Navy Gas Free Engineering SEA 04RS EXPAND THE ADVANTAGE DESIGN, BUILD, DELIVER AND MAINTAIN

Transcription

1 Navy Gas Free Engineering SEA 04RS DESIGN, BUILD, DELIVER AND MAINTAIN SHIPS AND SYSTEMS ON TIMEAND ON COST FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY EXPAND THE ADVANTAGE 1 THE FORCE BEHIND THE FLEET

2 Navy begins using gas test equipment after deaths during Pearl Harbor salvage ops 2

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4 Precautions Taken Against Toxic Gases: A systematic procedure for testing for toxic gas was employed, and was in charge of by Lieutenant Commander C. M. Parker, USN, a specialist in industrial gas hazards. A large bulletin board was used to inform personnel which compartments were safe and which should not be entered without proper mask protection. Although extraordinarily high concentrations of gases were found on the West Virginia (200,000 parts per million (ppm)) there were no individuals overcome by the toxic environment. If concentrations on the detectors reached 20 ppm the space was considered unsafe for entry except when entered with a rescue breathing apparatus or suitable face plate with air lead. 4

5 Regulatory History THE FORCE BEHIND THE FLEET Vessel Explodes in Guam; CO s start designating GFE as collateral duty * OSHA formed; mandates gas free program guidelines under 29CFR1915 Subpart B on all vessels Formal GFE Program established by NAVSEA S6470-AA-SAF-010 SAF10 Manual USCG mandates Marine Chemist inspections before USCG vessel inspections 5

6 Establishing a Navy Gas Free Program 6

7 Key Points from NAVSEA letter to OSHA, 14 November

8 Key Points from NAVSEA letter to OSHA, 14 November

9 Gas Free Engineering Program 9 9

10 Current Policies NAVSEA S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010 Technical Publication Industrial Ship Safety Manual for Fire Prevention and Response NAVSEA S6470-AA-SAF-010 Technical Publication Navy Maritime Confined Space Entry Program NAVSEA 8010 Technical Publication Industrial Ship Safety Manual for Fire Prevention and Response SECNAVINST Navy Gas Free Engineer Certification / Recertification Process OPNAVINST Navy Safety and Occupational Program Manual Forces Afloat NAVSEA Standard Item Confined Space Entry, Certification, Fire Prevention and Housekeeping OSHA 1915 Sub part B 10

11 Key Objectives Provide a Safe Working and Living Environment for the Crew Provide a Safe Working and Living Environment for the workers Provide Hazard Awareness Training of a General Nature for the Crew 11

12 Ships in Availability Fire Metrics 2015 to Present 12

13 Shipboard Fires Information 147 Fires from CY15 to present. HOT WORK 61 (41%) of those fires have something to do with hot work and are a violation in some aspect of NAVSEA standard item (80%) of those hot work fires involve contractor work. CLASS C FIRE 71 (48%) of those fires involve work on electrical equipment. 59 (83%) of those class C fires involve failure of electrical equipment. Work Practice is the overwhelming root cause for most fires followed by Supervision and Material Failure. 13 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

14 Shipboard Fires Root Cause Codes 1) Work Practice Failure to follow procedures or guidance Use of incorrect or outdated procedure Inattention to detail Inadequate Hazard Identification 2) Supervision Assignment of unqualified personnel Inadequate direction provided Inadequate review of work Poor oversight and/or inspection 3) Procedures Nonexistent procedure Procedure provides inadequate or unclear direction Procedure contains incorrect direction 4) Training Nonexistent training/qualification Inadequate training content Inadequate training/qualification frequency 5) Material Failure 6) 14

15 Shipboard Fires Root Cause Total # of Shipboard Fires Root Causes ) Work Practice 2) Supervision 3) Procedures 4) Training 15 5) Material Failure 6) Four Naval Shipyards RMC's SUPSHIPs Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect. 15

16 Shipboard Fires at Industrial Activities CY15-17 Total # of Shipboard Fires Extinguished SUPSHIPs 6 RMCs Four Naval Shipyards Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov CY 2015 CY 2016 CY 2017 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect. Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct 16 Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec **Fires onboard ships during a maintenance availability.

17 8 Shipboard Fires at Industrial Activities 2017 # of Shipboard Fires Extinguished 7 6 Occurrences SUPSHIPs RMCs Four Naval Shipyards 1 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 17 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

18 8 Shipboard Fires at Industrial Activities 2016 # of Shipboard Fires Extinguished 7 6 Occurrences SUPSHIPs RMCs Four Naval Shipyards 1 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 18 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

19 8 Shipboard Fires at Industrial Activities 2016 # of Shipboard Fires Extinguished 7 6 Occurrences SUPSHIPs RMCs Four Naval Shipyards 1 0 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 19 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

20 8 Shipboard Fires at Industrial Activities 2015 # of Shipboard Fires Extinguished 7 6 Occurrences SUPSHIPs RMCs Four Naval Shipyards 1 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 20 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

21 8 Shipboard Fires at Industrial Activities 2015 # of Shipboard Fires Extinguished 7 6 Occurrences SUPSHIPs RMCs Four Naval Shipyards 1 0 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 21 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

22 List of Shipboard Fires 2017 Section 1:1 Event Date Description Fire Extinguished by? 6/22/2017 Class C fire on # 2 40WT lube oil purifier motor controller in MMR#2. 6/21/2017 A power cable that supplies power to ship heated up at a splice point and ignited. (NAVSEA Employee) 6/20/2017 KTRs were conducting hot work inside 3 gen exhaust, embers fell and burned 2 SQFT of KTR plastic containment. 6/12/2017 KTR noticed smoke and reported to the Quarterdeck. Ships force responded and extinguished the fire. Norfolk responded to the Fire. 6/1/2017 Ship repair KTR's 440 VOC electric cables positioned along pier were observed burning/smoking by ship's (Contractor) Quarterdeck Watch personnel. 5/27/2017 Fire was caused by shipyard during hot work at the top od the sail. 5/22/2017 Welding slag dropped onto insulation material below the worksite, caused a class A fire. 5/22/2017 SKTR conducting blasting operations in the aft uptake severed a ship s installed 110 volt lighting circuit cable which shorted out and caused a class Charlie fire. 5/9/2017 While disconnecting temp diesel generator cables from FWD shore power MTS, a fire ball explosion from the MTS back panel happened. 5/8/2017 A temp lighting stringer was lying on top of a bag of lagging which ignited the lagging creating a class alpha (Contractor) fire. 5/4/2017 Class "C" fire was reported on # 1 waste water pump controller in M MR #1 and duty section IET was called away. 4/21/2017 KTR's were cutting STBD kingspost for removal, a spark fell into the groove of the kingpost gear and caught residual grease on fire. 4/21/2017 An improperly grounded welding machine arching at the grounding point, caused a Class "C" fire 4/4/2017 An EB shipyard worker noted sparking from a temp. servive line topside. 3/21/2017 Class A fire reported in CIWS mount 21. Fire extinguished by ships force IET using CO2. 22 Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect.

23 List of Shipboard Fires 2017 THE FORCE BEHIND THE FLEET Event Date Description Fire Extinguished by? 3/12/2017 A fire in the STBD MER, the MOW attempted to enter the space but it was smoked filled. The local FD was called and extinguished the fire. 2/22/2017 A SKTR was grinding a berthing rack foundation welds from the deck when sparks from the grinding operation migrated behind a berthing rack and began smoldering within lagging material on the bulkhead. 1/31/2017 KTR welder/pipe fitter was doing some brazing work in AFT engine room, suddenly the gas supply stopped, causing a flash back fire. 1/21/2017 Blue masking tape installed on a scaffolding stanchion pipe clamp was ignited by oxy-fuel torch being used by scaffolding sub-contractor employee to heat shrink a weather enclosure. (Self Extinguished) 1/20/2017 Ships force noticed a spark during an op test of a breaker. The fire went out immediately on its (Self Extinguished) own. The breaker grounded out. 1/17/2017 While energizing equipment shipboard personnel observed arcing and sparking in the 400Hz main but tie power cabinet. 1/15/2017 Berthing Barge 28 at NASSCO Shipyard experienced a griddle fire. The fire was discovered by Personnel. 1/11/2017 BAE personnel witnessed flame from generator stack. The fire department was notified. (Contractor) 1/5/2017 SF reported white smoke from fan room Q Ships force responded at 1020 and determined the fan preheater was smoking. Data Source: Trouble Reports, OSHE Comm s, OPREP 3 Messages, ect. 23

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