Partnerships (HSR 183) Introduction The seven regional transport partnerships in Scotland were established by the Transport (Scotland) Act 2005 and are responsible for strategic transport planning at a regional level throughout Scotland. The seven chairs of the partnerships met on 1 st June to consider their response to this consultation. This response supersedes the version from 6 of the Scottish RTPs forwarded to you earlier. The seven partnerships strongly support the development of a national HSR network that must include Scotland. The particular changes are that the response is now on behalf of all seven regional transport partnerships and therefore geographically covers the whole of Scotland. The joint chairs particularly are of the view that they do not support the strategy of a phased development of HST starting from London and moving northwards. They believe that the long time delay before reaching Scotland under this strategy would be detrimental to the Scottish economy and would therefore wish to see an alternative strategy deployed whereby construction started at both ends of the network in a similar timescale. This view is reflected in the revised wording in paragraphs 2.6; 2.8, , 4.6 and 4.7 of this response. 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; Economic growth and a balanced economy, Rail Capacity and Journey times and the Environment. 1.2 Economic growth and re-distribution of wealth; The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current northsouth divide. Improved accessibility to the north of England and Scotland will in addition provide opportunities for growth as a whole in the UK economy. 1.3 Rail capacity; The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services and freight. 1.4 Reduced End-to-End Journey time; This is a more important benefit for North of England and in particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail whilst at the same time enhancing UK regional connectivity as part of a sustainable economic growth strategy. 1.5 Environment; Increased capacity and significantly reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between UK cities and regions in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being renewable.

11 2. How does HSR fit with the Government s transport policy objectives HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1 The objectives of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity through improving overall network capacity and enhancing regional connectivity by reducing journey times. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to redistribute wealth and enhance regional prosperity by reducing real and perceived peripherality within the UK and to make transport more sustainable, in line with Government Climate Change objectives. 2.2 Some of these objectives could be met in part by investing in other transport modes but when compared with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is best suited for travel between and to access city-centres. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the classic network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.3 There are already significant high-cost rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approx. 15 billion over around 7 years) and Thameslink (approx. 5.5 billion over around 8 years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general classic network. 2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around At an approx. cost of 17 billion over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects. 2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (e.g. Hitchins and Stafford flyovers) 2.6 The development of a comprehensive and regionally inclusive HSR network, which includes commitment to constructing high speed lines to/from Edinburgh and Glasgow from the outset, must be viewed as a UK Treasury priority. It is essential that a UK HSR network delivers comparable step change journey time and capacity benefits for all of the regions, including Scotland. What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.7 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger journeys were undertaken between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode. 2.8 Out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finishes in Edinburgh or Glasgow demonstrating the much more significant modal change potential that exists in extending the full HSR network to Scotland. It is therefore imperative that the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border and that the UK Government s strategy for delivery of HSR includes a clear and unequivocal commitment to the funding and construction of HSR lines starting from Scotland within the initial stages of the project.

12 2.9 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20% with rail journey times of typically 4hrs 30 mins. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hrs and for Manchester-London journeys, rail held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hrs 10 mins. For the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail journey time of 2 hrs 15 mins A 30 mins reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of today s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights between Manchester/Leeds/Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport access In addition, there would also be significant growth in the total long-distance travel market beyond what took place in 2009 so the overall transfer from rail to air with the introduction of a high speed rail network to/from Scotland will be considerably higher million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so there should be significant scope to redirect valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes. Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness which will not directly gain from the HSR network due to their geographical peripherality, so that these cities and surrounding regions do not fall behind in respect of London connectivity. 3. Business case How robust are the assumptions and methodology for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the classic network? 3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies:- 1. Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in Network Rail New Lines study (2009) 3. Greengauge21 Fast Forward study (2009) 3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of and costs and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study. 3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is un-productive has overestimated the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be regarded as working-time ) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in the original estimate and this would outweigh the over-estimate (in the original study) of working time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services.. It could also be argued that HSR will create a better

13 working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train. 3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh London services in its modelling and business case for the London Birmingham/Litchfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow London market. Edinburgh London Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 mins faster than existing services (as for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh London services should make the business case even stronger. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West Midlands. 3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual upgrading cost of around 9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line. 3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journeytimes and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of England and Central Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line. In summary, the potential regional and UK economic and environmental benefits would be significantly diminished compared to investment in HSR. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms. 3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society, contrary to wider equality and social inclusion objectives. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget, e.g. HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project. There will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this respect. 4. The strategic route

14 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations are well located to serve the key UK cities and major centres of population and, through excellent connections with regional rail networks, their surrounding regions. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres where this can be achieved and without city-centre termini the advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded. 4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but the general rule of thumb should be that not all services will necessary stop at non-city-centre stations and that in general, distances between stops should not be less than hundred miles or so. 4.3 Stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail travel. The temptation to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, must be resisted on the basis that such a strategy would erode the benefits of HSR. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.4 Most studies have demonstrated that a UK network that includes London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow derives greatest benefits and offers best value. These should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed network (which could be expanded by a western network). The UK Government s proposed y-network supports this scenario but needs to be extended to Scotland. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.5 The proposition that phases should be constructed moving northwards from London is fundamentally challenged. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border. In addition, as indicated above, various studies have confirmed that an HSR network including Scotland will deliver significantly greater economic and environmental benefits. Consequently, detailed consideration should be given to starting construction of northern sections at a much earlier stage rather than as last legs, with cross-border sections being progressed as soon as possible. 4.6 The UK Government has decided that phase 1 of the HSR network should be the London-Birmingham section. It is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and it is probably also the most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link between Birmingham and London is accepted as being crucial to the future development of a more extensive UK HSR network. 4.7 In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to early planning and construction of the network to/from Edinburgh and Glasgow in recognition of the greater benefits that a comprehensive HSR national network, including Scotland, will achieve. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current West Midlands-Europe market.

15 4.9 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Commons interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way so that High Speed Trains for Heathrow from the north can continue on the classic network south of London to also serve important destinations such as Gatwick Airport and south coast cities. 5. Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the construction of HS The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a full HSR network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around 80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Central Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting most. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers and commuters in particular, as well as users of rail-freight. As such, all socio-economic groups would benefit. 5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonably good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a future HSR network extending to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities will also experience improved connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network so most of the UK will benefit from HSR. 5.6 However, it must be recognised there will be areas that will benefit significantly less such as the Northern half of Scotland, Wales and the South West of England and Northern Ireland. Transport investment in these areas should be identified to reverse their relative decline (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) to ensure a fair distribution of benefits. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU s TEN-T programme? 5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project

16 5.8 A UK HSR Network will replace current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should be sought from TEN-T and other relevant EU budgets. 6. Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is renewable, the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction completion) should be relatively very small. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the safe side so that overall environmental benefits have not been fully expressed. What would be the impact on freight services on the classic network? 6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight services by HSR should be very positive. How much disruption will be there to services on the classic network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that this should be manageable. Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Commons area, extending planned Crossrail services from the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oaks Commons. This could take away up to 7 train arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station.

17 Written evidence from Birmingham Airport (HSR 184) Introduction 1. This is an independent response from Birmingham Airport to the Transport Select Committee s Enquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail. It should be read in connection with a submission provided by the Airport Operators Association (AOA). 2. The AOA is the trade association that represents the interests of many UK airports. Membership comprises some 70 airport companies, representing the nation's international and major regional airports in addition to many serving community, business and general aviation. 3. The AOA has made a submission to the Select Committee. 4. It is understandable that an organisation such as AOA, which represents geographically disparate Airports, each within their own zone of economic activity, has to find a fair compromise between its members when making submissions to enquiries which could influence fundamental travel patterns, and hence profitability, of its members. 5. Birmingham Airport is providing this submission as a supplement to, and not replacement of, the submission made by the AOA. 6. Where no comment has been made to the contrary, the Committee should assume that the views of Birmingham Airport are aligned with those of the Airport Operator s Association. 7. This document seeks to outline areas where are differences in opinion, interpretation, or indeed strategic emphasis. 8. Our starting point is that UK Plc must not be wedded to one mode of transport. Just as rail is not the complete answer, neither is road or air. Each mode should be used to best advantage whether domestically or in creating vital International links with commerce. 9. Transport links are the lifeblood of UK Plc; they are enablers of wealth and commerce. They should be integrated and seamless, to make travelling and switch between modes, stress-free. Scarce resources should be used to best advantage. 10. It is hoped that by providing an alternative vision, Birmingham Airport will assist the Select Committee in examining options from a national perspective. Background: Birmingham Airport

18 London s other Airport? Maybe but Birmingham also has an important regional role to play. 11. The Airport launched its current Airport Master Plan Towards 2030: Planning a Sustainable Future for Air Transport in the Midlands in November The Master Plan sets out a framework for the sustainable development of Birmingham Airport up to It illustrates how the Airport intends to meet the regional demand for air travel over the plan period of 23 years. 12. Sitting beside the Master Plan is the Airport Surface Access Strategy entitled Moving Together (see the Surface Access Strategy section for more details). 13. The Airport s Master Plan is a response to the 2003 Government White Paper The Future of Air Transport 1, which projected the demand for aviation growth across the UK up until the year The strategic advantages of Birmingham Airport with its proximity to motorways and the rail network are recognised in the White Paper. 14. The Airport Company recognises that changes in Government Policy towards aviation in the South East, together with proposals for HS2 (neither of which are reflected in the Master Plan or Surface Access Strategy) could have a fundamental effect on its customer base in future years. However, with the current runway infrastructure, Birmingham has the capacity to expand beyond the projections set out in the Master Plan. 15. Birmingham Airport s site hosts over 140 businesses, and supports over 6,000 people. The Airport has a positive effect on the regional economy, by acting as an International Gateway. 16. Birmingham Airport hosts over forty Airlines, and serves over a hundred direct destinations with hundreds more by connecting flights. It is very capable and can even accommodate A380-the World s biggest Airliner. 17. By 2014 a Runway Extension will provide more direct long-haul capability where it is needed and will make Birmingham as capable as any other Western European Airport. 18. In May 2011, the Secretary of State for Transport opened the new airport - which has the capacity to take another nine million passengers immediately. The Airport s Master Plan envisages this figure rising to 27 million by 2030, and it is a matter of record that over 30 million passengers per annum can be catered for off a single runway. 19. Thus between now and the 2030s, it is reasonable to conclude that Birmingham Airport at least the same capacity of that which would have been provided by a third, short runway at Heathrow. At best, Birmingham Airport is probably only realising about a third of its potential as a transport node 1

19 20. This provides a tremendous opportunity for those planning and integrating National Infrastructure. Current transport links with Birmingham Airport 21. Birmingham has the best road and rail connectivity of any UK Airport and it is a winning combination; however to maximise use of a scarce national resource, it will be essential to maintain and improve such connectivity in the future. 22. Road connectivity is good and will benefit from upgrading in future years; it is recognised this is outside of the scope of the current enquiry. 23. The current West Coast Rail Franchise, which offers links to London, is reaching capacity. Journey times between London and Birmingham are only six minutes shorter than they were in the 1970s A typical journey from Birmingham International to Euston takes 70 minutes; the airport has suggested that the next franchisee might offer a headline time of 59 minutes Rail Links to Derby, Sheffield, East Midlands and the Northwest are often slow and uncompetitive when compared to road travel. 26. Longer term, HS2 has the ability to mitigate all of these issues; either by releasing capacity on the classic network, or by providing direct services with attractive journey times. HS2 serving Birmingham Airport 27. Birmingham Interchange - located at or very close to Birmingham Airport and the National Exhibition Centre would provide additional connectivity. New direct rail services from across the region could link with High Speed Rail as well as international flights. 28. The Passenger Transport Authority, CENTRO, recognises the opportunities afforded by creating such a node. 29. Birmingham Interchange also provides a channel for the South East to access additional aviation capacity (Birmingham Airport has significant spare capacity and thus is a valuable resource to be exploited). 30. Without Birmingham Interchange, there is a risk of long-term economic decline across one of the most successful parts of the Midlands. There is also a risk of unintended 3 Great Britain Timetable 1974, table 66. Journey time 89/91 minutes every half hour Virgin Trains Timetable 84/85 minutes, every 20 minutes

20 consequences. Our Airport Master Plan to 2030 envisages the creation of thousands of jobs both at the Airport and in the wider region. The same situation applies at the adjacent National Exhibition Centre. It is essential that modern transport links are maintained, and that best use is made of Strategic National Assets. 31. Our stance on High Speed Rail is that it complements Air Travel. Whilst we are very supportive of a station in Central Birmingham we believe that there are very compelling reasons why the Birmingham Interchange should also be adopted. 32. Birmingham Interchange would provide connectivity over and above that provided in central Birmingham. For instance, North Warwickshire and Coventry would be economic beneficiaries (not least through the continued employment of many of their population at the Airport/NEC), as well as those located around the Midlands Motorway Box, for whom travel to Birmingham City Centre would be problematic not just to themselves but to the capability of the A38 infrastructure and to City-Centre parking. 33. A recent survey by the British Chambers of Commerce suggested that 44% of Businesses in the West Midlands would use Central Birmingham, whilst 56% would use a station at or near the Airport/NEC. 34. Birmingham Interchange, located at or very close to Birmingham Airport and the National Exhibition Centre (where there is already a main line station), would not only provide additional connectivity to the wider region, and link with an existing transport hub; it would also plug in to the M42 corridor acknowledged as a major economic driver of the region 4 and the only significant location in the Midlands which outperforms National GVA. It would also provide a route to additional aviation capacity. Airport Surface Access Strategy 35. Surface access including High Speed Rail will be key to the development of Birmingham Airport and the economic regeneration of the Midlands. The current published Airport Surface Access Strategy 5 does not reflect HS2 or any changes in Government Policy, and it is being reviewed in the light of emerging policy. 36. The Airport is not wedded to one mode of transport. Just as rail is not a panacea, neither is road or air. Each mode should be used to best advantage. The alternative to HS2 would appear to be very significant increases in the UK Motorway network, with consequent land take (perhaps three times that of HS2). 37. Adding additional tracks alongside the existing Victorian Infrastructure would destroy the heart of many towns that owe their existence or expansion to the railways. It would 4 See Realising the Potential of the M42 Corridor, Final Report to Advantage West Midlands, most pages but page 17 for GVA _tcm pdf 5

21 also be expensive and as the 9bn upgrade of the West Coast route demonstrated, it might not deliver the intended outcomes. The Airport doubts whether this approach would deliver a truly High-Speed, High-Capacity railway. 38. The above approach would not release capacity to permit the development of new routes (for example, those that would use part of the current WCML for an element of their journey) for Example, Kenilworth to Birmingham International, Leicester to Stratford-upon-Avon. 39. Further upgrade to the existing infrastructure will, in any case, be required to ease existing bottlenecks and pinch-points. This is already happening. 40. With regard to reported cost, the Airport s view is that Crossrail is spending about 2 Billion per year on a commuter railway through central London and its suburbs. As that 17bn + project is completed, we would envisage that 2 Billion per annum would roll forward annually to High Speed Rail projects. 41. It would appear equitable that investment also be made outside of London, which reportedly has a disproportionately subsidised transport infrastructure, compared to the rest of the UK. Impact of a Government Review into Aviation 42. The Government has already suggested that Airports in the South East should be better not bigger 6. Without pre-empting the outcome of the forthcoming review, it is reasonable to assume that at least part of it might seek to make better use of existing resources. Existing resources, such as Birmingham, can be unlocked so long as they are integrated into a wider transport network, and provided that awareness is increased. Rebalance of the UK economy 43. Many commentators seem to consider HS2 s primary aviation role to be as a feeder to Heathrow Airport. This appears anomalous to the Better not Bigger agenda, and counter to plans to rebalance the UK economy. 44. However, the use of HS2, to match aviation demand with spare capacity, could bring very significant regional economic benefits and would be in line with the Government s desire to rebalance the economy. 6

22 45. Whilst Birmingham provides an early opportunity to integrate HSR and Aviation, there are other airports - with significant spare capacity capable of being linked to the High Speed Rail network. 46. It is possible that some Airports will remain silent on the issue of High-Speed Rail, as they have to remain sensitive to their relationships with their Airline customers. 47. As High Speed Rail develops, it should be regarded as complementary to Aviation, and not necessarily as a replacement. High Speed Rail should be used to connect a network of International Gateways offering choice to consumers and airlines, and providing balanced economic growth. High-Speed to Heathrow? 48. It is important that London s largest Airport have a link to the High-Speed network. However, it is unclear which terminal would be served by High Speed Rail. 49. Depending on which terminal was selected, it is possible that changing from HS2 to an enhanced shuttle service from Old Oak Common would offer the quickest alternative for people travelling to the majority of the terminals at Heathrow. In other words, the optimal solution (both in cost and journey times) may not be a direct link using HS2 trains. 50. Any link to Heathrow should not be to the detriment of everyone travelling from the North to London and beyond. If every HS2 train were to be diverted via Heathrow (with, reportedly, nine minutes extra journey time or more), one suspects that this would have a very significant negative effect on productivity and on the overall business case for HS2. Integration and Awareness 51. Awareness increases through a variety of methods; these include end-to-end ticketing (what is the difference between flying New York-Heathrow and catching a train to London, and Flying New York-Birmingham and catching a train to London?) the possibility of a congestion charge for very busy airports (leading to the creation of secondary markets elsewhere), and of course adequate marketing activity. 52. High Speed Rail and Aviation should be integrated for the purpose of journey planning and ticketing. This already happens in Germany, with a very forward-looking partnership between Lufthansa and Deutsche Bahn. Airline-style tickets are issued, which include some legs by rail, and others by air Integration of UK domestic rail into Aviation s Global Distribution systems would be a pre-requisite of changing travel behaviours, and bringing more choice on price and 7

23 journey time to the market. For High-Speed rail to be properly integrated into a Global Transport system, through ticketing will be essential. 54. Successful integration of air and rail also depends upon a number of critical factors including interchange location, ease of interchange, service frequency, baggage management and wider connectivity. Air passengers will not be tempted onto HSR unless it is capable of providing efficient and seamless airport connections. This includes seamless security, baggage handling, border control and other associated security issues. 55. Such a process should begin now, with the existing domestic rail system. However, it is not clear who act as catalyst and lead such a project or whether it would work on a voluntary basis, as it would almost certainly meet resistance in some areas. This is a matter for Government to decide. Confidence Building prior to HS2 56. Changing transport behaviours and travel patterns, through policy and effective marketing of choice, can start a confidence-building exercise that will demonstrate to stakeholders, a microcosm of what HS2 might bring. 57. In Birmingham Airport s case, a greater willingness to engage on the part of the West Coast franchisee (perhaps to include through ticketing and joint marketing), could lead to mutual and measurable benefits. 58. A greater willingness of the Control Authorities to work on remote check in and clearance might simplify procedures on arrival and contribute to the seamless experience. 59. With hard data available, the Airport and its shareholders may be in a better position to evaluate the benefits of investing in a future joint Airport/HS2 Terminal at the HS2 Station. 60. It is important to trial new systems and working practices within the existing system, to create an evidence base for potential future investment. Classic Rail Vss HSR 61. HSR investment should be additional to, not at the expense of, other much-needed- in rail (for example, the required measures to address congestion at the investment 'Northern Hub', which affects the whole northern region, or the four tracking of the similarly-congested Birmingham to Coventry Corridor). Conclusion

24 62. Birmingham Airport supports High Speed 2 and the creation of a High-Speed Rail network for Great Britain. However, transport modes are not mutually exclusive, and they must be better integrated if they are to be fit for purpose in the mid 21 st Century. Customers should have a seamless journey experience, and should be able to easily access through journey information including times and prices. 63. It is important that the customer-service attributes (including through ticketing, security/customs clearance etc) for the High-Speed Network are trialled and any issues resolved, within the current rail structure. 64. The new InterCity West Coast Franchise (to be let in 2012, and currently being negotiated) would appear to be an excellent test bed for any proposals. It is suggested that there is still opportunity to build some of the above concepts into that franchise. 65. Birmingham Airport would be willing to work with airlines and with the franchise operator on issues of mutual interest, provided that there is Government support and encouragement for the process. May 2011

25 Written evidence from Robert H Parker (HSR 185) High Speed Rail and Alternatives to Travel: Contradictory Policy Agendas The Department for Transport is, of course, the recognized driving force behind the scheme to build a High Speed Rail network in the U.K., in particular HS2. Less well known is the Department s pursuit of an objective that, if successful, would undermine much of the present case for HS2, radically reducing the need for such an immense project, and this objective is made explicit in the Department s Alternatives to Travel agenda (details of which can be found on its website). It might be supposed that in such a large department, the left hand does not always realise what the right is doing; indeed, in the ongoing HS2 Public Consultation roadshow, no adviser (all confirmed as DfT officials) could be found who had even heard of the Department s Alternatives to Travel agenda. But at the top there is no such ignorance, for both the Secretary of State for Transport and one of his two Parliamentary Under Secretaries, Mr Norman Baker, have spoken out in enthusiastic support of first one and then the other of these opposed initiatives, each in calls or speeches of his that have sometimes been less than weeks apart or less than minutes apart in Philip Hammond s case. However, neither minister has, it seems, been publicly challenged to reconcile the contradictory objectives inherent in HS2 and Alternatives to Travel, each having so far managed to avoid the discomfort of being required to wear his two departmental hats at the same time. It is true that Mr Hammond (IBM START Conference, 20 Oct. 2010), in noting his Department s adoption of Alternatives to Travel, at least recognized that his audience might detect in it something odd, for as he said: you might be surprised to know that the most innovative change we have made in the Department for Transport in the last four months is to introduce a portfolio responsibility for nontravel. Yet even so astute a politician as Mr Hammond failed to see that this portfolio he had assigned to Mr Baker perhaps originally conceived in the context of local transport problems concerned a technology that could and would affect transport on much more than a local scale, and, if implemented with determination, would almost certainly have adverse consequences for national transport schemes of supposed alleviation like HS2, dependent as much of the case for it is on continuing high demand. Said Mr Hammond: Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda.... So my colleague, Norman Baker, is working with colleagues at DCMS, in BIS and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. Encouraging home working; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to longdistance travel. [My italics] Reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business? But this is the very custom usually deemed essential to the HS2 business case by Mr Hammond himself. It is not as though Mr Hammond had failed to mention HS2 in that same IBM speech, or failed to extol its merits as usual, but in the space of ten minutes or so he managed to treat Alternatives to Travel and HS2 as if the one had not the least bearing on the other. Mr Hammond revealed a similar failure of joined-up thinking at the Age of Energy debate in Victoria on 1st March 2011 (see below), where he seemed to forget for a moment that he even had an HS2 hat to wear, and in referring mainly to motorways he admitted a rare truth that applies equally to railways. He said: our roads aren t congested most of the day, our railways aren t actually

26 congested most of the day... we re spending billions of pounds to build something that is only used for a couple of hours in each day and the challenge is to get much better value for money as a nation out of the infrastructure we ve already invested in, whether it s trains, train tracks or motorways. In view of the above evidence, it is hard to conclude that High Speed Rail fits easily and without contradiction into the Government s transport policy objectives or, at least, into a significant part of them and I submit that owing to the apparent lack of both ministerial and departmental awareness that such a disjunction exists, the Committee s own examination would be welcome and to the public good. MR HAMMOND & MR BAKER AS ADVOCATES OF ALTERNATIVES TO TRAVEL Don t Travel, says Transport Minister (Parliamentary Under Secretary for Transport, Norman Baker s own website, 12 July 2010) Transport Minister Norman Baker has launched an initiative to reduce travel. He says this will benefit the economy, the environment, and the individual. The plans include more working from home, and greater use of video conferencing facilities. Economic benefits, resulting from reduced congestion on the roads and on public transport, as well as reduced demand for office space; Environmental benefits, as carbon emissions will decrease as demand for transport falls; Benefits to quality of living, as people will be able to balance their work and home lives more effectively. Mr Baker has also asked his own Department, and the rest of government, to set an example by making greater use of videoconferencing to cut back on their own travel. Reducing demand for travel will reduce congestion, pollution and stress in our daily lives. Twenty-first century transport choices should fit a twenty-first century world where we shouldn't just use smart cards to travel, we should be smarter about when we travel and when we use office technology for virtual travel instead. The results will be tangible reduced congestion, reduced carbon emissions, improved quality of life Indeed, I am the first Transport Minister to say don t travel! Transport Minister, Norman Baker, in a 14 July 2010 conference speech (Dept. for Transport website) We currently think of transport in terms of four different modes - road, rail, air, and water, he said. I want us all to start recognising that communication can be the 5th mode...and that communications technology can provide an alternative to travel in the first place. So I m looking into ideas and measures that enable people to do business without having to leave their homes or offices, for instance through the use of broadband-enabled technologies. Working from Home (BBC Radio 4, Costing the Earth, 15 September 2010). On this programme, Transport Minister Norman Baker spoke enthusiastically for home-working and against the over-use of transport:

27 It was, he said a development that would benefit both the economy and business. Take video-conferencing, for instance: if you can have a business meeting without the need to travel, then that is not only more efficient for business but could reduce carbon emissions significantly, a plus for the environment and a plus for business. I am working today with colleagues at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. Norman Baker: Speech to the Fleet News Green Summit, Hurlingham Club, 12 October (from Dept. of Transport website) It is for this last reason that I have become the first ever Transport Minister to have official responsibilities for alternatives to travel. When this new brief was announced in the summer, I was rather pleased when it was welcomed by the Campaign for Better Transport as a "huge step forward", and by the CBI. Today, you and I are not only responsible for getting people and goods from A to B. We are also responsible for the impact of transport. On budgets. On the effectiveness of business. On the environment. And on people. I am working today with colleagues at the Department for Culture Media and Sport, Department for Business Innovation and Skills and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. That might mean encouraging home working; staggering people s working days so roads and trains are less congested at peak times; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes; and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel. Of course it is not the mission of the Department for Transport to stop people travelling, but unnecessary travel is expensive in environmental and financial terms and, if we can help businesses to operate more efficiently with a need for less travel, we will be advancing both their agenda and our own. encouraging the uptake of video-conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel. Philip Hammond repeating Norman Baker s own words in his speech entitled Sustainable Transport, delivered on 10th September 2010 at the IBM START Conference: Business Summit, Day 3. (DfT website: Sustainable Transport ). But you might be surprised to know that the most innovative change we have made in the Department for Transport in the last four months is to introduce a portfolio responsibility for nontravel. Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda. And although it has not traditionally been thought of as a transport responsibility, I have decided that we should integrate it into our transport agenda. So my colleague, Norman Baker, is working with colleagues at DCMS, in BIS and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. Encouraging home working; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to longdistance travel. MR HAMMOND AS ADVOCATE OF HIGH SPEED RAIL

28 Since the election and his appointment as Secretary of State for Transport, Mr Hammond has made many speeches, taken part in many interviews and written many replies in support of High Speed Rail, and of HS2 in particular, and they are too numerous and well known to need repeating. MR BAKER AS ADVOCATE OF HIGH SPEED RAIL I congratulate HS2 on producing a route that, I think, minimises environmental damage while maximising the usefulness of the line. (Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, Norman Baker M.P.in the House of Commons debate on the Labour Government s official announcement of its intention to build HS2, 11 Mar 2010: (Hansard, Column 453) Protests won t stop High Speed Rail link (Birmingham Post, 14 January, 2011). It reported the Transport Minister Norman Baker in Birmingham urging local supporters of High Speed 2 not to be put off by protests against the link, and gave his enthusiastic support for the HS2 plans. He said that the economy of the West Midlands would benefit enormously from the new line, and added enthusiastically: You must make sure your voice is heard. Scots asked to back UK s high speed rail plan, (as reported by Damien Henderson in 18 Mar 2011 edition of the Scottish newpaper, the Evening Times:- Scotland has been asked to back UK plans for a high-speed rail network that won t extend north of the Border for at least 20 years. Speaking in Glasgow, UK Transport Minister Norman Baker said Scotland s voice was vital in supporting the initial phase of a 250mph new route from London to Birmingham, as local campaign groups in England mobilise against it. Norman Baker issued the rallying cry whilst visiting Glasgow to highlight the benefits high speed rail could bring to Scotland. (from the DfT website, 17 March 2011) Scottish politicians and business leaders were today urged to support proposals for a new high speed rail network or risk missing out. Transport Minister Norman Baker issued the rallying cry whilst visiting Glasgow to highlight the benefits high speed rail could bring to Scotland. Transport Minister Norman Baker said: High speed rail has the potential to shrink the UK and bring our great cities closer together in a way that has never been possible before. HS2 would deliver significant benefits for Scotland, which must not be ignored. Our proposed line runs from London to Leeds and Manchester, but experience in Europe has taught us that high speed rail networks are built in stages. If this network is to be built and if Scotland is to link up to it, it is vital that we hear vocal support now and that everybody understands the transformational impact it would have on the economy." MR HAMMOND CONSIDERS THE NETWORK AS IT IS Mr Hammond speaking on 1st March this year at a debate in Victoria organized jointly by Shell and the Daily Telegraph with the title The Age of Energy (transcribed from a sound recording.) our roads aren t congested most of the day, our railways aren t actually congested most of the day... we re spending billions of pounds to build something that is only used for a couple of hours in each day and the challenge is to get much better value for money as a nation out of the infrastructure we ve already invested in, whether it s trains, train tracks or motorways.

29 Written evidence from Network Rail (HSR 186) Network Rail o o o o Network Rail owns and operates Britain s rail network. It is a private, independent, not for dividend company directly accountable to its Members and regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation. Profits made go straight back into improving the railway. The aim of the business is to provide a safe, reliable, efficient and sustainable railway, fit for the 21st century. Network Rail owns around 20,000 miles of track; 40,000 bridges and tunnels; 1,000 signal boxes; 9,000 level crossings; 2,500 stations that are leased to train operators; 18 large stations that are managed and operated directly by the company, and a further 8,200 commercial properties all of which fund the rail network infrastructure. In a complex and entirely interdependent system, both Network Rail and the train operating companies share the responsibility of delivering train services to the travelling public and to the nation. Network Rail welcomes the Committee s intention to conduct an inquiry into the issues connected to high speed rail, and the opportunity to respond. 1. What are the main arguments either for or against high speed rail 1.1 The fundamental argument in favour of high speed rail is that, by expanding the capacity and improving the performance of our rail network, it can play a vital part in supporting sustainable economic growth. 1.2 Of the 1.3 billion passenger journeys made on the railways every year, 1 billion are made by people commuting or travelling for business and our forecasts predict continued strong growth in passenger and freight demand, in line with the trend of recent years. 1.3 On the West Coast Main Line in particular, strong growth on intercity services and continued growth on commuter and regional services to towns including Milton Keynes and Northampton, will soon mean that capacity on the line will be effectively exhausted and it will be impossible to do anything to further increase capacity on the existing line. Our New Lines Study (published in August 2009) and West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy (RUS: published in December 2010) predict that this point will be reached around the end of this decade. 1.4 The West Coast Main Line RUS set this out clearly: the WCML, particularly at the south end of the route, is effectively full and any interventions will be disproportionately expensive compared with the benefits gained. The RUS supports the development of the proposed high

30 speed line, initially between London and the West Midlands and then onwards to Manchester and beyond In this context, full means that, at certain times of the day, some train services will be carrying so many passengers that ordinarily some form of capacity enhancing intervention would be considered essential. However, once the work that Network Rail is undertaking at Stafford (which will have capacity benefits further south on the West Coast Main Line) has been completed, there will be no possibility of increasing capacity on the line further to enable significantly more trains to run, and no possibility of lengthening the crowded services significantly. 1.6 At first, the pressure will be felt on commuter services serving communities such as Northampton or Milton Keynes, but this pressure will soon be similarly problematic on long-distance high speed services using the current infrastructure as, in the longer term, demand for all services will continue to grow strongly. 1.7 Network Rail s passenger growth forecasts for the three biggest cities on the proposed HS2 Y network show that demand will continue to grow. Our published figures also lead us to expect growth into the foreseeable future. Note that these projections are for the discrete intercity markets only, and on a different timescale to the Department for Transport (DfT) and HS2 Ltd s forecasts. o London-Manchester will see passenger demand growth of up to 61% by 2024 o London-Birmingham will see growth of 58% over the same period 2 o London-Leeds passenger demand was forecast to grow by 44% from Given the already very intensive use of the network by today s level of traffic a step change increase in capacity to accommodate increasing demand can only be delivered by a new line. Network Rail s New Lines Study considered the long-term future of the main inter-city routes, including the West Coast Main Line, finding that: only the addition of further running lines over long sections of route would be likely to provide any meaningful increase in capacity Additional rail capacity, and specifically the additional capacity provided to the network by a high speed line, can play a vital role in supporting sustainable economic growth. The business case for HS2 shows benefits of 43.7 billion against net costs of around 17.1 billion. 5 Furthermore, there are substantial risks in doing nothing: that our transport infrastructure becomes a brake on economic growth, and not an accelerant of it. 2. How does high speed rail fit with the Government s transport policy objectives

31 2.1 The Government has been clear that one of its main policy objectives is to build an economy which is more balanced both sectorally and geographically, delivering sustainable economic growth at the same time as meeting climate change targets. 2.2 Investment in transport infrastructure generally, and in high speed rail in particular, is seen as central to delivering this objective. High speed rail will contribute both by providing the additional rail capacity that can accommodate anticipated demand growth but also by encouraging modal shift and helping to minimise congestion on Britain s strategic road network. 2.3 The Eddington Study estimated that time lost to road congestion costs the economy 7-8 billion every year, a figure that is set to rise to 22 billion by Investment in high speed rail helps to address the issue of road congestion not only by providing passengers with a fast and efficient alternative to intercity road transport but also by releasing capacity on the West Coast Main Line for freight and in so doing, encouraging lorries off Britain s roads. It is estimated that each freight train can typically take around 60 lorry journeys off the roads. 2.4 At their full extent, new high speed lines also have very significant potential for modal shift, making rail the transport mode of choice between our key cities. Effectively integrating HS2 in the existing network can help to maximise the benefits of the project. This could be with Crossrail at Old Oak Common, or in Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield where the network will, funding permitting, have been substantially improved by the Northern Hub project Modal shift to rail can also bring significant environmental benefits over time. Network Rail s New Lines Study found that there are significant potential environmental benefits from a new line. Our model was for a different specification project, but it was clear that the reduction in road and air journeys resulting from a new high speed line connecting London to the Midlands, the North West and, eventually, on to Scotland would lead to carbon savings. However, any carbon savings should be seen alongside the significant increase in capacity and therefore the support for economic growth HS2 would provide. 2.6 In terms of the implications on funding for the existing network, the DfT has yet to set out its funding strategy for HS2 in detail, though it should be noted that the expenditure will, of course, be in stages over a decade or more. Over this period, however, the existing infrastructure can be expected to continue to require investment, particularly to deal with the growth in passenger demand. 2.7 Sir Roy McNulty's recently published independent Rail Value for Money Study, jointly sponsored by the Department for Transport and the Office of Rail Regulation, recommends ways in which the whole industry can work towards delivering a safe and efficient railway. The study estimated that the whole industry should be 30% more efficient by 2018/19. Network Rail is already committed to reducing the cost of the rail network by 5 billion between April 2009 and March 2014.

32 3. Business case 3.1 Network Rail s New Lines Study demonstrated there was a robust business case for a high speed rail line on the basis that it serves a sufficient number of cities. An optimised network which serves the key targets London, Birmingham and Manchester and adds more destinations to spread the costs over more journeys produces a strong business case. 3.2 In terms of future additions to the network beyond the Y, our findings indicated that the extension of any line to Scotland would significantly improve the benefit-to-cost ratio. London-Scotland is a substantial market currently dominated by aviation; a high speed rail line would reduce carbon emissions and time and offer substantial improvements to connectivity. 3.3 Our New Lines Study only looked at the key transport markets on the WCML London, Birmingham, Manchester and Scotland. Later (though unpublished) work confirmed that the second part of the Y to the East Midlands, South Yorkshire and Leeds, also had a strong business case. 3.4 It is worth noting that the wider economic benefits of HS2, as well as alternative rail packages, have been assessed using the New Approach to Transport Appraisal (NATA) framework. Using conservative assumptions, this analysis calculated HS2 would generate 44 billion benefits for the economy, set against net costs of 17 billion. 3.5 However, research published last year by Network Rail Prioritising investment to support our economy showed that traditional appraisal methodology do not necessarily capture all the wider benefits to the economy. The report suggests that spending decisions on transport and other related sectors (such as housing and regeneration) should focus more strongly on real economic returns of projects. Such an approach would better understand impacts such as changes in business behaviour, job creation and responses in local labour markets. 3.6 The difficulty of traditional models in capturing the full economic impacts of transport projects is unfortunate when dealing with incremental improvements, but is possibly more problematic when dealing with a potentially transformative project such as HS2. The impact of nearly halving some journey times and releasing huge amounts of capacity is hard to capture adequately with an approach based on assessing the value of incremental improvements in journey times. As a result, it is possible that the full positive impact of HS2 on the economy may have been underestimated as a result of the limitations of the methodology used in terms of capturing the full economic benefits of the project. 3.7 The proposed scheme would deliver a huge increase in capacity to the rail network as a whole and the key routes to the Midlands and the North of England in particular. In our view, smaller schemes are simply not suitable alternatives for meeting the Government s strategic objectives. It should also

33 be noted both that upgrading the existing infrastructure would have substantial negative financial impacts as a result of the inevitable disruption that would be caused, and also that it was only in December 2008 that the West Coast Route Modernisation programme was completed. 3.8 HS2 clearly meets the strategic specification required from government, unlike any other scheme. No alternative would deliver enough additional capacity, nor would it improve journey times to anything like the same degree or have anywhere near the same transformative economic impact. Upgrading the existing network would also be disruptive for passengers and companies moving their goods by rail and this, of course, would in itself have an associated cost. 3.9 As a result, we strongly believe that a new line is the most appropriate way of addressing the need to deliver substantial additional capacity to the rail network to meet future demand. That being the case, our New Lines Study concluded that the additional cost involved in making any new line a high speed line, compared to the additional benefits that would accrue, were such that it should be high speed Managing demand through price would not, we believe, be a sustainable longterm and politically acceptable solution to the capacity issues. In our view, it is only through a substantial increase in capacity that these issues can be addressed. 4. The strategic route 4.1 In our view, the proposed route is the best option. It is highly efficient both in terms of land use and in making maximum possible use of existing transport corridors, tunnels and deep cuttings while also ensuring the route can support optimal journey times. The route has been designed to maximise performance while mitigating the impacts on local communities as far as possible. 4.2 Clearly, rail technology has changed enormously between the time the West Coast Main Line was built and today. Higher train speeds require much straighter lines. The WCML winds sinuously around the landscape, hence the need for tilting Pendolino trains to reach current linespeeds of 140mph. This type of tilting rolling stock is not necessary on the East Coast Main Line, which was built on a far straighter alignment. 4.3 As noted in above, our conclusion was in line with that reached by HS2 Ltd in terms of the markets that should be served by high speed rail. It should also be noted that additional intermediate stations would reduce route capacity and impose a significant journey time penalty (approximately six minutes for each station stop), thereby undermining the journey time benefits of the scheme as a whole. 4.4 Adopting a phased approach for a project of this scale is both suitable and appropriate. Beginning in the south and moving from London northwards is

34 also logical given that it is at the southern end of the West Coast Main Line that the need for increased capacity is most acute. 4.5 In terms of strategic links to and from the line, both the spur to Heathrow and the link to HS1 show the limitations of relying solely on the benefit-to-cost ratio. Our modelling of the business cases did not make a strong case, but the fact that there may be a stronger strategic case to build these connections is understood. 4.6 In addition, it should be noted that the proposed link to HS1 would require a tunnel from Old Oak Common, and it is this that requires it to be included in the first phase of the project, rather than this being an indication of having been accorded a higher priority than the spur to Heathrow. 5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 HS2 will support economic growth nationally, but this would particularly be the case in the cities served by new high speed services both to and from London and each other. However, the positive impact of the new network capacity delivered by HS2 on economic growth would not be restricted to the cities it serves. By moving the majority of inter-city passenger journeys onto the new line, significant spare capacity on the existing infrastructure can be released for freight, commuter and regional services. 5.2 Network Rail is currently working with Passenger Focus now to explore how best to use this released capacity, including consulting with local communities to understand their preferences and future aspirations. This would potentially also give those companies who already make extensive use of rail freight, particularly in the West Midlands, more scope to expand and more flexibility in their use of the network. In turn, this would help take lorries off the roads and ease congestion on a key part of the national road network. 5.3 Furthermore the direct benefits in terms of increased capacity and faster journeys are unlikely to be sum total of the benefits that high speed rail delivers. A new high speed line will provide vital support for regional growth through agglomeration effects. By improving the connections between the major cities of the Midlands and the North a high speed line will help businesses by improving access to wider markets, bigger pools of labour and greater numbers of suppliers. 6. Impact 6.1 As noted in 2.5 above, it is our view that HS2 will deliver substantial carbon benefits, but it is vital that these are seen alongside the project s contribution both to long-term sustainable economic growth and the pressing need to meet the capacity challenge effectively. 6.2 However, the proposed route for HS2 will have both positive and negative impacts on the environment. In our view, the negative sustainability impacts arising from the project such as pollution (noise, vibration and visual

35 aesthetics), climate change, environment, heritage and community impacts have been very substantially mitigated through the extensive use of deep cuttings, routing along existing corridors and tunnelling. 6.3 The proposed route interacts with the existing rail network at various points. Some of these interfaces will present challenges in making sure that both the high speed and existing lines are optimised. 6.4 However, none of these challenges are insuperable, and we look forward to working with the department and HS2 Ltd to produce the best overall outcome and minimising disruption. The key issues which will need to be worked through include: o o o o Old Oak Common, where the interfaces between Great Western Main Line, HS2, Crossrail, and local services will need to be managed effectively. Euston station will need to remain operational throughout the construction phase, which will be a major challenge and one in which close co-operation between all partners, including Transport for London, will be essential. Delivery of the North London Line link has the potential to be disruptive for existing passengers; we are working with HS2 to refine the scheme and minimise the impact. In the Day 1 scheme, high speed trains will have to run from the high speed line onto the existing West Coast Main Line at a point north of Rugeley. This will undoubtedly present challenges to the operation of the network. Scheduling all the services is likely to be complex, though we look forward to working with DfT and HS2 to resolve these issues. 6.5 It is important that HS2 is seen in the context of the whole network and, by thinking in this way, the benefits of the scheme for the network as a whole can be maximised and any negative impacts mitigated as far as is possible. June Network Rail (2010) West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation, p8 2 Network Rail (2010) West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation, p4 3 Network Rail (2008) East Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy, p77 4 Network Rail New Lines Study (2009) Capacity Analysis, p30 5 Department for Transport (2011) High Speed Rail: investing in Britain s future p14 6 Network Rail (2009) The Northern Hub: transforming rail in the North

36 Written evidence from The Campaign for High Speed Rail (HSR 187) The Campaign for High Speed Rail fully welcomes the Government s plans for a high speed rail network to be extended across Britain and supports the proposals put forth in the Government s consultation that was published on 28 February The below statement is in response to the Transport Select Committee s call for evidence into the Government s consultation on HS2. We have chosen to focus on the economic benefits that highspeed rail will bring to the Midlands, North and Scotland as the members of our Campaign find this to be the most compelling reason for supporting the Government s plans for a high speed rail network. 1. Introduction 1.1. The Campaign for High Speed Rail is a campaign, independent from the Government and HS2 Ltd, representing employers from across the country who believe Britain needs a modern, high speed rail network to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. We are supported by hundreds of business people from up and down the country, with the vast majority of supporters coming from the Midlands and the North Our Director, Professor David Begg, has been advocating for high speed rail for many years. He is also the Chief Executive of Transport Times and the Director of Portobello Partnership. He sits on the boards of numerous transport related projects and companies including FirstGroup and BAA, as well as the Greater Manchester Transport Executive and the Business Infrastructure Commission. He was formerly the Chairman of the Commission for Integrated Transport and sat on the board of the Northern Way Transport Compact. He is also a Visiting Professor in Sustainable Transport at Plymouth University, and has an international reputation as a commentator on transport issues. 2. Main arguments for HSR 2.1. The members of our campaign support high speed rail for many reasons, but the main reasons can be boiled down to (1)Building the economy; (2) Bringing Britain closer together; (3) Investing in the Midlands, the North and Scotland and (4) Meeting the demand for more trains Building the economy. I will elaborate in Section 4 on the economic benefits that HSR will bring, in particular to the Midlands and the North. Transformational changes to connectivity in the Midlands, North and Scotland will help to facilitate growth in employment, allow for existing businesses to reach new markets and stay competitive in an increasingly competitive marketplace, and allow people more time to do their business Bringing Britain closer together. Of our direct peers, Britain is the only country without a high speed rail network. Employers now to look further afield for talent, and employees look across a more diverse geographic area for employment opportunities, it is only natural to build a high speed rail network that supports our modern economic needs. Connectivity is key for business and Britain must stay competitive Investing in the Midlands, the North and Scotland. For too long our country s infrastructure planning has been short sighted. The majority of money spent on transport infrastructure is

37 spent in the South of England Cross Rail and HS1 for example the Midlands and North have similar infrastructure needs to the South and deserve a chance Meeting the demand for more trains. Demand for rail travel is not predicted to decrease and is forecast to continue to grow. The East Coast Main Line and West Coast Main Line are both already nearing capacity and will reach capacity in the coming years, so the Government will need to do something to increase our future capacity needs. Upgrading existing lines will be expensive and disruptive, without providing the economic and agglomeration benefits that come with high speed rail. This is supported by the Government s consultation which states: A new conventional rail line would cost 90% of HS2 but deliver 33% fewer benefits. Upgrading existing infrastructure would deliver less than 25% of the benefits of HS2. 1 Additionally, high speed rail will then release capacity on existing networks, allowing for more frequent and more efficient commuter services, such as Coventry to London. The obvious choice for our capacity needs is to build a high speed network. 3. Economic re balancing and equity 3.1. According to government statistics, on a per capita basis, Gross Value Added in the North is just 80% of the South. GDP per person is one third higher in the South than the North. Productivity in Yorkshire and the Humber is the second lowest in England and declining. Unemployment in the North is nearly 2.5% higher compared to the South East. We need an infrastructure system that will give the North a change for economic regeneration There have been several independent reports that have begun to quantify the economic benefits that HSR could bring to the Midlands and the North, helping to re balance the country s current south eastern centric economy Accountants KPMG have quantified wider economic benefits from high speed rail for the North of England alone at 12bn 3 while economic partnership group, The Northern Way, valued the impact at 6bn The Northern Way report also indicates that, with the full Y network proposed by the Government, the North sets to benefits the most. To quote: The Northern Way has identified that a north south high speed rail network serving both sides of the Pennines has the potential to generate agglomeration benefits through linking the northern city region economies. In analysis pre dating the Government s identification of the Y shaped network as its preferred way forward and for a more extensive network, these agglomeration impacts are valued at 13bn PV33, (using the Department for Transport s current methodology). Of this 13bn, 5bn is in the North of England. Proportionally, the North s economy receives a greater uplift than that in London and the South East In that same Northern Way report, Transforming Our Economy and Connectivity: High Speed Rail for the North, published in March of this year, the Northern Way also predicts that the 44bn will be a multiple based on the success of HS1 they estimate that the GVA 1 Page 43 of Economic Case for HS2, DfT, February Source: Table 1, Public Sector Employment and Expenditure by Region, House of Common Library, July 2010; Source: Calculations based on Office for National Statistics, Regional Labour Market Statistics February 2011, (Table S1). 3 KPMG report 4 The Northern Way Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed Rail for the North, March 2011, page The Northern Way Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed Rail for the North, March 2011, page 29.

38 benefits could be up to three times the size of the welfare benefits assessed in a conventional cost benefit appraisal A report by Greengauge and KPMG, found that areas of greater connectivity have higher wage levels and found strong links between employment density and rail connectivity. That same report suggests that areas like the North East could see more than a doubling in the rate of employment growth Evidence from accountants, economists and transport consultants suggests that high speed rail could have a dramatic effect on the economies of the Midlands and the North. For Britain to remain competitive in the world economy, a large portion of the workforce and population cannot continue to be ignored. 4. How does HSR fit with the Government s transport policy objectives 4.1. To reiterate, for too long our country s transport planning has been short sighted and shortterm. HS2 offers the chance for forward thinking and much needed long term planning HS2 also helps to achieve the Government s goal of promoting more sustainable travel. High speed rail is one of the most carbon effective methods of mass transit. HS2 has the potential to reduce the number of internal flights, reducing aviation carbon emissions HS2 will link up to existing transport airports, HS1, commuter lines, etc, bringing existing networks closer together and helping to create a unified, national transport system The links to airport and HS1 are critical for British business and tourism high speed rail will allow for better access to European and other foreign markets, in addition to sending a signal that Britain is open for business. 5. Conclusion 5.1. On behalf of all members of the Campaign for High Speed Rail, I hope the Select Committee strongly considers what high speed rail will do for our entire country. Everyone is set to benefit from greater connectivity. This is a project of national significance and a once in a generation opportunity that must be seized. June Greengauge and KPMG, High Speed Rail in Britain: Consequences for employment and economic growth, Feb 2010, page 25.

39 Written evidence from the Cardiff Business Partnership (HSR 188) Given plans for High Speed 2, which will bring every major English and Scottish City at least 30 minutes closer to London (for example Manchester to London in one hour 15 minutes) then an upgrade to the Great Western Mainline (GWML) is essential if Cardiff is to remain competitive in both UK and European terms. This is especially important given that Greengauge21/KPMG found that HS2 would have a negative impact on the Welsh economy, thereby restricting Cardiff s capacity to address Wales deteriorating GVA/capita Vs the UK average. The Cardiff City Region, home to 1.4M people, half the Welsh population, has the potential to transform Welsh economic performance. Cardiff itself contains a Leading UK Russell Group University; has a diversifying employment base, has achieved amongst the largest growth in the private sector in UK and now has ~80,000 inward commuters in a total work force of nearly 200,000 or one third of the entire city region workforce. From a business perspective transport connectivity is crucial especially inter and intra regional transport. For example, Admiral Insurance s (one of Wales leading private sector companies) recent statements as regards public transport provide a stark warning: Admiral would not locate in Cardiff today with >2hr travel time to London Improved connectivity to Heathrow maybe needed to maintain a Cardiff HQ in the long term. In March 2011, the Department for Transport (DfT) announced that the GWML would be electrified as far as Cardiff; returning Cardiff-Paddington journey times to those that existed in 1980, at 1 hour 45 minutes. That work will be completed by 2017 alongside other upgrades including introduction of ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) and a fleet of new Inter City Express Programme (IEP) trains. In May 2011, First Great Western (FGW) announced their intention not to take up the option to extend their franchise beyond 2013, bringing forward the tendering process for a longer term and perhaps more strategic arrangement. The Cardiff Business Partnership believes that the electrification programme and franchising process should be a catalyst for the implementation of long term and incremental upgrade of the Great Western Corridor. This position acknowledges that whilst a dedicated new high-speed line is desirable, it would be at least 25 years before such a scheme could be delivered at a cost of over 15Bn. A pragmatic approach would see a series of ongoing upgrades to the existing rail corridor, with electrification as the foundation that can deliver significant benefits in terms of capacity, journey times and Heathrow access by 2025 which collectively will help provide a stimulus to the Welsh economy. A deliverable target is: Cardiff to London journey times of less than 80 minutes at least twice an hour Cardiff to Heathrow journey times of less than 90 minutes at least twice an hour Figure 1 - Illustration of potential enhancements to the Great Western Line

40 It is anticipated that the above performance criteria can be delivered from a range of enhancements to both infrastructure and service patterns, as suggested in the following sections. 1 - Heathrow Access In the first instance, for inclusion in CP5 (Network Rail s planning period), a new western link should be constructed to Heathrow from the GWML. BAA recently cancelled plans for Airtrack, which would have linked Heathrow Terminal 5 to the Staines-Windsor commuter line from Reading (in blue below). A far better option for Swindon, Bristol, Cardiff and the Thames Valley is to see a new western route into Terminal 5 to link up with the existing Heathrow express line as shown in red below (from NR GW Route Utilisation Strategy). This would allow a Heathrow express service to operate from Reading to serve passengers from South Wales and South West England. Figure 2 - Excerpt from Network Rail's Great Western Route Utilisation Strategy re: Heathrow Access The HS2 focussed exploration of Heathrow access should be extended to include the GWML so that direct services could eventually run to a new HSR station at Heathrow from Cardiff and Bristol. As the DfT found in its 2002 review of UK airport capacity, Future Airport Capacity in the UK, Wales and SW England has the greatest need for better access to Heathrow than any other region in the UK (outside the SE England). The study found the leakage of passengers to other regions, mainly South East England Airports and specifically Heathrow, was about 65 per cent for both Wales and South West England, the highest in the UK. For each region, the total annual trips were estimated at 3.4 million and 7.2 million respectively. That was 10.6 million in total, with about 6.5 million using airports in the SE England and in particular, Heathrow. Most of these Heathrow journeys are by car indicating a latent demand for better Great Western Main Line connectivity to Heathrow. The DfT reports also made some other relevant statements:.. it does appear that Wales is suffering in attracting inward investment because it does not offer a wide range of air services to European centres.

41 It is important for Wales to maintain access to key London airports, especially Heathrow and Gatwick. Even if Cardiff was to provide a much wider range of services and frequencies than it currently offers, it is likely that a large number of Welsh air passengers would continue to use airports in the South East of England. Their [South East England airports] route networks especially for long haul, will continue to be wider than the route networks offered by regional airports. Links to London are also important, particularly for the business community. There are also at least ten return flights per day from Cardiff and Bristol airports to Schipol. Better access to Heathrow could deliver a significant modal shift and reduce the need for this number of short haul flights and resulting CO 2 emissions. This position should be set against a situation in which Wales continues to be disadvantaged by competitive transport investment elsewhere in the UK and a significant deterioration in services from Cardiff Airport since A Series of Incremental Upgrades to the GWML Determine the theoretical maximum speed of the GWML based on the curvature of the current alignment, etc Then, identify sections of track that may restrict this theoretical maximum speed (> 125 mph) as a result of constraints in curvature, junctions, signalling, etc. Then suggest and scope works (realignment, 4-tracking, junctions, signalling, ballast, etc) and costs to address. For example, Wootton Bassett grade separated junction 4-tracking of Didcot to Wootton Basset & perhaps Bristol Parkway A new Severn Crossing New/upgraded section(s) of the South Wales main line (eg Newport by-pass Estimate costs of each of the incremental infrastructure upgrades to achieve sustained higher speed of >140mph (track, ballast, signalling, gantries, other civils, safety, etc) Assess impact of speed upgrades on route pathways (eg between Bristol Parkway and Yate Junction for X-country services to the Midlands) and the need for 4-tracking to accommodate different service patterns and traffic speeds. Explore different stopping patterns (eg less stops between Cardiff and London), schedules, etc, and their potential impact on capacity, operational costs, passenger revenues and journey times; also review impact on freight usage. One of the most congested sections of the GWML is actually between London and Reading (as shown below from Network Rail s Great Western Route Utilisation Strategy). If a new line is built, one section could be from London via Heathrow to just west of Reading where it can connect to the existing GWML. This should be included in the consideration of HSR rail access to Heathrow as set out in plans for HS2.

42 Figure 3 - Excerpt from Network Rail's Great Western Route Utilisation Strategy re: Capacity Constraints Give the ~145 miles distance between Cardiff and Paddington, an 80-minute journey would require an average speed of approximately 109 mph. As a comparator, the WCML service between Manchester Piccadilly and Euston, as a result of its 9Bn upgrade, now provides a 1 hour 58 minute service for the 185 mile journey, at an average speed of ~95mph (on a line with a max running speed of 125mph). Even achieving this average speed on the GWML between Cardiff and Paddington, would deliver a journey time of approximately 90 minutes. 3 - Other GWML Corridor Considerations What maximum speed will be specified for the new inter-city trains to be procured as part of the IEP programme? Given the potential for the track to cope with speeds of >140mph then it would be prudent to specify >140mph What is the freight impact (can t run >140mph trains if <80mph freight train in the way) especially between Didcot and Bristol with only two tracks; will this strengthen the case for further 4-tracking? Electrification to Swansea and the Valleys Electrification of the diversionary route via Kemble and to Birmingham from Bristol and Cardiff up both sides of the Severn at the same time via Cheltenham and Gloucester) In terms of termination stations in South Wales, aside from Cardiff Central, Swansea and Newport, consideration should be given to: Pontypridd, Cardiff Airport (new on site-station) and Swansea Parkway (new station). The franchise tendering process for First Great Western and Arriva Trains Wales services presents an opportunity to explore these options more fully. In addition to the improvements to the GWML, there is also the potential to provide more effective and seamless connectivity to both HS1, HS2 and Crossrail

43 As part of HS2, a new interchange is proposed at Old Oak Common in West London to enable transfer between the GWML, HS2 and Crossrail. A direct link is also proposed from HS2 to HS1 to provide through services for all Northern and Scottish cities. A link should also be provided from the GWML so that through trains can access HS1 and the Channel Tunnel and European destinations from Wales and SW England. If not, every other major UK city will have this capability but not Cardiff and Bristol. Would it be possible to run the occasional Intercity express onto/into Crossrail and into central London? Recommendations Given plans for major upgrades on the GWML corridor in the next ten years, the introduction of the IEP trains and the upcoming tendering process for the FGW Franchise, there is now an opportunity to develop a more strategic vision for this route. This would place the economic needs and expectations of the major cities along the GW Corridor at the heart of the review and recognise the importance of the Great Western Line to the Welsh Economy. It is therefore recommended, that a comprehensive and strategic, Great Western Corridor study is undertaken to examine: The costs, practicality and benefits of a range of GWML infrastructure upgrades that will contribute to a reversal in the decline in Wales GVA/capita Vs the UK average, by achieving the following performance objectives Cardiff to London Journey times of less than 80 minutes at least twice an hour Cardiff to Heathrow journey times of less than 90 minutes at least twice an hour Changes to TOC franchise and service patterns should be explored if they can also contribute to achieving the above targets Improved access to Heathrow from the GWML(west) Access and interchange with HS1/HS2 services and the running direct service from GWML to HS1 Access and interchange with Crossrail Further electrification of the network to Swansea, Plymouth and beyond Identity potential funding sources (these could include direct government capital investment, TOC contribution, Local Authority borrowing, other transport providers, etc) The objective is to develop a clear business case, with a focus on the wider economic benefits, for a programme of incremental upgrades to the GWML. This work should be undertaken on the same basis as the work undertaken to date by the DfT in developing the business case for HS2. June 2011

44 Written evidence from the Cardiff Business Partnership (HSR 188A) Summary The new High Speed Line from London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds (HS2) will bring most major English and Scottish cities at least 30 minutes closer to London (for example Manchester to London in one hour 15 minutes). The DfT also calculates economic benefits in excess of 40Bn with the first phase alone generating over 40,000 jobs. In response, the Cardiff Business Partnership believe, that in addition to electrification, a major upgrade to the GWML is essential if Cardiff is to remain competitive in both UK and European terms. This is especially important given that Greengauge21/KPMG found that High Speed 2 (Greengauge21/KPMG, March 2010 High Speed Rail in Britain, Consequences for employment and economic growth ), would have a negative impact on the Welsh economy thereby restricting Cardiff s capacity to address Wales deteriorating GVA/capita Vs the UK average. That report found that HS2 would result in: 21,000 less jobs in Wales to % lower annual growth in Wales to average lower income in This analysis assumed the GWML would be electrified with Cardiff-London journey times of 105 minutes (vs >125 mins today) If the DfT believe that additional expenditure is necessary to mitigate the environmental impacts of HS2, then surely the same logic means that proportionate investment (in addition to that already committed) must be made on the GWML to mitigate the economic impact on Wales and SW England. This is especially important given Welsh tax payers will be paying for HS2 as well as those in England. This also would be consistent with the UK Government s stated objective of encouraging a more even distribution of economic growth across the UK This paper sets out further details of this position. 1 - Impact of HS2 on Wales Economic Impact Whilst the Cardiff Business Partnership broadly supports the UK Government s aspiration for a UK HSR network, it does not feel that what is proposed represents a truly UK National network. In fact, as currently configured, the plans ignore Wales and SW England. Furthermore, whilst the DfTs consultation paper presents a compelling business case for HS2 in terms of the positive economic benefits, it does not explore the economic impacts of the proposals on Wales and SW England. The only substantive work in this regard was undertaken by Greengauge21 in Their key findings, prepared in associated with KPMG, were as follows: Overall UK Impact of UK HSR Overall, HSR could boost annual GVA (a measure of economic output) in 2040 by between 17bn and 29bn, depending on how effectively this network could enable other service changes on the rail network to be implemented and capacity constraints to be addressed

45 The HSR network could contribute between 25,000 and 42,000 additional jobs in Britain, as more productive businesses offer higher wages and attract people into the labour market. KPMG has only been able to model those jobs that are expected to come from domestic residents encouraged to enter the labour market but expect that attracting foreign firms and workers to the country could give rise to a further positive impact on employment The following are tables show the regional impact on growth and employment of HSR Employment Impact Wales will have 21,000 less jobs in 2040 as a result of HSR Annual employemt growth rate will be 0.05% lower as a result of HSR

46 Wage/GVA Impact HSR leaves Wales worse off by 0.04% in its average annual growth rate Average wage in Wales will be 600 lower as a result of HSR by 2040 Summary of impact of Wales and SW England of UK HSR The Greengauge/KPMG analysis as regards Wales and SW England was as follows: Wales sees HSR connections to Cardiff along the Great Western route, although modelled journey time savings of around 20 minutes to London are smaller than for other HSR routes as HS- WW has not been modelled as a full HSR scheme. The growth in business connectivity improves wages by some 130 per annum by 2040 and attracts around 400 new residents into the labour market. However, business and employment growth is abstracted somewhat to the most significantly affected areas in the north and Midlands of England slowing overall employment growth rates. The South West benefits from an HSR connection to Bristol and areas can benefit through interchange with the HSR network at Bristol, Birmingham and London. However, limited journey time improvements have been modelled for Greater Western services which explains the relatively small impacts in these areas. The impact is again to ease employment growth rates by around 1/20th of a percentage point per annum although wages are forecast to rise slightly by around 0.2% by As with the impacts in Wales, if a full HSR line to Bristol and Cardiff were modelled, the impacts would be commensurately greater Cardiff Business Partnership Position It is clear then that the HSR programme as currently presented is at best neutral in economic development terms for Wales and SW England and most likely negative. Given the Government s stated ambition to encourage more balanced economic development across the UK, it is clear some compensatory initiatives are required. This has also to be set against the fact that over the last twenty years, multi-billion pound upgrades of the East and West Coast Main Lines have resulted in Leeds and Manchester having comparable or faster rail journey times to London than Cardiff, despite being 50 miles further away. Post HS2 these cities will be over 30 minutes closer to London than Cardiff.

47 It is also unclear from a funding perspective whether HS2 is a UK scheme, an England Wales scheme or an England only scheme. This has funding consequences for the devolved administrations: For a UK scheme or even and England/Wales scheme it is the case that Welsh tax payers will contribute some 5% of the overall 32Bn cost in the next 20 years - or approx 1.6Bn for a scheme that is, as currently proposed, damaging to the Welsh economy. If it is an England only scheme then a Barnet consequential must be considered to provide an equitable amount of funds to add to the Welsh block grant which can be spent on transport enhancements. Given the above, it is the view of the Cardiff Business Partnership, that the current plans for a new > 32 billion high-speed rail line from London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds (High Speed 2) will only exacerbate the issues facing the Welsh economy. As presented above, the current proposals for HSR in the UK indicate that the economies of Wales and South West England will suffer as a direct consequence. Furthermore, that work assumed that the Great Western Main Line would be electrified. Whilst the decision to electrify is welcome, it must be viewed as a bare minimum investment and that an ongoing programme of enhancements must be planned and delivered over the next fifteen years. Cardiff Business Partnership Recommendations That the DfT undertake a full economic analysis of the impact of its HSR plans on all of the UK and especially Wales and SW England That the funding arrangements and implications for the devolved administrations are clarified That a complimentary and incremental upgrade of the GWML for faster running (>140mph) and higher capacity is investigated and assessed in full (to the same standard and criteria as were used for HS2) Impact re: Heathrow Access and interchange with HS1 and HS2 The CBP is disappointed that the Heathrow access question ignores the potential of an interchange with and access from, the GWML corridor from the west. As the DfT found in its 2002 review of UK airport capacity, Future Airport Capacity in the UK, Wales and SW England has a greater need for better access to Heathrow than any other region in the UK (outside the SE England). The study found the leakage of passengers to other regions, mainly South East of England Airports and especially Heathrow, was about 65 per cent for both Wales and South West England, the highest in the UK. For each region, the total annual trips were estimated at 3.4 million and 7.2 million respectively. That was 10.6 million in total, with about 6.5 million using airports in SE England and in particular, Heathrow. Most of these Heathrow journeys are by car indicating a latent demand for better Great Western Main Line connectivity to Heathrow. The report also made some other relevant statements:.. it does appear that Wales is suffering in attracting inward investment because it does not offer a wide range of air services to European centres. It is important for Wales to maintain access to key London airports, especially Heathrow and Gatwick. Even if Cardiff was to provide a much wider range of services and frequencies than it currently offers, it is likely that a large number of Welsh air passengers would continue to use airports in the South East of England. Their [South East England airports] route networks especially for long haul, will continue to be wider than the route networks offered by regional airports. Links to London are also important, particularly for the business community.

48 There are also at least ten return flights per day from Cardiff and Bristol airports to Schipol. Better access to Heathrow could deliver a significant modal shift and reduce the need for this number of short haul flights and resulting CO 2 emissions. This position should be set against a situation in which Wales has historically been disadvantaged by competitive transport investment elsewhere in the UK and a significant deterioration in services from Cardiff Airport since Finally, current plans for HS2 envisage a direct link to HS1 no integration between HS1 and the GWML is proposed. Cardiff Business Partnership Recommendations That the discussions and investigations of HSR access to Heathrow are broadened to include enhanced access from the GWML corridor from the west and in particular the potential, in the first instance, of a Heathrow Express from Reading direct to Terminal 5 using a new link between the GWML and the airport. That the exploration of options to link HS2 to HS1 should also be extended to include the GWML and its connectivity to both HS2 and HS1

49 2 - A Strategy to Mitigate the Negative Economic Impact of HS2 on Wales Cardiff City Region The Cardiff City Region, home to 1.4M people within 20 miles of the city centre or half the Welsh population, has the potential to transform Welsh economic performance. Cardiff itself contains a leading UK Russell Group University, has a diversifying employment base, has achieved amongst the largest growth in the private sector in UK and now has ~80,000 inward commuters in a total work force of nearly 200,000. From a business perspective transport connectivity is crucial especially inter and intra regional transport. For example, a leading member of the Cardiff Business Partnership, Admiral Insurance s (one of Wales leading company s with over 3000 staff and a > 4Bn Mkt Cap) recent statements as regards public transport provide a stark warning: Admiral would not locate in Cardiff today with >2hr travel time to London Improved connectivity to Heathrow maybe needed to maintain a Cardiff HQ in the long term The provision of an effective Cardiff City Region public transit system is essential for the longterm success of its business. These statements underline the need to invest in transport connectivity to help address Wales economic problems. Current Plans for the GWML In March 2011, the DfT announced that the GWML would be electrified (alongside introduction of ERTMS and other enhancements) as far as Cardiff; returning Cardiff- Paddington journey times to those that existed in 1980, at 1 hour 45 minutes. However, given the journey time benefits that will accrue to cities on HS2, the electrification programme will still leave Cardiff at a significant disadvantage. This will continue a trend that that has seen journeys from Cardiff to London go from 30 minutes faster to 20 minutes slower when compared to the journey from Manchester to London. However, there is an opportunity to develop a more strategic and ambitions vision for the GWML and one that could see a TOC and NR develop a far closer, longer term and more cost effective partnership as McNulty recently recommended. This, in part, is due to FGW s decision, in May 2011, not to take up the option to extend their franchise beyond 2013, bringing forward the tendering process for the route. Opportunities for Economic Regeneration on the GWML The Cardiff Business Partnership believes that the electrification programme and franchising process should be used as a catalyst to develop and implement a long term and incremental upgrade of the Great Western Corridor. This position acknowledges that whilst a dedicated new high-speed line is desirable, it would be at least 25 years before such a scheme could be delivered at a cost of over 15Bn. A pragmatic approach would see a series of ongoing upgrades to the

50 existing rail corridor (as suggested by the Bow Group in their report, The Right Track, in January 2010), with electrification as the foundation. This approach would deliver significant benefits in terms of capacity, journey times and Heathrow access, which collectively will help provide a stimulus to the Welsh economy and mitigate the impact of HS2. A deliverable target is: Cardiff to London journey times of less than 80 minutes at least twice an hour Cardiff to Heathrow journey times of less than 90 minutes at least twice an hour It is anticipated that these performance criteria can be delivered from a range of enhancements to both infrastructure and service patterns, for example: In the first instance, for inclusion in CP5 (Network Rail s planning period), a new western link should be constructed to Heathrow from the GWML. BAA recently cancelled plans for Airtrack which would have linked Heathrow Terminal 5 to the Staines- Windsor commuter line from Reading (in blue on diag). A far better option for Swansea, Cardiff, Newport, Bristol, Swindon and The Thames Valley is a new western route into Terminal 5 to link up with the existing Heathrow express line as shown in red below (from Network Rail s Great Western Route Utilisation Strategy). This would allow a Heathrow express service to operate from Reading to serve passengers from South Wales, South West England and The Thames Valley. In addition, a series of ongoing incremental upgrades to the GWML (see diagram) should be implemented over the next 15 years, that will allow non-stop services to run at speeds of >140mph. The GWML should also be intergrated with HS2 and HS1 to allow through services to Europe. In terms of termination stations in South Wales, aside from Cardiff Central, consideration should be given to: Pontypridd, Cardiff Airport (new station) and Swansea Parkway (new station). Given the ~145 miles distance between Cardiff and Paddington, an 80-minute journey would require an average speed of approximately 109 mph. As a comparator, the WCML service between Manchester Piccadilly and Euston, as a result of its 9Bn upgrade, now provides a 1 hour 58 minute service for the 185 mile journey, at an average speed of ~95mph (on a line with a max running speed of 125mph). Even achieving this average speed on the GWML between Cardiff and Paddington, would deliver a journey time of approximately 90 minutes. It is essential therefore that the DfT and WAG commission a strategic, Great Western Corridor study the objective of which is to develop a clear business case, with a focus on the wider economic benefits, of a programme of incremental upgrades to the GWML. This work should be undertaken on the same basis as the work completed to date by the DfT in developing

51 the business case for HS2. After all, the wider Severnside region has a population in excess of 5M people and includes the Cardiff City Region (1.4M), Swansea City Region (0.5M) the Bristol City Region (>1M). That s the same as Scotland. A complementary investment in a Cardiff City Region Metro As has been demonstrated across Europe, to maximise the returns from the investment in HSR between cities there also needs to be a complementary investment in city/city region transport infrastructure. The same applies to the Great Western Corridor. Specifically, The Cardiff Metro (illustrated below) presents just such an opportunity and one, which, using the planned electrification of the valley lines as a catalyst, can be delivered incrementally over perhaps 15 years from The Cardiff Metro concept was fully explored in, A Metro for Wales s Capital City Region Connecting Cardiff Newport and the Valleys, written by Mark Barry and published by the Cardiff Business Partnership and The Institute of Welsh Affairs in February The benefits to the Cardiff City Region are significant: Stimulate economic growth throughout the region leading to increased GVA/capita Vs UK Major modal shift (>20%) and reduction in CO 2 emissions A coherent & sustainable city region plan for housing, transport and the economy A psychological and confidence boost to the residents of the valleys Both the upgrade of the GWML and the Cardiff Metro could deliver a major economic stimulus to the economy of South Wales and especially the Valleys and halt a long-term decline in Wales economic fortunes. Given plans for HS2 it is essential that both schemes are progressed to ensure the Welsh economy does not suffer as a result of HS2. About the Author Mark is the author of the paper, A Metro for Wales Capital City Region Connecting Cardiff, Newport and The Valleys published by the Cardiff Business Partnership and the Institute of Welsh Affairs in February June 2011