PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ALLISION BETWEEN THE MV NAESBORG AND THE M/V VOYAGER II

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1 PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ALLISION BETWEEN THE MV NAESBORG AND THE M/V VOYAGER II R /DISAM ON SEPTEMBER 12 TH, 2007 IN THE APPROACHES TO GALVESTON BAY, TEXAS, USA, WITH NO INJURIES, LOSS OF LIFE, OR POLLUTION.

2 Accident Reporting and Investigation The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame. 2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS SYNOPSIS SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 Particulars of the MV VOYAGER II 1.2 Particulars of the MV NAESBORG 1.3 Accident Details 1.4 Background (all times UTC less 5 hours, Ship s Time) 1.5 The Crew Watch Schedule 1.6 Environmental Conditions Beaufort Scale (reference) 1.7 Narrative Chart Copy (Showing positions of anchorage and allision) 1.8 Damage Sustained from the collision Damage Survey Report (RINA) Diagram of Damage Photographs of Damage SECTION 2 ANALYSIS 2.1 Aim 2.2 How the MV NAESBORG collided with the MV VOYAGER II 2.3 Attempt to Avoid the Collision SECTION 3 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings 3.2 Cause Copy of Masters Correspondence to Charters SECTION 4 RECOMMENDATIONS 3

4 SYNOPSIS On September 12 th, 2007 the MV NAESBORG allided with the M/V VOYAGER II while at anchorage in the approaches to Galveston, USA. The investigation was initiated by the Panama Maritime Authority once the situation was informed, and the investigator, Eng. John Pope, was appointed to lead the investigation on behalf of the Panama Administration, who visited the vessel on September 18 th, 2007 while alongside at the Port of Galveston, USA. On September 10 th, 2007 the bulk carrier M/V VOYAGER II arrived in ballast at the Houston Fairway Anchorage, Galveston, USA, waiting to load a cargo of Pet Coke on September 17 th, 2007 in Houston, USA. At approximately 1800 h, on September 12 th, 2007 the Master came on the bridge due to the increasing bad weather of Tropical Storm / Hurricane Humberto, joining the OOW and AB, and ordered the Chief Engineer to put the main engines on standby. At 2200 h, a security call over the VHF from the M/V NAESBORG stating that due to the strong winds they were dragging their anchor and was without their main engines. At 2255 h the Master noticed that the M/V NAESBORG was drifting dangerously close to the M/V VOYAGER II. The M/V NAESBORG called once again on the VHF and reported that they had no control over their vessel. The Master of the M/V VOYAGER II began to heaving in their port anchor and to maneuver the vessel to avoid coming into full contact with the drifting M/V NAESBORG. At 2320 h the M/V NAESBORG came into contact with the portside of the VOYAGER II causing damage to both vessels. After making contact with the M/V VOYAGER II, the M/V NAESBORG also came in contact with a chemical tanker, the MT VALERIE, who was also anchored nearby. The extent of their damage is unknown. All times indicated in this report are expressed as local Central Standard Time, Twenty- four hour clock. 4

SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 VESSEL PARTICULARS OF MV VOYAGER II Name : VOYAGER II Flag : Panama Classification : RINA (Registro Italiano Navale) Class No.

5 SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 VESSEL PARTICULARS OF MV VOYAGER II Name : VOYAGER II Flag : Panama Classification : RINA (Registro Italiano Navale) Class No. : Class Notations : Bulk Carrier ESP, Heavy Cargo, Ice Class, Unrestricted Navigation IMO No. : Call Sign : HPDI Type of Vessel : Bulk Carrier Gross Tons: 21,531 Net Tons : 12,295 Deadweight (DWT) : 33,288 MT Length (LOA) : M Breadth (Moulded) : M Depth (Moulded) : M Date Built : 1985 Place Built : Szczecin, Poland Hull # Owner : Baltic Navigation Company SA 53 Street, Swiss Tower, 16 th Floor, Panama Operator : Svendborg Ship Management A/S Haveneggarden Jessens Mole 11, DK-5700 Svendborg, Denmark Main Engine : (1) Sulzer 6RLB 66 Horsepower : 8, rpm Master : Albert M. Centeno 5

6 M/V VOYAGER II (Alongside at the Port of Galveston) 1.2 VESSEL PARTICULARS OF MV NAESBORG Name : NAESBORG Flag : Liberia Class : RS (Russian Maritime Register of Shipping) Class ID : Assigned Class : KM*L3A2 IMO No. : Call Sign : A8IS3 Type : RORO Gross Tons : 32,173 Net Tons : 11,074 Deadweight : 22,691 MT Length (LOA) : M Breadth (Moulded) : M Depth (Moulded) : M Date Built : 1976 Place Built : Valmet, Helsinki Owner : Unknown Operator : Nordana Line Propulsion : 2 x Wartsila 8R46 VASA 2 x 7,250 KW Master : Unknown MV NAESBORG 6

7 1.3 ACCIDENT DETAILS Time and Date : Approximately 23:20 hr Ship s time on September 12 th, 2007 Location of the Allision : Persons Onboard : Injuries / Fatalities : Damage : Galveston Fairway Anchorage 27 Crew Members including Master None Port Side Shell Plating iwo # 3 Hold & # 3 DBT DBT # 3 Internals Cargo Hold # 3 Bulwark Poop Deck Poop Deck Main Deck Handrailing Port Midship Gangway 1.4 BACKGROUND The vessel Voyager II is a geared bulk carrier owned by Baltic Navigation Company, and operated by Svendborg Ship Management A/S. She was built in 1985 in Poland and registered under the Panamanian Flag; the vessel s ex name was Myrto. The vessel had completed discharging its cargo and was at anchorage in ballast prior to the incident. The vessel had just undergone Special Survey # 4, on November 3 rd, 2006 in Guangzhou, China. Class records show that the vessel had satisfactorily completed survey and that repairs were carried out; also, that it is currently free of outstanding conditions of class. All of the statutory certificates for the M/V Voyager II were valid prior to the collision, and the vessel was manned in accordance with the safe manning certificate. The ISM certification and Safety Management System was found in place. The vessel is fitted with a single 2-stroke diesel main engine for propulsion. 7

8 1.5 THE CREW Captain Albert M. Centeno Master M/V Voyager II Captain is licensed by the governments of Philippines and Panama as a Master (F.G), the designation F.G. means foreign-going unlimited. He also holds a Panamanian GMDSS endorsement. Panamanian licenses expire every five years. Captain currently holds a Provisional Panamanian Master s and G.M.D.S.S. licenses which are valid until October 24 th, Captain has been sailing as a Master since 2001 with a total sea time of (44) months on board bulk carriers of Pamamax size, where (8) months of his time was as Master of the Voyager II. All remaining officers Panamanian Certificates and National Certificate of Competency were found in valid and in order form. It should be noted that none of the ratings held the required Panamanian Certificate of Competency, WATCH SCHEDULE The watch schedule maintained on board for the month of September (see attached) was being followed by the crew on board, with the OS and AB on the bridge at the time of the incident ( watch). The Master came on the bridge at 1800 hrs due to the deteriorating weather, and was also standing watch at the time of the incident at 2320 hrs. No signs of crew fatigue were observed or contributed to this incident. 1.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS Weather data gathered from log entries and interviews of the watch from the VOYAGER II. The weather was reportedly deteriorating rapidly with the presence of Tropical Depression Humberto in the Gulf of Mexico. The wind speed and sea state were recorded by the OOW (3 rd Mate) of the MV Voyager II during the day of September 12 th, 2007 as follows: Watch Wind Force Sea Barometer ESE 3/ SSE 4/ ESE 4/ E 5/ ENE 5/ ENE 5/ Visibility 0-5 miles, according to the lookout (AB) and the OOW (3 rd Mate), at times the bow was not visible from the bridge during periods of heavy rain showers. The Master stated that at times the rain was coming in horizontally, and that during intermittent rain periods the wind force was at 7/8. 8

9 1.6.1 BEAUFORT SCALE (for reference) Force Mean Speed(knots) Description State of sea Ashore Probable Wave Height (m) Probable Max Wave Height Calm Flat Smoke rises vertically Light air Ripples Smoke shows wind direction Light breeze Small wavelets, non breaking Leaves rustle Gentle breeze Large wavelets, crests breaking Wind extends small flag, leaves in motion Moderate breeze Fairly frequent white horses Small branches begin to move Fresh breeze Strong breeze Moderate waves, many white horses, some spray Large waves, white foam crests, some spray Near gale White foam blows from crests Branches move, difficult to walk against the wind Gale Mod high waves, foam in streaks along surface Strong gale Storm Violent storm Hurricane High waves, tumbling crests, dense streaks of foam, much spray Very high waves with long overhanging crests, heavy tumbling sea Sea completely covered with long white foam patches Air filled with foam and driving spray. Visibility very seriously affected Small trees begin to sway Large branches move Twigs break off trees Slates, chimneys begin to be moved 7 10 Trees uprooted, structural damage to buildings Wide spread damage to buildings etc As above 14 Above NARRATIVE (All times UTC less 5) September 10 th, 2007 At 0822 hrs, the M/V VOYAGER II arrived in ballast at Galveston Fairway Anchorage, Texas USA. At 1640 hrs, the M/V VOYAGER II was anchored at Lat 29 deg 18.8 N Long 94 deg 33.5 W. At 1648 hrs the M/V VOYAGER II was finished with Engine. September 12 th, 2007 At 0400 hrs, Anchor watch was being maintained, no signs of dragging observed, VHF watch on Channels 14 & 16. At 0800 hrs, Anchor watch was being maintained, VHF watch on Channels 14 & 16, weather overcast with rain. At 1200 hrs, Anchor watch was being maintained, no signs of dragging observed, VHF watch on Channels 14 & 16. 9

10 At 1600 hrs, Anchor watch was being maintained, no signs of dragging observed, VHF watch on Channels 14 & 16. The closest vessel was approximately 1 mile and the anchor was holding well. At 1800 hrs, Master came on the bridge due to the deteriorating weather, and ordered the Engineers to put the Main Engine on standby. At this time the M/V NAESBORG was not on the 1.5 mile radar. At 1900 hrs, the Master walked out the starboard anchor from 5 shackles to 8 shackles. At 2000 hrs, Anchor watch maintained, Master walked out the starboard anchor to 8 shackles on the deck, the weather overcast was with intermittent rain wind force observed at 7/8. At 2215 hrs, The Master informed the engine room that he would heave in the anchor due to a slight sign of dragging. At this time the M/V NAESBORG was approximately 1.2 NM NE of the M/V VOYAGER II. At 2230 hrs, Crew at anchor stations. At 2255 hrs, the Master ordered to start heaving in the starboard anchor 3 shackles due to the M/V M/V NAESBORG approaching without power from the SW toward its port stern. The Master called the M/V NAESBORG on the VHF and the M/V NAESBORG said that they could not control the vessel. It is unknown at what time the M/V NAESBORG actually began dragging its anchor due to the strong winds and seas created by Tropical Storm / Hurricane Humberto in the Gulf of Mexico. At 2320 hrs, the M/V NAESBORG came into contact with the M/V VOYAGER II on the portside adjacent to the No. 4 & 5 Hatch against the starboard side of the M/V NAESBORG, somewhere from midship s forward. September 13 th, 2007 At 0145 hrs, the M/V VOYAGER II was re-anchored at location 29 o N & 94 o W, approximately 0.8 NM from it s original anchorage. 10

11 1.7.1 CHART OF ANCHORAGE Scanned copy of the BA chart 374, showing where the M/V Voyager II was anchored prior to the allision. 11

12 1.8 DAMAGE SUSTAINED FROM ALLISION The damage to the VOYAGER II was inspected by the following organizations and reported by the Master, which are as follows: 1) Port Side Shell Plating iwo # 3 Hold & # 3 DBT 2) DBT # 3 Internals 3) Cargo Hold # 3 4) Bulwark Poop Deck 5) Poop Deck 6) Main Deck Handrailing 7) Port Midship Gangway On September 14 th, 2007 a joint survey was carried out by BMT (Salvage Association) on behalf of the owners P & I Club and Hull Underwriters (see attached survey report). On September 14 th, 2007 an underwater survey was carried out by T & T Marine Salvage on behalf of the P & I Club and Hull Underwriters (see attached survey report). Divers inspected the damage made by the bulbous bow of the M/V NAESBORG coming into contact with the portside No. 3 WBT below the waterline. A video was taken of the inspection during this time. On September 14 th, 2007 the surveyor for the Classification Society (RINA) attended the vessel and inspected the damage. The class made an endorsement to the certificate of class Class confirmed until (?)for a single voyage Galveston Anchorage area to a suitable repair facility to be carried out in a ballasted condition not later than October 14 th, The owners decided to carry out temporary repairs in Mobile, Alabama USA, and were awaiting the development of another Tropical Depression forming in the Gulf of Mexico prior to departing Galveston. It was reported that the estimated cost for the repairs would be approximately $400,000 (four hundred thousand dollars). 12

3 PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE TO M/V VOYAGER II Damage

13 1.8.2 REFERENCE DIAGRAM SHOWING LOCATION OF DAMAGE Damage shown is on opposite side (portside) PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE TO M/V VOYAGER II Damage to Portside Hand Railing Damage to Midship Gangway 13

14 1.8.3 PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE TO M/V VOYAGER II Damage to Roller Fairlead Main Deck Damage looking Aft Damage to Port Stern Corner Damage in DBT # 3 Damage in DBT # 3 Damage in DBT # 3 14

15 SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 2.1 AIM The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. 2.2 HOW THE M/V NAESBORG ALLIDED WITH THE M/V VOYAGER II In this case, the M/V NAESBORG allided with the stationary anchored M/V VOYAGER II, without any loss of life, injuries or pollution. The M/V NAESBORG was adrift, without main engines and dragging anchor towards the M/V VOYAGER II which was anchored at the Galveston anchorage, riding out the Tropical Storm / Hurricane Humberto. The M/V NAESBORG first came into contact with the VOYAGER II on the portside midship, and swung around making contact a second time at the portside stern corner. It should be noted that both the M/V NAESBORG and M/V VOYAGER II were in ballast, giving both vessels a large sail area towards the bow. 2.3 THE ATTEMPT TO AVOID CONTACT WITH THE M/V NAESBORG. The Master began to heave in the starboard anchor 3 cables, while going slow ahead to make some space from the M/V NAESBORG, which was drifting (South West) towards the M/V VOYAGER II s port stern. The wind suddenly shifted to the (West) pushing the M/V NAESBORG into the VOYAGER II s port mid-ship side. 15

16 SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 3.1 FINDINGS 1. The M/V VOYAGER II was properly manned and the vessel was fully certified by class, with no outstanding recommendations prior to the allision. 2. The weather at the time of the allision was deteriorated rapidly with reportedly intermittent tropical storm / hurricane force winds from the ENE, with seas ranging from 5 to 7 meters. The adverse weather directly contributed to this accident. 3. The M/V NAESBORG was reportedly adrift, dragging anchor and was without its main engines. The vessel was also in ballast creating a large sail area for the gale force winds created by tropical storm / hurricane Humberto. 4. The propulsion, steering, and navigation equipment on the Voyager II operated properly. There were no mechanical failures that contributed to this collision. 5. The Master of the M/V VOYAGER II followed company procedures for Emergency Situations and Response Actions for a Collision at Sea. 3.2 CAUSE The incident was caused by the rapidly deteriorating weather, caused by tropical storm / hurricane Humberto, and the inability of the M/V NAESBORG to maneuver once she began to drag her anchor. 16

17 3.2.1 MASTER S CORRESPONDENCE TO OPERATORS 17

18 SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS To the Crew of the M/V Voyager II: 1. We are at the opinion that due to the circumstances surrounding the Captain of the M/V Voyager II, (at anchor, in ballast and the presence of a forming Tropical Storm / Hurricane Humberto), that he followed the companies procedures for heavy weather, and No Recommendations Noted. 2. The engines were made ready approximately 5 hours 20 minutes prior to the allision. The Captain recognized the possibility of dragging anchor and acted accordingly. 18

ATLANTIC / ARNGAST Collision in the DW route east of Langeland, Denmark, 4 August 2005

Review from the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents ATLANTIC / ARNGAST Collision in the DW route east of Langeland, Denmark, 4 August 2005 Ship s data ATLANTIC, IMO No. 9135676, is a 39017