The Battle for Monte Cassino A History

Transcription

1 The Battle for Monte Cassino A History The struggle for the Gustav Line dragged from the winter of 1943 to the spring of It was an inspiring and traumatic test of endurance for the Allied troops forced to extract the Germans from their positions in the mountains of southern Italy. The most famous flaring of this bitter conflict came in a series of four battles fought between January 17th and May 18th in 1944, which have since become collectively known as the Battle of Monte Cassino. The sleepy backwater of Cassino, with its ancient Benedictine abbey atop the mountain, became for a few months the very tipping point of the Allied advance north. The prize for its capture was an open road to Rome. Geographically, Monte Cassino provides the ideal defensive position, a fact cemented by the constant study of these qualities in military colleges. Sitting astride the mountainous spine of central Italy, the peak looms over three converging valleys the Liri, the Garigliano and the Rapido each with their own river. The latter two of these rivers create a natural moat to the south, while the Aurunci Mountains stretch between the Liri valley and the coast. These mountains make for dangerous terrain, being uneven and without footpaths. Finally, at its rear, the Cassino massif rises into the Abruzzi range. The Germans used the natural fortification of the land to their advantage, seeding it with countless defences that extended between Gaeta and Ortona, across the breadth of the Gustav Line. Here, the Allied troops met with the most formidable defensive system of any in the war. Taking a special interest in the Gustav Line, Hitler ordered that it be upgraded to fortress strength. Defences were multi-layered, underground passages linked dugouts, and anti-personnel minefields covered the plains below the mountains. By removing buildings and trees and replacing them with fields of fire, the Germans enhanced the defensive advantages naturally afforded by the land. Furthermore, caves had been extended, while cover was strengthened with railway girders and concrete. Hitler was also adamant that retreat from the line was not an option. British and American bombers dropped leaflets over the German defenders on January 24th 1944, offering them Stalingrad or Tunis destruction or surrender. Yet Hitler issued the following decree on January 28th, declaring that surrender was unthinkable: All officers and men...must be penetrated by a fanatical will to end this battle victoriously, and never to relax until the last enemy soldier has been destroyed... the battle must be fought in a spirit of holy hatred for an enemy who is conducting a pitiless war of extermination against the German people... The fight must be hard and merciless, not only against the enemy, but against all officers and units who fail in this decisive hour. 1

2 German Panzer commander Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin claimed that, when there was a question of retreating or not, Hitler s simple solution was no, which of course was in very many cases simply quite impossible because we were thoroughly beaten and had only the chance to go back and rally again or be made prisoners. Both the resilience of the Germans and their geographical situation posed a considerable barrier to the Allied penetration north. Napoleon s statement that Italy is a boot. You have to enter it from the top was testimony to the mountainous task that the geography of the land quite literally posed. Historically, Rome had proven particularly difficult to storm from the south and success had not occurred since Belisarius triumph in AD 536. The advance of the British Eighth Army under Sir Bernard Montgomery on the Eastern coast of Italy capturing Ortona as they went had been halted by atrocious weather conditions by the turn of the year. This ruled out Route 5 to Rome, leaving only Routes 6 and 7. Route 7, the old Appian Way, was deemed an unsuitable axis of attack. Being narrow and easily defensible, as the Allies quickly discovered, this sequence of valleys along the western coast was rejected in favour of an approach towards Cassino. Thus it was Route 6, which ran up the old Via Casiliana, that the Allied Command turned in early Not only was this impregnable position their third choice of advance but also the weather that beset the Eighth Army continued to batter their comrades to the west. The winter of was dire frosts fractured metal, frostbite and exposure accounted for more casualties than action, and it rained for fifty of the last seventy days of Despite the new technologies available to both sides in WWII, the terrain of Monte Cassino sent the fighting back to a premechanised age, argues Parker. Always a hindrance, the conditions frequently became lethal too. Moreover, the troops had to resort to using mules to carry the wounded, so unsuitable were vehicles in the boggy and steep valleys of the approach to Cassino. The innumerable rivers of the region only served to slow the advance. It was thanks to Donald Bailey s Bailey bridges pre-fabricated, easily deployable platforms, first used in Tunisia and subsequently in Sicily and Southern Italy that the Allies could crawl across the torrential flows that barred their approach. Moving sluggishly, the Allies followed the Garigliano from the south and arrived at the flooded valley of the Rapido to the east. The sight that met them must have been awe-inspiring and not a little daunting the peak of Monte Cassino on Hill 516, dominating the convergence of the valleys, it s abbey resembling a Bavarian castle more than a house of worship. Built by St. Benedictine of Nurcia in AD 529, the abbey was an influential part of the culture of Christianity in Western Europe. Having been largely destroyed in an earthquake in 1349, it was quickly rebuilt, becoming the vast complex that dominated the massif and the town of Cassino below. Over the centuries, it has been a popular destination for pilgrims, a centre for fine arts, and home to the writings of Cicero, Horace, Ovid and Virgil, among others. Most significantly, in relation to the Battle of Monte Cassino, it had been declared a non-combatant zone. Pax or peace was the sole word carved above the gate of the abbey. But for five months this peace would be desecrated by fierce combat, unnecessary loss and devastation. This began with the German Tenth Army, commanded by the formidable Field Marshal Smiling Albert 2

3 Kesselring, who at 58 was one of the most resourceful and stubborn commanders in the entire Wehrmacht. Assiduously avoiding the abbey, the Germans dug into the slopes below its walls. They had prepared well, with a series of interlocking bunkers and fortifications sealing off southern Italy across the Gustav Line, and these defences were superbly constructed and ably manned. What is more, in the months preceding the battle, the Allies had chased the Germans north, reasonably assuming that they were fleeing all the way to Rome. Instead, the Germans were conducting a calculated withdrawal, buying themselves time to reinforce the Gustav Line. It would take 20 Allied divisions to smash through the German defences. First Battle The US Fifth Army, under Lieutenant-General Mark Clark, fanned out across the three valleys in the middle of January. Having endured some six weeks of heavy engagement to reach the Gustav Line on January 15th, Fifth Army had just two days to recover and prepare for the first offensive against the wall of mountains in its path. The order of battle was thus: the British X Corps on the left flank of the 20-mile front to cross the Garigliano; US II Corps in the centre to ford the Gari just south of Cassino, and the French Expeditionary Corps to wheel northwest to enclose the German forces with an attack on Monte Cairo. Speculation suggests that Clark was not fully convinced of the plan s potential for success. Rather, with the landings at Anzio due on January 22nd, he had hoped to divert German attention and thus leave the right flank of the Gustav Line exposed. Either way, it is evident that the first attempt on the line was rushed, under-prepared and unlikely to strike the decisive blow. Nonetheless, on the night of January 17th, sections of British X Corps crossed the Garigliano where they were met by the fire of von Senger s XIV Panzer Corps. Von Senger, a devout Catholic and member of the Benedictine order, marshalled the German defence brilliantly and with the British armour struggling to deploy effectively due to the terrain once crossing the river, the three divisions of X Corps suffered considerable casualties, rapidly weakening their position. Despite this, the Germans were clearly worried: von Senger requested reserves to bolster the 94th Infantry Division, and two additional Panzer divisions were drafted in from the north. Three days later, the US 36th Division, the renowned Texas men, made a night-time attempt at crossing the Gari. They found the position untenable and were nearly obliterated in just two days, losing more than 2,200 soldiers. Only 40 men were reported to have made it back across the river. Once again, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, whose vicious counterattacks pinned the 36th to the banks of the Gari, exploited the minimal Allied armoured support. On January 24th, the 34th Infantry Division of the US II Corps launched an attack across a fordable stretch of the Rapido, north of Cassino. Struggling through the marshy floodplain of the river, the 34th managed to gain a mountain foothold by squeezing the German 44th Infantry from the foothills. On their right flank, the indomitable Alphonse Juin led the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC). The Corps, numbering in excess of 100,000, was largely composed of North African colonial troops. They passed through Monte Cifalco to the northeast, towards Monte Belvedere to the north of Cassino. As was sadly becoming customary, these 3

4 specialised mountain troops incurred huge losses, though not without securing a strong position in the process. The three main prongs of the assault had stalled, the Allies meeting stiff resistance and having no clear solution. Even a switch of tactics the US 34th and elements of the depleted 36th fighting along the ridge directly north of the abbey yielded little success. The terrain, weather and stoic German defence proved more than a match for the exhausted American troops. After more than a month of fruitless endeavour, Allied Command forced a final assault on February 11th against the abbey and town. This three-day conflict became famous for the heroics of the 34th Infantry, whose actions are counted amongst the finest of the war. However, the losses were significant, as the Allies sustained 80% casualties in some sections. There is no doubting that this first battle for Monte Cassino had left the Allies chastened, Clark in particular wary of the resistance shown towards their waves of attack. He was blamed for his hesitancy and inexperience, but it may simply have been that, in commanding the entire 5th Army and overseeing the Anzio landings, he had too much to handle at once. This coastal town was witness to one of the largest amphibious landings of the war and this surprise tactic initially made progress unopposed. But indecision and inactivity, for which Clark was perhaps to blame, stalled the advance and permitted the Germans to halt the assault, itself designed to alleviate pressure on Cassino, and thus trap the Allies at the coast. In comparison, the Germans had two commanders: von Mackensen, leading the 14th Army at Anzio, and von Vietinghoff, directing the Tenth at Cassino. In addition, Clark had to deal with Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg. A living legend and veteran of WWI who had won a Victoria Cross for his bravery in action, Freyberg was a formidable and influential character. He commanded the New Zealand Corps (the 2nd New Zealand Division and 4th Indian Division), who were sent to replace the exhausted US divisions. Freyberg and Clark s relationship is open to much debate, but it has been suggested that the natural forcefulness of the former played a part in persuading Clark to destroy the abbey by bombardment. Second Battle Operation Avenger Following on from the failed attempts of February 11th, the Allies determined to catch Cassino in a pincer between the northern ridge that was beside the abbey and the southern entrance to the town. The focal point of the southern attack would be the train station of Cassino. It was hoped that this tactic would isolate Cassino and open up the path into the Liri valley. However, the plan was rushed by the continuing struggle at Anzio, and the 4th Division had severe difficulties positioning themselves in the treacherous rocky terrain north of Cassino on Snakeshead Ridge. Given such progress, the Allied command became increasingly convinced that the abbey provided the solution that would break the Gustav Line. Flyovers had purported to see German occupants of the abbey, although Major-General Keyes of US II Corps was vocally dismissive of such reports, saying that; they ve been looking for so long they re seeing things. Regardless of any actual occupation (and there was in fact none), 4

5 the Allies legitimised the subsequent bombardment based on the potential use of the abbey as a defensive position. Freyberg made the case for the bombardment, and found support from Brigadier Harry Dimoline, acting commander of 4th Indian Division. It has also been suggested that members of the US Air Force had exaggerated their report, in order to illustrate the capabilities of what they considered to be an underused arm of the campaign. Either way, Clark was sceptical, but not enough to withstand the pressure: he took the order to General Sir Harold Alexander, commander of 15th Army Group, who signed it off. Thus, on the 15th and 16th of February, some 229 Allied planes along with the ground artillery of US II Corps unleashed one of the largest bombardments in history upon the abbey. The bombing certainly succeeded in levelling the abbey, though a substantial stretch of the outer wall and floors remained. There could be no doubt of its destruction when surveying the steaming rubble belonging to the one of Europe s finest examples of early-church architecture. Yet not one German soldier was pronounced dead as a result and Italian civilians were also caught in the fire. The accuracy of the bombings was no more than 10%, though that was not necessarily remarkable in an age before computerised weaponry systems. Clark himself almost became a casualty when a stray bomb landed near his headquarters, 20 miles away from the abbey, and the bombing was denounced by the Vatican as gross stupidity. Any confusion it may have elicited from the German defenders on the hillside was not capitalised upon, as the New Zealand Corps were not ready for an immediate assault, whilst the 4th Indian Division had not even been informed that a bombardment was due to take place. The surviving monks and civilians quite reasonably fled the scene, including the 80-year-old abbot Gregorio Diamare, who had remained at the Abbey since sending many of the monks away from the danger in September The German 1st Parachute Division, the embargo on the abbey quite emphatically broken by the bombing, slipped into the ruins, no doubt thankful for the improved defences. An eccentric tale of this strangest of conflicts occurred within the abbey, prior to its obliteration. In anticipation of the advancing Allies, two conscientious officers Lieutenant-Colonel Julius Schlegel and surgeon Captain Max Becker arranged to have the treasures housed within the abbey relocated to the Vatican as early as November This measured evacuation centred on the library and included countless manuscripts, Papal documents and decrees. The ancient artefacts were shipped to Rome, with a monk in each truck. This ingenious strategy to save this treasure-trove of history also denied Nazi collectors when it was safely transported into the Catholic Church s safekeeping. In the aftermath of the bombardment, the Royal Sussex Regiment embarked upon a series of night-time assaults along Snakeshead Ridge and point 593, suffering shockingly high casualties and being beaten back repeatedly. The Rajputana Rifles, alongside a detachment of Gurkhas, launched a frontal assault towards point 444. Both efforts were repulsed before the attack was called off. Perhaps the most memorable action of Operation Avenger occurred away from the main stage of the battle. Two companies of the 28th Maori Battalion forded the Rapido and seized the railway station. Waves of German counterattacks were held, the New Zealanders laying out a smokescreen to ward against being overwhelmed. Their ultimate withdrawal, under heavy fire, was a close run thing. The Germans counterattack against the Maori troops 5

6 dogged defence of Cassino s station was surprisingly limited, Kesselring himself worried that it would fail. But the indecision and poor planning that had plagued the Allied troops in the mountains meant that his worries were unfounded. The Allies were forced to surrender their gains and struggle back over the Rapido. Third Battle Forced to reassess, the Allies swiftly ruled out another crossing of the Rapido, not least because the weather had worsened. The sweeping move into the mountains to the north of Cassino had very nearly proved successful. Yet a more direct approach was decided upon punch two holes in the line around Cassino at the town and the hill above it, thus clearing the bottleneck that these positions created. Following this, British 78th Infantry, under the auspices of New Zealand Corps, would cross the Rapido at a safe distance and head to Rome, linking up with the troops beginning to squeeze out of Anzio after the failed German counterattack. But as always at Cassino the atrocious weather delayed the necessary bombardment of the fortifications on the surrounding peaks. 20 days later, on March 15th, a second cataclysmic bombardment was launched. This time, the New Zealanders advanced under supporting fire. However, the unrelenting weather, along with vast and waterlogged craters (inevitably created by the Allies themselves) hindered their progress. In spite of this, they captured Castle Hill and point 165, while the Indians beside them stormed neighbouring outposts. Two days later, Gurkhas of the 9th Rifles seized a position known as Hangman s Hill, just 250 yards from the base of the abbey walls. For almost a week they held this position against sniper fire and counterattack. In conjunction with these attacks, the New Zealanders seized the railway station at Cassino again and this time they held it. Only by house-to-house close-quarters fighting could they advance, resulting in a gradual loss of momentum. In both the town and on the hill, the Allies found themselves ground to a halt. The German 1st Parachute Division, fighting in small units, without leaders and with considerable weaponry, prevented any further advances with vicious and unexpected counterattacks. Harold Alexander later recommended them as one of the best forces in the entire Wehrmacht. Realising the battle to be in the balance, Freyberg committed further elements of the 78th Infantry Division to reinforce both lines of attack. Again, the fighting was in close proximity and with gains of mere yards. Although this fighting yielded few results, the Allies were able to close off the reinforcement route of the Germans through point 445. On March 23rd, the Allies were withdrawn, spent by the ferocity of the action. Freyberg himself was visibly shaken, his own son having been declared missing at Anzio. All that remained of another failed attack was to extract the stalwart Gurkha s from Hangman s Hill and make wholesale personnel changes. These came in the form of the British 78th occupying the mountains, and the British 1st Guards Brigade replacing the New Zealand Division. Fourth Battle Operation Diadem & Operation Strangle In response to the floundering offensive in the west, Alexander shifted the bulk of British Eighth Army to join Fifth Army. The former were now led by Bernard Montgomery s successor (reassigned to the impending invasion of Normandy), Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese, 6

7 and comprised of XIII Corps and Polish II Corps. As winter gave way to spring, troop movements became more easily achievable and the combined Fifth and Eighth Armies began to stir. Having realised the weakness of a full frontal assault, deceptions were laid in place: a fictional amphibious attack north of Rome was devised, and diversionary troop movements and radio messages were instigated. As late as the second day of the fourth and final battle for Cassino, Kesselring believed his four divisions were facing six, rather than the actual 13 Allied divisions. Operation Strangle, to deprive the Germans of communications, reinforcements and logistical flexibility, was perhaps the first lasting success of the whole Gustav offensive. But the German 1st Parachute Division was renowned for its initiative and resourcefulness, traits that would serve it well in the coming storm. With diversions and subterfuges in place, the Allied command set about enacting a fourpronged strategy, known as Operation Diadem, to root out the stubborn German defence. From the left flank on the coastal Route 7, the US II Corps would advance towards Rome. To their right, the French Corps would attack the bridgehead previously opened by X Corps in January, surging across the Garigliano. To their right flank, elements of the British XIII Corps (the 4th British Division and 8th Indian Division) would force a way through the Liri valley, followed by the Canadian Corps, led by General Tommy Burns. Finally, on the furthest right flank, Lieutenant-General Wladyslaw Anders led the Polish II Corps. In another bizarre footnote to the campaign, the Poles had with them Wojtek, an Iranian bear, enlisted as an official soldier when Allied commanders issued an order that prevented troops advancing on Rome from being accompanied by animals. The Polish II Corps would isolate the abbey and thus place the diadem upon the unfortunate head of Cassino. The plan began on May 11th with a bombardment at 11pm following its end, the ground attack was launched. On the coast, US II Corps made sluggish progress. However, the French Corps and British XIII Corps were more successful, having pushed over the rivers despite heavy opposition. The Allies succeeded in moving armour across, as well as Canadian and British infantry regiments. With this substantial support, they were able to cement a position over the Rapido. Perhaps the most momentous incident of the fourth battle was the Polish assault of Monte Calvario. Along Snakeshead Ridge, the Poles and German paratroopers fought for three days. It saw carnage on a scale, and in such concentration rarely seen since WWI: losses were staggering, with some 3,500 Polish troops killed in the unrelenting attacks. It is no surprise that to this day, the fourth battle of Monte Cassino holds a high place in Polish history, the cemetery at Cassino marking the fallen, whilst The Red Poppies on Monte Cassino, a song written on the eve of the battle, is among the most famous military songs in Poland. Wladyslaw Anders, who led the charge throughout the battle, was buried with his comrades when he died in By May 13th the pressure was starting to show and the German right wing began to crumble under the persistent attention of US Corps II. Meanwhile, the capture of Monte Cassino s neighbouring peaks by the French secured mountain footholds (though not exploited to their full potential, which might have secured a breakthrough) but did little to alleviate the con- 7

8 tinued strain on the British in the Liri valley. The next day the French Corps, with the feared North African troops, outflanked the Germans on the mountains parallel to the Liri valley, whilst the British 78th moved to isolate Cassino itself. With the ring tightening around the German forces, the Polish troops renewed their attacks, linking up with the British in the valley below Monte Cassino. Finally, on May 18th Polish troops entered the remnants of the abbey, finding a handful of wounded soldiers who had been abandoned in the flight. The heights of Monte Cassino had been won, but at substantial cost. From the landings of September 1943 to the German surrender in May 1945, some 312,000 Allied troops and 435,000 Germans were recorded killed, wounded or missing. Of all the battles during the Italian Campaign, the losses were most pronounced at Cassino, where some 200,000 troops on both sides and of all nationalities became casualties. What is more, atrocities committed by the French colonial Goumiers in the hills south of the Liri in May added a macabre addition to an already bitter conflict, their actions coining the phrase marocchinate or morrocanned to refer to violations perpetrated on enemy and civilian alike. These offences and the destruction of the countryside left an indelible mark on the Italian populace who, caught in the crossfire, were frequently displaced, if not killed. The scars of the conflict are still evident in the Cassino region and few families are without a story to tell of the five-month battle that savaged their homeland. Aftermath Like the advance that had preceded the assault on the Gustav Line, the passage through its broken gates was equally slow. Worn by a terrible winter and devastating losses, the Allies steadily regrouped and slipped through the gap they had created for themselves, before the eventual march north towards Rome. It was here that Clark already held in mixed regard for his involvement in the abbey s bombardment, and the way in which he handled the Anzio and Salerno landings made another contentious decision. With Kesselring s Tenth Army virtually surrounded Clark opted to head directly to Rome, which he entered on June 4th in triumph, two days before the Normandy landings. Despite some harsh criticisms of his decision, Clark s arrival in the newly liberated Rome was greeted with jubilation. Klaus Huebner, attached to 3rd US Division, described it as a dream, marvelling at the splendid buildings and clean-looking children, which were a welcome replacement to the customary sights of the battlefield. Meanwhile, Kesselring seized the opportunity afforded him by Clark s decision and headed north: though harried by Eighth Army and Fifth Army, he dictated the pace of the retreat and escaped with seven divisions to form a new line of defence known as the Gothic Line. Numerous battle honours were awarded for the sacrifices made in the Battle of Monte Cassino. Units involved in the first part of the campaign received the battle honour Cassino I. Cassino II was awarded to those who contributed to the second part of the battle, while all members of the Polish units obtained the Monte Cassino Commemorative Cross. Today, the abbey and hillside have been reconstructed. The cemetery of the Commonwealth in the valley below is one of the few remaining memorials to the devastation of Other nationalities are buried at further removes Americans at Anzio, Germans in the Rapido valley, 8

9 French and Italians in the Liri Valley. These cemeteries are a reminder of the sheer diversity of troops who fought at Monte Cassino, showing that despite the terrible losses, and the conflicts both internally within camps, and towards the opposition, men drawn from many different parts of the world were for five long months united in their sacrifice against Hitler s forces in Italy. Sources and recommendations Monte Cassino: Ten Armies in Hell Peter Caddick-Adams. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy Rick Atkinson. Imperial War Museum: 60th Anniversary Commemorative Document. The Phoenix Grand Island Films (1999). Face-to-Face BBC documentary featuring von Senger und Etterlin (1960). 9