AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Transcription

1 MDSA-812 AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT MBA (AVM)

2 Course Code: MDSA-812 Course Name: Aviation Safety and Security Management UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY STUDIES

3 Contents Unit 1 Airport Surface Operations... 1 Unit 2 Crew Alerting Management Unit 3 Hazardous Material Transportation Unit 4 Administrative Practices & Procedure Unit 5 Aircraft Rescue & Fire Fighting System Unit 6 ICAO Standard & Recommended Practices Unit 7 Civil Aviation Security Unit 8 Role of DGCA/BCAS in Aviation Safety and Security Unit 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor Unit 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management Unit 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle Unit 12 Principles of System Safety Unit 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories Appendix

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5 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 1 Unit 1 Airport Surface Operations Part-I AIRPORT LAYOUT AIRPORT Aerodrome or airport is defined as a defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft. Airport is a wide term, used in a broad manner. Normally, what a passenger feels that the airport consists of only the terminal building where he purchases his air ticket, boards and disembarks the plane. In fact the terminal building is just one part of the airport, and in totality it includes a lot many other features, some of them extremely important, such as runways, taxiways, apron, air traffic control, apron (With Parking Stands), Hangar, Radio Navigational aids, Communication facilities etc. etc.

6 2 Aviation Safety and Security Management Normally the airport is divided into two basic parts, 'city side' and 'air side'. 'City side' is what a travelling passenger is well familiar with and includes airport terminal building, ticket counters, airline and other offices, waiting halls, security lounges, customs, immigration, outside car park, cargo building, outside roads etc. The 'air side' consists of the areas of the airport used mainly for aircraft operation purposes like runways, taxiways, apron, Radio Navigational aids, landing aids etc. In addition, Airport support elements include air traffic control tower, aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) facilities, airport administration facilities, fuel storage, City maintenance facilities, Medical Centre, Catering and utility systems etc. To start with we can discuss these items one by one in brief. Runway Runway (RWY) is a defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome used for landing and take-off of aircraft. Runways on an established aerodrome may be a man-made surface (often asphalt, concrete, or a mixture of both), and for small aerodromes it could also be a natural surface (grass, dirt, or gravel).

7 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 3 The runways are named according to their Magnetic Bearings (the direction it is "pointing towards") with reference to North rounded to nearest 100. The runway number is the whole number nearest one-tenth the magnetic azimuth of the centre line of the runway, measured clockwise from the magnetic north. As two 'ends of the runway' point out in two different directions (Each separated by 1800), thus each runway has two names separated by For example the Runways at Delhi (IGI Airport) are 09/27 & 10/28 and Runways at Mumbai are 09/27 & 14/32. Each digit of runway name is pronounced separately for clarity in radio communications. Thus, Runway Three Six would be aligned in roughly a 360 degrees direction (i.e. magnetic north), Runway Nine would be used for a runway with a 94 degree-alignment (i.e. close to magnetic east), and Runway One Seven for 168 degrees. Thus, Runway One Zero (100 ) becomes Runway Two Eight (280 ) when used in the opposite direction and Runway One Eight (180 ) becomes Runway Three Six (360 ). For runways less than 100 include the leading "zero", e.g. Runway Zero Two or Runway Zero One Left.

8 4 Aviation Safety and Security Management If there is more than one runway pointing in the same direction (parallel runways), each runway is identified by appending Left, Centre and Right to the Runway number. For example, at Kolkata Airport, the Runways One Nine Left (19L), Zero One Right (01R), and One Nine Right (19R). Runway Zero One Left (01L). From left to right-a pair of parallel runways 35L/17R & 35R/ 17L For aircraft it is advantageous to perform take-offs and landings into the wind to reduce take off roll and reduce the ground speed needed to attain flying speed. Larger airports usually may have more than one runway in different directions, so that one can be selected that is most nearly aligned with the wind. Airports with one runway are often constructed to be aligned with the prevailing wind. Runway dimensions vary from as small as 800 ft (244 m) long and 25 ft (8 m) wide in smaller general aviation airports, to 18,000 ft (5,486 m) long and 250 ft (76 m) wide at large international airports built to accommodate large passenger jets. In India major passenger airports are having runways with length 4500 ft to less than ft. Runway dimensions can be measured in feet or in meters depending on your location in the world. Runways can be further categorized into the following types; A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using visual approach procedures. One of the following types of runways intended for the operation of aircraft using instrument approach procedures: (a) Non-precision approach runway: An instrument runway served by visual aids and a non-visual aid providing at least directional guidance adequate for a straight-in approach.

9 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 5 (b) (c) (d) Precision approach runway, category I: An instrument runway served by ILS and/or MLS and visual aids intended for operations with a decision height not lower than 60 m (200 ft) and either a visibility not less than 800 m or a runway visual range not less than 550 m. Precision approach runway, category II: An instrument runway served by ILS and/or MLS and visual aids intended for operations with a decision height lower than 60 m (200 ft) but not lower than 30 m (100 ft) and a runway visual range not less than 350 m. Precision approach runway, category III: An instrument runway served by ILS and/or MLS to and along the surface of the runway and: A intended for operations with a decision height lower than 30 m (100 ft), or no decision height and a runway visual range not less than 200 m. B intended for operations with a decision height lower than 15 m (50 ft), or no decision height and a runway visual range less than 200 m but not less than 50 m. C intended for operations with no decision height and no runway visual range limitations. Take off Run Available (TORA): The length of runway declared available and suitable for the ground run of an airplane taking off. Take off Distance Available (TODA): The length of the take off run available plus the length of the clearway, where provided (the clearway length allowed must lie within the aerodrome or airport boundary). Accelerate Stop Distance Available (ASDA): The length of the take off run available plus the length of the stopway, where provided. Landing Distance Available (LDA): The length of runway which is declared available and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane landing.

10 6 Aviation Safety and Security Management The Runway Stripw is the cleared, grassy area around the paved runway. It is kept free from any obstacles that might impede flight or ground roll of aircraft, although the grass is not always necessarily in good condition. The grass is often marked with white cones or gables. The Runway is the entire paved surface, which typically features threshold markings, numbers, centre lines, and overrun areas at both ends. Stopways also known as overrun areas are also constructed at the end of runways as emergency space to slowly stop planes that overrun the runway on a landing gone wrong, or to slowly stop a plane on an aborted take-off or a take-off gone wrong. Stopways are often not as strong as the main paved surface of the runway and are marked with yellow chevrons. Planes are not allowed to taxi, take-off or land on stopways, except in an emergency. Threshold. The beginning of that portion of the runway usable for landing. Displaced threshold means that a threshold not located at the extremity of a runway. Displaced threshold is the point at the end of the runway. In major airports, it is usually marked with white paint arrows that lead up to the displaced threshold (see diagram). Smaller runways may not have markings to indicate the displaced threshold. A displaced threshold may be used for taxiing and take off but not for landing, because

11 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 7 obstacles just before the runway, runway strength, or noise restrictions may make the area unsuitable for landings. The centre line is shown with white broken lines. Runway lights are also white in colour. Taxiway

12 8 Aviation Safety and Security Management A taxiway is a path on an airport connecting runways with ramps, hangars, terminals and other facilities. They mostly have hard surface such as asphalt or concrete, although smaller airports sometimes use gravel or grass. At most airports, taxiways are designated by letters such as Taxiway 'A', Taxiway 'C', Taxiway 'B-4' etc. Busy airports typically construct high-speed or rapid-exit taxiways in order to allow aircraft to leave the runway at higher speeds. This allows the aircraft to vacate the runway quicker, permitting another to land in a shorter space of time. Taxiway markings are shown by yellow continuous lines. 1. Double yellow lines mark the boundary between areas under jurisdiction of ATC and the parking areas. 2. A single solid yellow line marks the taxiway centre line. 3. Two parallel dashed yellow lines followed by two parallel solid yellow lines indicate a hold line. A hold line marks the intersection of a taxiway and a runway. Taxy Holding position lines are marked across the width of a taxiway. These markings should not be crossed to enter into the runway until a clearance is received from the tower. Rotating Beacons Pilots identify airports at night by looking for rotating beacons. Civil airport beacons flash alternating white and green lights. Military airports flash two white lights followed by a green light. Seaplane landing areas and lighted heliports use different sequences. If the rotating beacon is turned on during the day, it usually indicates that IFR conditions prevail, but this isn't always the case.

13 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 9 Apron The airport apron is a defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading and boarding of passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance. The use of the apron may be controlled by the apron control service The apron is designated by the ICAO as not being part of the manoeuvring area, but a part of the movement area. All vehicles, aircraft and people using the apron are referred to as apron traffic. In fact, the pre-flight activities are done in Ramps; and areas for parking & maintenance are called aprons. However, normally the words "Apron" and "Ramp" are used interchangeably. Passenger gates are the main feature of a terminal ramp. 'Aircraft stand' is a designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft. Also known as "Parking Bay" or "Gate". Aircraft stands are named as "Stand Nos" 1,2, 3,...,31,..,45 etc. Apron flood-lighting Apron floodlighting is provided on an apron, on a de-icing/ anti-icing facility and on a designated isolated aircraft parking position intended to be used at night.

14 10 Aviation Safety and Security Management Apron floodlights should be located so as to provide adequate illumination on all apron service areas, with a minimum of glare to pilots of aircraft in flight and on the ground, aerodrome and apron controllers, and personnel on the apron. The arrangement and aiming of floodlights should be such that an aircraft stand receives light from two or more directions to minimize shadows. Terminal Building An airport terminal is a building at an airport where passengers transfer between ground transportation and the facilities that allow them to board and disembark from aircraft. Within the terminal building, passengers purchase tickets, transfer their luggage, and go through security. Smaller airports have one terminal while larger airports may have several terminals. Some larger airports have one terminal that is connected to multiple concourses via walkways, Aerobridges (Also called skybridges), or underground tunnels etc. Most airport terminals are built in a plain style. However, some, such as Baghdad International Airport, are monumental in stature, while others are considered architectural masterpieces, such as Terminal 1 at Charles de Gaulle airport near Paris or Terminal 5 at New York's JFK Airport. A few are designed to reflect the culture of a particular area. For example, in India, Jodhpur Airport

15 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 11 terminal looks like a Rajshthani Fort, while the terminal at Dimapur (Nagaland Airport) looks like a Naga House. Mostly airport terminals open directly onto the tarmac and passengers are able to proceed to the aircraft either by walking or by taking a bus to their aircraft. However, on some large airports, aircraft may be parked to remote aprons or on remotely located bays, where Passengers can be taken by a surface transport. Now modern airports have many "Aerobridges" to join directly into the aircraft. Control tower A control tower, or more specifically an air traffic control tower (ATC Tower), is the name of the air traffic control unit responsible for movements around an airport, and is also the name of the building from which the unit operates. Airport Control tower is generally a high rise structure above other buildings at an airport to give air traffic controllers a view of aircraft moving on the ground and in the air around the airport. Control tower structures usually have glass (Or transparent) windows to give an all round view Control Towers typically contain the following: radios for communication with aircraft, linked to controllers' headsets or to microphones and speakers; a telephone system that connects dedicated voice lines

16 12 Aviation Safety and Security Management and public telephone lines via quick-dial systems to controllers' headsets, allowing them to talk to other controllers and outside parties; a strip board allowing Flight Progress Strips to be used (however in some towers these have been replaced by a computerised system); a 'very pistol' for exhibiting light signals to the aircraft in the event of a radio communication failure; wind and pressure gauges. Various other, optional equipment. In addition modern control towers may also include the following: an Aerodrome Traffic Monitor with a small radar display. a Surface Movement Radar displaying aircraft and vehicles on the airport to assist controllers at night and in poor visibility. computerised meteorological information or a met observer, flight data and briefing systems. Hangar

17 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 13 A hangar is an enclosed tall and massive structure designed to hold aircraft in protective storage, for the purpose of maintenance, repair, overhaul, inspection, storage and other purposes. Visual Approach Slope Indicator System (VASIS) and Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) Visual approach slope indicator System (VASIS): This is an airport lighting facility which provides visual gliding guidance to aircraft during approach and landing, by radiating a pattern of high intensity red and white focused light beams which indicate to the pilot that he/she is above, on, or below the glide path. These lights may be visible from up to eight kilometres during the day and up to 32 kilometres or more at night. Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) PAPI uses the same basic principle as a VASI, but the white and red lights are arranged in a single row. It is a light system positioned beside the runway that consists of two, three, or four boxes of lights that provide a visual indication to the pilot on the glide path for the associated runway. These lights radiate a high intensity red or white beam to indicate whether the pilot is above or below the required approach path to the runway.

18 14 Aviation Safety and Security Management The PAPI is usually located on the left side of the runway and has an effective visual range of 5 NM (8 kms) during the day and 20 NM (32 kms) at night similar to VASIS. Each light box of lights of PAPI is equipped with an optical apparatus that splits light output into two segments, red and white. Depending on the angle of approach, the lights will appear either red or white to the pilot. Ideally the total of lights will change from white to half red, moving in succession from right to left side. The pilot will have reached the normal glidepath (usually around 3 degrees) when there is an even split in red and white lights. If an aircraft is beneath the glidepath, red lights will outnumber white; if an aircraft is above the glidepath, more white lights are visible. Now a days mostly PAPIs are used in place of VASIS. Markings A symbol or group of symbols displayed on the surface of the movement area in order to convey aeronautical information.

19 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 15 Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL) Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL) is the generic term used to describe the various lighting systems that are provided on an aerodrome for the guidance of pilots operating aircraft both at night and in low visibility conditions. Runways centre line markings are white stripes with broken lines. They come in three basic types: 1. A visual runway, which is used only for VFR flights, usually has a threshold marking, a runway number, and stripes designating the centre line and the runway edges. It may also have fixed-distance markers-two large, white rectangles on either side of the centre line about 1,000 ft (305 m) from the threshold. 2. An Instrument Runway (non-precision approach) supports both VFR and IFR traffic. As indicated by its name, this type of runway is served by a non-precision instrument approach, usually a VOR or NDB approach. In addition to the markings used on a visual runway, a non-precision runway also has threshold markings. 3. An Instrument Runway (precision approach) supports a precision approach, usually an ILS. Precision runways have all the marks found on a non-precision runway, plus touchdown zone markings. These marks appear at 500-ft (150 m) increments, beginning 500 ft from the threshold. These additional marks help pilots make the transition from instrument to visual flight and define the proper touchdown point for an aircraft flying an ILS. Runway thresholds are marked by green lights at the landing end and red lights at the departure end. White lights define runway edges. At a runway served by a precision instrument approach such as an instrument landing system (ILS), the white edge lights alternate with red lights starting 1,000 ft from the end of the runway and then change to all red for the last 500 ft.

20 16 Aviation Safety and Security Management All runways used for night use have Edge, Threshold and End Lighting. Centre line and Touchdown Zone Lighting is provided as additional guidance in support of low visibility operations. Runway Edge Lighting Runway Edge Lighting is located along the edges of the area declared for use as the runway delineated by edge markings, and may be provided either by elevated or by flush fitting lamp fixtures. At some aerodromes where elevated runway

21 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 17 edge lights are employed, the light fixtures may be located on the grass shoulder just beyond the declared runway width. Runway Edge Lighting is white except in the following instances: (a) Caution Zone Lighting On ILS equipped runways without centre line lighting, Yellow edge lighting is installed on the upwind 600 m or one third of the lighted runway length available, whichever is the less. The Yellow 'caution zone' so formed gives a visual warning of the approaching runway end. (b) Pre-Threshold Lighting Where a landing threshold is displaced, but the prethreshold area is available for the take-off run, the lights between the beginning of the runway pavement and the displaced threshold show red from the approach. Pilots taking off in such a situation would see red edge lights up to the green threshold then edge lights beyond. Where a starter extension, narrower than its associated runway is provided, blue edge lighting is normally used to mark the edges. (c) Runway Exit Lighting One or two omni-directional blue lights may replace or supplement the edge lights in order to indicate an exit taxiway. (d) Stopway Lighting Where stopway is provided at the end of a runway, the declared stopway is delineated by red edge and end lighting showing ONLY in the direction of landing. A stopway is provided for emergency use only and is not normally suitable for routine use. Taxiway Lights Taxiway edge lights are blue in colour. However, centre line taxiway way lights are green in colour.

22 18 Aviation Safety and Security Management Taxiway Lights-Blue (Edge Lights), Green (Centre Line) Runways served by instrument approach procedures usually have approach lights to help pilots identify the runway environment during low-visibility conditions. Approach lights greatly increase a pilot's chances of seeing the runway and making a safe landing. Varieties of approach lighting systems, based on the centre line and cross bar concept, are in use at aerodromes. These systems range from the simple low intensity centre line and cross bar intended to serve visual runways at night only, to the precision approach lights consisting of centre line and 5 cross bars for day and night use on ILS equipped runways. Simple approach lighting systems normally commence 500 m prior to the runway threshold whilst the precision approach commences 900 m prior to runway threshold. Where, because of the geography of the approach, it is not possible to install a full system, a shortened system is employed and the Runway Visual Range (RVR) minima associated with the instrument approach procedure adjusted accordingly. Except where supplemented by red side barrettes as described below, approach lighting is white in colour.

23 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 19 Types of Approach Lights Following approach lighting system (ALS) are used. 1. Green threshold lights mark the beginning of the runway. 2. A long line of lead-in lights aligned with the runway centre-line. The lead-in lights extend from the end of the runway into the approach area.

24 20 Aviation Safety and Security Management 3. Alignment bars perpendicular to the lead-in lights that help the pilot quickly determine if the airplane is properly aligned with the runway. These lights can be seen on the high-rise buildings and tall chimneys, TV Antennas, HT Lines acting as an alert warning for aircraft flying in the area. For aircraft flying during night or in poor visibility, flashing or fixed lights are installed on such structures.

25 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 21 Radio Communication/Navigation Facilities & Landing Aids Radio is used frequently in aviation for air ground communication, for Radio Navigation Facilities and for landing aids. Radio waves are of following types; Name Frequency Application Low Freq (LF) Less than 300 KHz Loran's Medium Freq (MF) Between 300 KHz to 3 MHz NDB High Freq (HF) Between 3 MHz to 30 MHz Long Distance Air/ Ground Communication Very High Freq Between 30 MHz to 300 MHz VOR, Short Distance Air (VHF) Ground Comm. Ultra High Freq Between 300 MHz to 3000 ILS, DME, RADAR (UHF) MHz Exta or Super High Freq (SHF) Between 3 GHz to 30 GHz Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) Non-directional beacon (NDB): is a radio beacon transmitting non-directional signals that a pilot of an aircraft equipped with direction finding equipment can determine his/ her bearing to or from the radio beacon and "home" on or track to or from the station. It is similar to a radio broadcast station in a known location, used as an aviation navigational aid. NDBs are operated on a frequency between 190 khz and 1750 khz. Each NDB is identified by a one, two, or threeletter Morse code call sign.

26 22 Aviation Safety and Security Management NDBs have one major advantage over the more sophisticated VOR: NDB signals follow the curvature of the earth, so they can be received at much greater distances at lower altitudes. However, the NDB signal is affected more by atmospheric conditions, mountainous terrain, coastal refraction and electrical storms, particularly at long range. However, it is not possible for an aircraft pilot to know the exact bearing of the aircraft. Hence at most of the airports, they are using VOR, comparatively a superior radio navigational aid. VHF omnidirectional range (VOR) VOR, short for VHF Omni-directional Radio Range, is a type of radio navigation system for aircraft. VOR broadcasts a VHF radio composite signal including the station's Morse code identifier, and data that allows the airborne receiving equipment to derive the magnetic bearing from the station to the aircraft (direction from the VOR station in relation to the earth's magnetic North). This line of position is known as the "radial". The intersection of two radials from different VOR stations on a chart allows for a "fix" or specific position of the aircraft. The VOR was designed to provide 360 courses to and from the station selectable by the pilot. The VOR's major advantage is that the radio signal provides a reliable line (radial) to or from the station which can be selected and easily followed by the pilot. VORs operate in the range of VHF Frequencies, and thus are relatively free from in-built deficiencies of MF (As in NDB) such as static interference, man made and electrical noise, less course bending around terrain features and coastlines, and less interference from bad weather & thunderstorms etc. Because of their VHF frequency, VOR stations rely on "line of sight" -- if the transmitting antenna could not be seen on a perfectly clear day from the receiving antenna, a useful signal would not be received. This limits VOR (and DME) range to the horizon, or closer if mountains intervene. This means that an extensive network of stations is needed to provide reasonable coverage along main air routes.

27 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 23 VORs are assigned radio channels between MHz (megahertz) and MHz (with 50-kHz spacing); this is in the VHF (very high frequency) range. The VOR system uses the phase relationship between a reference-phase and a rotating-phase signal to encode direction. The carrier signal is omni-directional and contains the amplitude modulated (AM) station Morse code or voice identifier. The phase angle is equal to the direction from the station to the airplane, in degrees from local magnetic north, and is called the "radial." Distance measuring equipment D-VOR/DME ground station Distance Measuring Equipment (DME): It is an equipment (airborne and ground) used to measure, in nautical miles, the slant range distance of an aircraft from the DME navigational aid. It is a transponder-based radio navigation technology that measures distance by timing the propagation delay of VHF or UHF radio signals. DME functions on the same principle as a Secondary Radar, except in reverse. Aircraft use DME to determine their distance from a land-based transponder by sending and receiving pulse pairs - two pulses of fixed duration and separation. The ground stations are typically co-located with VORs. Sometimes DME is also co-located with an ILS localizer where it provides an accurate distance function, similar to that otherwise provided by ILS Marker Beacons. The Instrument Landing System (ILS) is a ground-based instrument approach system which provides precise

28 24 Aviation Safety and Security Management guidance to an aircraft approaching a runway, using a combination of radio signals and, in many cases, high-intensity lighting arrays to enable a safe landing during Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), such as low clouds or reduced visibility due to fog, rain, or blowing snow. An ILS consists of two independent sub-systems, one providing lateral guidance (Localizer), the other vertical guidance (Glideslope or GlidePath) to aircraft approaching a runway. A localizer (LOC, or LLZ in Europe) antenna array is normally located beyond the departure end of the runway and generally consists of several pairs of directional antennas. It provides lateral guidance to the landing aircraft, by the help of radio signals that assist the aircraft to come in line of the runway. Two signals are transmitted on a carrier frequency between MHz and MHz. One is modulated at 90 Hz, the other at 150 Hz (Known as Yellow and Blue rays) and these are transmitted from separate but co-located antennas. Each antenna transmits a fairly narrow beam, one slightly to the left of the runway centre line, the other to the right.

29 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 25 The localizer receiver on the aircraft measures the Difference in the Depth of Modulation (DDM) of the 90 Hz and 150 Hz signals. For the localizer, the depth of modulation for each of the modulating frequencies is 20 percent. The difference between the two signals varies depending on the position of the approaching aircraft from the centre line. If there is a predominance of either 90Hz or 150Hz modulation, the aircraft is off the centre line. In the cockpit, the needle on the Horizontal Situation Indicator, or HSI (The Instrument part of the ILS), will show that the aircraft needs to fly left or right to correct the positional error to fly down the centre of the runway. If the DDM is zero the receiver aerial and therefore, the aircraft, is on the centre line of the localizer coinciding with the physical runway centre line. A glideslope or Glidepath (GP) provides vertical guidance to the landing aircraft by the help of radio signals that assist the aircraft to come at the right angle of descent for touch down on the runway. Glidepath antenna array is sited to one side of the runway touchdown zone. The GP signal is transmitted on a carrier frequency between and 335 MHz using a technique similar to that of the localizer. The centre line of the glideslope signal is arranged to define a glideslope of approximately 3 above the horizon. Localizer and glideslope carrier frequencies are paired so that only one selection is required to tune both receivers. These signals are displayed on an instrument in the cockpit. The pilot controls the aircraft so that the indications on the instrument remain cantered on the display. This ensures the aircraft is following the ILS centre line. There are two Markers provided on the ILS Path known as Outer marker and Middle Marker to give the distance of the aircraft from touch down. They are equipped with audible and visible signals to the pilot. The outer marker is normally located 7.2 km (4 NM) from the threshold except that, where this distance is not

30 26 Aviation Safety and Security Management practicable, the outer marker may be located between 6.5 and 11.1 km (3.5 and 6 NM) from the threshold. The Middle marker is normally located so as to indicate, in low visibility conditions, the missed approach point, at a distance of 1050 m from the threshold. There are three categories of ILS which support similarly named categories of operation. Category I: A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height not lower than 60 m (200 ft) above touchdown zone elevation and with either a visibility not less than 800 m or a runway visual range not less than 550 m. Category II: Category II operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height lower than 60 m (200 ft) above touchdown zone elevation but not lower than 30 m (100 ft), and a runway visual range not less than 350 m. Category III: is further subdivided Category III A: A precision instrument approach and landing with: (a) a decision height lower than 30 m (100 ft) above touchdown zone elevation, or no decision height; and (b) a runway visual range not less than 200 m. Category III B: A precision instrument approach and landing with: (a) (b) a decision height lower than 15 m (50 ft) above touchdown zone elevation, or no decision height; and a runway visual range less than 200 m but not less than 50 m. Category III C: A precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height and no runway visual range limitations. A Category III C system is capable of using an aircraft's autopilot to land the

31 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations aircraft and can also provide guidance along the runway surface. Microwave landing system (MLS): a precision instrument approach system that provides precision guidance in azimuth, elevation, and distance measurement. In Europe this is used at many airports. 27 Radar is a system that uses electromagnetic waves to identify the range, altitude, direction, or speed of both moving and fixed objects such as aircraft, ships, motor vehicles, weather formations, and terrain. A transmitter emits radio waves, which are reflected by the target and detected by a receiver, typically in the same location as the transmitter. The time taken by the Radar waves to go to the target (aircraft) and come back is measured to get the distance (Height) of the aircraft. Radar can be of two types. Primary Radar shows all the objects, whether fixed or moving; Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) shows only those targets (Aircraft), which reply the signals sent by the other aircraft. Thus SSR eliminates undesirable clutters. Radar is used in many contexts, including meteorological detection of precipitation, air traffic control. The pilot uses the weather radar installed in the aircraft to know the surrounding weather and the ATC uses it for proving separation between the aircraft.

32 28 Aviation Safety and Security Management Light signal from aerodrome control Green flashes Permission to cross landing area or to move onto taxiway Steady red Stop Red flashes Move off the landing area or taxiway and watch out for aircraft White flashes Vacate manoeuvring area in accordance with local instructions In emergency conditions or if the signals in are not observed, the signal given hereunder shall be used for runways or taxiways equipped with a lighting system and shall have the meaning indicated therein. Flashing runway or taxiway lights Vacate the runway and observe the tower for light signal Part-II Manoeuvring area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons. Movement area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the manoeuvring area and the apron(s). OBJECTIVE While operating at the airport area, the aircraft; landing, taking off, taxiing, and parked on the apron are to be provided safe separation from other movements. On the other hand, a large number of vehicle movements at the operational area make the things difficult. The Air Traffic Controller is

33 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 29 required to ensure that all the traffic movements on the ground are controlled in a safe manner through ATC instructions. Accordingly the ATC or the ground control units have been entrusted to organize the vehicular and aircraft traffic in such a manner that there are no conflicts and no incidents & accidents within its control. Designated positions of aircraft in the aerodrome traffic and taxi circuits. The following positions of aircraft in the traffic and taxi circuits are the positions where the aircraft normally receive aerodrome control tower clearances from ATC. Where practicable, all clearances should be issued without waiting for the aircraft to initiate the call. Position 1: Taxi clearances given. Position 2: If conflicting traffic, the departing aircraft is held at this position. Otherwise T/O clearance is issued by ATCO. Position 3: T/O clearance is issued here, if not practicable at position 2. Position 4: Clearance to land is issued here as practicable. Position 5: Clearance to taxi to apron is issued here. Position 6: Parking information issued here.

34 30 Aviation Safety and Security Management ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON AERODROME CONDITIONS. Essential information on aerodrome conditions is information pertaining to airport surface & movement area or any facilities usually associated issued by ATC to aircraft, which are necessary to safety of aircraft operation. This may include; (a) (b) construction or maintenance work on, or immediately adjacent to the movement area; rough or broken surfaces on a runway, on a taxiway or on apron. (c) (d) (e) (f) water, snow, slush or ice on a runway, on a taxiway or on apron. other temporary hazards, including parked aircraft and birds on the ground or in the air. failure or irregular operation of aerodrome lighting system. any other pertinent information. Traffic on the manoeuvring area Use of Runway-Holding Positions Taxing aircraft should be held at the runway holding position, till the runway is reported as clear, and only then it should be allowed to enter the runway.

35 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 31 CONTROL OF OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT TRAFFIC. Entry to the Manoeuvring Area The movement of persons or vehicles including towed aircraft on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome shall be controlled by the aerodrome control tower as necessary to avoid hazard to them or to aircraft landing, taxiing or taking off. Persons, including drivers of all vehicles, shall be required to obtain authorization from the aerodrome control tower before entry to the manoeuvring area. Notwithstanding such an authorization, entry to a runway or runway strip or change in the operation authorized shall be subject to a further specific authorization by the aerodrome control tower. In conditions where low visibility procedures are in operation: (a) persons and vehicles operating on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome shall be restricted to the essential minimum, and particular regard shall be given to the requirements to protect the ILS sensitive areas when Category II or Category III A precision instrument operations are in progress; (b) the vehicles shall remain at safe distance from taxiing aircraft. Priority on the Manoeuvring Area Emergency vehicles proceeding to the assistance of an aircraft in distress shall be afforded top priority over all other surface movement traffic. All movement of surface traffic should, to the extent practicable, be halted until it is determined that the progress of the emergency vehicles will not be impeded. Vehicles on the manoeuvring area shall be required to comply with the following rules: (a) vehicles, vehicles towing aircraft and pedestrians shall give way to aircraft which are landing, taking off or taxiing;

36 32 (b) (c) (d) Aviation Safety and Security Management vehicles shall give way to other vehicles towing aircraft; vehicles shall give way to other vehicles in accordance with ATS unit instructions; notwithstanding the provisions of a), b) and c), vehicles and vehicles towing aircraft shall comply with instructions issued by the aerodrome control tower. When an aircraft is landing or taking off, vehicles shall not be permitted to hold closer to the runway-in use than: (a) (b) at a taxiway/ runway intersection - at a runway holding position; and at a location other than a taxiway/ runway intersection - at a distance equal to the separation distance of the runway-holding position. Communication Requirements and Visual Signals At controlled aerodrome vehicles employed on the manoeuvring area shall be capable of maintaining two-way radio communication with the aerodrome control tower, except when the vehicle is occasionally used on the manoeuvring area and is: (a) (b) accompanied by a vehicle with the required communications capability, or employed in accordance with a prearranged plan established with the aerodrome control tower. Light signal from aerodrome control Permission to cross landing area or to move onto taxiway Stop Move off the landing area or taxiway and watch out for aircraft Vacate manoeuvring area in accordance with local instructions

37 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 33 In emergency conditions or if the signals in are not observed, the signal given hereunder shall be used for runways or taxiways equipped with a lighting system and shall have the meaning indicated therein. Vacate the runway and observe the tower for light signal CONTROL OF TRAFFIC IN THE TRAFFIC CIRCUIT. General Aircraft in the traffic circuit shall be controlled to provide the separation minima except that: (a) (b) (c) aircraft in formation are exempted from the separation minima with respect to separation from other aircraft of the same flight; aircraft operating in different areas or different runways on aerodromes suitable for simultaneous landings or take-offs are exempted from the separation minima; separation minima shall not apply to aircraft operating under military necessity. Sufficient separation shall be effected between aircraft in flight in the traffic circuit to allow the spacing of arriving and departing aircraft. Entry into traffic circuit The clearance to enter the traffic circuit should be issued to an aircraft depending on the circumstances and traffic conditions. An arriving aircraft executing an instrument approach shall normally be cleared to land straight in unless visual manoeuvring to the landing runway is required. Priority for landing In cases of emergency the ATC should render all assistance possible. Priority shall be given to: (a) an aircraft which anticipates being compelled to land because of factors affecting the safe operation of the aircraft (engine failure, shortage of fuel, etc.);

38 34 (b) (c) (d) Aviation Safety and Security Management hospital aircraft or aircraft carrying any sick or seriously injured persons requiring urgent medical attention; aircraft engaged in search and rescue operations; VVIP aircraft. ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ARRIVING AND DE- PARTING AIRCRAFT. An aircraft landing or in the final stages of an approach to land shall normally have priority over an aircraft intending to depart from the same or an intersecting runway. CONTROL OF DEPARTING AIRCRAFT. Departure sequence Departures shall normally be cleared in the order in which they are ready for take-off, except that deviations may be made from this order of priority to facilitate the maximum number of departures with the least average delay. Factors which should be considered in relation to the departure sequence include, inter-alia: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) types of aircraft and their relative performance; routes to be followed after take-off; any specified minimum departure interval between takeoffs; need to apply wake turbulence separation minima; aircraft which should be afforded priority; and aircraft subject to ATFM requirements. Separation of departing aircraft. A departing aircraft will not normally be permitted to commence take-off until the preceding departing aircraft has crossed the end of the runway-in-use or has started a turn or until all preceding landing aircraft are clear of the runwayin-use. Take-off clearance.

39 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 35 Take-off clearance may be issued to an aircraft when there is reasonable assurance that the separation will exist when the aircraft commences take-off. When an ATC clearance is required prior to take off, the take-off clearance shall not be issued until the ATC clearance has been transmitted to and acknowledged by the aircraft concerned. The take-off clearance shall be issued when the aircraft is ready for take-off and at or approaching the departure runway, and the traffic situation permits. To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, the take-off clearance shall include the designator of the departure runway. In the interest of expediting traffic, a clearance for immediate take-off may be issued to an aircraft before it enters the runway. On acceptance of such clearance the aircraft shall taxi out to the runway and take off in one continuous movement. CONTROL OF ARRIVING AIRCRAFT. Separation of landing aircraft and preceding landing and departing aircraft using the same runway. A landing aircraft will not normally be permitted to cross the runway threshold on its final approach until the preceding departing aircraft has crossed the end of the runway-in-use, or has started a turn, or until all preceding landing aircraft are clear of the runway-in-use.

40 36 Clearance to land. Aviation Safety and Security Management An aircraft may be cleared to land when there is reasonable assurance that the separation will exist when the aircraft crosses the runway threshold, provided that a clearance to land shall not be issued until a preceding landing aircraft has crossed the runway threshold. To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, the landing clearance shall include the designator of the landing runway. Landing and roll-out manoeuvres. When necessary or desirable in order to expedite traffic, a landing aircraft may be requested to: (a) (b) (c) (d) hold short of an intersecting runway after landing; land beyond the touchdown zone of the runway; vacate the runway at a specified exit taxiway; expedite vacating the runway. PROCEDURES FOR LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS. Control of aerodrome surface traffic in conditions of low visibility. In conditions where low visibility procedures are in operation, persons and vehicles operating on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome shall be restricted to the essential minimum, and particular regard shall be given to the requirements to protect the ILS sensitive area(s) when Category II or Category III A precision instrument operations are in progress. When there is a requirement for traffic to operate on the manoeuvring area in conditions of visibility which prevent the aerodrome control tower from applying visual separation between aircraft, and between aircraft and vehicles, the following shall apply: At the intersection of taxiways, an aircraft or vehicle on a taxiway shall not be permitted to hold closer to the other taxiway than the holding position limit defined by a clearance bar, stop bar or taxiway intersection marking.

41 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations 37 Subject to the provisions in, the vehicles shall remain at safe distance from taxiing aircraft. SUSPENSION OF VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR) OPERATIONS. Aircraft may be permitted to fly VFR at certain airports. However, Any or all VFR operations on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome may be suspended by the ATC, if circumstances warrants so, in the interest of safety or other reasons. AERONAUTICAL GROUND LIGHTS. General All aeronautical ground lights shall be operated (a) (b) (c) (d) during the time from sunset to sun rise; during time from sunrise to sunset when visibility is 3000 m or less; when requested by pilot. When so requested, further adjustment of the intensity light shall also be made whenever possible. at any other time when their use, based on weather conditions, is considered desirable for the safety of air traffic. Lights on and in the vicinity of aerodromes that are not intended for enroute navigation purposes may be turned off, subject to further provisions hereafter, if no likelihood of either regular or emergency operation exists, provided that they can be again brought into operation at least one hour before the expected arrival of an aircraft. The lights of a visual approach slope indicator system (VASIS) or PAPI shall be operated during the hours of daylight as well as of darkness and irrespective of the visibility conditions when the associated runway is being used.

42 38 Runway lighting. Aviation Safety and Security Management Runway lighting shall not be operated if that runway is not in use for landing, take-off or taxiing purposes, unless required for runway inspections or maintenance. (a) (b) at aerodromes where air traffic control service is provided and where lights are centrally controlled, the lights of one runway shall remain lighted after take-off as long as is considered necessary for the return of the aircraft due to an emergency occurring during or immediately after take-off; at aerodromes without air traffic control service or without centrally controlled lights, the lights of one runway shall remain lighted until such time as would normally be required to reactivate the lights in the likelihood of the departing aircraft returning for an emergency landing, and in any case not less than fifteen minutes after take-off. Taxiway lighting. Where required to provide taxi guidance, taxiway lighting shall be turned on in such order that a continuous indication of the taxi path is presented to taxiing aircraft. Taxiway lighting or any portion thereof may be turned off when no longer needed. Obstacle lighting. Obstacle lighting associated with the approach to or departure from a runway or channel, where the obstacle does not project through the inner horizontal surface should be turned off and on simultaneously with the runway lights. Un-serviceability lights may not be turned off while the aerodrome is open. References 1. ICAO Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation-Volume I-' Aerodrome Design and Operations', Fourth Edition, July 2004

43 UNIT 1 Airport Surface Operations Civil Aviation Requirements, Section-4, Aerodrome Standards & Air Traffic Services, Series 'B', Part I dated 31st July, 2006-: Aerodrome Design And Operations, issued by Office Of Director General Of Civil Aviation. 3. ICAO Aerodrome Design Manual (ICAO Doc 9157), Part 1 - Runways, Part 2 - Taxiways, Aprons and Holding Bays, Part 3 - Pavements, Part 4 - Visual Aids, Part 5 - Electrical Systems. 4. ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (ICAO Doc 9476) 5. Airports Authority of India ATS Manual. 6. ICAO Annex 10 -Volume I-Aeronautical Telecommunications- Radio Navigation Aids, Fifth Edition - July 1996 Questions General Questions 1. Describe the functioning of a Visual Approach Slope Indicator System (VASIS) or a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) 2. What is an ILS (Instruments Landing System)? What are its main features? 3. What are the different types of aircraft emergencies? What are the actions taken by various ground agencies to handle such emergencies? Objective Type Questions. a. Two parallel runways located in North/South direction will be named as and b. Precision Approach Runway Cat II is a kind of i. Instrument runway ii. iii. iv. Non- Instrument runway Grassy runway Unlighted Runway

44 40 Aviation Safety and Security Management c. An aircraft is landing on Runway 09 at an airport. This means that the aircraft is approaching from; ---- to d. VOR & DME are used for getting the & of the aircraft from an airport. e. Top Priority for landing should be given to the aircraft 1. Aircraft experiencing in-flight emergency like engine failure, fire, shortage of fuel etc. f. The Taxiway markings are shown by broken white lines and the colour of taxiway edge lights is g. The NDB (Non Directional Beacon) is used by aircraft for communication with ATC. (True or False) h. Displaced Threshold mean; i. A threshold not located at the extremity of a runway. ii. iii. iv. A runway not aligned properly. A runway located very far from the airport. A misplaced taxiway Answers to Objective Type of questions a. 18L/36R, 18R/36L b. i. Instrument runway c. West to East d. Direction & Distance e. Aircraft experiencing in-flight emergency like engine failure, fire, shortage of fuel etc. f. Blue g. False h. i. A threshold not located at the extremity of a runway.

45 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 41 Unit 2 Crew Alerting Management General Aircraft while in flight is prone to various types of emergency situations, which become risky if not attended in time. The flight crew members (Pilots, Co-pilots, Flight Engineers, Cabin crew, stewards etc.) are expected to handle such situations of their own, since it may not be possible to provide any kind of fruitful assistance by ground personnel in the air. However, under such circumstances, ground people (ATC, Airlines, Fire Staff, Ground handling staff, Military and Defence authorities etc.) make efforts to allow the aircraft to land in a safe, expeditious and efficient manner and then provide full ground assistance; and also help in search & rescue efforts. In order to resolve any such eventuality, the best possible assistance that can be given to the pilot by the system is in the form of an early warning, so that he is able to take the necessary preventive action at the earliest. In order to meet this requirement, modern aircraft are equipped with various facilities and gadgets, which provide early alert warning of an emergency situation in the aircraft. Some such installations are given below; If the speed of the aircraft becomes dangerously low (Known as stalling speed) this particular warning appears, so that the pilot can take preventing action to increase the speed of the aircraft. In the event of fire in the aircraft the Fire Warning appears in the form on bell, buzzer and light, thereby causing the

46 42 Aviation Safety and Security Management pilot to apply fire extinguishers and can take other preventing actions. If any of the aircraft doors remain open during flight, Door warning comes and suitable necessary actions are taken by the air crew. It is an integrated system used in modern aircraft to provide aircraft crew with aircraft engines and other systems instrumentation and crew annunciations. EICAS typically includes instrumentation of various engine parameters, including for example Revolution per Minute (RPM), temperature values, fuel flow & quantity, oil pressure etc. Typical other aircraft systems monitored by EICAS are for example hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, de-icing, environmental and control surface systems. As EICAS has high connectivity, it provides data acquisition and routing. EICAS is a key function of a Glass cockpit system, which replaces all analogue gages with software-driven electronic displays. Most of the display area is used for navigation and orientation displays, but one display or a section of a display is set aside specifically for EICAS. The Crew Alerting System (CAS) is used in place of the annunciator panel on older systems. Rather than signalling a system failure by turning on a light behind a translucent button, failures are shown as a list of messages is shown in a small window near the other EICAS indications. The CAS system is, in essence, and electronic version of the light Warning system of old generation aircraft. Ground proximity warning system (GPWS) is a system designed to alert pilots if their aircraft is in immediate danger of flying into the ground or high terrain. Another common name for such a system is ground-collision warning system (GCWS).

47 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 43 The system monitors an aircraft s height above ground as determined by a radar altimeter. A computer then keeps track of these readings, calculates trends, and will warn the captain with visual and audio messages if the aircraft is in certain defined flying configurations ( modes ), like Whoop Whoop Pull up. The modes are: Risk Warning (Aural/Visual) 1. Excessive descent rate ( PULL UP SINKRATE ) 2. Excessive terrain closure rate ( TERRAIN PULL UP ) 3. Altitude loss after take off ( DON T SINK ) 4. Unsafe terrain clearance ( TOO LOW - TERRAIN TOO LOW - GEAR TOO LOW - FLAPS ) 5. Excessive deviation below glide slope ( GLIDE SLOPE ) 6. Bank angle protection ( BANK ANGLE )-[With EGPWS] 7. Wind shear protection ( WINDSHEAR )-[With EGPWS] Prior to the development of GPWS in US, large passenger aircraft were involved in 3.5 fatal CFIT accidents per year, falling to 2 per year in the mid-1970s. Since the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration required large airplanes to carry such equipment in 1974, there has not been a single passenger fatality, in a CFIT crash by a large jet in U.S. airspace. In 2000 the FAA extended this requirement to smaller commuter planes as well. In India also, DGCA has made it mandatory for civil aircraft to be equipped with GPWS. Basic GPWS, however, provide warning for the obstacles, which are directly below the aircraft, and, it does give information about the obstructions just ahead of it. Thus if there is a sudden change in terrain, such as a steep slope, GPWS will not detect the aircraft closure rate until it is too late for evasive action. In 2002 an advanced version of GPWS, known as Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) or Terrain

48 44 Aviation Safety and Security Management avoidance System (TAWS) based on new technology was introduced, which could solve this problem by presenting information about obstacles ahead of the aircraft. In addition it could also give warnings about the wind shear and excessive bank angle on approach. On 12th Nov. 96, a tragic aircraft accident occurred over Village Charkhi Dadari near Delhi. On that day one B747 of Saudi Arab Airlines and an IL-76 aircraft of Kazakhstan Airlines collided in the air while Saudia was climbing to 14,000ft and Kazakh was descending to 15,000ft. All the 351 innocent passengers and crew of both the aircraft got killed and the debris of the ill-fated aircraft mingled with the dead bodies fell over the fields. The mid-air collision left the world stunned. It was evident that at least one of the aircraft was not maintaining proper height. Since Delhi Air Traffic Control was not equipped with the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), ATC was not aware of the heights maintained by the two aircraft, as the Primary Radar available with Delhi ATC does not show the heights of the aircraft over the Radar screen. And then questions were raised whether the sad mishap somehow could have been averted. Within six months of the Saudia-Kazakh mid-air, another incident was reported. Air-Force One (also known as the flying White House), the VIP Jumbo jet (B ) aircraft which is the official aircraft used by the President of the United States, came dangerously close to another US Cargo plane while they were about 400 Kms off the European Coast. These aircraft were operating flights between USA and Europe on reciprocal tracks and they came close to each other within 2 to 3 nautical miles (4 to 6 Kms) laterally and less than 1000 ft. vertically. At a combined speed of about Kms an hour (or about 25 to 30 Kms per minute), these aircraft should have been hardly 15 to 20 seconds away from each other creating a critically dangerous situation. However immediate alert warnings in the cockpit were given by the state-of-the-art equipment known as Traffic Alert Collision

49 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 45 Avoidance System (TCAS) and the pilots could manoeuvre the aircraft safely taking them out of danger. Thus because of the presence of a particular equipment, a possible disaster could be averted. This important equipment TCAS (also called Airborne Collision Avoidance System or ACAS) is thus getting the recognition as one of the primary requirement for the safety of the passenger aircraft. ACAS or Airborne Collision Avoidance System is an air-toair communication system that gives audio visual warnings in the cockpit in the event of a potential danger being faced in the form of a conflicting aircraft dangerously coming in the close proximity. ACAS provides avoidance protection & air space situational awareness for the aircraft and is completely independent of ground-based equipment. ACAS can track as many as 45 aircraft and display up to 30 of them at a time. ACAS works on the principal of Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), where in radio signals are sent and received in the form of questions-answers (or Interrogator-transponder) between the aircraft and the ground control (Air Traffic Control Centre). The only difference between SSR and the ACAS is that, while in case of a SSR the question-answer is between ground and the aircraft, in case of ACAS the interrogation is between aircraft to aircraft. TYPE OF EQUIPMENT There are 3 type of ACAS equipment presently available. ACAS-I provides traffic information (Known as Traffic Advisories or TAs) and it acts as an aid to SEE & AVOID ACTION. This type of warning is known as traffic advisories (TAs). However, this equipment does not have the capability for generating Resolution Advisories (RAs), which is the advisory type of manoeuvre for altering the flight path for avoiding the conflict. ACAS is found to be very useful equipment for the pilot as it immediately issues alert warnings for avoidance of collision. This warning issued by ACAS-I, known as Traffic Advisories (TA) is in the form of

50 46 Aviation Safety and Security Management lights as well as audio signals. Audio Signal is a synthesized human voice in the form of different kinds of spoken warnings (sometime it appears as if some ghost is shouting). For example: TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC In other words, ACAS-I can issue only TRAFFIC TRAFFIC aural warnings and the relevant visual warnings, but it cannot advise the pilot to take steps for avoiding the conflicting traffic. ACAS I is intended for use in smaller commuter and general aviation aircraft. ACAS-II: This equipment provides coordinated vertical Resolution Advisories (RAs) such as CLIMB, CLIMB in addition to Traffic Advisories (TAs) in the event of the aircraft facing threat from a conflicting traffic. This is one of the most important equipment that has been accepted for international implementation and standardization by ICAO. ACAS II is intended for use in air transport category aircraft and large commuter aircraft. In addition to TAs, the advanced version of ACAS known as ACAS-II, also issues Resolution Advisories (RA) alerting the pilot to take evasive action for avoidance of collision. For example: CLIMB; CLIMB; CLIMB CLIMB - CROSSING CLIMB; CLIMB - CROSSING CLIMB; DESCENT; DESCENT; DESCENT REDUCE DESCEND; REDUCE DESCEND INCREASE CLIMB; INCREASE CLIMB MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED; MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED CLEAR OF CONFLICT, and so on... ACAS-III: ACAS III provides vertical as well as horizontal Resolution Advisories in addition to Traffic Advisories. ACAS-IV: ACAS IV is being designed to meet the operational requirements of Free Flight and Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) and may include GPS composition

51 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 47 capabilities, horizontal Resolution Advisories, extended Range and other enhancement over existing TCAS/ACAS equipment. Similar type higher versions of the equipment are also under development. LIMITATIONS ACAS has got a limitation that both the aircraft which are coming within the close proximity to each other must be equipped with ACAS on board, in order to have Traffic Advisories (TAs) as well as Resolution Advisories (RAs). However, in case the intruding aircraft is not fitted with ACAS, still the alert warning in the form of Traffic Advisories (TAs) will be received by the pilot. Looking into all these aspects, Govt. of India has made it mandatory for passenger aircraft to get themselves equipped with ACAS System. There can be a number of aircraft emergencies, which may create various problems for the pilot. ATC is the first and most important unit to interact with the pilot during aircraft emergencies. Some such problems are discussed below; The Pilot can abort take-of, in case of any problem during T/ O provided the aircraft has not crossed the V1 speed. If an engine fails during or immediately after T/O, the Pilot normally tries to land straight without delay. ATC will provide full assistance to clear the runway and divert all other traffic. A precautionary landing is made by the pilot when the aircraft and engines may be functioning normally, however, there may be some small problem causing the pilot to take the landing as a precautionary step.

52 48 Some such cases could be Aviation Safety and Security Management One engine shut down due oil loss, heavy vibration or similar such malfunctions etc. (Other engines working normally). Minor Instrument failure Bad weather Other minor snags Fuel leakage or not having sufficient fuel to reach to the desired destination Smoke warning Any other warning, which is assumed to be False indication. In case of any serious trouble the pilot can not continue the flight and makes an Emergency Landing. The ATC unit under such an event would provide full assistance and top priority to the aircraft. Some typical examples of problems leading to Emergency Landing are given below; Fire on aircraft Malfunction of any Control system Major Failure of any critical part/instrument Aircraft loosing height due multi engine failure Acute Fuel shortage Aircraft in distress due to any other reason. Pressurisation is needed in the cabin of an aircraft flying at an altitude above 8000 ft. Normally modern aircraft cruise at an altitude of 30,000 ft. to 50,000 ft. Thus in the event of Pressurization Failure at high altitudes, the passengers and the crew would face acute discomfort and serious medical & biological problems.

53 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 49 Thus the aircraft would need immediate descent below 9000 ft. Thereafter, the flight can be continued in normal manner (Provided the aircraft has not remained with Pressurization Failure for a long duration, when the passengers may need immediate medical attention). Many controls of the aircraft like flaps, Landing Gears, Brake actuating systems etc. are normally operated hydraulically. In case of Hydraulic Failure, the pilot may face tremendous problems in operating the controls/ systems etc, and may need priority landing. The aircraft on landing may require longer length of runway for landing, and may block the runway as it will not be able to taxi on its own; and may have to be towed out. In case the pilot of an aircraft gets the warning indication that the wheels are not extended and locked, there can be two possibilities. First the wheels might be extended but the warning may be false due to some reason. In such cases the pilot flies the aircraft low across the Air Traffic Control Tower for visual inspection of the Landing Gears. However, if the Landing Gears are actually not extended, the pilot make attempts to extend the gears through mechanical methods or manually. If all efforts fail, the pilot tries to make a belly-landing which is a case of full emergency. There may be a case when the pilot is not able to retract the L/G after it is airborne. In such cases the pilot would not like to continue the flight and instead would return for landing. This may be a precautionary landing. Upon receipt of information regarding any emergency situation, the Air traffic control (ATC) unit will declare an alert in the form of a; LOCAL STANDBY FULL EMEGENCY

54 50 Aviation Safety and Security Management Subsequent action will be taken by ATC and other concerned agencies based on the type of emergency to handle the situation. During an emergency Air traffic control units are expected to maintain full and complete coordination and give top priority for any type of ATC Clearance required by the aircraft in distress and in landing. For example, the progress of an aircraft in emergency is monitored on the ATC radar display until the aircraft passes out of radar coverage, and position information is then provided to all air traffic services units which may be able to give assistance to the aircraft. Radar transfer to adjacent radar sectors shall also be effected when appropriate. When an emergency is declared by an aircraft, the ATS unit should take appropriate and relevant preventive action. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) unless clearly stated by the flight crew or otherwise known, take all necessary steps to ascertain aircraft identification and type, the nature of emergency, the intentions of the flight crew as well as the position and level of the aircraft; decide upon the most appropriate type of assistance which can be rendered; enlist the aid of any other ATS unit or other services which may be able to provide assistance to the aircraft; provide the flight crew with any information requested as well as any additional relevant information, such as details on suitable aerodromes, minimum safe altitudes, weather information; obtain from the operator or the flight crew such of the following information as may be relevant: number of persons on board, amount of fuel remaining, possible presence of hazardous materials and the nature thereof; and notify the appropriate ATS units and authorities as specified in local instructions

55 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 51 Manoeuvring instructions to an aircraft experiencing engine failure should be limited to a minimum. When appropriate, other aircraft operating in the vicinity of the aircraft in emergency should be advised of the circumstances. Priority An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference, shall be given maximum consideration, assistance and priority over other aircraft as may be necessitated by the circumstances. Unlawful interference and aircraft bomb threat Air traffic services personnel shall be prepared to recognize any indication of the occurrence of unlawful interference with an aircraft Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is known or suspected or a bomb threat warning has been received, ATS units shall promptly attend to all requests made by, or to anticipated needs of, the aircraft, including requests for relevant information relating to air navigation facilities, procedures and services along the route of flight and at any aerodrome of intended landing, and shall take such action as is necessary to expedite the conduct of all phases of the flight, especially the safe landing of the aircraft ATS units shall also: (a) (b) (c) transmit, and continue to transmit, information pertinent to the safe conduct of the flight, without expecting a reply from the aircraft; monitor and plot the progress of the flight with the means available, and coordinate transfer of control with adjacent ATS units without requiring transmissions or other responses from the aircraft, unless communication with the aircraft remains normal; inform, and continue to keep informed, appropriate ATS units, including those in adjacent Flight Information Regions (FIRs), which may be concerned with the progress of the flight;

56 52 (d) Aviation Safety and Security Management notify: the airline operator, the appropriate rescue coordination centre, the designated security authority (In case of hijacking or security threat) An aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference or which for other reasons needs isolation from normal aerodrome activities shall be cleared to the designated isolated parking position. Emergency descent Upon receipt of advice that an aircraft is making an emergency descent through other traffic, the air traffic control units shall immediately instruct other aircraft flying in the area to clear the path of the aircraft in distress. Air-Ground Communications Failure As soon as it is known that two-way communication between aircraft and ATC has failed, separation shall be maintained between the aircraft having the communication failure and other aircraft, and the aircraft will be given freedom to continue to fly as per standard procedures. Assistance To VFR Flights A VFR flight reporting that it is uncertain of its position or lost, or encountering adverse weather conditions, should be considered to be in a state of emergency and handled as such. Navigation assistance to help the pilot determine the aircraft position may be provided by use of radar, direction-finder, navigation aids or sighting by another aircraft. Care must be taken when providing navigation assistance to ensure that the aircraft does not enter cloud. OTHER IN-FLIGHT CONTINGENCIES Strayed or unidentified aircraft The terms strayed aircraft means An aircraft which has deviated significantly from its intended track or which reports that it is lost. and unidentified aircraft means An aircraft which has been observed or reported to be operating in a given area but whose identity has not been established.

57 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 53 As soon as an air traffic services unit becomes aware of a strayed aircraft, it shall take all necessary steps to assist the aircraft and to safeguard its flight including Navigational assistance, Radar Assistance. Interception of civil aircraft As soon as an air traffic services unit learns that an aircraft is being intercepted in its area of responsibility, it shall inform the pilot of the intercepted aircraft of the interception and relay messages between the intercepting aircraft and the intercept control unit, as necessary. In close coordination with the intercept control unit take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of the intercepted aircraft Fuel dumping An aircraft in an emergency or other urgent situations may need to dump fuel so as to reduce to maximum landing mass in order to effect a safe landing. Under such circumstances, the ATC unit should then coordinate with the flight crew and give clearance for the route to be flown, which, if possible (should be clear of cities and towns, preferably over water, and clear of weather); the level (should be not less than ft); and duration of the fuel dumping. References 1. Aeronautical Information Circular No. 03 of 2006 issued by DGCA Dt 19 th May ICAO Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137) Part 1 Rescue and Fire Fighting. 3. DGCA, Civil Aviation Requirement, Aircraft Instrument, Equipment And Accessories-GPWS, Series I-Part VII, Issue II, Dated DGCA, Civil Aviation Requirement, Aircraft Instrument, Equipment And Accessories-ACAS, Series I-Part VIII, Issue II, Dated AAI Air Traffic Services Manual 6. AAI Airport Operations Manual

58 54 Aviation Safety and Security Management 7. DGCA Website also 8. AAI website 9. Indian Aircraft Manual 10. FAA Advisory circulars on various Cockpit Warning Instruments. Questions General Questions. 1. What is the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) or TCAS. How it functions? 2. An aircraft is coming for emergency landing due to Landing Gears not extending? What actions are required to be taken by the pilot and different ground agencies? 3. In case the aircraft is met with a bomb threat or an unlawful interference (Threat of Hijacking), what action is required to be taken by the ATC Unit. 4. Describe the functioning of GPWS equipment. Objective Type of questions a. In case of hydraulic failure the aircraft may experience the following problems; b. If two aircraft come dangerously close to each other, an alert warning will be issued by equipment installed in the aircraft. c. GPWS is the equipment installed for safety of aircraft to avoid of collision with high terrain and hills etc. It stands for - d. In case of Pressurization failure, the aircraft may need the following assistance; i. e. EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System); i.

59 UNIT 2 Crew Alerting Management 55 ii. iii. iv. It only provides engine information It shuts down all aircraft engines in case the pilot receives a smoke warning. It is another form of ACAS. f. GPWS issues alert warning Terrain-Terrain, whenever; i. g. In case of a fire on one of its engines, the aircraft may; i. Make an Emergency landing. ii. iii. Make a precautionary landing Fly near control tower for visual confirmation iv. Continue its flight as long as there is no fuel shortage. h. Prior to an emergency landing, the Fuel dumping is necessary so as to; i. To cool down the temperature of the aircraft. ii. iii. reduce the landing weight of the aircraft to bring it within the maximum permissible & safe limit of landing. To increase the flying speed of the aircraft. iv. Achieve a quick descent rate. General Questions 5. What is the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) or TCAS. How it functions? 6. An aircraft is coming for emergency landing due to Landing Gears not extending? What actions are required to be taken by the pilot and different ground agencies? 7. In case the aircraft is met with a bomb threat or an unlawful interference (Threat of Hijacking), what action is required to be taken by the ATC Unit. 8. Describe the functioning of GPWS equipment.

60 56 Aviation Safety and Security Management Answers to Objective Type of questions a. On landing the aircraft may need longer runway to stop due to less effective brakes, and may need towing as it may not be able to turn. b. ACAS. c. Ground Proximity Warning System d. Immediate descent to a height of 8000 ft or low. e. EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) It is an integrated system used in modern aircraft to provide aircraft crew aircraft engines and other systems instrumentation and crew annunciation. f. Aircraft comes in close proximity of a high hill or high ground. g. Make an Emergency landing. h. reduce the landing weight of the aircraft to bring it within the maximum permissible & safe limit of landing.

61 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 57 Unit 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material "Dangerous goods" or "Hazardous Material" means articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are listed as such in the Technical Instructions or which are classified according to the Technical Instructions. The above mentioned Technical Instructions known as "Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air" are in the form of an ICAO document (ICAO Doc 9284) issued by ICAO and is available for sale at ICAO and at their authorised dealers. A number of aircraft accidents and many cases of explosions are caused as a result of carriage of certain dangerous or prohibited articles inside the aircraft which are referred as `Hazardous cargo by International Civil Aviation Organisation. Often passengers deliberately or unknowingly carry such dangerous articles due to which there is a possibility of fire or explosion during the flight. Sometimes such objects are carried through cargo or through unaccompanied baggage. Some such dangerous goods that we are familiar with are petrol, kerosene, bottles of acid, cooking gas, fire crackers etc. However even many innocent looking objects like domestic cleaning liquid, cans of aerosol, various organic liquids, a bundle of match boxes, cigarette lighters, paints etc. can also be quite harmful at times and therefore have been categorized as restricted articles and should be carried on board the flight under special precautions. So much so that even a simple kitchen item like Copra (Dried Coconut) is restricted due to its high oil content.

62 58 Aviation Safety and Security Management The hazardous material that have been forbidden in carryon and checked baggage on board the commercial aircraft have been categorised in different classes as given below; HAZARD CLASS Explosives Gas or vapour Flammable liquids COMMON ITEMS** Fireworks, loose ammunitions, flares, gun powder loaded firearms Aerosols containing flammable material under pressure (e.g. hair sprays and paints), CO cartridges, medical oxygen, butane fuel, Chemical Mace, tear gas, scuba tanks, propane tanks, selfinflating rafts. Flammable paints and related material, solid perfumes, gasoline, safety or "strike-any where" Matches, some cleaning solvents. Oxidisers Poisons Infectious Material Corrosives Organic Peroxides Radioactive Material Magnetized Materials Other hazardous Materials Bleach, nitric acid, fertilizers, swimming pool and spa chemicals. Weed killers, pesticides, rat poisons. Bacterial cultures, viral organism, medical laboratory specimens. Drain cleaners, wet-type batteries, acids lye Fibreglass resins. Smoke detectors, radioactive-labelled materials & pharmaceuticals. Magnets as in some loudspeakers and laboratory equipments. Dry ice, mercury, any equipment material containing fuel. (There are certain exceptions for personal care medical needs sporting equipment and items to support physically challenged travellers.) ** Source Hazardous Materials Advisory Council and the US Federal Aviation Administration. There are hundreds of cases of aircraft accidents, which were primarily caused due to dangerous articles. For example, a B727 aircraft was flying at 35,000 feet with 68 passengers on board. The flight attendants suddenly smelled a burning odour and some smoke at the rear side of the passenger cabin. One airhostess went with the fire extinguisher and found that the flames were emerging from a passenger baggage kept below his seat. With great difficulty the fire could be controlled which had already spread all around by that time.

63 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 59 The pilot informed Air Traffic control and made an emergency landing at the airport. Fortunately there was no injury to any passenger. However the aircraft had suffered significant fire damage in and around the area of fire. During investigation it was found that the fire has emerged from the handbag of a passenger that contained a book of matchboxes which ignited due to friction and vibration due to presence of a container of hair spray perfume and other miscellaneous items that were found to be highly inflammable during tests. In another accident a Pan Am B707 cargo aircraft crashed during emergency landing at Boston in December 1973 killing all the three crew members who were the only occupants of the aircraft. Investigations revealed that incorrectly packed nitric acid had spilled reacted with the sawdust packing and the resultant toxic fumes affected the crew performance. The accident was attributed to carriage of dangerous goods. Similarly in case of another cargo flight in Canada the crew smelled a strong nauseating odour twenty minutes after departure. The crew members decided to return and make an emergency landing after wearing protective oxygen masks. On ground the officials found a 10-litre container of Ethyl Mercaptan a chemical used for mixing with cooking gas for making it smelly (Normally the cooking gases which consist of Butane and Propane is odourless however it is made odoury by artificial means so as to make its presence felt during leakage to prevent kitchen accidents). The material (Ethyl Marcaptan) had leaked and had been absorbed by the packing in the outer container. Thus a near mishap was averted. On 12 April 89 a powerful blast damaged some portion of the airport building at Calcutta International Airport. The explosion occurred a few minutes before the Calcutta- Mumbai (Bombay) flight was to take-off. The investigating officer located the source of explosion in a package brought by a private courier service from Vishakhapatnam that was to be dispatched to Mumbai for its final destination to Cochin

64 60 Aviation Safety and Security Management (Kerala). Had the package containing explosive materials not exploded while it was in the airport lounge it would have been loaded on to the Calcutta-Mumbai (Bombay) flight. Under those circumstances there was every possibility of it exploding in the aircraft after it had taken off leading to disastrous consequences) as nearly 230 passengers were to travel by that flight. Investigation revealed that the explosive material, locally known as "rocket parachute", normally used by fisherman as a danger signal in case of an emergency at the mid sea. It is likely that the parcel might not have been intended for the sabotage (perhaps it was meant for the genuine need of a local fisherman) however the danger involved in such a risky transportation was easily evident. As a matter of fact International Civil Aviation Organisation has issued ICAO Annex-18 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air) containing Standards and Recommended Practices for the Transportation of Dangerous Goods by Air. All contracting States are required to follow these instructions, which in turn would result into carriage of dangerous goods in a safe and secured manner that will not pose any danger to passengers, aircraft and the crew. Govt. of India has also formulated rules for carriage of Hazardous material vide "The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules, 2003". The relevant extracts from these rules are given below. Every Operator (a person, organisation or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation) is required to be certified by the DGCA to carry the dangerous goods. These dangerous goods will be required to be carried in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions issued by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO Doc 9284);

65 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 61 A permission in writing is required to be granted by the Central Government for carriage of explosives and radioactive material. In the event of an extreme emergency such as national or international crisis or natural calamities or otherwise necessitating transportation by air of such goods and full compliance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions may adversely affect the public interest, exemption may be granted for such carriage by DGCA/ Central Government. The articles and substances classified as dangerous goods but otherwise required to be on board the aircraft in accordance with the pertinent airworthiness requirements and the operating regulations, or for specialised purposes are also exempted It is the duty of the shipper, the operator and every person concerned with packing, marking, labelling, acceptance, handling, loading, unloading, storage, transportation or any other process connected directly or indirectly with carriage of such dangerous goods, to take all precautions to avoid danger to the aircraft or to the persons on board or to any other person or property. In case of requirement, the Government may cause the dangerous goods in question to be placed under his custody pending detailed examination of the nature of the goods or pending a decision regarding the action, if any, to be taken in the matter. The dangerous goods shall be classified in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Instructions. Dangerous goods will be required to be packed in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions

66 62 Aviation Safety and Security Management It shall be ensured that no harmful quantity of a dangerous substance adheres to the outside of the packagings. Packagings shall be of good quality and shall be constructed and securely closed so as to prevent leakage which might be caused in normal conditions of transport by changes in temperature, humidity or pressure, or by vibration. The packagings shall be suitable for the contents and the packagings in direct contact with dangerous goods shall be resistant to any chemical or other action of such goods. The Packagings shall be tested, should meet the material and construction specifications there should not be any leakage No packaging used for the transport of the dangerous goods shall be re-used unless inspected and found free from corrosion or other damage Provided that where it is not possible to properly clean a packaging already used for the transport of dangerous goods, then such an uncleaned empty packaging shall be transported by air following the same procedure as laid down for the transport of the dangerous goods for which such packagings has been used earlier. The dangerous goods are required to be labelled and marked in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions. It should be marked with the proper shipping name of its contents and, when assigned, the UN number (Four-digit number assigned by the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods to identify a substance or a particular group of substances) and such other markings as may be specified in those Instructions. For marking, the languages of the State of origin and English shall also be used. No shipper or his agent shall offer any package or overpack (An enclosure used by a single shipper to

67 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 63 contain one or more packages and to form one handling unit for convenience of handling and stowage) of dangerous goods for transport by air unless he has ensured that such dangerous goods are not forbidden for transport by air and are properly classified, packed, marked and labelled in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions. He must also complete, sign and provided to the operator a dangerous goods transport document, as specified in the Technical Instructions. The operator shall accept dangerous goods for transport by air, subject to duly certified, labelled, marked, as per the Technical Instructions The package, overpack or freight container containing the dangerous goods should be inspected for evidence of leakage or damage before loading. A unit load device (any type of freight container, aircraft container or aircraft pallet with a net, but excluding an overpack, designed for loading on an aircraft) shall not be loaded aboard an aircraft unless the device has been inspected and found free from any evidence of leakage from, or damage to, any dangerous goods contained therein. Where any package of dangerous goods loaded on an aircraft appears to be damaged or leaking, the operator shall remove such package from the aircraft, or arrange for its removal by an appropriate authority or organisation, as the case may be, and thereafter shall ensure that the remainder of the consignment is in a proper condition for transport by air and that no other package has been contaminated. If evidence of any damage or leakage upon unloading from the aircraft or unit load device and if evidence of damage or leakage is found, the area where the dangerous goods or unit load device were stowed on the aircraft shall be inspected for damage or contamination.

68 64 Aviation Safety and Security Management Dangerous goods should not be carried in an aircraft cabin occupied by passengers or on the flight deck of an aircraft. Any hazardous contamination found on an aircraft as a result of leakage or damage to dangerous goods shall be removed without delay. An aircraft which has been contaminated by radioactive materials shall immediately be taken out of service and not returned to service until the radiation level at any accessible surface and the non-fixed contamination are not more than the values specified in the Technical Instructions. Packages containing dangerous goods which might react dangerously with one another shall not be stowed on an aircraft next to each other or in a position that would allow interaction between them in the event of leakage. Packages of toxic and infectious substances shall be stowed on an aircraft in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions. Packages of radioactive materials shall be stowed on an aircraft so that they are separated from persons, live animals and undeveloped film, in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions. When dangerous goods are loaded in an aircraft, the operator shall protect the dangerous goods from being damaged, and shall secure such goods in the aircraft in such a manner that will prevent any movement in flight which would change the orientation of the packages. For packages containing radioactive materials, the securing shall be adequate to ensure that the separation requirements at all times. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Instructions, packages of dangerous goods bearing the "Cargo aircraft only" label shall be loaded in such a manner that a crew member or other authorised person can see, handle and, where size and weight permit, separate such packages from other cargo in flight.

69 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 65 The operator shall provide information in writing to the pilot-in-command about the dangerous goods before departure of the aircraft. The operator shall provide such information in the Operations Manual so as to enable the flight crew member to carry out their responsibilities with regard to the transport of dangerous goods and shall also provide instructions as to the action to be taken in the event of emergencies arising involving dangerous goods. Operators shall ensure that information is promulgated in such a manner that passengers are warned as to the types of goods which they are forbidden from transporting aboard an aircraft as provided in the Technical Instructions. Operators, shippers or other organisations involved in the transport of dangerous goods by air shall provide such information to their personnel so as to enable them to carry out their responsibilities with regard to the transport of dangerous goods and shall also provide instructions as to the action to be taken in the event of emergencies arising involving dangerous goods. If an in-flight emergency occurs, the pilot-in-command shall, as soon as the situation permits, inform the appropriate air traffic services unit, for the information of aerodrome authorities, of any dangerous goods on board the aircraft, as provided in the Technical Instructions. In the event of an aircraft accident or a serious incident where dangerous goods carried as cargo are involved, the operator of the aircraft shall provide information, without delay, to the emergency services responding to the accident or serious incident, and, as soon as possible, to the appropriate authorities of the State of the operator and the State in which the accident or serious incident occurred, about the dangerous goods on board, as shown on the written information to the pilot-in-command.

70 66 Aviation Safety and Security Management In the event of an aircraft incident, the operator of an aircraft carrying dangerous goods as cargo shall, upon request, provide information, without delay, to the emergency services responding to the incident and also to the appropriate authority of the State in which the incident occurred, about the dangerous goods on board, as shown on the written information to the pilot-in command. The officials of DGCA, or Government may, at any reasonable time, are authorized to enter any place to which access is necessary and inspect any services, equipment, documents and records. In the event of a dangerous goods accident or dangerous goods incident, as the case may be, the pilot-in-command of the aircraft and the operator of the aircraft or of the aerodrome, as the case may be, shall submit a report in writing to the Director General on such accident or incident. The report shall, in addition to any other relevant information, contain the following information, namely: - the type, nationality and registration marks of aircraft; the name of the owner, operator and hirer of the aircraft; the name of the pilot-in-command of the aircraft; the nature and purpose of the flight; the date and time of the dangerous goods accident or incident; the place where the accident occurred: the last point of departure and the next point of intended landing of the aircraft; the details of the dangerous goods on board the aircraft viz. their proper shipping name, UN number, quantity etc.

71 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 67 the known cause of the dangerous goods accident or incident; details of other cargo on board the aircraft; the extent of known damage to the aircraft, other property and persons on board the aircraft; any other information required to be included by the Director-General. On receipt of such report, the DGCA may, if considered necessary, order an investigation to determine the causes of such accident or incident and take preventive measures to avoid re-occurrence of such accident or incident. All persons engaged in any manner in the transport of dangerous goods like shippers, operators, ground handling agencies, freight forwarders, security agencies etc. shall undergo proper training in accordance with the Technical Instructions. Training shall be provided in the requirements commensurate with the responsibilities of the personnel being trained and such training shall include, general familiarization training, function, safety training. Training shall be provided or verified upon the employment of a person in a position involving the transport of dangerous goods by air and recurrent training shall take place within twenty-four months of previous training to ensure knowledge is current. The training programmes established and maintained by or on behalf of operators shall be subjected to review and approval by Government/ DGCA. The DGCA has issued Aeronautical Information Circulars (AICs No. AIC 03 of 2004 Dated 24th Feb 2004) and Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR), Section 3 - Air

72 68 Aviation Safety and Security Management Transport Series 'L' Part III dated 4th October 2006, containing the provisions of the requirement of transport and training on the carriage of dangerous goods by air, and Air Safety Circular No. 2 of 1962 and 2 of 1989 dated 13th January, 1989 containing the Instructions regarding handling of Radio active materials and aircraft emergencies containing Radio active materials. These circulars are given in the Appendix. The Central Government may, by general or special order in writing, exempt any aircraft or class of aircraft or any person or class of persons from the operation of these rules, either wholly or partially, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in that order. Where the Director-General, after giving an opportunity of being heard, is satisfied that any person has contravened or failed to comply with the provisions of these rules, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, cancel or suspend any licence, certificate or approval issued under these rules or under the Aircraft Rules, Any unaccompanied baggage required to be carried by air is sometimes subjected to undergo waiting through a certain period of time known as "Cooling period". Thereafter the baggage is loaded on board the aircraft. This is done with the intensions to exclude the possibility of any mishap to take place on ground instead of within the flight. Action Plans for an Emergency involving Radioactive Consignments There are special requirements as regards to transportation of radioactive consignments by air formulated in consultation with Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Mumbai.

73 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 69 These procedures have been promulgated by DGCA Vide Air Safety Circular no. 02 of In addition, DGCA has also circulated another circular (Air Safety Circular no. 02 of 1989) giving action to be taken in case the aircraft carrying radioactive material meets with an emergency. The following extracts from ICAO Aircraft accident Investigation manual are forwarded for information of investigation. "Radioactive isotopes are being carried as freight with increasing frequency in transport aircraft and the investigator should be on guard against the possibility of such material being present in the wreckage. A routine preliminary check of freight manifest or an enquiry to Air Carrier's agent will resolve the question. If it is established that the radioactive materials were being carried, steps must be taken immediately to make sure that they are removed to a place of safety before they can cause harm to persons working in close proximity to the wreckage. Radioactivity can not be detected by the human senses but by means of a special instrument known as a "Geiger Counter". The radiation can not be stopped or slowed down by any known means but its distance can be reduced to a harmless level by distance or by suitable screening. A radioactive source, if spilled or scattered may cling to any object including clothing, food and the human body with obviously harmful results. The small size of an isotope likely to be carried in an aircraft, the strength of its package and the shielding incorporated in it, minimize the possibility of damage even when subjected to the impact of an aircraft accident. As long as the package and shielding remain intact there is likely to be little danger from the radiation. Where fire follows the impact, however, the package and shielding may be damaged. The radioactive isotopes may then be changed into gaseous form by heat, in which the radiation may spread in the downwind direction. Splashing of the radioactive material with water would, in such circumstances, increase the risk of radiation spreading throughout the wreckage.

74 70 Aviation Safety and Security Management In case where an accident resulting in fire occurs to an aircraft carrying radioactive isotopes, no examination of the wreckage should be commenced until the degree of radiation has been checked by an expert. (Of course in India the Expert has to be a representative from BARC). References 11. ICAO Annex-18 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation-The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air 12. Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Doc 9284). 13. DGCA Website also DGCA Air Safety Circular no. 02 of DGCA Air Safety Circular no. 02 of Indian Aircraft Manual Questions General Questions 1. How ICAO defines 'Dangerous Goods' 2. Give an example of the case history an aircraft accident caused due to presence of some kind of dangerous goods on board or due to some bomb or terrorist attack, please give the causes of the accident with possible methods of prevention and your views on avoiding such accidents. 3. What is the meant by 'cooling period' in respect of unaccompanied baggage. 4. What actions are required to be taken in the event of an aircraft carrying Radio Active material meets with an accident. Objective Type of questions a. The following item is considered as a Hazardous material and can not be carried on board the aircraft as hand baggage;

75 UNIT 3 Transportation of Hazardous Material 71 i. Acid Battery ii. iii. iv. Shaving Cream Double edged (Twin Blade) Safety Razor Camera Equipment with Battery b. Hazardous cargo should be carried as per the instructions contained in the ICAO document known as ---- c. For carriage of Dangerous cargo, the airline operator must be certified by --- d. State True or False; i. "Aerosols containing flammable material under pressure (e.g. Hair sprays and paints), CO2 Cartridges, medical Oxygen, Butane fuel, Chemical Mace, tear Gas, scuba tanks, propane tanks, self inflating rafts etc. come under then category of hazardous materials."- True/False ii. iii. iv. "Bacterial cultures, viral organism, medical laboratory specimens and such other hospital wastes or Infectious Material are categorised as 'hazardous materials.'- True/False" "The dangerous goods are required to be labelled and marked in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions, with the proper shipping name of its contents and, the UN number etc. - True/False" "The operator shall provide such information in the Operations Manual so as to enable the flight crew member to carry out their responsibilities with regard to the transport of dangerous goods and shall also provide instructions as to the action to be taken in the event of emergencies arising involving dangerous goods. - True/False" v.

76 72 Aviation Safety and Security Management Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Acid Battery b. "Technical Instructions for the safe transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Doc 9284)" c. DGCA d. State True or False; i. True ii. iii. True True iv. True

77 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 73 Unit 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures National Regulations and Requirments 1.1 DESIGNATED AUTHORITIES The operational and functional control of aviation in India rests with a number of organizations; some of them are Government bodies, some Public Sector Undertakings and some private bodies. The Regulatory functions and policy matters for almost total aviation sector, however rests with the DGCA and BCAS under the overall control of Ministry of Civil Aviation. The addresses of the designated authorities concerned with facilitation of International Air Navigation are as follows: CIVIL AVIATION Technical Centre, Opp. Safdarjung Airport New Delhi TEL : FAX : AFS : VIDDYAYG, - Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan Safdarjung Airport New Delhi TEL :

78 74 Aviation Safety and Security Management / FAX : E. MAIL : chairman@aai.aero,chairman@airport sindia.org. AFS : VIDDYXAC 2. METEOROLOGY Director General of Meteorology India Meteorology Department, Mausam Bhawan, Lodhi Road New Delhi TEL : , FAX : AFS : VIDDYMYX 3. CUSTOMS Commissioner of Customs (Gen) New Custom House I.G.I. Airport New Delhi TEL : / FAX : AFS : Nil 4. IMMIGRATION Foreign Regional Registration Office, Hans Bhawan, Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi (Off)/ (Airport)

79 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures (Off)/ (Airport) AFS : Nil 5. HEALTH Airport Health Officer, Airport health Organisation, IGI Airport, New Delhi Tel: AFS : Nil 6. EN-ROUTE & AERODROME / HELICOPTER CHARGES Airports Authority of India Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan Safdarjung Airport New Delhi TEL : FAX : E. MAIL: chairman@aai.aero, chairman@airportsindia.org AFS : VIDDYAYG 7. AGRICULTURAL QUARANTINE Directorate of Plant Protection Quarantine and Storage NH4, Faridabad Haryana TEL : / FAX : AFS : NIL

80 76 Aviation Safety and Security Management Most of the Administrative Practices & Operational Procedures pertaining to aviation in our country that have been designed and promulgated & implemented, are based on the Standards and Recommended Practices of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The document containing all the rules and regulations pertaining to Civil Aviation in India is known as Aircraft Manual and is issued by DGCA. MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION Ministry of Civil Aviation, located at Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi , India, headed by Hon ble Minister of Civil Aviation (Presently Hon ble Shri Praful Patel), is the nodal Ministry responsible for the formulation of national policies and programmes for development and regulation of Civil Aviation and for devising and implementing schemes for the orderly growth and expansion of civil air transport. Its functions also extend to overseeing airport facilities, air traffic services and carriage of passengers and goods by air. The Ministry also administers implementation of the Aircraft Act, 1934 and is administratively responsible for the Commission of Railways Safety, a statutory body set up under The Indian Railways Act. It has under its purview the following organisations: 1. Attached / Autonomous Organisations 2. Air Carriers 3. Airports Directorate General of Civil Aviation Bureau of Civil Aviation Security Commission of Railway Safety Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Uran Akademi Air India Ltd. Indian Airlines Ltd. Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd. Airports Authority of India

81 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 77 The Secretary is the head of the Ministry and is assisted by one Additional Secretary & Financial Adviser, three Joint Secretaries, seven officers of the level of Director / Deputy Secretary / Financial Controller and ten officers of the level of Under Secretary. Functions of the Ministry are distributed under sixteen Sections and one Pay & Account Office. In addition to framing policies, the Ministry provides guidance to the organisations listed above in the implementation of policy guidelines and also monitors and evaluates their interface with Parliament and other statutory bodies. It also supervises implementation by the organisations of special programmes of Government, particularly those intended for weaker sections. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION DGCA is the regulatory authority for all matters pertaining to Civil Aviation in India and consists of a number of Directorates like Administration Directorate, Aerodrome Standards Directorate, Air Safety Directorate, Air Transport Directorate, Airworthiness Directorate, Flight Inspection Directorate, Information & Regulation Directorate, Research & Development Directorate, and Training & Licensing Directorate. It carries out the following functions; Registration of civil aircraft Formulation of standards of airworthiness for civil aircraft registered in India and grant of certificates of airworthiness to such aircraft Licensing of pilots, aircraft maintenance engineers and flight engineers, and conducting examinations and checks for that purpose Licensing of air traffic controllers Certification of aerodromes and CNS/ATM facilities Maintaining a check on the proficiency of flight crew, and also of other operational personnel such as flight dispatchers and cabin crew

82 78 Aviation Safety and Security Management Granting of Air Operator s Certificates to Indian carriers and regulation of air transport services operating to/ from/within/over India by Indian and foreign operators, including clearance of scheduled and non-scheduled flights of such operators Conducting investigation into accidents/incidents and taking accident prevention measures including formulation of implementation of Safety Aviation Management Programmes Carrying out amendments to the Aircraft Act, the Aircraft Rules and the Civil Aviation Requirements for complying with the amendments to ICAO Annexes, and initiating proposals for amendment to any other Act or for passing a new Act in order to give effect to an international Convention or amendment to an existing Convention Coordination of ICAO matters with all agencies and sending replies to State Letters, and taking all necessary action arising out of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) of ICAO Supervision of the institutes/clubs/schools engaged in flying training including simulator training, AME training or any other training related with aviation, with a view to ensuring a high quality of training Granting approval to aircraft maintenance, repair and manufacturing organizations and their continued oversight To act as a nodal agency for implementing Annex 9 provisions in India and for coordinating matters relating to facilitation at Indian airports including holding meetings of the National Facilitation Committee Rendering advice to the Government on matters relating to air transport including bilateral air services agreements, on ICAO matters and generally on all technical matters relating to civil aviation, and to act as an overall regulatory and developmental body for civil aviation in the country;

83 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 79 Coordination at national level for flexi-use of air space by civil and military air traffic agencies and interaction with ICAO for provision of more air routes for civil use through Indian air space; Keeping a check on aircraft noise and engine emissions in accordance with ICAO Annex 16 and collaborating with the environmental authorities in this matter, if required; Promoting indigenous design and manufacture of aircraft and aircraft components by acting as a catalytic agent; Approving training programmes of operators for carriage of dangerous goods, issuing authorizations for carriage of dangerous goods, etc. AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA (AAI) The Airports Authority of India (AAI) was constituted by an Act of Parliament and came into being on 1st April 1995 by merging the International Airports Authority of India and the National Airports Authority with a view to accelerate the integrated development, expansion and modernization of the operational, terminal and cargo facilities at the airports in the country conforming to international standards. The merger brought into existence a single Organization entrusted with the responsibility of creating, upgrading, maintaining and managing Civil Aviation infrastructure both on the ground and air space in the country. AAI at present manages 128 airports including 15 International airports (Out of that two airports have been privatized), 8 Custom airports, 25 Civil Enclaves and 80 Domestic airports. AAI provides air navigation services over 2.8 million square nautical miles of airspace. During the year , AAI at various airports handled about 5 lakhs aircraft movements (4 lakhs domestic and 1 lakh international);40 million passengers (26 million domestic and 14 million international) and 9 lakh tonnes of cargo (3 lakh domestic and 6 lakh international).

84 80 Broadly the two main functions are; Aviation Safety and Security Management Development & Management of Airport Infrastructure Air Traffic Management Other functions are; management of the entire Indian airspace including oceanic Airspace Provision of Communication, Navigational and Surveillance aids Design, development, operation and maintenance of passenger terminals. Operation, maintenance and up-gradation of operational areas viz., runways, aprons, taxiways etc. Development and management of cargo terminals. Most of the civil airports belong to AAI (Airports Authority of India) and are headed and controlled by an officer of AAI. Thus at an airport, all the administrative functions such as allotment of land and space, payment of RNFC & Landing Charges, security functions, Bird Hazard controls, etc are entrusted with AAI. THE BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY (BCAS) The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security was initially set up as a Cell in the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) in January 1978 on the recommendation of the Pande Committee constituted in the wake of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight on 10th September, The role of the Cell was to coordinate, monitor, inspect and train personnel in Civil Aviation Security matters. Subsequently, the BCAS was reorganized into an independent department on 1st April, 1987 under the Ministry of Civil Aviation as a sequel to the Kanishka Tragedy in June The main responsibility of BCAS are to lay down standards and measures in respect of security of civil flights at

85 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 81 International and domestic airports in India, in accordance with Annex 17 to Chicago Convention of ICAO for airport operators, airlines operators, and their security agencies responsible for implementing Aviation Security (AVSEC) measures. AIR INDIA & INDIAN Air India and Indian (Earlier known as Indian Airlines) are the two national airlines in our country, which operate flights within and outside the country. In July 2007, these airlines have been merged and are being known as Air India. OTHER AIRLINES & LOW COST CARRIERS There are a large number of private airlines both small & large and many low cost carriers like Jet Airways, Air Sahara (Now merged and known as Jet Lite ), Kingfisher Airlines, Paramount airways, Indigo, Jagsons airlines, Air Deccan (Now merged with Kingfisher), Go Air, Spicejet, etc. in our country. Each of the above airlines have framed their own set of administrative practices and rules and regulations. However by and large most of these regulations have been framed based on the overall policy and guide lines issued by ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and IATA (International Airline Transport Association). 1.2 ENTRY, TRANSIT AND DEPARTURE OF AIR- CRAFT 1. GENERAL 1.1 International flights into, from or over Indian territory are required to be subjected to the current Indian regulations relating to civil aviation and other national laws relating to immigrations, customs, passport and health etc. These regulations correspond in all essentials to the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

86 82 Aviation Safety and Security Management Some of the regulations are as follows; i. The Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934) ii. The Aircraft Rules, 1937 iii. The Aircraft (Public Health) Rules, 1954 iv. The Indian Aircraft Rules, 1920 (Part IX) v. The Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (69 of 1972) vi. The Tokyo Convention Act, 1975 (20 of 1975) vii. The Indian Wireless Telegraphy (Foreign Aircraft) Rules, viii. The Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 (65 of 1982) ix. The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 (66 of 1982) x. The Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and ICAO procedures adopted with such reservations as may be necessary and brought into force from time to time by notification in NOTAMs (NOTice to AirMen), Aeronautical Information Circulars and AIP India. Note: Additionally every aircraft entering or leaving India must comply with regulations relating to immigration, customs, quarantine and health as laid down by the Government from time to time. 1.2 Aircraft flying into or departing from Indian Territory shall make their first landing at, or final departure from, an International Aerodrome. Aircraft may be permitted to land or depart from any notified customs aerodrome. 1.3 International flights into, from or over Indian Territory are required to follow the established international ATS routes. International flights may be permitted by ATC to operate on domestic ATS routes provided there is no established international ATS route.

87 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures International flights are not permitted to pick up passengers/load at any place in India and disembark/ discharge at any other place in India. 2. SCHEDULED FLIGHTS 2.1 General For regular international scheduled flights operated by foreign airline into, in transit or across India, the following requirements must be met: (a) (b) (c) (d) State of the airline and India must be a party to a multilateral or bilateral International Air Transport Services Agreement; and The airline must be eligible to make the flights under the provision of a bilateral or multilateral agreement to which the state of the airline and India are contracting parties and must have a permit to operate in to or in transit across India. The schedule of the flights must have a prior approval of the Director General Of Civil Aviation (DGCA). It will be responsibility of the operator to ensure that the flight schedule approved by DGCA is submitted to the respective Flight Information Centre and Aerodrome of intended landing before the commencement of the schedule. It is advisable for the pilot-in-command to carry with him DGCA s Approval Reference No. and quote the same if required to do so by the ATC authorities. 2.2 Requirement for grant of Operating Permit The airline shall, in accordance with the provisions of the Air Transport Services Agreement, formally designated either through diplomatic channels or by the Aeronautical Authorities of the country whose Government has concluded the agreement with the Government of India Detailed requirements for grant of a permit to a foreign airline for commencement of scheduled international air

88 84 Aviation Safety and Security Management services are given in Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) No. 3 of 2000 which inter-alia includes: (a) (b) The airline shall submit all documents mentioned in the said AIC at least 60 days in advance prior to the proposed date of commencement of air services for the issuance of the operating permission. A detailed security programme in accordance with the provisions contained in Annex 17 to the convention on International Civil Aviation and the instructions issued by Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) shall be filed with the Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation), Janpath Bhavan, A Wing, 3rd floor, Janpath, New Delhi for approval. A copy of the approval granted by BCAS shall be furnished to the office of the DGCA The airline shall coordinate allocation of slots with Airports Authority of India, Operational Complex, Gurgaon Road, New Delhi Applications for obtaining approval for operating scheduled flights shall be filed by the designated airline, at least 30 days prior to the commencement of the scheduled flights, with the Director General of Civil Aviation (Attention: Director of Information and Regulations), Opposite Safadarjung Airport, New Delhi Documentary requirements for clearance of aircraft It is necessary that the under mentioned aircraft document be submitted by the airline operators for clearance on entry and departure of their aircraft to and from India. All documents listed below must follow the format acceptable to the public authorities in India. For details, reference may be made to the relevant appendices to ICAO Annex 9 together with the differences as notified by India in respect of the concerned provisions of ICAO Annex 9.

89 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures Aircraft Document Required (Arrival/Departure) Required by General Declaration Passenger Manifest Customs Immigration Health Cargo Manifest Note: No flight shall leave India without obtaining clearance of Immigration and Customs authorities on General Declaration. 3. Non-Scheduled flights 3.1 General No prior permission is required for aircraft operating outside the Indian territory which includes territorial waters but within Indian Flight Information Regions (FIRs) If an operator intends to perform a (series of) nonscheduled flight(s) into, from or over Indian territory, it is necessary for the operator to apply and obtain prior approval of Director General of Civil Aviation. The details of Notice Period and the application are at Para 3.2 and 3.3 respectively Flights are not permitted to pick up passengers/load at any place in India and disembark/discharge at any other place in India Due reasons for safety of flights, an AFTN signal authorizing such flights is issued by DGCA in every case. The authorizing reference No. (YA/N/ ) shall be quoted at field 18 of the flight plan filed with Air Traffic Control Centre Pilot-in-Command is also required to carry the reference No. (YA/N/ ) of such AFTN signal authorising the flight with him and quote it when required by ATC authorities. Overflying aircraft that are unable to quote the authority are liable to make a landing in India Any aircraft after landing in India in accordance with Para shall require specific permission of the Director General of Civil Aviation for undertaking any further flight.

90 86 Aviation Safety and Security Management A flight clearance shall be valid for a period of 48 hours. If a flight gets delayed beyond 48 hours, it will require fresh clearance from the DGCA. 3.2 Notice period Application for operating non-scheduled flight(s) is required to be submitted in advance with a minimum notice period as follows: (a) (b) Seven working days for flights for traffic purposes; and Three working days for flights for non-traffic purposes i.e. overflight(s)/technical halts The minimum notice period requirements, however, may not be insisted upon in the following cases: (a) (b) (c) Ambulance flight (name and address of the patient and the doctor to be given); Relief flight of a scheduled passenger airline necessitated due to grounding of aircraft; and Relief flights in case of natural calamities. 3.3 Application The request for the flight clearance should be submitted to DGCA in the prescribed Application form, duly signed by the operator/owner of the aircraft or his authorised representative and submitted to the Director General of Civil Aviation (Attention: Deputy Director Air Transport), Technical Centre, Opposite Safdarjung Airport, Sri Aurbindo Marg, New Delhi Special permissions Special permission from the Government of India is required to be taken in the following cases, which may take a longer period for clearance of the flight then stipulated in Para 3.2: (a) (b) stay of any aircraft in India for more then 15 days. flight of an aircraft registered in a state not member of ICAO; and

91 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 87 (c) passenger charter flights to India not covered by Tourist Charter Guidelines Operations of flights with aircraft capable of airdropping Request for operating flights with aircraft capable of air-dropping require detailed scrutiny/check-up of the application. In such cases, it may not be possible to clear these flights within the notice period stipulated at Para 3.2 except when these flights are operated by International Airlines operating scheduled passenger services to/from India Aircraft capable of air-dropping are not permitted to overfly Indian territory and are required to land at first International Airport for Customs check Except for take-off or landing, such aircraft shall have to maintain a minimum flight level FL100 while in Indian airspace. 3.5 Change in the flight clearance Any request for change in the flight clearance would normally not be accepted and would require fresh clearance with proper notice. However, in exceptional circumstances, change may be accepted provided: (a) (b) the replacing aircraft is not capable of air-dropping; or the approved flight scheduled time is not pre-poned such that the notice period stipulated at Para 3.2 of the original application is not met. 3.6 Applications forwarded by Ministries/Departments of Government of India Applications forwarded by Ministries/Departments of Government of India, Indian Missions abroad and by the Missions of the concerned countries through and duly supported by Ministry of External Affairs, may be given clearance notwithstanding the aforesaid guidelines. Such applications are required to be forwarded by Ministries/ departments at the level of Deputy Secretary/Director and above.

92 88 Aviation Safety and Security Management 3.7 Documentary requirements for clearance of flights Same requirements as for scheduled flights mentioned at Para Private Flights 4.1 Same requirements as for non-scheduled flights contained in Para 3 above. NOTE: Flight clearance will only be granted to aircraft having maximum certified seating capacity of 30 seats or pay-load of three tonnes provided it is fitted with ACAS-II/TCAS-II. (Ref: AIC-05/1998). 1.3 ENTRY, TRANSIT AND DEPARTURE OF PASSENGERS AND CREW 1. CUSTOMS REQUIREMENTS 1.1 Incoming Passengers All the goods imported into India by air are subject to clearance by Customs authorities, except the goods within the limits of duty free allowance. For the purpose of Customs Clearance of arriving passengers, a two channel system has been adopted i.e. Green Channel for passengers not having any dutiable goods and Red Channel for passengers having dutiable goods. (a) (b) (c) Passengers must ensure to file correct declaration of their baggage. Passengers walking through the green channel with dutiable/prohibited goods are liable to prosecution/ penalty and confiscation of goods. Green Channel passengers must deposit the Customs portion of the disembarkation Card to the custom official at the gate before leaving the terminal For duty free entitlements and rates of applicable duties, please see customs homepage at Enquiries can be made at igiacustoms@hotmail.com. Enquiries can also be made from the following officers of the Customs Department;

93 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 89 Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi at telephone numbers Deputy Commissioner (Admn) , Additional Commissioner , Commissioner of Customs (General) Unaccompanied Baggage The passengers can also send their baggage through cargo, which is treated, as unaccompanied baggage. However, no free allowance is admissible in case of unaccompanied baggage and only used personal effects can be imported free of duty. (a) Provisions of Baggage Rules are also extended to unaccompanied baggage except where they have been specifically excluded. (b) (c) (d) The unaccompanied baggage should be in the possession abroad of the passenger and shall be dispatched within one month of his arrival in India or within such further period as the Deputy / Assistant Commissioner of Customs may allow. The unaccompanied baggage may land in India up to two months before the arrival of the passenger or within such period, not exceeding one year as the Deputy / Assistant Commissioner of Customs may allow, for reasons to be recorded, if he is satisfied that the passenger was prevented from arriving in India within the period of two months due to circumstances beyond his control, such as sudden illness of the passenger or a member of his family, or natural calamities or disturbed conditions or disruption of the transport or travel arrangements in the country or countries concerned on any other reasons, which necessitated a change in the travel schedule of the passenger. All the unaccompanied baggage is chargeable to customs 40% advalorem + education 2% Baggage of Deceased person Used, bonafied personal and household effects belonging to a deceased person are allowed to be imported free of duty

94 90 Aviation Safety and Security Management subject to the condition that a certificate from the concerned Indian Mission (Embassy / High Commission) is produced at the time of clearance regarding the ownership of the goods by the deceased person Detained baggage A passenger may request the Customs to detain his baggage either for re-export at the time of his departure from India or for clearance subsequently on payment of duty the detailed baggage would be examined and full details will be inventorised. Such baggage will be kept in custody of customs Mishandled Baggage In case the baggage has been lost or mishandled by the Airlines, a simplified procedure is in place for clearance of such baggage which allows the passenger to have delivery of his baggage at his door step by the Airlines. There is no need to handover the passport or the keys of the baggage. The passenger is merely required to complete the Custom declaration form at counter no.1 authorizing the Airline to complete the formalities when the baggage arrives. The passenger is required to obtain a certificate to that effect from the airlines and get it countersigned by Customs indicating specifically the unutilized portion of the free allowance. This would enable the passenger to avail the unutilised portion of the duty free allowance when his baggage is delivered by the airlines. 1.3 Currency Declaration (a) Any person can bring into India from a place outside India foreign exchange without any limit. However, declaration of Foreign Exchange/Currency is required to be made in prescribed Declaration form in the following cases. (i) Where the value of Foreign Currency notes exceeds US$5000 or equivalent.

95 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 91 (b) (ii) Where the aggregate value of Foreign exchange (in the form of currency notes, bank notes, traveller cheques etc.) exceeds US$10,000 or equivalent. Import of Indian currency is prohibited. However, in the case of passengers normally residing in India who are returning from the visit abroad, import of Indian currency up to Rs is allowed. 1.4 Regulation for the airline crew Crew member of aircraft are subject to submit correct declaration before customs authorities with respect to the currency gold ornaments and electronic goods etc. in their possession on arrival as well as departure. They are allowed to bring items like Chocolate, cheese, cosmetic and other petty gifts for their personnel or family use upto value of Rs. 600/- only at the returning of the aircraft from foreign journey. However a crew member on final payoff or at the termination of his engagements with the airlines shall be eligible for allowances as common passenger. 1.5 Outgoing Passengers All the passengers leaving India by air are subject to clearance by Custom Authorities. Only bonafide baggage is allowed to be cleared by passengers. There is a procedure prescribed whereby the passengers leaving India can take the export certificate for the various high value items as well as jewellery from the Customs authorities. Such an export certificate comes handy while bringing back the things to India so that no duty is charged on such goods exported by the passenger. OTHER INFORMATION (a) (b) Export of most species of wild life and articles made from wild flora and fauna, such as ivory, musk, reptile skins, furs, shahtoos etc. is prohibited. Trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is prohibited.

96 92 Aviation Safety and Security Management (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Export of goods purchased against foreign exchange brought in by foreign passengers are allowed except for prohibited goods. Carrying of Indian currency notes in the denomination of Rs. 500 and Rs to Nepal is prohibited. Export of Indian Currency is strictly prohibited. However Indian residents when they go abroad are allowed to take with them Indian currency not exceeding Rs Tourists while leaving India are allowed to take with them foreign currency not exceeding an amount brought in by them at the time of their arrival in India. As no declaration is required to be made for bringing in foreign exchange / currency not exceeding equivalent of U.S. $ 10000, generally tourists can take out of India with them at the time of their departure foreign exchange/currency not exceeding the above amount. There is no value limit on the export of Gold Jewellery by passenger through the medium of baggage so long as it constitutes the bonafied baggage of the passenger. A passenger may request the Customs for issue of an Export certificate at the time of his / her departure from India, in respect of jewellery carried by him / her, to facilitate its re-import subsequently. Commercial export of gold jewellery through the courier mode is permitted subject to observance of prescribed procedures. 1.6 Certain goods are prohibited (banned) or restricted (subject to certain conditions) for import and/or export. These are goods of social, health, environment, wild life and security concerns. While it is not possible to list all the goods, more common of these are : PROHIBITED GOODS Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances. Pornographic material

97 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 93 Counterfeit and pirated goods and good infringing any of the legally enforceable intellectual property rights. Antiquities. RESTRICTED GOODS Firearms and ammunition. Live birds and animals including pets. Plants and their produce e.g. fruits, seeds. Endangered species of plants and animals, whether live or dead. Any goods for commercial purpose: for profit, gain or commercial usage. Radio transmitters not approved for normal usage. Gold and Silver, other than ornaments (For import only) Indian and foreign currency in excess of prescribed limits : foreign currency in excess of US$ 5000 in the form of currency notes or equivalent US$ or equivalent in the form of currency notes, bank notes or traveller s cheque is required to be declared on arrival. foreign currency in excess of amount legally obtained or in the case of tourists in excess of the amount declared on arrival or in excess of the exempted limit of declaration at the time of departure. Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs like Heroin, Charas, Cocaine or in Psychotropic substances is a serious offence and is punishable with imprisonment. Export of most species of wild life and articles made from flora and fauna such as Ivory, Musk, Reptile skins, Furs, Shahtoosh etc. is prohibited. For any clarifications passenger should approach the Regional Deputy Director (Wildlife Preservation) Govt. of India or the Chief Wildlife Wardens of State

98 94 Aviation Safety and Security Management Governments posted at Calcutta, Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai. Export or Import in prohibited and restricted goods commonly leads to arrest. 6.1 PENAL PROVISIONS The Indian Customs Act empowers imposition of heavy penalties for those passengers who : Attempt to walk through green Channel with prohibited restricted or dutiable goods. Mis-declare their goods at the Red Channel Attempt to export prohibited or restricted goods Abet the commission of any of the above offences THE PENAL PROVISION MAY LEAD TO : Absolute Confiscation of goods, or Imposition of heavy fine in respect of the concerned goods if these are released Imposition of penalty on individual or concerned entities upto five times the value of goods or the duty involved Arrest and prosecution including invocation of preventive detention in serious cases 1.7 Customs Duty on aircraft If any aircraft arriving from a place outside India is forced to land in India in any place other than an appointed customs aerodrome, the person-in-charge of the aircraft shall immediately report to the nearest Customs or Police Officer and shall on demand produce to such officer the General Declaration or, if it does not give the movements of the aircraft subsequent to the last destination, the journey log book, and/ or any other document belonging to the aircraft, and shall not permit any goods to be unloaded there from without the consent of such officer, and no passenger or member of the crew thereof shall leave the immediate vicinity of the aircraft without the consent of such officer. In case where it is necessary to dispatch a Customs Officer to the place of landing to examine the aircraft, charges for conveyance of such officer may be made against the owner of the aircraft concerned.

99 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures No customs duty is levied on the aircraft not registered in India which is brought into India for purpose of a flight to or across India, which is not intended to be registered in India and is intended to be removed from India within six months from the date of entry, provided that the person-incharge of the aircraft makes a written declaration to that effect to the Customs Collector on arrival. In the case of an aircraft in respect of which such declaration has been made and which is not removed from India within six months, the duty leviable in respect of it shall be paid to the Custom Collector before the aircraft is again flown. 1.8 Regulation for Transit Passengers Transit passengers are kept in Customs area and Customs authorities keep watch on such passengers that they should not hand over anything to any other person. They are also not allowed to go outside the airport building. 1.9 Drugs Trafficking in narcotics is a serious offence and is punishable with imprisonment. 2. IMMIGRATION REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Pre-requisite for entry into India: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Foreigner should have valid travel documents such as visa, passports etc. Pak nationals who are coming from Pakistan or third country should carry visa application form issued by the Indian Mission in addition to visa affixed which should be handed over by him/her at the port of entry. Nepalese visiting India by air from third country other then Nepal or Bhutan should carry national passport and Indian visa. Foreigner should not be an insane person. Foreigner should not be suffering either from a loathsome disease or an infectious disease.

100 96 (vi) (vii) Aviation Safety and Security Management Foreigner should not have been sentenced abroad for an extraditable offence. His entry should not have been banned by any government agency. (viii) Foreigners coming from or through yellow fever countries must come with proper vaccination certificate. (ix) Disembarkation/ Embarkation card provided by Immigration should be carefully filled up by the passengers and presented to the immigration desk with travel documents. Red and Green ink should not be used for filling up the cards. There should not be any tick marks or any other marks put on the cards by the passengers. The cards also should not be folded Visa Requirements for Children: Minor children of foreigners including of Indian origin would require proper visa for entry into India Identification Document for Nepalese visiting India by Air: Nepalese visiting India by air may travel on the authority of any of the following identification documents: (i) Valid national passport; (ii) Photo identity card issued by the Government of India / any State Government or Union Territory Administration in India / Election Commission of India in respect of Indian citizens and by the government of Nepal in respect of Nepalese citizens; (iii) Emergency certificate issued by Embassy of India, Kathmandu to Indian nationals and by Embassy of Nepal in Delhi in respect of Nepalese citizens, in case of emergent conditions Seamen: (i) Seamen being repatriated: Foreign seamen, who are signed on at an Indian port, are under the terms of their articles required to be

101 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 97 (ii) returned for discharge to the port of their engagement. If such a seamen is discharged at a foreign port for being returned to India, he can, be granted a visa for three months stay in India, without prior reference, provided he holds a continuous discharge certificate or Seamen. s Registration Book issued in India and the agent. s certificate that he is being repatriated for discharge at an Indian port. The visa may be granted on the national passport, if any, or on the continuous Discharge Certificate / Registration Book or on a sworn affidavit. Seamen joining ships: Foreign seamen signed abroad, who are coming to join their ships at an Indian port, may be granted Transit visas in accordance with the instructions contained under heading. TRANSIT VISA.. Such visas may be granted on national passports or Seamen s Identity Documents Non-scheduled flights: Members of crew of non-scheduled and chartered flights operated by airlines, not operating scheduled flights to India, would not be granted visas without prior reference to the Government of India. When approved, visas would be given to such persons, on their national passports only and not on crew member certificate. 2.2 Requirement of registration: Foreigner entering into India on student, research, employment, yoga visas valid for more than 180 days is required to register within 14 days of first arrival with the FRRO/ FRO under whose jurisdiction he proposes to stay. In case of other long term visas like. entry.,. business. etc. other than. tourist. visa, if the foreigner intends to stay for more than six months he should register himself within 180 days of his arrival. As regards Afghan nationals, the holders of Residential Permit must report within seven days of his/ her arrival to the concern FRRO/FRO with the proof of residence. The holder will have to report to the authority concerned even if the stay in India is less than seven day.

102 98 Aviation Safety and Security Management The following categories of foreign nationals are exempted from registration. i. Foreigners of Indian origin visiting India for short duration with long term multiple entry visa, each stay in India not exceeding 180 days. ii. iii. iv. Foreigners connected with tourism and travel trade with five year multiple entry visa, each stay not exceeding 180 days. US nationals with 10-year validity multiple entry visa for tourism or business purpose with each stay not exceeding 180 days. PIO cardholders if continuous stay in India does not exceed 180 days. v. Children below 16 years of age Registered foreigners should always carry their registration certificate / residential permits along with them. 2.3 Retaining of Embarkation card Foreigners are required to retain embarkation portion of the disembarkation card in their possession to facilitate their return journey. 2.4 Filling up of Form. C. Foreigners are required to fill Form. C. during their stay in hotels which include boarding houses, clubs, dak bunglows, rest houses, paying guest homes, sarai etc. 2.5 Prior Permission For Visiting Certain Areas Foreigners intending to visit Restricted Area / Protected Area are required to obtain prior permission of the Govt. during their stay in India as visa alone is not enough to enable a foreigner to visit such places. They may have list of such areas from the tourist offices of Central / State Govt. 2.6 Grant of Landing Permit For Group Grant of landing permit for a group of 4 or more organized by recognised /approved tour /travel operator may be granted

103 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 99 upto a period of 60 days, with Multiple Entry Facilities against a fee of US $ 40 or equivalent amount in Indian rupees per passenger. The travel agency has to make a return request to the immigration giving full personal and passport details of the group members, Itinerary and undertaking to conduct the group as per itinerary and an assurance that no individual would be allowed to drop out from the group at any place. 2.7 Transit Visa Transit visa is not required from a person who is in direct transit by air when there is no through flight provided he/ she does not leave the precincts of airports. 2.8 Landing Permit 72 hours landing permit is granted to a foreigner transiting though India without visa if he/she has a conformed onward journey tickets. 15 days TLP can also be granted in emergent situation like death/illness in the family. However, landing permit facility is not available to the nationals of Shri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria and Ethiopia. 2.9 Surrender of embarkation card Foreigners are required to complete / fill up and surrender Embarkation card in their possession at the airport from where finally departing. 3. PUBLIC HEALTH REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Disembarking passengers are required to fill up the information in the health portion of disembarkation card. 3.2 Disembarking passengers are not required to present vaccination certificates except when coming directly from an area infected with yellow fever. 3.3 All passengers on board coming from yellow fever infected areas as declared by Central Government shall be in possession of valid international certificate against yellow fever.

104 100 Aviation Safety and Security Management 3.4 Aircraft shall have been disinfected at the commencement of the journey as per aircraft (public health) Rules, 1954 and in accordance with the procedures laid down in Schedule IV of the said rules, or the procedure recommended by the World Health Organisation The Pilot-in-Command of the aircraft shall send a radio message three hours before arrival about the state of health of any person on board, who has visited a yellow fever infected area, as declared by the Central Government, with in the previous six days and who is not in possession of valid yellow fever certificate. 3.6 If, on inspection of the aircraft, the Airport Health Officer detects any person or crew suspected to be infected with yellow fever, the Airport Health Officer may direct the Pilotin-Command of the aircraft to proceed to Kolkata or Mumbai or any other place as may designated by the Airport Health Officer and Pilot-in-Command of the aircraft shall obey such directions. 3.7 No departure formalities are required for embarking passengers. 1.4 ENTRY, TRANSIT AND DEPARTURE OF CARGO 1. Customs requirements concerning Cargo and other articles 1.1 Goods for export by air (including unaccompanied baggage) are required to be presented for examination to the Customs authorities sufficiently in advance for such goods to be examined before the departure of the aircraft on which they are consigned. As a general rule, such presentation should be made not less than four working hours before the scheduled time of departure. The period may be reduced in the case of perishable goods or urgent consignments or aircraft spares and essential equipment of air service by arrangement with custom authorities in each individual case. 1.2 Other Customs requirements are being developed.

105 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENTS, EQUIPMENT AND FLIGHT DOCUMENTS 1. General Commercial air transport operating in India must adhere to the requirements as contained in the Civil Aviation Requirements Section 2. Airworthiness Series O. Note: The regulations/requirements referred herein are subjected to amendment. Users should ensure that fully amended documents are used for reference purpose. 2. Instruments and Equipment, Communication and Navigation equipment to be carried: 2. 1 Aircraft Instruments and Equipment In addition to the minimum equipment necessary for the issuance of a Certificate of Airworthiness, the instruments and equipment prescribed in the Civil Aviation Requirements Section 2. Airworthiness Series. I. Part II shall be installed or carried as appropriate, according to the aircraft used and the circumstances/operations under which the flight is to be conducted. 2.2 Aircraft Communication and Navigation Equipment Communication Equipment A. All aeroplane shall be fitted with radio communication equipment capable of (a) (b) (c) Conducting two-way communication for aerodrome control purposes. Receiving meteorological information at any time during flight, and Conducting two way communication at any time during flight with at least one aeronautical station and with such other aeronautical stations and on such frequencies as may be prescribed by the appropriate authority. All aircraft fitted with HF

106 102 Aviation Safety and Security Management communication equipment shall be capable of operating on SSB mode. B. The radio communication equipment shall provide for communications on the aeronautical emergency frequency MHz Navigation Equipment for Operations under IFR A. All aeroplanes shall be provided with navigation equipment, which will enable it to proceed: (a) (b) In accordance with its operational flight plan; In accordance with prescribed Required Navigation Performance (RNP) types; and (c) In accordance with the requirements of air traffic services; Except when, if not so precluded by the appropriate authority, navigation for flights under the visual flight rules is accomplished by visual reference to landmarks. B. For flight in defined portion of airspace where based on regional air navigation agreement minimum navigation performance specifications (MNPS) are prescribed, an aeroplane shall be provided with navigation equipment which: (a) (b) Continuously provides indications to the flight crew of adherences to or departures from track to the required degree of accuracy at any point along with the track: Has been authorised by DGCA for MNPS operations concerned. C. For flight in defined portion of airspace where, based on regional air navigation agreement, a vertical separation minimum (VSM)of 1000 ft (300m) is applied above FL290,an aeroplane: (a) Shall be provided with equipment which is capable of:

107 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 103 (b) (i) (ii) Indicating to the flight crew the flight level being flown; Automatically maintaining a selected flight level; (iii) Providing an alert to the flight crew when a deviation occurs from the selected flight level. The threshold for the alert shall not exceed +/ -300ft (90m); and (iv) Automatically reporting pressure-altitude; and Shall be authorised by DGCA for operation in the airspace concerned. D. The aeroplane shall be sufficiently provided with the navigation equipment to ensure that in the event of failure of one item of equipment at any stage of flight, the remaining equipment will enable the aircraft to navigate in accordance with above Paras. E. On flights in which it is intended to land in Instrument Meteorological Condition (IMC) an aeroplane shall be provided with a radio equipment capable of receiving signals providing guidance to a point from which a visual landing can be affected. This equipment shall be capable of providing such guidance at each aerodrome at which it is intended to land in instrument meteorological conditions and at any designated alternate aerodromes. F. The equipment installation shall be such that the failure of any single unit required for either communication or navigation purposes or both will not result in the failure of another unit required for communication or navigation purposes. 3. Carriage of Pressure Altitude Reporting Transponder All aeroplane having maximum certified take-off mass of 5700 Kgs. and above and having maximum certified passenger seating configuration (excluding any pilot seats) of more than 30 seats or maximum payload capacity of more then 3 tonnes if flying in Indian air space shall be equipped with mode. S transponder.

108 104 Aviation Safety and Security Management The requirements for installation of Pressure Altitude Reporting Transponder are laid down in the CAR Section 2 Series. R. Part IV. 4. Carriage of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) 4.1 Unless otherwise authorised by DGCA, no person shall operate in the Indian airspace, an aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of more then 30 or maximum payload capacity of more then 3 tonnes: (a) After 31st December 1998,if it is not equipped with an approved TCAS II and (b)after 1st Jan 2003 if it is not equipped with an approved TCAS II with change 7 (equivalent to ACAS. II) 4.2 All aeroplanes having maximum certified passenger seating configuration of more than 30 or maximum payload capacity of more than 3 tonnes, to be imported after 1st Jan for the purpose of registration and operation within, to and from India shall be fitted with TCAS II with change 7 (equivalent to ACAS II). This requirement shall also apply to aeroplanes taken on wet lease by Indian operators. Note: The operators are strongly advised to install ACAS II if imported before 1st Jan Unless otherwise authorised by DGCA, no person shall operate in the Indian airspace, from 1st Jan, 2005, (a) (b) (c) An aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of 20 to 30 or a maximum certified take-off mass in excess of 5700 Kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with an approved ACAS II. An aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of 10 to 19 and a maximum certified take-off mass less than 5700 Kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with an approved ACAS I. A twin jet engined aeroplane having maximum certified passenger seating configuration of less than 10 and a maximum certified take-off mass less than 5700 Kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with approved ACAS I.

109 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures Unless otherwise authorised by DGCA, no person shall acquire for the purpose of operation In Indian airspace, from 1st January, 2004; (a) (b) An aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of 20 to 30 or a maximum certified take-off mass in excess of 5700 Kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with an approved ACAS II. An aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of 10 to 19 and a maximum certified take-off mass less than 5700 Kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with an approved ACAS I. (c) A twin jet engined aeroplane having maximum certified passenger seating configuration of less than 10 and a maximum certified take-off mass less than 5700 Kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with approved ACAS I. Note : The operators are strongly advised to install ACAS II on aeroplanes covered under the provisions of Paras 4. 3(b)&(c) and 4. 4 (b)&(c) above. Detailed requirements for installation of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) are laid down in the CAR Section 2 Series. I. Part VIII. 5. Flight documents to be carried The requirements for carriage of documents to be carried on board are laid down in the CAR Section 2 Series. X. Part VI. 1.6 SUMMARY OF INDIAN REGULATIONS AND INTER- NATIONAL AGREEMENTS/CONVENTIONS The following is the brief of legislation affecting civil aviation in India. The regulations/requirements referred herein are subject to amendments. Users should ensure that fully amended documents are used for reference purpose : 1. Air Transport Services: Rule 134 and Schedule XI of Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements Section 3. Air Transport

110 106 Aviation Safety and Security Management Provides for the minimum airworthiness, operational and other general requirements for grant of permit for air transport operations in India. 2. Registration and Nationality Marking: Part IV of Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements Section 2. Airworthiness Series. F. Part I and Series. X. Part I Provides for the registration marking of the aircraft, nature of application for registration, change of ownership, registration fees and use of State marks. 3. Instruments and Equipment: Rule 57 of Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements Section 2. Airworthiness Series. I. Part II and Series. R. Part I Provides for minimum instruments and equipment including Communication and Navigation Equipment which are to be installed on aircraft depending on their operation. 4. Radio Telegraph apparatus: Rule 9 of the Aircraft rules, 1937 Provides for the operation of radio telegraph apparatus by licensed person. 5. Prohibited areas: Rule 12 and Schedule I of Aircraft Rules, 1937 Provides for the areas prohibited for flying. 6. Personnel of Aircraft: Part V and Schedule II of Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements Section 7. Flight Crew Standards, Training and Licensing Provides for the regulations concerning the knowledge, skill, experience and medical requirements for licensing of flight crew. This also provides the regulation concerning granting of exemption for medical examination and renewal of flight crew licenses. Validation of licenses issued by foreign states is also given.

111 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures Maintenance of aircraft by licensed persons: Rule 61 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements Section 2. Airworthiness Series. L Provides for the regulations concerning the knowledge, skill, experience and medical requirements for issue of licence to persons to maintain an aircraft. This also provides the regulation concerning renewal of such licences. 8. Dropping of articles and decent by parachute: Rule 26 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 Provides for the requirement for dropping of articles/descent by parachute. 9. Air Traffic Services: Civil Aviation Requirements Section 4. Aerodrome Standards and Air Traffic Services. Provides for requirements for Aerodrome Standards and Air Traffic Services. 10. National Legislation: Aircraft Manual (India) Volume II provides the national legislation. i. The Air Corporation Act, 1953 (27 of 1953) ii. iii. iv. The Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings and repeal) Ordinance, 1994 (4 of 1994) The Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings and repeal) Act, 1994 (13 of 1994) The International Airports Authority of India Act, 1971 ( 43 of 1971) v. The National Airports Authority of India Act, 1985 ( 64 of 1985) vi. The Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 ( 55 of 1994) vii. The Carriage by Air Act, 1972 ( 69 of 1972)

112 108 Aviation Safety and Security Management viii. The Tokyo Convention Act, 1975 ( 20 of 1975) ix. The Anti-hijacking Act, 1982 (65 of 1982) x. The Anti-hijacking (Amendment) Act, 1994 (39 of 1994) xi. xii. xiii. The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 (66 of 1982) The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act, 1994 (40 of 1994) Notification regarding application of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, to carriage by air which is not International. 11. International Conventions: Aircraft Manual (India) Volume II provides the details of following International Conventions. i. Chicago Convention, 1944 ii. iii. iv. The International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944 The International Air Transport Agreement, 1944 Protocol on the Authentic Trilingual Text of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 v. Warsaw Convention, 1929 vi. The Hague Protocol, 1955 vii. Guatemala City Protocol, 1971 viii. The Additional Protocol No. 1, 1975 ix. The Additional Protocol No. 2, 1975 x. The Additional Protocol No. 3, 1975 xi. The Montreal Protocol No. 4, 1975 xii. Gualdalajara Convention, 1961 xiii. Geneva Convention, 1948 xiv. Rome Convention, 1952 xv. Tokyo Convention, 1963

113 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures 109 xvi. The Hague Convention, 1970 xvii. Montreal Convention, 1971 xviii. Montreal Protocol, 1988 xix. Montreal Convention, Defect in Foreign Aircraft: Rule 59A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 provides the details of procedures to be followed in case of defect(s) in a foreign registered aircraft. 13. Investigation of Accident: Part X of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 Provides the details regarding notification of accident, report of accidents, removal and preservation of damaged aircraft. 14. Directions by Director General: Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 gives the power to the Director General to issue special Directions in the form of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), Aeronautical Information Publication, Aeronautical Information Circulars (AICs), Notices to Aircraft Owners and Maintenance Engineers, and Civil Aviation Requirements. 15. Dangerous Flying: Rule 21 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 requires that no persons shall fly any aircraft in such circumstances as, by reason of low altitude or proximity to persons or dwellings or for other reason, to cause unnecessary danger to any person or property. 16. Prohibition of intoxicated person entering aircraft: Rule 24 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 prohibits members of flight crew to enter/operate aircraft under influence of any alcoholic drink, sedative, narcotic, or stimulant drug. 17. Carriage of person suffering from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft, prisoners and animals, birds and reptiles in the aircraft: Rule 24A, 24B and 24C of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 provides requirements for carriage of persons suffering

114 110 Aviation Safety and Security Management from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft, prisoners and animals, birds and reptiles in the aircraft. 18. Smoking in Aircraft: Rule 25 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 provides requirements for smoking in an Indian registered aircraft. 19. Fuelling of Aircraft: Rule 25A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 provides requirements for fuelling of aircraft. 20. Carriage of Arms, Explosives or Dangerous Goods: Rule 8 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements Section 3. Air Transport Series. L Provides the requirements for carriage of arms, explosives or dangerous goods by air to, from, within or across India. DGCA Website nic. in/ also gov. in/ AAI website aero/aai/ BCAS website bcasindia. nic. in/ Ministry of Civil Aviation website nic. in/ Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP, India), Airports Authority of India Various related ICAO Annexes & Documents Indian Aircraft Manual Various Air Safety Circulars, AICs and other important notification issued by DGCA. Questions General Questions 1. What are the main functions and responsibilities of Ministry of Civil Aviation?

115 UNIT 4 Administrative Practices & Procedures Write main functions and responsibilities of Airports Authority of India. Objective Type of questions a. Various rules and regulations pertaining to Indian Civil Aviation are contained in the document known as. b. State True or False i. The registration certificate of a new aircraft in India is issued by ii. Investigation of accident/ incident to any passenger aircraft is conducted by as per Indian aircraft rules. iii. iv. No prior permission is required for any aircraft operating outside the Indian territory, however, it an operator intends to perform a non-scheduled flight into, from or over Indian territory, it is necessary for to apply and obtain prior approval of DGCA. - True/False International Transit passengers arriving from any other country and proceeding to any other destination outside India are required to be kept in Customs area and they are also not allowed to go outside the airport building. - True/False Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Aircraft Manual. b. State True or False i. DGCA ii. DGCA iii. True iv. True

116

117 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 113 Unit 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services 5.1 Introduction The details contained in this chapter relate to various operational standards based on ICAO Standards & recommendations for aircraft rescue and fire fighting services at AAI aerodromes. More or less similar practice is followed at other airports belonging to other agencies. 5.2 Criteria for establishment of ARFF. ARFF services are required to be provided at all airports in conformity with ICAO standards and guidelines regarding level of fire protection. Fire fighting in and around crashed aircraft is a highly specialized field of fire fighting. A ARFF fire fighter must process the required alertness, courage, dedication, agility, physical strength, and the ability to be an exacting team worker. 5.3 The Chemistry of Fire. Fire is the most common form of chemical reaction. The process of fire may be regarded as a chemical triangle (fig. 5- Figure 5-1.-Requirements for combustion.

118 114 Aviation Safety and Security Management (1). The three sides consist of fuel (combustible matter), heat, and oxygen. After extensive research, the presence of a fourth element has been identified. It is the chemical chain reaction (fig.5-2) that takes place in a fire that allows the fire to both sustain itself and grow. Figure 5-2.-Chain reaction. This process of fire is now called the "fire tetrahedron." See figure 5-3. Figure 5-3.-Tetrahedron and fire triangle. 5.4 Controlling Fire. The most common method of controlling or extinguishing a fire is to eliminate one or more of sides of the tetrahedron. This can be accomplished by the following methods. 1. Smothering: removing the oxygen.

119 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services Cooling: removing the heat. 3. Starving: removing the fuel or combustible matter. There are two terms associated with fires, the fire point and the flash point. The fire point of a substance is the lowest temperature at which its vapours can be ignited and would continue to burn. At this temperature, the vapour would ignite spontaneously in the air. Also, substances don't have to be heated to this ignition temperature throughout in order to ignite. The flash point of a substance is the temperature at which the substance gives off enough vapours to form an ignitable mixture with the air near the substance's surface. An ignitable mixture is a mixture within the explosive range. The mixture is capable of spreading a flame away from the source of ignition when ignited. For example, fuel would spontaneously ignite when a portion of it (or its vapours) is exposed to temperatures around 268 C (ignition temperature). It is capable of being touched off by a match or spark at temperatures down to -20 C (fire point). It would also flash across the surface at temperatures from - 20 C down to -43 C (flash point). From these examples, it can be readily seen that fuel has a low flash point and is easily ignited. Fuel is a constant fire hazard around aircraft. A spark, heat caused by friction, or an electrical discharge could supply enough heat to cause fuel to flash. 5.5 Classes of Fire Different types of fires are combated by different means. It is important for a fire person to identify various types of fires and to understand specific ways of combating each type of fire. Class A fires occur in combustible materials, such as bedding, mattresses, books, cloth, and any matter that produces an ash. All fires of this class leave embers, which are likely to rekindle if air comes in contact with them. Class A fires must

120 116 Aviation Safety and Security Management not be considered extinguished until the entire mass has been cooled below its ignition temperature. Smothering (removing the oxygen) is not effective for class A fires because it does not lower the temperature of the smouldering embers below the surface. The extinguishing agents most effective for class A fires are solid water stream, both high- and low-velocity fog, CO2, and water immersion. Class B (Most Important from Aircraft fire point of view). Class B fires occur with flammable liquid substances. Examples of class B fires are gasoline, jet fuels, paints, grease, and any petroleum-based product. These and other combustible substances do not leave embers or ashes. Class B fires are extinguished by providing a barrier between the burning substance and oxygen necessary for combustion. Chemical and mechanical foams produce such a barrier and are known as permanent smothering agents, but their effect is only temporary. The application must be renewed if there is any danger of re-ignition. The extinguishing agents recommended for combating class B fires are CO2, PKP, Halon, and Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF). However, water by itself is NOT recommended for use on class B fires. Class C fires are energized electrical fires that are attacked at prescribed distances by using nonconductive agents such as CO2 and Halon 1211.

121 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 117 The most effective tactic is to de-energize the system and handle the fire as a class A fire. When fires are not deep seated, clean agents that pose no cleanup problem, such as Halon 1211 or CO2, are the preferred extinguishing agents. However, water in any form, is dangerous when used on electrical equipment. Class D fires are combustible metals, such as magnesium and titanium. Water in large quantities, as high velocity fog, is the recommended extinguishing agent. When water is applied to burning class D materials, there may be small explosions. The fire fighter should apply water from a safe distance or from behind shelter. 5.5 Extinguishing Agents There are many materials that may be used as fire-fighting agents. The primary agents discussed in the following paragraphs are the most extensively used. Water is a cooling agent, and it is easily available. If the surface temperature of a fire can be lowered below the fuel's ignition temperature, the fire would be extinguished. Water is most efficient when it absorbs enough heat to raise its temperature to 100 C or boiling point. The steam carries away the heat, which cools the surface temperature. Water in the form of fog is very effective for fire-fighting purposes. Additionally, water fog can provide protection to fire fighters from heat. However, the fog must be applied directly to the area to be cooled if its benefits are to be realized. Water in the form of a straight stream (also called solid stream) is used to reach into smoke-filled spaces or areas at a distance from the fire fighter. When a straight stream is needed as an extinguishing agent, it should be directed into the seat of the fire. For maximum cooling, the water must come in direct contact with the burning material. A straight stream is best used to break up and penetrate materials.

122 118 Aviation Safety and Security Management AFFF is composed of synthetically produced materials similar to liquid detergents. These film-forming agents are capable of forming water solution films on the surface of flammable liquids. AFFF concentrate is non-toxic and biodegradable in diluted form. When proportioned with water, AFFF provides three fire-extinguishing advantages. 1. An aqueous film is formed on the surface of the fuel that prevents the escape of the fuel vapours. 2. The layer effectively excludes oxygen from the fuel surface. 3. The water content of the foam provides a cooling effect. The primary use of AFFF is to extinguish burning flammable or combustible liquid spill fires (class B). AFFF has excellent penetrating characteristics and is superior to water in extinguishing class A fires. CO2 is an inert gas and extinguishes fires by smothering them. CO2 is about 1.5 times heavier than air, which makes it a suitable extinguishing agent because it tends to settle and blanket the fire. CO2 is a dry, non-corrosive gas, which is inert when in contact with most substances and would not leave a residue and damage machinery or electrical equipment. CO2 is a non-conductor of electricity regardless of voltage, and can be safely used in fighting fires that would present the hazard of electric shock. CO2 extinguishes the fire by diluting and displacing its oxygen supply. If gaseous CO2 is directed into a fire so that sufficient oxygen to support combustion is no longer available, the flames would die out. CO2 has limited cooling capabilities, and may not cool the fuel below its ignition temperature. It is more likely than other extinguishing agents to allow reflash. CO2 is however, not an effective extinguishing agent for fires in materials that produce their own oxygen supply, such as

123 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 119 fires involving reactive metals like magnesium and titanium. Halon is a halogenated hydrocarbon. Halon 1211, known chemically as bromo-chloro-difluoromethane, is colourless and has a sweet smell. Halon attacks the fire by inhibiting the chemical chain reaction. Halon decomposes upon contact with flames or hot surfaces above 900 F (482 C). Halon 1211 is used for twin agent (AFFF/Halon 1211) applications on board flight and with mobile fire-fighting equipment. Potassium bicarbonate (PKP) is a dry chemical principally used as a fire-fighting agent for flammable liquid fires. When PKP is applied to fire, the dry chemical extinguishes the flame by breaking the combustion chain. PKP does not have cooling capabilities on fire. PKP is highly effective in extinguishing flammable liquid (class B) fires. Although PKP can be used on electrical (class C) fires, it would leave a residue that may be hard to clean. Also, when combined with moisture, it may corrode or stain the surfaces it settles on. PKP does not produce a lasting inert atmosphere above the surface of a flammable liquid. Therefore, its use would not result in permanent extinguishing if ignition sources, such as hot metal surfaces or persistent electrical arcing, are present. Reflash of the fire will most likely occur. The ingredients used in PKP are non-toxic. However, the discharge of large quantities may cause temporary breathing difficulty and, immediately after the discharge, it may seriously interfere with visibility. 5.6 Aircraft Fire Hazards Flammable, hazardous, and fire accelerating materials carried on aircraft are of major concern e.g. Aviation gasoline (AVGAS), jet fuels (JP-4, JP-5, and JP-8), engine oils, oxygen systems, and hydraulic fluids constitute problems in aircraft fire-fighting. Under aircraft crash impact conditions where fuel-air mixtures or mists are created, all fuels are easily ignited.

124 120 Aviation Safety and Security Management The flash point (by closed cup method at sea level) of AVGAS is -50 F (-46 C). The rate of flame spread has also been calculated to be between 700 and 800 feet per minute. JP-4 jet fuel is a blend of gasoline and kerosene and has a flash point from -10 F (-23 C). The rate of flame spread has also been calculated to be between 700 and 800 feet per minute. JP-5 fuel is a kerosene grade with a flash point of 140 F (60 C). The rate of flame spread has been calculated to be in the order of 100 feet per minute. 5.7 General Hazards Not every crash results in fire. The responsibility of the crash fire fighter does not end when fire fails to occur. Serious actual and potential fire hazards may have been created, which must be eliminated or minimized without delay. The greater the damage to the aircraft, the greater the possibility of fuel spillage. A spark or a hot engine part could ignite fuel vapours and set off a full-fledged fire. All precautions must be taken all to prevent accidental ignition. When an aircraft crashes, the impact usually ruptures the fuel lines and fuel tanks. Ordinarily, all the fuel is not liberated at once. There is a source of fuel that is supplying the fire either from the rupture in the tank or from the loosened and ruptured fuel lines in the accessory section of the engine. The control of the fire around the fuselage section under these conditions presents a very complex problem. The top portion of the tank is more void of liquid than any other section of the tank. Because of the restraining cushion of the liquid

125 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 121 itself, the explosive force will be directed upward instead of downward or on a horizontal plane. Fuel loads can vary from 100 Litres in small aircraft to approximately two Lakhs Litres or more in large jet aircraft. Fuel tanks are installed in a variety of places within the aircraft structural framework or as a built-in part of the wing. There is so little difference in the heat of combustion of the various aircraft hydrocarbon fuels that the severity after ignition would be of no significance from the "fire safety" point of view. The fire-fighting and control measures are the same for the entire group of aviation hydrocarbon fuels. Oxygen systems on aircraft can present hazardous conditions to fire fighters during an emergency. Liquid oxygen is a light blue liquid that flows like water and is extremely cold. It boils into gaseous oxygen at -297 F (-147 C) and has an expansion rate of approximately 860 to 1. Liquid oxygen is a strong oxidizer, and although it is non-flammable, it vigorously supports combustion. Anti-icing fluids are usually a mixture of about 85-percent alcohol and 15-percent glycerine. While not as great as other aircraft hazards, however alcohol used in aircraft anti-icing systems burns with an almost invisible flame. The best method of control is by dilution with water. Class A combustibles in aircraft fires are best extinguished with AFFF. When aircraft cockpit and interior finish materials are burned or charred, they produce toxic gases. These gases include carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide. Therefore, it is necessary that firefighting and rescue personnel who enter an aircraft during a fire sequence be equipped with a self-contained breathing apparatus.

126 122 Aviation Safety and Security Management Alkaline or nickel-cadmium batteries may get hot from internal shorting or thermal runaway. The overheated battery is hazardous to both aircraft and personnel and hence proper type extinguishing agent available for instant use. Inhalation of composite fibres resulting from aircraft fires and/or aircraft material damage may be harmful. Composite materials that are reinforced with carbon/graphite fibres provide superior stiffness, a high strength-to-weight ratio, and ease of fabrication. As a result, this material is being used extensively in advanced aircraft, to replace heavier metal components. Unfortunately, carbon or graphite fibres can be released into the atmosphere if their epoxy binder burns. Once free, these small lightweight fibres can be transported up to several kilometres by air currents and, because of their high electrical conductivity, can damage unprotected electrical/electronic equipment. Until such time as more information is known, aircraft crash and fire-fighting units must attempt to extinguish fires involving carbon-fibre-reinforced composites as quickly as possible and to provide maximum containment of the aircraft debris. Composite materials reinforced with boron fibres also provide superior stiffness, a high strength-to-weight ratio, and ease of fabrication. Unfortunately, boron fibres can be released if their epoxy binder burns. The extinguishing, containment, and cleanup practices for boron fibres are the same as those previously outlined for carbon or graphite fibres. The most common source of crash fires is the engine compartment, particularly the accessory section. Steps should be taken by fire personnel to prevent ignition of fuel vapours by hot exhaust stacks and collector rings. CO2 discharged through the cooling flaps, air scoop, or inspection doors is an effective precaution.

127 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 123 Fuel spills can be caused by ruptured fuel lines. These spills should be swept clear of the aircraft. Water streams should be used to be followed up with a layer of foam to halt vaporization. An aircraft should NEVER be dragged or moved unnecessarily. There is great danger that friction will ignite the fuel. Fuel Selector Valve is the primary fuel cut-off valve and is used to select various fuel tanks. This should be switched to OFF position, and then the valve completely separates the source of fuel from engines. Battery switch should be turned to OFF by the Fire People. This is the master electrical switch and also the source of all power to the aircraft electrical system when the engine(s) are not running. The battery should be disconnected, if possible, as detonators and electrical recognition devices are connected ahead of the master switch. Turning the switch off will not stop the flow of current to these devices. The hydraulic system of a crashed aircraft should be considered a potential hazard. The loss of hydraulic fluid/ pressure could cause an unexpected movement of the aircraft. The landing gear could collapse or brakes could release, causing injury to personnel. 5.8 Determining the category of the aerodrome The level of protection provided at an aerodrome for rescue and fire fighting is required to be appropriate to the aerodrome category determined in accordance with Table 5-1 below and is based on the longest aeroplanes normally using the aerodrome and their fuselage width. If after selecting the category appropriate to the longest aeroplane's overall length, that aeroplane's fuselage width is greater than the maximum width in Table 5-1 below for that category,

128 124 Aviation Safety and Security Management then the category for that aeroplane is taken as one category higher. The level of protection is appropriate to the aerodrome category so determined. Availability of ARFF services including level of protection and watch hours is notified through Aeronautical Information Publication and any temporary change in the status of service is notified through NOTAM (Notice to Airmen). Table 5-1: Aerodrome category for rescue and fire fighting. Aerodrome category. (1) Aeroplane overall length.. (2) 1 0 m up to but not including 9 m 2 m 2 9 m up to but not including 12 m 2 m 3 12 m up to but not including 18 m 3 m 4 18 m up to but not including 24 m 4 m 5 24 m up to but not including 28 m 4 m 6 28 m up to but not including 39 m 5 m 7 39 m up to but not including 49 m 5 m 8 49 m up to but not including 61 m 7 m 9 61 m up to but not including 76 m 7 m m up to but not including 90 m 8 m Maximum fuselage width. (3) 5.9 ARFF vehicles All rescue and fire fighting vehicles are normally housed in a fire station. Separate / Satellite fire stations can be provided whenever the response time cannot be achieved from a single fire station. Wherever position of satalite fire station is not practicable, at least one ARFF vehicle is required to be positioned in forward position to meet the response time. Number of vehicles provided for ARFF service are commensurate with the aerodrome category as determined in accordance with table 5-1A. The minimum number of rescue and fire fighting vehicles provided at an aerodrome are in accordance with the following. Category of aerodrome Table 5-1A ARFF vehicles. 1 to ,

129 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 125 Fire Station of Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL), Kochi 5.10 Vehicle performance. ARFF vehicles would meet all the requirements outlined in Table 5-2 below. Table 5-2: Suggested minimum characteristics for rescue and fire fighting vehicles. RFF vehicles upto 4500 litre RFF vehicles over 4500 litres Monitor Optional for Categories Required 1&2. Required for Categories 3 to 9. Design feature High discharge capacity High and low discharge capacity Range Appropriate to longest aircraft Appropriate to longest aircraft Handlines Required Required Under truck Optional Required nozzles Bumper turret Optional Optional Acceleration 80 km/h within 25 seconds at normal operating temperature 80 km/h within 40 seconds at normal operating temperature Top speed At least 105 km/h At least 100 km/h All wheel Yes Required drive capability Automatic and semi automatic Yes Required transmission Single rear wheel configuration Minimum angle of approach and departure Minimum angle of tilt (static) Preferable for categories Required 1&2. Required for categories 3 to 9 30 degree 30 degree 30 degree 28 degree

130 126 Aviation Safety and Security Management ARFF vehicles and equipment are subjected to inspection schedules and tests on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and annual basis. ARFF are required to have a comprehensive fleet management programme with a prescribed test method to check performance at regular interval Response Time Response time is considered as the time between the initial call to the ARFF and the time when the first responding vehicle(s) is (are) in position and if required, apply foam at a rate of at least 50 % of the discharge rate specified in Table 5.3. The operational objective of the ARFF would be to achieve response time not exceeding three minutes to the end of each runway in conditions of visibility 2500 m or better and dry, paved surface conditions. Any other vehicles required to deliver the amounts of extinguishing agents specified in Table5-2 would arrive no more than one minute after the first responding vehicle(s) so as to provide continuous agent application. Access routes to the response area are required to be designated and made suitable for use by RFF vehicles. Routes are to be maintained in a condition that facilitates use. Procedures would be developed to place the RFF personnel on stand by alert when the aerodrome visibility has deteriorated below a predetermined level. Table 5.3: minimum usable amounts of extinguishing agents. Foam meeting performance level A Foam meeting performance level B Discharge rate Discharge rate Dry2 Aerodro Water foam Water foam solution me 1 solution 1 /minute /minute (L) (L) (L) (L) (Kg) Complemen tary agents Chemical powders. Categor y (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Contd...

131 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services Supplementary water supplies, for the expeditious replenishment of rescue and fire fighting vehicles at the scene of an aircraft accident would be provided Fire extinguishing agent performance criteria. The primary attack agent for ARFF vehicles would be aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), performance conforming to level B, as given below in table 5-4. Requisite quantities of foam compound would be maintained at each station in conformation with ICAO guidelines. Table 5-4 Fire tests Performance level B 1. Nozzle (air aspirated). Branch pipe. UNI 86 foam nozzle. Nozzle pressure. 700 kpa. 2.5 litre per minute per square meter. Application rate litre per minute Discharge rate 2. Fire size 4.5 square meter approx. (circular) 3. Fuel (on water substrate) Kerosene 4. Preburn time 60 seconds 5. Fire performance. extinguishing time. Equal to or less than 60 seconds. total application time. 120 seconds. 25% reignition time. Equal to or more than 5 minutes. In addition to primary agent, necessary amount of complementary agent would also be carried in ARFF vehicles. A minimum of 200 % of foam concentrate and complementary agent would be held in reserve and would be available at all times on the aerodrome. Additional stocks of extinguishing agents required for training would be also provided. The complementary agents would comply with the appropriate specifications of the Bureau of Indian Standards

132 128 Aviation Safety and Security Management / ISO or equivalent. The discharge rate of the foam solution would not be less than the rates shown in Table-5-2. The discharge rate of complementary agents would be selected for optimum effectiveness of the agent Ancillary equipment and performance criteria ARFF vehicles carry a wide range of rescue, fire fighting and salvage equipment as complements for providing rescue and fire fighting function. The list of such ancillary equipment is maintained at each ARFF vehicle and station. Equipments are tested at regular intervals in conformation with performance criteria and the results are recorded in equipment log books to draw life cycle for repair / refurbishing / replacement ARFF personnel- recruitment, training and Medical fitness The recruitment of ARFF personnel should conform to the recruitment rules laid by Airports Authority of India. Details of academic, physical and medical standards for each category should conform to recruitment rules issued by Airports Authority of India. All ARFF operational staff would be qualified and competent for their respective level in the service. They should also conform to the prescribed medical and physical fitness. ARFF officers and staff would undergo stipulated training courses at the fire training college/centre before deployment at the station. Fire Service Training Colleges are established by AAI at Kolkata and Delhi, with training courses conforming to ICAO training manual. The ARFF personnel would undergo station level familiarization training on local topography and equipment before deployment in actual service Emergency access roads Emergency access roads would be provided on an aerodrome where terrain conditions permit their construction, to

133 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 129 facilitate achieving minimum response times. Particular attention would be given to the provision of ready access to approach areas up to 1000 m from the threshold, or at least within the aerodrome boundary. Where a fence is provided, a convenient exit to outside areas shall be provided. Emergency access roads would be capable of supporting the heaviest vehicles which would use them, and be usable in all weather conditions. Roads within 90 m of a runway would be surfaced to prevent surface erosion and the transfer of debris to the runway. Sufficient vertical clearance would be provided from overhead obstructions for the largest vehicles. Proper Communication facilities would also be provided for ARFF services. An alerting system for rescue and fire fighting personnel should be provided at fire station, sub fire stations and the aerodrome control tower. ARFF service includes RFF vehicles (major CFTs, small CFTs), Ambulances, water bowsers, rescue tenders, high mast lights Interruption or change to level of operational service and contingency plans A system of notification with regard to level of fire protection and category reduction / up-gradation would be followed as and when any emergency or break down is encountered Arrangements with state/city fire brigades and other 3rd party providers Arrangement are required to be made at each airport for with State/City and/or other 3rd party fire brigades to supplement airport fire services during aircraft emergency Aerodrome emergency planning An aerodrome emergency plan is required to be established at all aerodromes, where RFF facilities have been established.

134 130 Aviation Safety and Security Management The plan provides details for the coordinated action to be taken during an emergency at an aerodrome or in its vicinity. It should contain details of responsibility and the type of participation needed from all agencies while responding to an emergency. It would also provide details of special infrastructure like casuality centre and command post etc available and required at an aerodrome. The command post would be a facility capable of being moved rapidly to the site of an emergency, when required, and would undertake the local coordination of agencies responding to the emergency The aerodrome emergency plan document would include at least the following (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) types of emergencies planned for viz.;. aircraft crash. aircraft emergencies (local standby, visibility standby & full emergency);. bomb threat;. unlawfully seized aircraft;. building fires; and. national / natural disasters. agencies involved in the plan;. responsibility and role of each agency, the emergency operations centre and the command post, for each type of emergency ie; local standby, full emergency, aircraft crash;. information on names and telephone numbers of offices or people to be contacted in the case of a particular emergency; and. a grid map of the aerodrome and its immediate vicinity. The plan would observe Human Factors principles to ensure optimum response by all existing agencies participating in

135 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services. 131 emergency operations. It would provide for co-operation and coordination with rescue coordination centre. Arrangements would be made to establish fixed emergency operation centre, equipped with adequate communication facilities, for overall coordination and general direction of the response to an emergency Aerodrome Emergency Exercise In order to test the adequacy of the aerodrome emergency plan full scale aerodrome emergency exercise is required to be carried out at intervals of not exceeding 2 years and partial emergency exercise once in the intervening period to ensure that any deficiencies found during the exercises are corrected Disabled aircraft removal Disabled aircraft removal plan is required to be developed by each aerodrome and included in the aerodrome manual. The disabled aircraft removal plan should be based on the characteristics of the aircraft that may normally be expected to operate at the aerodrome, and include among other things: (a) (b) a list of equipment and personnel on, or in the vicinity of, the aerodrome which would be available for such purpose; and. arrangements for the rapid receipt of aircraft recovery equipment kits available from other aerodromes. 17. ICAO Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation-Volume I-' Aerodrome Design and Operations', Fourth Edition, July Civil Aviation Requirements, Section-4, Aerodrome Standards & Air Traffic Services, Series 'B', Part I dated 31st July, 2006-: Aerodrome Design And Operations, issued by Office Of Director General Of Civil Aviation. 19. ICAO Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137) Part 1 - Rescue and Fire Fighting.

136 132 Aviation Safety and Security Management 20. Airports Authority of India Air Traffic Services Manual 21. AAI Airport Operations Manual Questions General Questions. What do you understand by the term 'Aerodrome Category' in relation to ARFF? How 'Aerodrome Category' is determined? What are the different classes of Fire? What are the most suitable methods of controlling them? Objective Type of questions a. Class 'C' fire is caused due to b. Most suitable fire extinguishing agent for control of burning aircraft fuel is c. Four essential conditions for origination and continuation of fire are Heat, Oxygen, Fuel and d. Response time is considered as the time between the initial call to the ARFF and the time when the first responding vehicle is in position and if required, apply foam at a rate of at least 50% of the discharge rate.- True/ False e. From the table given below, determine the 'Aerodrome Category' (In relation to ARFF) for an airport, where the following aircraft are operating on a regular basis? Type of Aircraft Length Max fuselage width B m 3.8 m A m 4.0 m A m 5.7 m B m 7.5 m Aerodrome category Aeroplane overall length. Maximum fuselage width. 1 0 m to less than 9 m 2m 2 9 m to less than 12 m 2m 3 12 m to less than 18 m 3m

137 UNIT 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services m to less than 24 m 4m 5 24 m to less than 28 m 4m 6 28 m to less than 39 m 5m 7 39 m to less than 49 m 5m 8 49 m to less than 61 m 7m 9 61 m to less than 76 m 7m m to less than 90 m 8m Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Electrical faults. b. Aqueous Film-forming Foam (AFFF) c. Chain Reaction. d. True e. The Aerodrome Category is 10 (Highest of all)

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139 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices 135 Unit 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is recognized by the United Nations as a specialized agency for International civil aviation, which codifies the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of International air transport to ensure its safe, efficient and orderly evolution. The ICAO Council adopts Standards and Recommended Practices concerning air navigation, prevention of unlawful interference, and facilitation of border-crossing procedures for international civil aviation. In addition, the ICAO defines the protocols for air accident investigation followed by transport safety authorities in countries signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly known as the Chicago Convention. An agreement between ICAO & UN is designed to ensure an efficient working relationship and a mutual recognition of their respective roles. However, ICAO is not subordinate to, and does not receive any line-of-command authority from, the United Nations. Civil aviation is a powerful force for progress in our modern global society. A healthy and growing air transport system creates and supports millions of jobs worldwide. It forms part of the economic lifeline of many countries. It is a catalyst for travel and tourism, the world s largest industry. Beyond economics, air transport enriches the social and cultural fabric of society and contributes to the attainment of peace and prosperity throughout the world.

140 136 Aviation Safety and Security Management Twenty four hours a day, 365 days of the year, an aeroplane takes off or lands every few seconds somewhere on the face of the earth. Every one of these flights is handled in the same, uniform manner, whether by air traffic control, airport authorities or pilots at the controls of their aircraft. Behind the scenes are millions of employees involved in manufacturing, maintenance and monitoring of the products and services required in the never-ending cycle of flights. In fact, modern aviation is one of the most complex systems of interaction between human beings and machines ever created. This clock-work precision in procedures and systems is made possible by the existence of universally accepted standards known as Standards and Recommended Practices, or SARPs. SARPs cover all technical and operational aspects of international civil aviation, such as safety, personnel licensing, operation of aircraft, aerodromes, air traffic services, accident investigation and the environment. Without SARPs, our aviation system would be at best chaotic and at worst unsafe. Creating and modernizing SARPs is the responsibility of the International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, the specialized agency of the United Nations whose mandate is to ensure the safe, efficient and orderly evolution of international civil aviation. ICAO has its headquarters in Montreal, Canada, with seven regional offices throughout the world. From its beginning in 1944 it has grown to an organization with over 180 Contracting States. The charter of ICAO is the Convention on International Civil Aviation, drawn up in Chicago in December 1944, and to which each ICAO Contracting State is a party. According to the Convention, the Organization is made up of an Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat. The chief officers are the President of the Council and the Secretary General. It is in the Council that Standards and Recommended Practices are adopted and incorporated as Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. With regard to

141 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices 137 the development of Standards, the Council is assisted by the Air Navigation Commission in technical matters, the Air Transport Committee in economic matters and the Committee on Unlawful Interference in aviation security matters. The principal body concerned with the development of technical Standards and other provisions is the Air Navigation Commission. Its primary role is to advise the Council of ICAO on air navigation issues. The Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General, is divided into five main divisions: the Air Navigation Bureau, the Air Transport Bureau, the Technical Co-operation Bureau, the Legal Bureau, and the Bureau of Administration and Services. ICAO PUBLICATIONS A. The ICAO Bulletin: This document is published 12 times annually and contains a digest of ICAO meetings and activities for the previous period. B. Final Reports of Meetings: The final reports of divisional, regional, and panel meetings include the proceedings and recommendations of each meeting. Approved recommendations are separately referred to the affected states for implementation C. Annexes to the Convention: Standards and Recommended Practices of ICAO are designated as Annexes to the Convention and are published separately for each technical field after adoption by the Council D. Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS): The uniform application of certain operating procedures is necessary for safe and efficient air navigation. Operating procedures covering aircraft operations, construction of visual and instrument flight procedures, ICAO abbreviations and codes, rules of the air, and air traffic services have been adopted by ICAO. E. Supplementary Procedures: Certain procedures apply only in specific regions and those are published as Supplementary Procedures.

142 138 Aviation Safety and Security Management F. Field Manuals: These manuals have no formal status by themselves but derive their status from the International Standards, Recommended Practices, and PANS from which they are compiled. They are prepared primarily for the use of personnel engaged in operations in the field. G. ICAO Circulars: ICAO Circulars are issued by the Secretary General to make specialized information available to contracting states. They include studies of statistics, summaries of treaties or agreements, analyses of technical documents, and studies of technical subjects H. The publications discussed in this paragraph and other publications published and distributed by ICAO are available at the following address: Public Information Office, International Civil Aviation Organization, 1000 Sherbrooke Street West, Suite 400 Montreal, Quebec Canada H3A, 2R2 97. ANNEXES TO THE CONVENTION ICAO Annexes contain the Standards and Recommended Practices that have been adopted through international agreement. The 18 Annexes are described as follows: 1, Annex 1, Personnel Licensing, provides information on licensing of flight crews, air traffic controllers, and aircraft maintenance personnel 2. Annex 2, Rules of the Air, contains rules relating to conducting visual and instrument flight 3. Annex 3, Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, provides for meteorological services for international air navigation and reporting of meteorological observations from aircraft 4. Annex 4, Aeronautical Charts, contains specifications for aeronautical charts used in international aviation 5. Annex 5, Measurement Units Used in Air and Ground Operations, lists dimensional systems to be used in air and ground operations

143 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, enumerates specifications which ensure a level of safety above a prescribed minimum in similar operations throughout the world. The three parts of this Annex are as follows: Part I - International Commercial Air Transport - Airplanes Part II - International General Aviation - Airplanes Part III - International Operations - Helicopters 7. Annex 7, Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks, specifies requirements for registration and identification of aircraft 8. Annex 8, Airworthiness of Aircraft, specifies uniform procedures for certification and inspection of aircraft 9. Annex 9, Facilitation, provides for simplification of border-crossing formalities 10. Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, volume 1, provides for standardization of communications equipment and systems, and volume 2 standardizes communications procedures 11. Annex 11, Air Traffic Services, includes information on establishing and operating air traffic control, flight information, and alerting services 12. Annex 12, Search and Rescue, provides information on organization and operation of facilities and services necessary for search and rescue 13. Annex 13, Aircraft Accident Investigation, provides for uniformity in notification, investigation, and reporting on aircraft accidents 14. Annex 14, Aerodromes, contains specifications for the design and equipment of aerodromes 15. Annex 15, Aeronautical Information Services, includes methods for collecting and disseminating aeronautical information required for flight operations 16. Annex 16, Environmental Protection, contains specifications for aircraft noise certification, noise

144 140 Aviation Safety and Security Management monitoring, and noise exposure units for land-use planning (volume 1) and aircraft engine emissions (volume 2) 17. Annex 17, Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, specifies methods for safeguarding international civil aviation against unlawful acts of interference 18. Annex 18, The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, contains specifications for labelling, packing, and shipping dangerous cargo. ICAO STANDARDS & RECOMMENDED PRACTICES Standard A Standard is defined as any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navigation and to which Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event of impossibility of compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under Article 38 of the Convention. Recommended Practice A Recommended Practice is any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation, and to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform in accordance with the Convention. States are invited to inform the Council of non-compliance. Why are Standards Necessary? Sixteen out of eighteen Annexes to the Convention are of a technical nature and therefore fall within the responsibilities of the Air Navigation Bureau and its sections. The remaining two Annexes, Facilitation and Security, are under the

145 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices 141 purview of the Air Transport Bureau. Since the majority of the Annexes concern technical issues, it is focused on them when the development process is described. ICAO standards and other provisions are developed in the following forms: Standards and Recommended Practices - collectively referred to as SARPs; Procedures for Air Navigation Services - called PANS; Regional Supplementary Procedures - referred to as SUPPs; and Guidance Material in several formats. SARPs are formulated in broad terms and restricted to essential requirements. For complex systems such as communications equipment, SARPs material is constructed in two sections: core SARPs - material of a fundamental regulatory nature contained within the main body of the Annexes, and detailed technical specifications placed either in Appendices to Annexes or in manuals. How SARPs are depicted in Annexes? The Recommended Practices are always written with Italic Fonts and should word is used in Recommended Practices. Standards are written with normal Fonts and shall word is used in Standards. Examples of typical of Standards and Recommended Practices from ICAO Annex-14 are given below; Recommendation. In considering proposed construction, account should be taken of the possible future development of an instrument runway and consequent requirement for more stringent obstacle limitation surfaces. (Standards are shown in the following form) Non-precision approach runways The following obstacle limitation surfaces shall be established for a non-precision approach runway:

146 142 conical surface; inner horizontal surface; approach surface; and transitional surfaces. Aviation Safety and Security Management The basic criterion for deciding whether a particular issue should be a Standard is an affirmative answer to the question, Is uniform application by all contracting States essential? The applicability of a Standard may be subject to certain conditions relating to such areas as terrain, traffic density, stages of flight, and climate. A Standard should, however, be applied equally by any contracting state where those specified conditions are encountered, unless the contracting state notifies ICAO of a difference Origin of Proposals for SARPs How are SARPs created? What makes them so effective today and how can they ensure the safe, efficient and orderly growth of international civil aviation in the years to come? The answer lies in the four C s of aviation: cooperation, consensus, compliance and commitment. Cooperation in the formulation of SARPs, consensus in their approval, compliance in their application, and commitment of adherence to this on-going process. The formulation of new or revised SARPs begins with a proposal for action from ICAO itself or from its Contracting States. Proposals also may be submitted by international organizations. Development of SARPs For technical SARPs, proposals are analysed first by the Air Navigation Commission, or ANC. Depending on the nature of the proposal, the Commission may assign its review to a specialized working group. Meetings are, of course, the main vehicle for progress in the air navigation field, although much of the preparatory work is accomplished by correspondence. It is through a variety of

147 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices 143 meetings that most of the work is finalized and the necessary consensus reached. In the development, a number of consultative mechanisms are used: Air Navigation meetings are divisional-type meetings devoted to broad issues in the air navigation fields. They can be either divisional meetings dealing with issues in one or more related fields or air navigation conferences normally having a theme covering issues in more than one field. All Contracting States are invited to participate in these meetings with equal voice. Interested international organizations are invited to participate as observers. ANC panels are technical groups of qualified experts formed by the ANC to advance, within specified time frames, the solution of specialized problems which cannot be solved adequately or expeditiously by the established facilities of the ANC and the Secretariat. These experts act in their expert capacity and not as representatives of the nominators. Air Navigation study groups are small groups of experts made available by States and international organizations to assist the ICAO Secretariat, in a consultative capacity, in advancing progress on technical tasks. Council technical committees are established to deal with problems involving technical, economic, social and legal aspects, for the resolution or advancement of which expertise is required that is not available through the normal Council means, are also instrumental in developing ICAO SARPs. In summary, technical issues dealing with a specific subject and requiring detailed examination are normally referred by the ANC to a panel of experts. Less complex issues may be assigned to the Secretariat for further examination, perhaps with the assistance of an air navigation study group. Review of Draft SARPs These various groups report back to the Air Navigation Commission in the form of a technical proposal either for revisions to SARPs or for new SARPs, for preliminary review.

148 144 Aviation Safety and Security Management This review is normally limited to consideration of controversial issues which, in the opinion of the Secretariat or the Commission, require examination before the recommendations are circulated to States for comment. The original recommendations for core SARPs along with any alternative proposals developed by the Air Navigation Commission are submitted to Contracting States and selected international organizations for comment. Detailed technical specifications for complex systems are made available to States upon request and are submitted to a validation process. States are normally given three months to comment on the proposals. Standards developed by other recognized international organizations can also be referenced, provided they have been subject to adequate verification and validation. The comments of States and international organizations are analysed by the Secretariat and a working paper detailing the comments and the Secretariat proposals for action is prepared. The Commission undertakes the final review of the recommendations and establishes the final texts of the proposed amendments to SARPs, PANS and associated attachments. The amendments to Annexes recommended by the Commission are presented to the Council for adoption under cover of a Report to Council by the President of the Air Navigation Commission. Adoption/Publication of Annex Amendments The Council reviews the proposals of the Air Navigation Commission and adopts the amendment to the Annex if twothirds of the members are in favour. Within two weeks of the adoption of an Annex amendment by the Council, an interim edition of the amendment, referred to as the Green Edition, is dispatched to States with a covering explanatory letter. This covering letter also gives the various dates associated with the introduction of the amendment.

149 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices 145 Policy prescribes that Contracting States be allowed three months to indicate disapproval of adopted amendments to SARPs. A further period of one month is provided for preparation and transit time, making the Effective Date approximately four months after adoption by Council. There should be a period of four months between an amendment s Effective Date and its Applicability Date. However, this can be longer or shorter as the situation requires. The Notification Date is normally one month prior to the Applicability Date. Provided a majority of States have not registered disapproval, the amendment will become effective on the Effective Date. On the Notification Date, which is one month prior to the Applicability Date, the States must notify the Secretariat of any differences that will exist between their national regulations and the provision of the Standard as amended. The reported differences are then published in supplements to Annexes. Immediately after the Effective Date, a letter is sent announcing that the amendment has become effective and the Secretariat takes action to issue the Blue Edition which is the form of the amendment suitable for incorporation in the Annex or PANS. On the Applicability Date, States must implement the amendments unless, of course, they have notified differences. To limit the frequency of Annex and PANS amendments, the Council has established one common applicability date for each year. This date is chosen from the schedule for the regulation of amendments to Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC) for the month of November. The result of this adoption procedure is that the new or amended Standards and Recommended Practices become part of the relevant Annex. It takes on average 2 years from the Preliminary Review by the ANC to the applicability date. Although this process may seem lengthy at first glance, it provides for repeated

150 146 Aviation Safety and Security Management consultation and extensive participation of States and international organizations in producing a consensus based on logic and experience. Cooperation and consensus have thus provided international aviation with the vital infrastructure for safe and efficient air transport. The third C, compliance, brings this comprehensive regulatory system to life. Implementation of SARPs/Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the implementation of SARPs lies with Contracting States. To help them in the area of safety, ICAO established in 1999 a Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme. The Programme consists of regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized safety audits carried out by ICAO in all Contracting States. The objective is to promote global aviation safety by determining the status of implementation of relevant ICAO SARPs, associated procedures and safety-related practices. The audits are conducted within the context of critical elements of a State s safety oversight system. These include the appropriate legislative and regulatory framework; a sound organizational structure; technical guidance; qualified personnel; licensing and certification procedures; continued surveillance and the resolution of identified safety concerns. Since its inception, the Programme has proved effective in identifying safety concerns in the safety-related fields under its scope, while providing recommendations for their resolution. The Programme is being gradually expanded to include aerodromes, air traffic services, aircraft accident and incident investigation and other safety-related fields. While providing additional assistance in the form of regional safety oversight seminars and workshops, the programme also provides ICAO with valuable feedback to improve existing SARPs and create new ones. The experience gained with the safety oversight programme was successfully adapted to aviation security. In 2002, the

151 UNIT 6 ICAO Standards & Recommended Practices 147 Universal Security Audit Programme was launched to similarly help States identify deficiencies in the implementation of security-related SARPs. The format may in the future be applied to other areas of civil aviation. Yes, cooperation, consensus, compliance and an unfailing commitment to the on-going implementation of SARPs have made it possible to create a global aviation system that has evolved into the safest mode of mass transportation ever conceived. The flight crew of today s commercial aircraft, as their predecessors and those that will follow, can count on a standardized aviation infrastructure wherever they fly in the world. ICAO is proud of this unique achievement, based on the singled-minded pursuit of working with its Contracting States and all other partners of the international civil aviation community in providing the citizens of the world with an aviation system that is safe and reliable, now and for years to come. References 1. Various related ICAO Annexes & Documents 2. ICAO Website Questions General Questions. 1. Write different steps involved in development of SARPs starting from Proposal stage till implementation. 2. How SARPs are adopted and published Objective Type of questions a. There are 18 ICAO Annexes, which contain that have been adopted through International agreement. b. Standards are mandatory requirements set up by ICAO in its Annexes for the safety or regularity of International air navigation and is denoted by the words -

152 148 Aviation Safety and Security Management c. A Recommended Practice is any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation, and to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform in accordance with the Convention. States are invited to inform the Council of non-compliance. It is denoted by the words - Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) b. shall c. should

153 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 149 Unit 7 Civil Aviation Security Civil Aviation Security refers to the techniques and methods used in protecting airports, aircraft, passengers and personnel associated with aviation from crime, sabotage and terrorism. Large numbers of people pass through airports every day. Such a large gathering of people presents a natural target for terrorism and other forms of crime due to the number of people located in a small area. Similarly, the high concentration of people on large airliners, the potential high lethality rate of attacks on aircraft, and the ability to use a hijacked airplane as a lethal weapon provide an alluring target for terrorism. CRIMES OF TERRORISM It includes espionage, sabotage, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, robbery, bombing, holding a person prisoner or hostage or any threat or attempt to kidnap, extort, bomb or hold prisoners or hostage or any threat to do any injury to a human being, animal or personal or real property or any conspiracy to do any of the above in order to compel an act or omission by any person or any government entity. The act of terrorism against civil aircraft can be divided into various categories viz. unlawful seizure of aircraft or hijacking, bomb hoax call, sabotage, in-flight attack on aircraft, ground attack on aircraft, damage to air navigation facilities etc. SOME GLARING CASES OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE Some of the glaring cases related to hijacking and sabotage are enumerated below,

154 150 Aviation Safety and Security Management September 70 was one of the most significant months in the history of civil aviation when not one but three large commercial jets were hijacked together by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Out of these two aircraft (a B707 of Trans World and a DC-8 of Swiss air) were made to land at a desert airstrip of Jordan known as Dawson and the third one (a Jumbo jet of Pan American Airways) was taken to Cairo. After two days a VC-10 of BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation) was also taken to Dawson. Later the hijackers off-loaded the passengers and crew and burnt all the aeroplanes. 2 June 76 Airbus aircraft of Air France while on a flight from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens with 24 passengers on board was hijacked by four Palestine supporters and taken to Entebbe (Uganda) taking 10 persons on board as hostages. On July Israel sent its aircraft on a secret mission to Entebbe where its soldiers rescued the hostage in a dare devil operation killing all the hijackers. The single deadliest airline catastrophe resulting from the failure of airport security to detect an onboard bomb was Air India Flight 182 in 1985, which killed 329 people. In June 85, Air India Jumbo jet named Kanishka on a flight from Montreal to Mumbai via London fell into the North Atlantic Sea near the coast of Ireland, killing all 329 persons on board. During investigation it was found that a bomb had been placed in the cargo compartment of the aircraft that exploded during flight. This was the worst and most brutal aeroplane accident caused by sabotage. In Dec 88, a Pan American Airways B747 aircraft crashed due to sabotage, during a flight from London to New York with 259 passengers on board, killing all passengers and crew and the parts of the burning aircraft fell over Lockerbie town in Scotland that set many houses ablaze and killed many innocent people on ground too (total 270 casualties). On 8 April 94, an Executive jet aircraft carrying Presidents of two African nations Rwanda and Burundi on flight from Tanzanian capital Dar-es-Salaam to Rwandan capital Kigali was hit down by a missile killing both the Presidents and

155 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 151 eight others on board the aircraft. This was the first instance when Heads of two nations got simultaneously killed under a single air casualty. In Nov. 96, an Ethiopian Airlines B767 aircraft on flight from Addis Ababa to Abjdan (Ivory Coast W.Africa) was hijacked by three persons just after take-off. The airliner crashed into the sea just one Km off the beach due shortage of fuel and the fuselage broke into two parts. Out of 178 Persons on board, only 55 could be rescued. The Rome and Vienna airport attacks in December 1985 were two more instances of airport security failures. The attacks left 20 people dead when gunmen threw grenades and opened fire on travellers at El Al airline ticket counters. Never the less, the most tragic security related incident was that of the horrific attack & destruction of World Trade Centre in New York by using the hijacked aircraft as missiles on 11 th September 2000 (Known as 9/11). Security Airport security provides a first line of defence by attempting to stop would-be attackers from bringing weapons or bombs into the airport. If they can succeed in this, then the chances of these devices getting on to aircraft are greatly reduced. As such, airport security serves two purposes: To protect the airport from attacks and crime and to protect the aircraft from attack. In India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) is the regulatory authority for control of Civil Aviation Security. They formulate and implement and monitor security system at various airports in the country. Civil Aviation Security consists of airline security and airport security at the airports. The airline security checks are carried out by the Security personnel of concerned airlines, who are employed, trained and made responsible for carrying out pre-boarding Security checks of person and baggage. (Pre-boarding Security checks are conducted after the airport security checks are over).

156 152 Aviation Safety and Security Management In addition, airlines are also performing security checks inside the aircraft. Some airlines do this by employing onboard guards (armed or un-armed). These guards may be sitting with the passengers in disguise at various strategic locations inside the cabin (Like El-Al airline of Israel) and in case of any requirement they may suddenly jump and overpower the terrorists. In addition, they also carry out checks of cargo, catering and other items required to be loaded on board the aircraft. Airport security provides a first line of defence by attempting to stop would-be attackers from bringing weapons or bombs into the airport. It serves two purposes: To protect the airport from attacks and crime and to protect the aircraft from attack. Airport security is the responsibility of the aerodrome operators (Like Airports Authority of India) who employ local police or CISF or any other such agency for this job. Airport security is further divided into two parts; City side security and Air side security. City side security includes security of Terminal building, passengers, baggage, all access points to the airport. Air side security includes security of operational areas (like runways, taxiways, apron etc.), Boundary wall, Navigational aids, Radio facilities and other essential airport equipments and installations. Normally the following procedures in steps are adapted to carry out the security checks at our airports; 1. When a passenger enters the airport, the security official checks the ticket to make sure that the passenger is having a bonafide reason to enter the airport premises. 2. The passenger it made to pass through Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMD), which normally works on the principle of eddy current inspection. 3. The Check-in baggage (The Registered baggage, which is carried inside the cargo hold) is passed through the X-Ray Machines and Security Checked tag is pasted a on it, and the baggage is returned to the passenger.

157 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security The passenger then goes to get the boarding pass, and then gives the Security Checked baggage to the airline counter for moving it to conveyor belt for loading on to the aircraft. 5. The Cabin baggage (Carry on Baggage) is then carried by the passenger to the security hold (Sterile Area) after undergoing X-Ray check for the baggage and physical checking (Frisking), passing through Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMD) and checking through Hand Held Metal Detectors (HHMD). 6. In India a passenger is allowed to carry only one hand baggage inside the cabin with him. However, no weapon of any kind what so ever is permitted in the cabin. Earlier in India due to religious reasons, Sikh passengers were permitted to carry their holy Kirpan (dagger) along with them inside the cabin. However after a number of hijacking incidents, even this privilege was withdrawn. 7. So much so that many innocent looking objects like nail cutters, scissors, wires, screw drivers or similar other household items are not permitted inside the cabin. However all these things can be carried inside the cargo baggage. 8. In India airline staff has instructions not to accept unaccompanied baggage unless and until the passenger himself travels along with. And in case it is necessary to send such unaccompanied baggage, the practice of allowing a suitable cooling period is adopted. The idea is that if any explosive or bomb etc. is hidden inside the baggage, its effect could be seen outside (and not inside the aircraft) during the waiting period. 9. In case of even accompanied baggage, many airlines in India follow the procedure of baggage identification by the passenger. For this purpose bonafide passengers are required to identify their baggage individually and only then it is loaded on the aircraft (inside the cargo compartment).

158 154 Aviation Safety and Security Management 10. At busy airports closed circuit television cameras are extensively used for monitoring the entry, movement and exits of undesirable elements over the passenger lounge and other strategically important areas to safe guard not only against breach of security but also to prevent theft burglary etc. 11. As far as the security of the airport boundary and installations are concerned, boundary walls/fencing as per ICAO Specifications, Watch towers, regular patrolling, continuous vigil etc. are introduced. CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF) In our country at most of the airports the responsibility of Security has been entrusted with the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), a paramilitary organisation, since the year 1999, and the remaining airports are also in the process of being handed over to CISF. Earlier this job used to be carried out by the local police, which had a Skeleton set of staff. In addition, concerned airlines also have their own security staff to carry out their security checks before passengers board the aircraft. In the backdrop of hijacking of Indian Airlines aircraft (IC- 814) in December, 1999, airport security matters were reviewed by the Ministry of Civil Aviation. It was decided that in order to bring in uniformity of practices and procedures and ensure effective control and supervision of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, airports security should be entrusted to a single dedicated force instead of different State Police forces with divergent work culture and practices. The Committee of Secretaries (COS) in its meeting on 7th January, 2000 recommended that in the long-term there was a need for a more professionalized force for civil aviation. The Commissioner of Security (CA) further recommended that Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) should be inducted at all airports in India. The dedicated CISF contingent earmarked for aviation security functions at airports in India has been notified as Aviation Security Group (ASG). Accordingly now CISF has been deployed or being deployed at most of the Indian airports.

159 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 155 After deployment of CISF at airports, there has been a marked improvement in all areas of airport security including Perimeter Security, Access Control, Terminal Building Security, Apron Security, Surveillance, Passenger Handling etc. ASG staff has proved their worth in handling all types of security situations at airports and have been meticulous in implementing security procedures. They have been quick to plug any loopholes in security and the security system is constantly upgraded to neutralize emerging threats. In addition they have been able to bring about a higher level of security awareness among all agencies operating at the airports, including the passengers. For the purpose of security, Hand Held Metal Detectors (HHMD) and Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMD) are normally used. PREVENTIVE MEASURES In good old days there used to be no system as security checking with regard to passengers and their baggage. Like a rail passenger or a bus passenger the airlines and airport agencies could just make sure that the air traveller is holding a valid ticket and then he could freely board the aircraft. At most some police personnel could be posted at the airport just to ensure that only authorised people enter the airport operational area so that there are no incidents of pilferage or thefts and no one disturbs or interferes with operation of aircraft (this was done more with a view to ensure safety of aeroplanes rather than from the security angle). During those days there used to be a free atmosphere and passengers could carry almost any thing within the permissible load limits except perhaps the inflammable articles like petrol or kerosene that could endanger the safety of aircraft. Subsequently after 1968 when the incidents of hijacking were on rise in many countries started tightening their security. However still not much of the importance was given to this aspect as it was assumed that cases of hijacking are confined to certain pockets of the world and only limited number of nations were affected by that phenomenon. Thus it was not

160 156 Aviation Safety and Security Management much difficult to carry weapons or similar other restricted articles into the aeroplanes. For example in October 1968 in USA an ex-naval official boarded a Trans World Airways B707 carrying with him a huge pile of grenades, fire arms and other material inside the aircraft. He also took a rifle along by concealing it into a fishing rod. Later he hijacked the aircraft and took it to Italy about 1000 kilometres away. This gives an indication of the standards of the security arrangements available during those days. However slowly most of the countries started recognizing the importance of security after experiencing phenomenal increase in the tendency of hijacking all over the world. For this purpose these countries started adopting strict security measures for making air travel safer. The very first step in this direction was to do the through checking of passengers and their baggage. Similarly the staff and officials of airlines and airport were also subjected to security checks before entering the airport area. Worldwide inspection and screening of passengers and cabin baggage went into effect July Because of strictness in security checking a large number of arms and ammunition were detected during seventies and early eighties. Thus more than 225 thousand weapons and ammunition were seized from 1971 to 1981 during such checking at various airports. Out of this there were more than 80,000 firearms ammunition and explosives and over 150 thousands were knives and similar type of articles. It is interesting to note that where as in 1971 there were only 36 cases of seizures of arms and ammunition and only 115 cases of seizure of knives in 1973 these number rose to the astronomical figures of 13,461 and 32,525 respectively. In 1975 the numbers rose to a record figure of 32,538 and 20,866 respectively. As per reports from US Government during the year 1973 about 3500 passengers were detained for checking at 531 US Airports since they were suspected to be possessing weapons. Out of them about 300 people refused to be checked and

161 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 157 therefore they were not allowed to board the aircraft. The remaining 3200 were arrested. And then about 2000 guns pounds of ammunition and about 23,000 knives and other dangerous weapons were recovered from them. (However many of the above articles were carried by girls travelling alone possibly for self-defence). After such strict checking the number of weapons carried by air travellers started decreasing. Perhaps by that time it was well understood by all that it was difficult to carry these items in view of intensified security measures at various airports. Perhaps due to the same reasons even there was considerable reduction in number of cases of unlawful seizures. The number of unlawful seizure of aircraft which had reduced in 1973 has continued at about the same level since then. The relatively static level of occurrences was mostly due to successful implementation of the world wide inspection/ screening of passengers and their baggage carried out by security personnel. INSPECTION/SCREENING OF PASSENGERS IN INDIA It is now becoming a regular practice at most of the airport to check the person and baggage of passengers before boarding the aircraft. This examination is normally done by physical checking and through X-ray machines metal detectors and various other means. For this purpose special training is provided to security personnel in handling airport security. In addition various other precautions are also taken with a view to reduce the cases of entry of unscrupulous elements inside the aeroplane. For this purpose certain security measures taken in India and various other countries are highlighted below. In India no unaccompanied baggage is accepted by airline staff unless and until the passenger himself travels along with. And in case it is necessary to send such unaccompanied baggage the practice of allowing a suitable cooling period is

162 158 Aviation Safety and Security Management adopted. Under this procedure the baggage is not loaded immediately in the aircraft but is kept at a suitable place for a reasonable period (known as cooling period). The idea is that if any explosive or bomb etc. is hidden inside the baggage its effect could be seen outside (and not inside the aircraft) during the waiting period. In case of even accompanied baggage many airlines in India follow the procedure of baggage identification by the passenger. For this purpose all bonafide passengers are required to identify their baggage individually and only then it is loaded on the aircraft (inside the cargo compartment). The airline staff sorts out the baggage that had not been identified by any passenger and keep it away till the travelling passengers comes and claims it to be his/her belonging. Actually this procedure sometimes creates problems too. If a passenger is not familiar with the practice of baggage identification or sometimes due to language and communications problem or similar other reasons the passengers may not come forward to identify the baggage. At times these people board the aircraft while their baggage is kept out waiting for identification. Under such circumstances the airline staff has to waste a lot of precious time in making a series of announcement to find out the concerned passenger and to make him identify the baggage. This may cause even delay to flights. However if due weightage is given to security aspect such exercises are considered necessary. In India a passenger is allowed to carry only one hand baggage inside the cabin with him due to security reasons. However no weapon of any kind what so ever is permitted in the cabin. Earlier in India due to religious reasons Sikh passengers were permitted to carry their holy Kirpan (dagger) along with them inside the cabin. However after a number of hijacking incidents even this privilege was withdrawn. So much so that many innocent looking objects like scissors, wires, screwdrivers or similar other household items are not permitted inside the cabin. However all these things can be carried inside the cargo baggage. However inspection of

163 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 159 baggage and security checking remain effective only if such inspections are carried out vigorously and sincerely. Any lapse in these vigils may give an opportunity to the terrorists to conduct their business in usual manner. For example in April 1988 a Kuwait airways B747 was hijacked during its flight from Bangkok to Gulf by persons carrying weapons. The Don Muang airport at Bangkok on the other hand is well equipped with Magnetometer (and X- ray equipment). Thus it gave a doubt to the investigating agencies whether the security officials were alert enough during checking? Similarly in June 1990 a renowned American journalist whose daughter had perished in Lockerbie crash flew on London Heathrow-New York route carrying a radio/cassette recorder in which a dummy bomb was hidden. The intension was to demonstrate the slackness of such agencies. Since security officials failed to detect the bomb it created an embarrassing situation for the British Government. ADDITIONAL VIGIL Many countries adopt additional preventive measures. Among these nations Israel is considered as one of best. In addition certain other countries are also quite strict. For example Israel carries security commandos on its flights. Mostly these commandos sit inside the cabin along with normal passengers at specific locations (normally in civil cloths). If required these people can attack and immobilize the hijackers. It is understood that national carriers of USA Netherlands Switzerland Pakistan and many more countries also carry plain clothed commandos on some of their flights. Sometimes airlines of certain countries carry male as well as female commandos aboard their flights in the guise of normal passengers who sit in the cabin along with other passengers and behave like normal travellers. Some quarters are of the view that security guards should not be armed on an airliner because if a bullet should penetrate the skin of a pressurised cabin the aircraft could disintegrate or the passengers be sucked out. Some examples

164 160 Aviation Safety and Security Management in this regard have also been given in respect of Iraqi airlines crash near Jordan on 25 December 1986 in which a large number of passengers and crew were killed as a result of a shoot out between hijackers and the armed guards and that of El Al flight of 1969 when Leila Khaled narrowly missed from blasting a grenade. However this is not always true. Pressurised bombers B-29 were frequently hit by bullets and riddled by sharpenels during raids over Japan during World War II yet were able to return safely. Of course if by chance the bullets happen to hit the crucial fuel or hydraulic lines or a part of the engines perhaps there could be a problem. It may be mentioned that usually the sky marshals use low-velocity bullets to lessen the risk. On most of the flights passengers are not allowed to enter the cockpit without any valid reason and even this can be done only with the specific permission of the pilot in command. For this purpose Israel was the first nation to introduce bullet proofing and automatic door closing technique of the cockpit doors in their aircraft. This was soon followed by many other airlines. Many airports have been effectively utilizing services of trained dogs and sometimes pigs for detection of bombs explosives and firearms etc. These animals are capable of sniffing and identifying dangerous objects either carried by a passenger or kept inside the baggage (additionally these animals can also identify drugs and therefore they are also used to combat drug trafficketing.) USE OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TV At busy airports closed circuit television cameras are extensively used for monitoring the entry, movement and exits of undesirable elements inside the airport. Security personnel in a control room keep watch through CCTV over the passenger lounge and other strategically important areas to safe guard not only against breach of security but also to prevent theft burglary etc. Thus any terrorist burglar or vandal can be easily spotted and apprehended even without his knowledge by the help of closed circuit TV.

165 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 161 The installation of CCTV is done in sensitive areas of the airport such as passenger lounge arrival departure lounges check-in areas security hold areas etc. It can be further extended to operational areas boundary gates and various other important locations depending upon the requirement. Benefits from CCTV surveillance are plenty and if exploited fully many a possible incidents can be prevented before hand. SEARCH OF BAGGAGE: Acts of unlawful interference with International Civil aviation continue to pose a serious threat to the safety regularity and efficiency of civil aviation despite the best efforts of nation s airport administrations and airline operators to implement the aviation security program advocated by ICAO. In order to achieve their goal of preventing such acts security measures have been extensively intensified at various airports with a view to ensure safety to passengers and aeroplanes. In the 1970 s it became a requirement to search all articles such as handbags brief cases packages etc. carried abroad the commercial airliner. Similarly physical examination of the air traveller is also conducted. In India and most of the other countries the security staff carry out frisking of passengers before they are allowed inside the aircraft. For this purpose each passenger is made to pass through metal detectors and thus anyone carrying a weapon gets detected. The metal detectors work on the principle of eddy current inspection. They may be hand held or walk through (Mostly walk through). As far as hand search of baggage is concerned it is time consuming and cumbersome process. On a conservative estimate a B747 aircraft carrying about 500 passengers on an international flight may carry more than 1000 packets of hand baggage and other such items. In a manual search each item has to be opened swiftly examined by security officials. Now if one piece of baggage takes half a minute to examine it may take about 500 minutes (or about eight hours) for one

166 162 Aviation Safety and Security Management man to complete the search. Even if four security personnel are employed for the job they may take more than two hours to do Job. And at an international airport where dozens of such flights depart on regular basis such a search may become a nightmarish experience. Apart from delay the inconvenience caused to passengers is also deplorable. Moreover there is no way to ensure that such a method will be fool proof. It is therefore evident that manual searching of carry-on luggage is not a satisfactory solution for high capacity aircraft through it can be adopted for domestic flights at small airports. Thus the need for having X-ray examinations of baggage was introduced. Under this system the baggage is passed through X- ray beams over conveyer belts. The X-rays images are then displayed on a display monitor that shows the inside contents of the baggage. Thus any dangerous article can be easily detected without opening the baggage. X-ray system has another feature known as film safe procedure. X-ray beams used for X-ray detection are using heavy filtration and therefore any camera film carried inside the passenger baggage does not get exposed. At some of the airports in USA and in many other countries a number of incentives are offered to security officials who can unearth a hidden weapon or an explosive. Some times the cash award may be as much as $25 for a single piece of weapon. This in turn gives good motivation to security officials to be more vigilant. At certain airports (like Frankfurt in Germany) special chambers for checking the baggage have been designed. Baggages about which security staff are doubtful are sent to these chambers, which are made of steel called decompression chambers. In these chambers conditions similar to actual flight conditions are produced and in case the baggage contains any bomb the same gets detonated.

167 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 163 MODERN TECHNIQUES (TNA, VAPOUR DETECTION, SMART X-RAY AND TOMOG- RAPHY) The inherent danger posed by Semtex plastic that had caused the crash of Pan Am Jumbo over Lockerbie had been troubling the security authorities all over the world. USA developed a technique in 1989 to detect the presence of Semtex through a process known as TNA (Thermal Neutron Analyser). Under this technique passenger s baggage is bombarded with neutrons, which causes the scanned items to emit gamma rays. By observing the concentration and other features of gamma rays it is possible to detect the presence of plastic explosives. It was reported that USA had tested a large number of luggage and cargo items through this technique and its detection capability was found as 95 percent of various types and shapes of explosives. The cost of this machine was more than 500,000 lbs. Certain TNA machines have already been installed at JFK airport in New York, Miami Airport, London airport etc. TNA takes about six seconds to scan a single bag. Since TNA equipment uses some amount of radiation it cannot be used for screening passengers nor is it suitable for screening carry-on baggage. The high cost of the machine is another hitch in fast implementation of this equipment at all airports. As an alternate to TNA another method called Vapour Detection is also being used for detection of plastic explosives. This machine works on the principles of sensing of minute amount of vapour emitted by explosives. The device uses gas chromatography or chemi-luminescence techniques for this purpose. The machine is comparatively slower that TNA requiring about 30 seconds per passenger and has slightly less effective performance. However the cost of a vapour detector is much less ($80,000) than TNA and thus it can be effectively used as a back up to TNA machine. For examination of bulky cargo the commercial models using mass-spectrography are used which is a variation on the vapour analysis theme.

168 164 Aviation Safety and Security Management Another effective process is called Enhanced X-Ray system (also known as Smart X-Ray system ). In this process X-ray machines linked with computers are used. They are programmed to highlight suspicious objects by evaluating parameters such as mass contiguity and atomic weight. Thus the true and intricate features of different objects carried by air-passengers can be determined. As a matter of fact the enhanced X-ray system is part of Explosives Detection System (EDS), which consists of enhanced X- ray nuclear technology and electromagnetic measurements for detection of explosives hidden inside the baggage. All of these approaches attempt to take a fundamental property of explosives to differentiate it from the normal passenger baggage. The latest topic in bulk explosives detection technology is called as computer tomography. This system was first developed in the medical science as CAT-Scanning. Later it was modified to cater for security needs. Tomographic images are obtained by acquiring multiple views (or slices) of an object. A powerful computer is used to reconstruct the slices and display the relative densities of the individual object within each slice. The information allows the equipment to automatically locate and highlight the suspicious object regardless of their shape and environment. In contrast traditional X-ray images are required to be interpreted manually by the security officials. This is a difficult job as the images are superimposed, overlapped and cluttered. A number of airports in Europe and in the Middle East have started using computer tomography for example Brussels airport, London (Gatwick), Manchester airport etc. IMPROVEMENTS With introduction of strengthened efforts and advanced techniques in the field of Civil Aviation Security, the security situation at various airports has improved at tremendous pace. Thus even now though, hijacking continues to occur but with a reduced pace and intensity. It is also felt that through the security and punishment measures that had been instituted in most of the countries it has probably been

169 UNIT 7 Civil Aviation Security 165 possible to deter a number of would be case of unlawful interference to civil aviation. Thus it is envisaged that with continued efforts in this direction matter can be brought within controllable limits. References: 1. BCAS website 2. DGCA Website also 3. AAI website 4. Ministry of Civil Aviation website civilaviation.nic.in/ 5. Aviation Terrorism Bimal K. Srivastava, 1998 Manas Publications, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi Various related ICAO Annexes & Documents 7. Indian Aircraft Manual 8. Various Air Safety Circulars, AICs and other important notification issued by DGCA Questions General Questions. 1. Write different steps taken by various security personnel for security checking of a passenger travelling from Delhi Airport to Mumbai with baggage. 2. What types of modern techniques are used in controlling the security problems? 3. What are the area falling under the jurisdiction of City Side Security 4. What are the area falling under the jurisdiction of Air Side Security Objective Type of questions a. It is possible to identify the presence of RDX and plastic bombs by using -

170 166 Aviation Safety and Security Management b. DFMD is a security equipment, which stands for c. HHMD is a security equipment, which stands for - d. Name the Annex Number of ICAO dealing with the Aviation Security Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Smart X-Ray and Tomography b. Door Framed Metal Detector c. Hand Held Metal Detector. d. Annex 17

171 UNIT 8 Role of DGCA/BCAS in Aviation Safety and Security 167 Unit 8 Role of DGCA/BCAS in Aviation Safety and Security THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION DGCA is the regulatory authority for all matters pertaining to Civil Aviation in India and consists of a number of Directorates like Administration Directorate, Aerodrome Standards Directorate, Air Safety Directorate, Air Transport Directorate, Airworthiness Directorate, Flight Inspection Directorate, Information & Regulation Directorate, Research & Development Directorate, and Training & Licensing Directorate. The responsibility of Aviation Safety for all the civil registered aircraft in the country, including investigation of air accidents and preventive measures to be devised, issuing safety instructions (In the form of Air Safety circulars, Civil Air Requirements, Aeronautical Information Circulars etc.) rests solely with DGCA. Main Functions of DGCA Registration of civil aircraft Formulation of standards of airworthiness for civil aircraft registered in India and grant of certificates of airworthiness to such aircraft Licensing of pilots, aircraft maintenance engineers and flight engineers, and conducting examinations and checks for that purpose Licensing of air traffic controllers Certification of aerodromes and CNS/ATM facilities Maintaining a check on the proficiency of flight crew, and also of other operational personnel such as flight dispatchers and cabin crew

172 168 Aviation Safety and Security Management Granting of Air Operator's Certificates to Indian carriers and regulation of air transport services operating to/ from/within/over India by Indian and foreign operators, including clearance of scheduled and non-scheduled flights of such operators Conducting investigation into accidents/incidents and taking accident prevention measures including formulation of implementation of Safety Aviation Management Programmes Carrying out amendments to the Aircraft Act, the Aircraft Rules and the Civil Aviation Requirements for complying with the amendments to ICAO Annexes, and initiating proposals for amendment to any other Act or for passing a new Act in order to give effect to an international Convention or amendment to an existing Convention Coordination of ICAO matters with all agencies and sending replies to State Letters, and taking all necessary action arising out of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) of ICAO Supervision of the institutes/clubs/schools engaged in flying training including simulator training, AME training or any other training related with aviation, with a view to ensuring a high quality of training Granting approval to aircraft maintenance, repair and manufacturing organizations and their continued oversight To act as a nodal agency for implementing Annex 9 provisions in India and for coordinating matters relating to facilitation at Indian airports including holding meetings of the National Facilitation Committee Rendering advice to the Government on matters relating to air transport including bilateral air services agreements, on ICAO matters and generally on all technical matters relating to civil aviation, and to act as an overall regulatory and developmental body for civil aviation in the country;

173 UNIT 8 Role of DGCA/BCAS in Aviation Safety and Security 169 Coordination at national level for flexi-use of air space by civil and military air traffic agencies and interaction with ICAO for provision of more air routes for civil use through Indian air space; Keeping a check on aircraft noise and engine emissions in accordance with ICAO Annex 16 and collaborating with the environmental authorities in this matter, if required; Promoting indigenous design and manufacture of aircraft and aircraft components by acting as a catalytic agent; Approving training programmes of operators for carriage of dangerous goods, issuing authorizations for carriage of dangerous goods, etc. Most of the functions stated above are safety related so as to maintain and enhance suitable level of Safety standards for Civil Aviation. Out of the above, the Aerodrome Standards Directorate in the DGCA has been entrusted with the responsibilities of licensing of aerodromes, Safety audits and Aerodrome standards etc. The functions of the Air Safety Directorates are Investigation of Civil Regis tered aircraft accid ent s, Accident to foreign registered aircraft in India, Accident to Indian registered aircraft out side India, Investigation of Civil Registered aircraft Incidents, and Accident/Incident Prevention work. The Airworthiness Directorate carries out the regulatory control of airworthiness to ensure that the civil aircraft are airworthy. The Flight Inspection Directorate (FID) conducts regular Inspections and Surveillance of Scheduled Airlines and their aircrew in particular to ensure effective implementation of safety related Standards and Recommended Practices contained in the ICAO Annexes, particularly Annex 6, and the relevant Rules, Regulations, Procedures and Requirements laid down in Aircraft Rules, Civil Aviation Requirements, Aeronautical Information Circulars, AIP India etc.

174 170 Aviation Safety and Security Management DGCA issues Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs), Aeronautical Information Circulars (AICs), Air Safety Circulars and other circulars for implementation of various safety measures in Aviation. The CARs are divided into various sections covering various aspects of Civil Aviation like General (Section 1), Airworthiness (Section 2), Air Transport (Section 3), Aerodrome Standards and Air Traffic Services (Section 4), Air Safety (Section 5), Design Standards and Type Certification (Section 6), Flight Crew Standards, Training and Licensing (Section 7) and Aircraft Operations (Section 8). These CARs are issued keeping the safety consideration in view; and are required to be followed by all concerned. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security was initially set up as a Cell in the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) in January 1978 on the recommendation of the Pande Committee constituted in the wake of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight on 10th September, The role of the Cell was to coordinate, monitor, inspect and train personnel in Civil Aviation Security matters. The BCAS was reorganized into an independent department on 1st April, 1987 under the Ministry of Civil Aviation as a sequel to the Kanishka Tragedy in June The main responsibility of BCAS is to lay down standards and measures in respect of security of civil flights at International and domestic airports in India. ORGANISATION BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by an officer of the rank of Director General of Police and is designated as Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation). Commissioner of security (CA) is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure 17 to Chicago convention of International civil aviation organization (ICAO).

175 UNIT 8 Role of DGCA/BCAS in Aviation Safety and Security 171 Commissioner of security (CA) is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme. BCAS Hqrs is located at "A" Wing, I-III floor, Janpath Bhavan, Janpath, New Delhi It has got four Regional Offices located at International airports i.e. Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai, headed by an officer of the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Security (CA). FUNCTIONS Laying down Aviation Security Standards in accordance with Annex 17 to Chicago Convention of ICAO for airport operators, airlines operators, and their security agencies responsible for implementing AVSEC measures. Issuance of Aviation Security Circulars containing policy decisions and advisory information for the information, reference and implementation by concerned organizations. Monitoring the implementation of security rules and regulations and carrying out survey of security needs. Ensure that the persons implementing security controls are appropriately trained and possess all competencies required to perform their duties. Planning and coordination of Aviation security matters. Conducting - a. Surprise/Dummy checks to test professional efficiency and alertness of security staff. b. Mock exercise to test efficacy of Contingency Plans and operational preparedness of the various agencies. It may therefore be seen that overall security policy, regulations, implementation, monitoring of airport and airline security in the country rests with BCAS. In fact BCAS plays a very important role in the matters related to Civil

176 172 Aviation Safety and Security Management Aviation Security such as anti-hijacking, anti-sabotage, Bomb Threat & Bomb Detection etc. References 9. DGCA Website also AAI website BCAS website Ministry of Civil Aviation website civilaviation.nic.in/ 13. Various related ICAO Annexes & Documents 14. Indian Aircraft Manual Questions General Questions. 1. What are the main functions/responsibilities of BCAS in India? 2. What are the main functions/responsibilities of DGCA in India? Objective Type of questions a. Regulatory authority of Civil aviation Security in India is b. Registration of an Indian Civil aircraft is done by c. A pilot, who is retired from Indian Air Force, but flying as a commander in Air India can get his B747 licence renewed from IAF-True/False. Answers to Objective Type of questions a. BCAS b. DGCA c. False

177 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 173 Unit 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor OBJECTIVE Flight safety is the major objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Considerable progress has been made, but additional improvements are needed and can be achieved. It has long been known that some three out of four accidents result from less than optimum human performance, indicating that any advance in this field can be expected to have a significant impact on the improvement of flight safety. A study was conducted by Department of Transport and Regional Development Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, USA to analyze Human Factors in Fatal Aircraft Accidents on the 75 fatal aeroplane accidents which occurred in USA in the period 1 January December They found that most accidents had more than one contributing factor, and out of that over 70% of the accidents involved pilot factors. Fatal accidents to fixed wing aircraft - broad accident factors

178 174 Aviation Safety and Security Management Accordingly among the broad accident factors, 72% of the accidents were judged to involve pilot factors (see figure). Weather was a factor in 17% of the accidents. Other personnel contributed to 12% of the accidents. (Other personnel refers to people other than the pilot of the aircraft, and includes air traffic controllers, other flight crew and maintenance workers.) This was recognized by the ICAO Assembly, which in 1986 formulated the following objective for the task: "To improve safety in aviation by making States more aware and responsive to the importance of human factors in civil aviation operations through the provision of practical human factors material and measures developed on the basis of experience in States." Human behaviour and performance are cited as causal factors in the majority of aircraft accidents. If the accident rate is to be decreased, Human Factors must be better understood and the knowledge more broadly applied. The expansion of Human Factors awareness presents the international aviation community with the single most significant opportunity to make aviation both safer and more efficient. So much so that even a specific terminology known as 'ergonomics' meaning the 'Human Engineering' is being used to denote the field of Human Factor. Ergonomics is commonly thought of as how companies design tasks and work areas to maximize the efficiency and quality of their employees' work. However, ergonomics comes into everything which involves people, like sports and leisure, health and safety should all embody ergonomics principles if well designed. As already mentioned, some three out of four accidents have resulted from less than optimum human performance. This has commonly been classified as "pilot error". The term "pilot error" is of no help in accident prevention. In fact, it is often counterproductive because, although this term may indicate WHERE in the system a breakdown occurs, it provides no guidance as to WHY it occurs. An error attributed to humans in the system may have been design-induced or stimulated by inadequate training, badly

179 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 175 designed procedures or the poor concept or layout of checklists or manuals. Further, the term "pilot error" allows concealment of the underlying factors which must be brought to the fore if accidents are to be prevented. Most often it is thought that human factors are related to flight crews only. However, now it has been established that human factors problems affect on the performance of maintenance people, and other ground staff also. SAFETY The best way to illustrate the effect on safety of a lack of proper application of Human Factors is through the example of accidents. A few accidents in which aspects of Human Factors are relevant are described here as examples. (a) (b) (c) (d) In December an L1011 crashed in the Florida Everglades and a B-737 crashed at Midway Airport in Chicago. In the first case, duties were not properly allocated and the whole flight crew became preoccupied with a landing gear indicator light bulb. In the second case, the captain - as a leader - did not properly manage the resources which were available to him. In 1974, a B-707 crashed during approach at Pago-Pago in Samoa, with a loss of 96 lives. A visual illusion related to the black-hole phenomenon was a cause factor. In 1974, a DC-10 crashed after take-off because a cargo door failed (it opened and blew out). The force applied by a cargo handler to close the cargo door, the door design and an incomplete application of a service bulletin were cited as factors. In 1974, a B-727 approaching Dulles Airport in Washington crashed into Mount Weather, with a loss of 92 lives. Lack of clarity and inadequacies in air traffic control procedures and regulations led to the accident. The absence of timely action of the regulatory body to resolve a known problem in air traffic terminology was also listed as a factor.

180 176 Aviation Safety and Security Management (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) In 1977, two B-747s collided while on the runway at Tenerife, with a loss of 583 lives. A breakdown in normal communication procedures and misinterpretation of verbal messages were considered factors (ICAO Circular 153-AN/98). In 1977, a DC-8 crashed after take-off in Alaska. The influence of alcohol on pilot performance was cited as a factor. In 1979, a DC-10 crashed into Mount Erebus in Antartica. Information transfer and data entry errors played a role in the accident. In 1982, a B-737 crashed after take-off in icing conditions in Washington. Erroneous engine thrust readings (higher than actual), and the co-pilot's lack of assertiveness in communicating his concern and comments about aircraft performance during the takeoff run were among the factors cited.. The report of a 1983 A300 accident in Kuala Lumpur suggests that variations in panel layout amongst the aircraft in the fleet had adversely affected crew performance. (The aircraft was on a dry lease.). In 1984, a DC-10 overran the runway at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Excessive reliance on automation was noted in the accident report. Excessive reliance on automation was also listed as a factor in a loss of control incident in 1985, in which a B- 747 lost 20,000 feet in less than two minutes and sustained structural damage. In 1987 an MD-80 crashed on take-off in Detroit. The pilots had not set the flaps, thus violating standard operating procedures. Also, the take-off configuration warning did not sound, for undetermined reasons. CASE HISTORY (Ref: National Transportation Safety Board NTSB, USA Aircraft Accident Report No. & Date NTSB-AAR-79-7, June 7, 1979)

181 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 177 About 1815 Pacific Standard Time on December 28, 1978, United Airlines, Inc., DC-8-61 aircraft, operating Flight 173 crashed into a wooded, populated area of suburban Portland, Oregon, during an approach to the Portland International Airport. The aircraft had been holding southeast of the airport at a low altitude for about one hour while the flightcrew coped with a landing gear malfunction and prepared the passengers for the possibility of a landing gear failure upon landing. The plane crashed about 6 nautical miles southeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed; there was no fire. Of the 181 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard, 8 passengers, the flight engineer, and a flight attendant were killed and 21 passengers and 2 crewmembers were injured seriously. During investigation it was determined that, as a result of a relatively minor landing gear problem, the aircraft was in a holding pattern while awaiting landing at Portland, Oregon. Although the first officer knew the aircraft was low on fuel, he failed to express his concerns convincingly to the captain. The plane ran out of fuel and crashed, killing 10. The National Transportation Safety Board summarized that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the captain to monitor properly the aircraft's fuel state and to properly respond to the low fuel state and the crewmember's advisories regarding fuel state. This resulted in fuel exhaustion to all engines. His inattention resulted from preoccupation with a landing gear malfunction and preparations for a possible landing emergency. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the other two flight crewmembers either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate their concern to the captain. TYPES OF HUMAN FACTORS Indeed, Human Factors problems can negatively impact the performance of all personnel, whether they are on ground or in the air, from senior personnel to the individual staff.

182 178 Aviation Safety and Security Management Human Factors can be classified into four primary categories: aero-medical, physiological, performance, and design. There may be others, but these four have traditionally proven to be the most common human factors noted in mishap investigation reports. In each case, the causes, indicators, and approaches to resolving the problems will be discussed. AEROMEDICAL Medical Health Psychological State PHYSIOLOGICAL Limits & Capabilities PERFORMANCE Limits & Capabilities SYSTEMS DESIGN AEROMEDICAL PROBLEMS Medical Health Problems: - FATIGUE - INADEQUATE NUTRITION - FLYING WHEN SICK - SELF-MEDICATION Flying, maintaining, or handling an aircraft whilst fatigued is a sure way to increase the probability of a mishap. The ability to perceive, understand, and respond to even the most mundane tasks can be greatly impaired when in a state of physical and/or mental fatigue. One would expect fatigue to become most evident during sustained operations, but it is likewise observed during normal operations. CAUSES - COMPETITIVENESS - DESIRE TO COMPLETE MISSION

183 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor DENIAL - INADEQUATE REST - NOISE/VIBRATION STRESS - CIRCADIAN (24-Hrs rhythmic biological Cycle) DISTURBANCES - EXCESSIVE PHYSICAL STRESS - EMOTIONAL STRESSORS Many of us are guilty of rushing to work without having had a good breakfast, or lunching on fast food items, or some make shift breakfast. Clearly, inadequate nutrition can degrade physical strength as well as mental acuity; both of which are critical to maintaining a safe aviation environment. The last two categories are ties together. There are a number of folks who will go to work even when they are quite ill. In some jobs, this may not affect performance. In aviation, however, being in good health is critical to optimizing performance. Still, there are those who, as we shall see, feel that being ill is not a sufficient reason to go temporarily 'hard down'. These folks tend to try to suppress symptoms of their illness by self-medication; an option clearly forbidden to aviators. Sadly, there are still instances where crews are found to betaking medications while in flying status. The question remains: why do these problems occur? These are some of the causes for the onset of aero medical problems. It is interesting to note here that by definition, people in aviation tend to be highly competitive, zealous individuals. These attributes are reinforced throughout the person's career and are often manifested outside of the workplace. Anything that may disturb the inertia toward peak performance is to be avoided or, when that is not possible, denied. The remainder of the causes listed reflect both physiological and emotional factors which are manifested as medical problems. Here we see some of the indicators which provide evidence for medical problems. Many of these again are discussed in

184 180 Aviation Safety and Security Management subsequent categories (physiological and performance-based human factors). It is this commonality of behavioural indicators which precludes one from being able to consistently diagnosis the etiology of the human factors problem on such evidence. INDICATORS - DISINTEGRATION OF SKILLED PERFORMANCE - TASK FIXATION - COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS - PERCEPTUAL DISTORTION - SLOWED REACTION TIME - DECREASED ATTENTION SPAN - CONFUSION - INCREASED RISK TAKING - COMPLACENCY (A feeling of reduced awareness of danger ahead.) CURES Administration Ensure that crew health is monitored regularly & sick crews are not scheduled. Conduct aero medical training re: health issues, human limitations, etc Crew If they are ill or fatigued, they should seek medical attention & should not fly. How can one minimize mishaps where aero medical factors were found to be involved? Responsible, proactive intervention at all levels of the command chain is a must.

185 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor DISRUPTION OF PSYCHO-SOCIAL INTERACTIONS - CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR - ONSET OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY - SUICIDE Psychological problems may not always be as evident as biomedical problems. The hidden complexities of psychodynamic processes may or may not manifest as overt indicators. As a community, those in aviation are as prone to experiencing the same societal, financial, and familial stresses as those in other professional communities. Thus, when psychological problems occur, and are not dealt with in a timely, effective manner, the result can result not only affects the individuals involved, but may in turn impact an organization's mission. This becomes most evident in the last of the factors on this list: suicide. Here are some common causes for the onset of psychological problems. They affect us all, but it is when their results become chronic or pronounced that the following indicators become evident. CAUSES - ENGAGEMENT/WEDDING/ SEPARATION/ DIVORCE - LONG SEPARATION FROM FAMILY - BREAKDOWN IN COPING SKILLS/ COMPARTMENTALIZATION - FALSE SELF-IMAGE - CHANGE OF JOB STATUS - ILLNESS - DEATH OF FRIEND, FAMILY - FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

186 182 Aviation Safety and Security Management Again, we must stress that all of us may experience one or more of these indicators from time to time. It is only when these indicators are chronically observed, especially to the point where they degrade performance, which they may point to some form of psychological problem. INDICATORS CHRONIC PERIODS OF - APATHY (Lack of interest in things)/ EUPHORIA (An exaggerated or false feeling of happiness) - ANXIETY - IRRITABILITY/NEGATIVITY - WITHDRAWN - SLEEP LOSS/MENTAL FATIGUE - ILLNESS - PERFORMANCE DECREMENTS - INCREASED RISK TAKING - MOOD SWINGS - SUICIDAL IDEATIONS/ATTEMPTS Many of us are taught to take our problems and place them aside; to compartmentalize them until such time as we can allow ourselves to better deal with them. On first glance, this can be a noble approach and an effective way of coping. However, a problem occurs when we start to stockpile our problems in this way, essentially compounding them by failing to resolving them. When this occurs, the indicators described earlier start to appear; that is, compartmentalization fails and performance is affected. It is imperative, therefore, to recognize that there are limits to compartmentalization, and that not everyone is as 'skilled' at this ability as others. COMPARTMENTALIZATION (To separate into distinct parts) A HEALTHY COPING MECHANISM TOTAL COMPARTMENTALIZATION

187 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 183 NOT POSSIBLE! STRESSORS DECREASE ABILITY TO COMPARTMENTALIZE INDICATORS APPEAR WHEN MECHANISM IS "MAXED OUT" (Exhausted) As with our approach to medical problems discussed earlier, one must be proactive in the prevention of mishaps as a function of psychological problems. One may not be able to prevent the problem, but one can keep the affected individual out of the air, or away from the aircraft. CURES Administration Conduct periodic Human Factors Councils and Boards when necessary. Provide training to heighten aircrew awareness. Remove individual from flight schedules. Conduct aero medical training re: psychological health issues, human limitations, etc. Monitor crew mental health closely. Crews They should co-operate and should not hide any problem. In case of any problem they should themselves offer for not flying. PHYSIOLOGICAL ISSUES There are a number of physiological issues which are addressed under the umbrella term of 'human factors'. Many

188 184 Aviation Safety and Security Management of them fall under one of the four general categories are listed here. PHYSIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING IN THE AEROSPACE ENVIRONMENT SURVIVAL AND SAFETY AEROSPACE PHYSIOLOGY TRAINING PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS Aircrew performance has been shown to be affected by the nature and scope of these factors. PHYSIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING IN THE AEROSPACE ENVIRONMENT - FLIGHT OPERATIONS - ACCELERATION - VIBRATIONS - NOISE/ HEARING - VISUAL SYSTEM/ VISION ENHANCERS (NVDS) - THERMAL ENVIRONMENT - PHYSICAL FITNESS SURVIVAL AND SAFETY GENERAL SURVIVAL SKILLS SAFETY IN CARRIER OPS Physiologists are concerned with performance in all of these environments. Training in each of these areas is critical if safety is to be maintained and survival ensured. AEROSPACE PHYSIOLOGY TRAINING ALTITUDE EGRESS (A place to Exit or escape) VISUAL PROBLEMS

189 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 185 SURVIVAL HUMAN FACTORS The effects of altitude on performance become clearest during physiology training. The effects of pressure changes and lack of oxygen are demonstrated in controlled altitude chamber 'Simulated flights'. The physiologist is also the expert in protective equipment and systems; the 'gear' which is designed to ensure safety and survival. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT & SYSTEMS It is the responsibility of administration to ensure that flight crew are thoroughly versed in the physiological aspects of human factors. This is best accomplished through careful monitoring of personnel records for currency, and providing for physiological training if and when required. Administration: ENSURE PERSONNEL HAVE RECEIVED/ AREPROVIDED WITH NECESSARY PHYSIO.TRAINING. ENSURE CURRENCY AND PROVIDE FOR REFRESHERS IF NECESSARY. Up to this point, we've examined how the medical, psychological, and physiological aspects of human factors will affect performance. We will now turn to a more 'cognitive' approach to performance by examining an individual's behavioural capabilities and limits, and how they are manifested. Capabilities will vary with the individual; what we all have in common is that we make errors. It is, however, possible to enhance our capabilities whilst minimizing error (or the effects of error). PERFORMANCE ISSUES - HUMAN LIMITS/ERROR - SITUATION AWARENESS

190 186 Aviation Safety and Security Management - INFORMATION PROCESSING - WORKLOADS - SYCHO-MOTOR ISSUES (or pertaining to movement produced by action of the mind or will.) - AIRCREW & GROUNDCREW COORDINATION Performance problems are manifested as breakdowns in flight behaviour(s). Some originate at a perceptual level whilst others combine perceptual and cognitive anomalies. Both result in degraded performance. PROBLEMS: LOSS OF AIRCRAFT CONTROL INABILITY TO COMPLETE MANEUVER/MISSION BREAKDOWN IN DISCIPLINE POOR HEADWORK LOSS OF SITUATION AWARENESS SPATIAL DISORIENTATION These are some of the primary causes of degraded flight performance most often noted in mishap analyses. CAUSES: AEROMEDICAL/INTERPERSONAL PROBLEMS WORKLOAD-CAPABILITIES MISMATCH COGNITIVE - TASK INCOMPATIBILITY (Cognitive- an information processing view of an individual's psychological functions.) INADEQUATE MISSION PREPARATION LACK OF TRAINING/EXPERIENCE FAULTY OR INADEQUATE MENTAL MODEL OF SYSTEM/TASK

191 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 187 Some of the more prominent behavioural indicators are listed here. PERFORMANCE ISSUES POOR HEADWORK ERRORS OF OMISSION CHANNELIZED OR LACK OF ATTENTION POOR/INADEQUATE CREW COORDINATION DEGRADED AIRCRAFT CONTROL SLOPPY PROCEDURES/NATOPS VIOLATIONS HOW CAN WE MINIMIZE/PREVENT IT? Will we ever be able to totally eliminate human error, and the other factors leading to degraded performance? Probably not, but one can continue to strive for that goal. How can the person in the cockpit, on the flight deck, or in the hangar minimize his/her making an error? Some of the more 'classic' recommendations are listed here. However, there is a better way to tackle the types of human factors problems discussed to this point. SOLUTIONS RECOGNIZE PERSONAL LIMITS MINIMIZE DISTRACTIONS PRIORITIZE NEVER ASSUME ANYTHING! PRE-PLAN STAY AHEAD OF AIRCRAFT CREW COORDINATION TRAINING SYSTEM DESIGN COCKPIT DESIGN AVIONICS AND DISPLAYS

192 188 Aviation Safety and Security Management EGRESS SYSTEMS CONTROLS LIGHTING DESIGN FOR MAINTAINENACE PERSONNEL EASY ACCESS HANDLING FEATURES SPECIAL GEAR/TOOLS FOOLPROOFING Each organization should create and maintain and ongoing, dynamic human factors program. This can be best accomplished under the umbrella of operational risk management. It is also critical to revise existing safety programs to include a strong emphasis on human factors. Human factors councils and boards must be carried out as per instruction. The way to best prevent the onset of human factors problems is to maintain a highly visible HF training program. KEY ELEMENTS OF A HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM - AN EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS - INCORPORATE HF INTO SAFETY PROGRAM - HF COUNCIL/BOARD - ONGOING HF TRAINING FOR ALL PERSONNEL - AN EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENTPROCESS INCORPORATE HF INTO SAFETY PROGRAM Another way to ensure that Human Factors programs can be promulgated is by incorporating one into an organization's Safety program. This does not require any added administrative processes. Rather, incorporation of a Human

193 UNIT 9 Aviation Safety Human Factor 189 Factors necessitates an ongoing program of training and awareness. ONGOING HF TRAINING FOR ALL PERSONNEL Again, the best way to promote Human Factors awareness is by training. This brief is but one resource in this process. There are a host of other HF briefs and resources available from military and civilian safety and aviation agencies. References 1. The Human Factor in Naval Aviation Safety, Cdr Andy Bellenkes Force Aviation Human Factors Safety Officer, Comnavairlant Code N452, USA 2. Document No. CAP 719, Fundamental Human Factors Concepts, -A publication of Civil Aviation Authority, U.K. 3. Document No. CAP 716, Aviation Management Human Factors, -A publication of Civil Aviation Authority, U.K. 4. ICAO as Circular number 216-AN/131. Human Factors, Digest No. 1 "Fundamental Human Factors Concepts". 5. Department of Transport and Regional Development, USA, Bureau of Air Safety Investigation-Human Factors in Fatal Aircraft Accidents. Questions General Questions. 1. What are the primary categories of human factors that may adversely affect the performance of aircraft personnel, and may result into an aircraft accident or incident? 2. Taking example of the case history an aircraft accident caused due to involvement of some extent of human factor, please give the causes of the accident with possible methods of prevention and your views on avoiding such accidents. 3. Describe briefly the various categories of human factors.

194 190 Objective Type of questions Aviation Safety and Security Management a. As per statistical records, maximum number of aircraft accidents are caused due to b. Human Factors can be classified into four primary categories: aero-medical, , performance, and design. Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Human Factors. b. Physiological.

195 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 191 Unit 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management Airport Operations are complex and diverse, with hazards and their severity varying by the type of operation. Accordingly the functional areas of air side can be divided under the following groups; Ramp operations Hangars and maintenance shops Runway incursions Specialized services Aviation Fuel Handling Aircraft Rescue and Fire fighting (ARFF) De-icing (Mostly for European & US Airports) Ramp operations The ramp area (Apron) is generally designed for the aircraft, and not for the vehicles that service and/or operate in the proximity of the aircraft. On the other hand, the ramp area sees a diverse collection of high placed activities that involve aircraft, vehicles and individuals working in close proximity to one another. This may include activities such as; Aircraft ground handling like taxiing, towing, chocking, parking, mooring etc. Refuelling Aircraft servicing-catering, cleaning, food service Baggage and cargo handling Ground Power supply Routine checks and maintenance

196 192 Aviation Safety and Security Management Individuals engaged in above activities are exposed to several of the occupational hazards like cuts from protruding aircraft parts, slips, trips, falls, strains from baggage handling, exposure to hazardous materials like aircraft fuel, hydraulic fluids, hot oil, high pressure air, electrical hazards, aircraft noise from engines etc. Accordingly suitable precautions are to be taken. Air side Vehicle Operation A number of incidents take place involving collision of vehicle with aircraft or with another vehicle. At the busy airports separate vehicular lanes are drawn for movement of the vehicles. Similarly yellow lines are drawn and no vehicle is permitted to cross this line. While plying on the operational area and while close to an aircraft, all vehicles are required to move with slow speed. In addition to watching for moving aircraft, the vehicles are also required to be careful not to get too close to a parked aircraft, to prevent collision with the aircraft, and also to avoid the problem of jet blast or prop wash. There have been several cases where vehicles have been overturned by jet blast. When driving near navigational aids, the vehicles are to stay out of the protected areas around them to avoid interfering with their signals. At "controlled" airports whenever the Control tower is operating, the vehicles must get permission from the controller to be on the runway or taxiways, their associated safety areas, or any other part of the movement area by radio or with advanced coordination with ATC. Night Driving or Bad Weather Driving Extra precautions have to be taken by vehicle drivers for driving at night or in bad weather. They should be driven with slow speed and with care. Under winter conditions, signs and marking may be obscured due fog. Caution has to be taken as there may be extra risks present.

197 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 193 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) FOD or Foreign Object Damage is caused due to ingestion of loose objects by aircraft engines, or due to hitting of such material with the aircraft. Trash or rocks sucked into a jet engine can shred parts of the engine in seconds. A rock caught by a propeller can damage the propeller, as well as become a deadly projectile. It should be made sure that all trash is put in a covered container that won't be blown over. Also all loose trash, rocks, pebbles, nails, bolts, or pieces of metal near aircraft movement areas should be picked up and removed. Also anything that could cause FOD or puncture tires should be picked up and tracking mud and rocks onto the pavement surfaces should be avoided. Aviation Fuel Handling Fuel handling is an important safety issue not only to fuel handlers but also to other airport personnel, passengers, and to the operations of the aircraft. Failure to adhere to safe operating procedures during refuelling of the aircraft, or transporting the fuel from one location to other, may result into major disasters. A few vulnerable areas concerning the fuel handling are health hazards to refuellers, Fuel contaminations, explosions and fires due fuel, hazards from spill etc. Thus strict precautions are to be taken by the concerned officials in order to avoid such incidents. As aircraft fuel is highly flammable, strict precautions are to be taken not to use ignition system (Like starting of vehicles) and not to use even RT (Radio Transmitter) as it may create fire. Electrical equipment should be earthed properly. De-icing The problem of de-icing occurs mainly at US or European airports, and at places where temperature goes normally below freezing point. Presence of ice and snow on the control surfaces, airfoil and sensor surfaces can create serious problems for the aircraft operations, and hence the same has to be removed before

198 194 Aviation Safety and Security Management the take off of the aircraft, by the spray of de-icing fluid. The fluid should be used with care failing which, it may cause damage to sensitive aircraft controls like angle of attack sensors, pitot & static sensors, engines etc. It is also hazardous for the health of personnel. Runway Incursions A runway Incursion is defined as an occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect or unauthorized presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface, designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. A large number of cases of runway incursions take place at many airports in some form or the other. There are many reasons for occurrence of runway Incursions. Main reasons can be divided into the following groups; Operational Error: This is due to failure of ATC system Pilot Error: This is due to violation of flight procedure or incorrect procedure by the pilot. Vehicle/ Pedestrian Mistake: Due to unauthorized or faulty entry or movement of any vehicle or person on the active runway. Miscellaneous: Due to any reason not covered under any of the above mentioned groups (e.g. due equipment failure). Runway incursion prevention programme involves 4 groups of persons/services. 1. Pilots of aircraft. 2. Drivers of vehicle /Pedestrians/Personal working at the airports. 3. Aerodrome owner/operator. 4. Air Traffic Controllers. Miscommunication between controller and pilot, improper use of ICAO phraseology, read back and hear back error, lack of knowledge of the operational area by airport staff engaged

199 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 195 in different airport operations were found to be the contributory factors. In order to avoid Runway incursion causing safety hazard which may eventfully lead to serious incident/accident DGCA has issued guidelines in the form of Aeronautical Information Circular No. 06 of 2006, Dt 14th Oct 2006, to be observed by all concerned while operating at Indian Airports. Extracts from AIC 06/2006 are given below. Complete AIC is enclosed as Appendix. I. Guidelines for Pilots: Extracts from AIC 06/2006 Detailed investigations of runway incursions have identified three major areas where pilots can help. Communications Airport knowledge Cockpit procedures for maintaining orientation. 1. Communications: Effective pilot/controller communications are key to safe surface operations. Clear understanding of instructions should never be compromised, especially during busy times when the frequency is congested. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Listen before you transmit. If able, monitor RT communication to have mental picture of Airport activity. Keep communications with the controller clear and concise. Ensure you understand all instructions. Never assume. Read back runway hold short instructions verbatim. 2. Airport knowledge: Ground operations can be the most demanding and complex phase of the flight. (a) Review airport diagrams before taxing or landing.

200 196 (b) (c) (d) (e) Aviation Safety and Security Management Keep the airport diagrams including taxi routings readily available. Be alert to airport vehicle and pedestrian activity. Maintain situational awareness of proximity to Runway at all times. Comply with Holding Point markings/signage 3. Cockpit procedures: Pilots can use proven and effective procedures in the cockpit to help conduct safe operations on the ground and during take-off and landing. (a) Avoid unnecessary conversation, during movements, takeoff, and landing. (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Constantly scan outside the cockpit, especially when on runways. If lost notify Air Traffic Control immediately. Make your aircraft visible by proper use of aircraft lights. If unfamiliar with the airport do not hesitate to request progressive taxi instructions. Insure proper radio telephony operation and check audio panel, volume control and squelch settings. 4. Stay alert especially when visibility is low: Extra vigilance is required when visibility decreases and the ability for pilots and controllers to maintain desired level of situational awareness becomes significantly more difficult. 5. Report confusing or deteriorating surface markings and signs: Report confusing or deteriorating surface markings and signs and inaccurate airport diagrams to the tower or airport manager. II. Guidelines applicable to Airport owners/ Operators and Airside vehicle Drivers: 1. The term ground aids commonly refers to Aerodrome Signs, Markings, Lightings and any other appearance

201 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 197 or object that is utilized to help guide the users of the Airport. 2. It is important to emphasize that effective and consistent training in the use of aerodrome ground aids is crucial in reducing the runway incursion problem. It is therefore important that all personnel having access to aerodrome operational areas and aerodrome ground aids undergo training in correct interpretation of information provided by signs markings and lightings. The training programme should be well coordinated and should make ample use of SARPS and guidance material as outlined in Annex 14 and associated technical manuals. A runway includes a runway strip, it is not just the pavement surface, but includes grass/gravel areas. Edge of the strip is marked, which needs to be always followed. 3. One of the primary causes of runway incursion is the lack of familiarization with the aerodrome lay out, it is important for the ground vehicle drivers to have on sight training experience in getting to know the aerodrome signs, markings and lighting. Maintain situational awareness of proximity to Runway at all times 4. All operations by vehicles on the runways or taxiways require individual authorization from control tower, even for pass holders in each individual case. 5. Pilots of aircraft and vehicles operating on or near the runway are expected to keep watch for light or other signals that might be issued from control tower according to local procedures. Radio equipped aircraft and vehicles should maintain continuous listening watch on Tower or Ground Control frequencies. 6. Faded signs and incorrectly placed signs often lead to runway incursion. Frequent and random inspection shall be carried out to prevent the above. 7. Deficiency in the aerodrome marking and visual aids often lead to runway incursion.

202 198 Aviation Safety and Security Management 8. All runway markings are white. This is to differentiate them from taxiway markings. 9. Equip all airside vehicles with ICAO compliant markings and lighting. 10. Provide airside escort vehicle to, vehicles/ aircraft unfamiliar with aerodrome layout/ procedure. 11. Runway side strip markings shall always be provided for precision approach runway. 12. All taxiway markings are yellow to differentiate them from runway markings. 13. Runway holding position marking shall be in yellow colour. 14. Aerodrome signs are divided in to mandatory instruction signs and information signs. 15. Mandatory instruction signs are made in red background with white inscriptions. Aircraft and vehicles are not allowed to proceed beyond these points unless specifically authorized by control tower. These include runway designation sign, runway holding position sign, no entry sign and road holding position sign. 16. Information signs are made of combination of yellow and black colours. Information sign includes location signs, destination signs and direction signs. Location sign is in black background with yellow inscription and when it is stand-alone will have yellow border. All other information signs will have black inscription on yellow background. 17. A location sign shall be provided in conjunction with a direction sign except it may be omitted when aeronautical studies indicate that it is not needed. 18. Aerodrome lights include the stop bar lights or runway guard lights. All traffic shall stop and hold at all lit stop bars and only proceed when specifically authorized by aerodrome control tower.

203 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 199 III. Guidelines for Air Traffic Controllers: 1. Apply existing ICAO standards and recommended practices and procedures. 2. Vehicles and aircraft shall not be permitted to hold closer to the runway than the applicable runway holding positions. 3. Do not use conditional phrases such as: - "behind landing aircraft" or "after departing aircraft" for movements affecting active runways unless appropriate pilot or the controller both see the aircraft concerned. 4. Controller shall listen to the read back of clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take-off, hold short of, cross and back-track on any runway whether active or not to ascertain that the clearance or instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew and shall take immediate action to correct any discrepancy revealed by the read back. 5. ROGER and WILCO do not constitute a read-back. Correct read-backs are mandatory. 6. Controller shall listen to the read back instructions carefully to avoid Read back and Hear back error i.e. controller confirming instructions as right although it is wrong. 7. Be alert for similar call signs, change call signs temporarily if required. 8. Avoid expectation bias i.e. hearing what is expected instead of what is really said. 9. In poor visibility conditions visual surveillance may be augmented by Radar if available. 10. If Surface Movement radar is either not provided or unserviceable during low visibility operations, all aircraft and vehicles must report having vacated active runway. Also by having the aircraft report airborne, the controller can be assured that the aircraft is no longer on the active runway.

204 200 Aviation Safety and Security Management 11. When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain an explicit clearance to either "cross" or "hold short" of that runway. 12. To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, the takeoff clearance shall include the designator of the departure runway. 13. If the control tower is unable to determine, either visually or by Radar that a vacating or crossing aircraft has cleared the runway, the aircraft shall be requested to report when it has vacated the runway. The report shall be made when the entire aircraft is beyond the relevant runway holding position. 14. One of the reasons for misunderstanding due to differences in FAA and ICAO phraseology has now been done away with. The phrase "TAXI TO HOLDING POINT RUNWAY 27" shall be used instead of TAXI TO HOLDING POSITION". All runway incursion incidents come under the category of incidents and must be reported as per procedure established for ATS incidents. Safety Management System (SMS) What's SMS, & Why it is needed? No other transportation industry has a better safety record than aviation. And yet there is still always a need to improve it further. Technology helped a lot in the recent decades to maintain a more or less constant accident rate while passengers' numbers went up tremendously, but now a need is felt to sharpen the management skills so as to remain ultrasafe in the future. SMS, or Safety Management Systems, is exactly the right tool to achieve safety in aviation. It basically is a process where operators identify the hazards and associated safetyrisks that are inherent in their individual operation and then develop appropriate mitigation strategies. SMS has two main purposes. The first is to reduce the safetyrisks for passengers, aircraft, personnel or property to a level

205 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 201 as low as reasonably practical. The second is to assist managers with their constant dilemma between production and protection: "is it a good idea to make an offer to that customer who wants us to fly around unfamiliar mountainous terrain in marginal weather or should we simply skip this business opportunity?" SMS is not just about investing in the improvement of an already quite impressive safety record. It's also about saving a lot more by managing the daily operations more safely and more effectively using Quality Management principles. Of course there is no "off-the-shelf" or "one-size-fits-all" system, and some fine-tuning is needed in every organization implementing SMS. Advantages First, it's not new: other major industries have implemented SMS for decades and to revert to the "old days without SMS" is simply unthinkable for them. They gained too much. The best companies in business aviation have also been benefiting from SMS for years, and they won't step back either. Second, from a purely business point of view there's no reason to wait to improve efficiency and reduce safety risks. Implementing an SMS has a cost, but definitely less than smashing a wing-tip in the hangar or less than refusing a flight request because risks were not properly assessed and mitigated (just to take rather "happy-ending" occurrences). Third, ICAO demands it and the various civil aviation authorities are preparing for it. The ICAO deadline for Air Traffic Service providers and airports has already passed; aircraft operators and maintenance organizations are the next in line. ICAO has issued DOC 9859-AN/460 containing the details of Safety Management System. Safety Management Systems of ICAO-General Description The scope of SMS encompasses most of the activities of the organization. SMS must start from senior management, and safety must be considered at levels of the organization. SMS

206 202 Aviation Safety and Security Management aims to make continuous improvement to the overall level of safety. All aviation stakeholders have a role to play in SMS. States are responsible for establishing a safety program. SMS is inclusive of the following components; Safety regulation Safety oversight Accident/ incident investigation Mandatory/ voluntary reporting systems Safety data analysis Safety promotion SMS Features Systematic- Safety management activities are in accordance with a pre-determined plan, and applied in a consistent manner throughout the organization. Proactive-An approach that emphasizes prevention, through hazards identification and risk control and mitigation measures, before events that affect safety occur. Explicit- All Safety management activities are documented, visible and performed independently from other management activities. Responsibilities of SMS A Systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, policies and procedures. Providers (operators, organizations-in our case AAI) are responsible for establishing an SMS. States (In our case DGCA) are responsible for the acceptance and oversight of providers SMS. It is also required by ICAO that the States shall establish a safety programme, in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety in:

207 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 203 The Operation of aircraft The maintenance of aircraft The Provision of air traffic services Aerodrome operations The acceptable level of safety to be achieved shall be established by the States concerned. ICAO SMS Framework 1. Safety Policies & objectives 1.1 Management commitment and responsibility 1.2 Safety accountabilities of managers 1.3 Appointment of key safety personnel 1.4 SMS implementation plan 1.5 Documentation 2. Safety Hazard identification and risk management 2.1 Hazard identification processes 2.2 Risk assessment and mitigation processes 2.3 Internal safety investigations 3. Safety Assurance 3.1 Safety performance monitoring and measurement 3.2 Audits and surveys 3.3 The management of change 3.4 Continuous improvement of the safety system. 4. Safety Promotion 4.1 Training and Education 4.2 Safety Communication

208 204 Aviation Safety and Security Management 5. Emergency response Planning SMS 5.1 Development of the Emergency response Plan. Difference between SMS & Quality Management Focuses on Safety, human & organizational aspects of an operation (i.e. Safety satisfaction) Results in the design and implementation of organizational processes & procedures to identify hazards and control/ mitigate risks in aviation operation. SMS should include both safety & quality policies. The coverage of quality policies should be limited to quality in support of safety. Safety objectives should receive primacy where conflicts are identified. QMS Focuses on Products of an operation (i.e. Customer satisfaction) QMS techniques provide a structured process for ensuring processes & procedures achieve their intended objectives and where they fall short, to improve them. (SMS builds partly QMS principles). Airports Authority of India's Safety Policy for Air Operation Areas Safety Management System The formal systematic procedures and practices for the management of safety of Air Operation Areas are generally referred to collectively as a safety management system. As a first step in formulating the ATS Safety Management System, the Safety Policy of Airports Authority of India in the form of following components has been formally established: Safe Navigation of Aircraft Airports Authority of India will provide the highest reasonable standard of safety within the Air Traffic Services Systems which it plans, provides and operates by identifying and minimizing those risks arising from Airports Authority of India's activities which could contribute to aircraft accidents.

209 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 205 Priority of Safety Airports Authority of India will regard the safety of the air traffic services system as the most important consideration throughout all its activities. Management Responsibility Safety is an integral part of the provision of an efficient & effective air traffic management system. All concerned executives are accountable for the performance in their areas of responsibility. Adoption of Explicit Safety Standards Airports Authority of India will continue to adopt Explicit Safety Standards which comply with statutory obligations & with the safety requirements of the Director General Civil Aviation. Safety Culture Airports Authority of India will develop a culture among all its Executives and Staff which fosters an increasing understanding of the importance of safety in all its activities and the resultant responsibility of each individual. Airports Authority of India will provide the environment, support and training necessary to achieve this goal. Systems Airports Authority of India will ensure that the air traffic management systems and technology it uses, whether developed internally or bought externally, meet specified and appropriate system. Objectives of ATS safety Management system The safety objectives applicable to the provisions of ATS within airspaces and aerodromes controlled by Airports Authority of India have been formally established as below: 1. ensure that the established level of safety applicable to the provision of ATS within an airspace or at an aerodrome is met.

210 206 Aviation Safety and Security Management 2. ensure that safety-related enhancements are implemented whenever necessary. 3. ensure that the achievement of satisfactory safety in ATM shall be accorded the highest priority over commercial, environmental and social pressures. 4. ensure that Airports Authority of India's safety policy, organizational responsibilities and positional responsibilities are understood by its employees whenever their activities may have impact on safety. 5. ensure that there is a system in place to assess the safety implications and safety hazards in ATM operations and to determine the action necessary to minimize those hazards, and to monitor the implementation of that action on a periodic basis. 6. control and manage safety hazards in any change to existing systems, equipment or procedures to ensure any unacceptable hazards are eliminated by the time the change is completed. 7. ensure that processes are in place which deliver personnel who are adequately trained, motivated and competent to perform the tasks required of them, in addition to being properly rated if so required and to monitor their continuing competence on a periodic basis. 8. ensure that processes are in place to facilitate the safe and effective management of the operations of air traffic services, aeronautical telecommunications services and aeronautical radio navigation facilities on a continuing basis. 9. ensure that processes are in place to minimize the impact of any abnormal operation on those utilizing the service and report and record the abnormal operation, thereby providing a mechanism for review, as and when required, after the event. 10. ensure that processes are in place to deliver accurate presentation of aeronautical information to the users of that information as and when they require it. 11. ensure that the control of entry of personnel into operational fire fighting functions and to periodically

211 UNIT 10 Air Operation Areas Safety Management 207 monitor and endorse the continuing competency of those personnel. 12. comply with ICAO standards for ATS messages recording and access to recordings on a continuing basis. 14. ensure that processes are in place which assure the provision of facilities for safe navigation on an on-going basis. References 1. DGCA CAR Section 4 - Aerodrome & Air Traffic Services, Series 'X' Part IV, , "Runway Safety Programme and formation of Runway Safety Teams". 2. Aeronautical Information Circular 6 of ICAO Runway Safety Toolkit and DOC FAA, 2000 Publication-The National Blueprint for the Runway Safety. 5. ICAO Document DOC 9859-AN/460 (Safety Management Manual). 6. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circulars on SMS 7. Commercial Aviation Safety by Alexander T. Wells, Ed.D. & Clarence C. Rodrigues, Ph.D., P.E. 8. Various Circulars and notifications on "Safety Management System" issued by DGCA. 9. DGCA, Civil Aviation Requirements, Section 8 - (Aircraft Operations), Series 'A' Part II, Issue I, Dated 16th October, 1995, Subject:-Safety Regulation And Oversight Of Flight Operations. 10. AAI Air Traffic Services Manual. 11. Civil Aviation Authority, UK Publication CAP 730-Safety Management Systems for Air Traffic Management. 12. Civil Aviation Authority, UK Publication CAP 642- Airside Safety Management Systems.

212 208 Aviation Safety and Security Management 13. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Acquisition System Toolset (FAST)- System Safety Management Program / Section 1 (Revised 12/2004) 14. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular AC No: AC 150/ Date: February 28, 2007, "Introduction to Safety Management Systems (SMS) For Airport Operators". Questions General Questions. 1. What is meant by 'Runway Incursion'? What are the primary reasons for occurrence of runway Incursions? Describe main features of prevention programme for 'Runway incursion' involving various groups of persons/ services as per DGCA Circular. 2. Define manoeuvring area and movement area at an airport. 3. What are the objectives of ATS Safety management system 4. What are precautions required to be taken for vehicle operations at the air side. Objective Type of questions a. Ramp operations on an airport include b. Foreign Object Damage (FOD) to an aircraft can be caused by the following;---- c. Three major areas where pilots can help are; i) Communications ii) Airport knowledge and iii) ---- Answers to Objective Type of questions a. -Aircraft servicing, catering, cleaning, cargo loading, refuelling etc. b. Aircraft engines sucking a loose stone lying on the runway. c. Cockpit procedures for maintaining orientation.

213 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 209 Unit 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 11.1 GENERAL Aviation is remarkable for the giant technological leaps it has made over the last century. This progress would not have been possible without parallel achievements in the control and reduction of aviation's safety hazards. Given the many ways that aviation can result in injury or harm, those involved with aviation have been preoccupied with preventing accidents since the earliest days of flying. Through the disciplined application of best safety management practices, the frequency and severity of aviation occurrences have declined significantly CONCEPT OF SAFETY In order to understand safety management, it is necessary to consider what is meant by "safety". Depending on one's perspective, the concept of aviation safety may have different connotations, such as: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) zero accidents (or serious incidents), a view widely held by the travelling public; the freedom from danger or risks, i.e. those factors which cause or are likely to cause harm; the attitude towards unsafe acts and conditions by employees (reflecting a "safe" corporate culture); the degree to which the inherent risks in aviation are "acceptable"; the process of hazard identification and risk management; and the control of accidental loss (of persons and property, and damage to the environment).

214 210 Aviation Safety and Security Management While the elimination of accidents (and serious incidents) would be desirable, a one hundred per cent safety rate is an unachievable goal. Failures and errors will occur, in spite of the best efforts to avoid them. No human activity or human-made system can be guaranteed to be absolutely safe, i.e. free from risk. Safety is a relative notion whereby inherent risks are acceptable in a "safe" system Safety can be defined as below: Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management NEED FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Although major air disasters are rare events, less catastrophic accidents and a whole range of incidents occur more frequently. These lesser safety events may be forerunners of underlying safety problems. Ignoring these underlying safety hazards could pave the way for an increase in the number of more serious accidents Accidents (and incidents) cost money. Although purchasing "insurance" can spread the costs of an accident over time, accidents make bad business sense. While insurance may cover specified risks, there are many uninsured costs. In addition, there are less tangible (but no less important) costs such as the loss of confidence of the travelling public. An understanding of the total costs of an accident is fundamental to understanding the economics of safety The air transportation industry's future viability may well be predicated on its ability to sustain the public's perceived safety while travelling. The management of safety is therefore a prerequisite for a sustainable aviation business ICAO REQUIREMENTS Safety has always been the overriding consideration in all aviation activities. This is reflected in the aims and

215 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 211 objectives of ICAO as stated in Article 44 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300), commonly known as the Chicago Convention, which charges ICAO with ensuring the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world In establishing States' requirements for the management of safety, ICAO differentiates between safety programmes and safety management systems (SMS) as follows: A safety programme is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety. A safety management system (SMS) is an organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures ICAO's Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) require that States establish a safety programme to achieve an acceptable level of safety in aviation operations. The acceptable level of safety shall be established by the State(s) concerned. While the concept of safety programmes and SMS is restricted to Annexes 6, 11 and 14 at present, it is possible that the concept will be expanded to include additional operational Annexes in the future A safety programme will be broad in scope, including many safety activities aimed at fulfilling the programme's objectives. The safety programme may include provisions for such diverse activities as incident reporting, safety investigations, safety audits and safety promotion Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annexes 6, 11 and 14, States shall require that individual operators, maintenance organizations, ATS providers and certified aerodrome operators implement SMS accepted by the State. As a minimum, such SMS shall (a) (b) identify safety hazards; ensure that remedial actions necessary to mitigate the risks/hazards are implemented; and

216 212 Aviation Safety and Security Management (c) provide for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety level achieved An organization's SMS accepted by the State shall also clearly define lines of safety accountability, including a direct accountability for safety on the part of senior management ICAO provides specialized guidance material, including the manual for Safety Management System (ICAO DOC 9859), for the fulfilment of the SARPs. This manual includes a conceptual framework for managing safety and establishing an SMS as well as some of the systemic processes and activities used to meet the objectives of a State's safety programme. Acceptable level of safety In any system, it is necessary to set and measure performance outcomes in order to determine whether the system is operating in accordance with expectations, and to identify where action may be required to enhance performance levels to meet these expectations The introduction of the concept of acceptable level of safety responds to the need to complement the prevailing approach to the management of safety based upon regulatory compliance, with a performance-based approach. Acceptable level of safety expresses the safety goals (or expectations) of an oversight authority, an operator or a service provider. It is a reference against which the oversight authority can measure safety performance. In determining an acceptable level of safety, it is necessary to consider such factors as the level of risk that applies, the cost/benefits of improvements to the system, and public expectations on the safety of the aviation industry In practice, the concept of acceptable level of safety is expressed by two measures/metrics (safety performance indicators and safety performance targets) and implemented through various safety requirements. Safety performance indicators are a measure of the safety performance of an aviation organization or a sector of

217 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 213 the industry. Safety indicators should be easy to measure and be linked to the major components of a State's safety programme, or an operator's/service provider's SMS. Safety indicators will therefore differ between segments of the aviation industry, such as aircraft operators, aerodrome operators or ATS providers. Safety performance targets (sometimes referred to as goals or objectives) are determined by considering what safety performance levels are desirable and realistic for individual operators/ service providers. Safety targets should be measurable, acceptable to stakeholders, and consistent with the State's safety programme. Safety requirements are needed to achieve the safety performance indicators and safety performance targets. They include the operational procedures, technology, systems and programmes to which measures of reliability, availability, performance and/or accuracy can be specified The relationship between acceptable level of safety, safety performance indicators, safety performance targets and safety requirements is as follows: -acceptable level of safety is the overarching concept; -safety performance indicators are the measures/metrics used to determine if the acceptable level of safety has been achieved; -safety performance targets are the quantified objectives pertinent to the acceptable level of safety; and -safety requirements are the tools or means required to achieve the safety targets Safety indicators and safety targets may be different (for example, the safety indicator is 0.5 fatal accidents per hours for airline operators, and the safety target is a 40 per cent reduction in fatal accident rate for airline operations), or they may be the same (for example, the safety indicator is 0.5 fatal accidents per hours for airline

218 214 Aviation Safety and Security Management operators, and the safety target is not more than 0.5 fatal accidents per hours for airline operators) Establishing acceptable level(s) of safety for the safety programme does not replace legal, regulatory, or other established requirements, nor does it relieve States from their obligations regarding the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300) and its related provisions. Likewise, establishing acceptable level(s) of safety for the SMS does not relieve operators/service providers from their obligations under relevant national regulations, and those arising from the Doc State safety programme. An oversight authority establishes an acceptable level of safety to be achieved by its safety programme that will be expressed by: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 0.5 fatal accidents per hours for airline operators (safety indicator) with a 40 per cent reduction in five years (safety target); 50 aircraft incidents per hours flown (safety indicator) with a 25 per cent reduction in three years (safety target); 200 major aircraft defect incidents per hours flown (safety indicator) with a 25 per cent reduction over the last three-year average (safety target); 1.0 bird strike per aircraft movements (safety indicator) with a 50 per cent reduction in five years (safety target); no more than one runway incursion per aircraft movements (safety indicator) with a 40 per cent reduction in a 12-month period (safety target); and 40 airspace incidents per hours flown (safety indicator) with a 30 per cent reduction over the fiveyear moving average (safety target).

219 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle The safety requirements to achieve these safety targets and safety indicators include: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) the oversight authority accident prevention programme; a mandatory occurrence reporting system; a voluntary occurrence reporting system; a bird strike programme; and the deployment of radar systems in the State's three busiest airports within the next 12 months Airline operator SMS. An oversight authority and an airline operator agree on an acceptable level of safety to be achieved by the operator SMS, one measure of which - but not the only one - is 0.5 fatal accidents per departures (safety indicator); a 40 per cent reduction in five years (safety target) and - among others - the development of GPS approaches for airfields without ILS approaches (safety requirement) Service provider and aerodrome operator SMS. An oversight authority, an ATS provider and an aerodrome operator agree on an acceptable level of safety to be achieved by the provider and operator SMS, one element of which - but not the only one - is no more than one runway incursion per aircraft movements (safety indicator); a 40 per cent reduction in a 12-month period (safety target) and - among others - the establishment of low visibility taxi procedures (safety requirement) APPROACHES TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT With global aviation activity forecast to continue to rise, there is concern that traditional methods for reducing risks to an acceptable level may not be sufficient. New methods for understanding and managing safety are therefore evolving Safety management may therefore be considered from two different perspectives - traditional and modern.

220 216 Traditional perspective Aviation Safety and Security Management Historically, aviation safety focused on compliance with increasingly complex regulatory requirements. This approach worked well up until the late 1970s when the accident rate levelled off. Accidents continued to occur in spite of all the rules and regulations This approach to safety reacted to undesirable events by prescribing measures to prevent recurrence. Rather than defining best practices or desired standards, such an approach aimed at ensuring minimum standards were met With an overall fatal accident rate in the vicinity of 10-6 (i.e. one fatal accident per one million flights), further safety improvements were becoming increasingly difficult to achieve using this approach. Modern perspective Figure- Safety management process Strategies to reduce or eliminate the hazards are then developed and implemented with clearly established accountabilities. The situation is reassessed on a continuing basis, and additional measures are implemented as required.

221 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle The steps of the safety management process outlined in Figure above are briefly described below: (a) (b) (c) (d) Collect the data. Analyse the data. Prioritize the unsafe conditions. Develop strategies. It may include; 1. Spread the risk across as large a base of risktakers as practicable. (This is the basis of insurance.) 2. Eliminate the risk entirely (possibly by ceasing that operation or practice). 3. Accept the risk and continue operations unchanged. 4. Mitigate the risk by implementing measures to reduce the risk or at least facilitate coping with the risk. (e) (f) (g) (h) When selecting a risk management strategy, care is required to avoid introducing new risks that result in an unacceptable level of safety. Approve strategies. Assign responsibilities and implement strategies. Re-evaluate situation. Collect additional data Safety management requires analytical skills that may not be routinely practiced by management. The more complex the analysis, the more important is the need for the application of the most appropriate analytical tools. The closed loop process of safety management also requires feedback to ensure that management can test the validity of its decisions and assess the effectiveness of their implementation. Safety oversight The term safety oversight refers to the activities of a State under its safety programme, while safety performance

222 218 Aviation Safety and Security Management monitoring refers to the activities of an operator or service provider under its SMS Safety oversight or safety performance monitoring activities are an essential component of an organization's safety management strategy. Safety oversight provides the means by which a State can verify how well the aviation industry is fulfilling its safety objectives Some of the requirements for a safety performance monitoring system will already be in place in many organizations. For example, States would normally have regulations relating to mandatory reporting of accidents and incidents In order to keep safety risks at an acceptable level with the increasing levels of activity, modern safety management practices are shifting from a purely reactive to a more proactive mode No single element will meet today's expectations for risk management. Rather, an integrated application of most of these elements will increase the aviation system's resistance to unsafe acts and conditions. However, even with effective safety management processes, there are no guarantees that all accidents can be prevented Even where the risk is classed as acceptable (tolerable), if any measures that could result in the further reduction of the risk are identified, and these measures require little effort or resources to implement, then they should be implemented The acronym ALARP is used to describe a risk that has been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. In determining what is "reasonably practicable" in this context, consideration should be given to both the technical feasibility of further reducing the risk, and the cost; this could include a cost-benefit study Showing that the risk in a system is ALARP means that any further risk reduction is either impracticable or grossly outweighed by the costs. It should, however, be borne in mind that when an individual or society "accepts" a risk,

223 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 219 this does not mean that the risk is eliminated. Some level of risk remains; however, the individual or society has accepted that the residual risk is sufficiently low that it is outweighed by the benefits These concepts are illustrated diagrammatically in the Tolerability of Risk (TOR) triangle in Figure below. (In this figure, the degree of risk is represented by the width of the triangle.) Tolerability of Risk (TOR) triangle 11.6 ACCIDENTS VERSUS INCIDENTS a) An accident is an occurrence during the operation of an aircraft which entails: 1) a fatality or serious injury; 2) substantial damage to the aircraft involving structural failure or requiring major repair; or 3) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. b) An incident is an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation. A serious incident is an incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.

224 220 1: 600 Rule Aviation Safety and Security Management Research into industrial safety in 1969 indicated that for every 600 reported occurrences with no injury or damage, there were some: 30 incidents involving property damage; 10 accidents involving serious injuries; and 1 major or fatal injury The ratio shown in Figure below is indicative of a wasted opportunity if investigative efforts are focused only on those rare occurrences where there is serious injury or significant damage. Figure-----1: 600 Rule The factors contributing to such accidents may be present in hundreds of incidents and could be identified -before serious injury or damage ensues. Effective safety management requires that staff and management identify and analyse hazards before they result in accidents. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 11.7 GENERAL ICAO requires States to establish a safety programme in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety in the operation of aircraft. As part of their safety programme,

225 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 221 States require operators to implement an accepted safety management system (SMS) An SMS allows operators to integrate their diverse safety activities into a coherent system. Examples of safety activities that might be integrated into an operator's SMS include: (a) (b) (c) (d) hazard and incident reporting; Flight Data Analysis (FDA); Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA); and cabin safety HAZARD AND INCIDENT REPORTING The principles and operation of successful incident reporting systems have been established. Nowadays, many operators have made this commitment to safety and, as a result, benefited not only from improved hazard identification but also from improved efficiencies in flight operations. Benefits Incident reporting systems are one of an operator's most effective tools for proactive hazard identification, a key element of effective safety management. Policies, procedures and practices developed within an organization sometimes introduce unforeseen hazards into aircraft operations. These latent conditions (hazards) may lie dormant for years. They are usually introduced unknowingly, often with the best of intentions. Examples include poor equipment design, inappropriate management decisions, ambiguously written procedures and inadequate communication between management and line personnel. Line management can also introduce such hazards by instituting operating procedures that do not work as intended under "real world" conditions. In short, hazards may have their origins far removed in space and time from the incidents that may eventually result from them.

226 222 Aviation Safety and Security Management An accident or incident may not result from these hazards immediately because "front-line personnel" (whether they be pilots, ATCOs or AMEs) often develop ways of coping with the hazard - sometimes described as "work arounds". However, if the hazards are not identified and addressed, sooner or later the coping mechanisms fail and an accident or incident ensues A properly managed in-house reporting system can help companies identify many of these hazards. By collecting, aggregating and then analysing hazard and incident reports, safety managers can better understand problems encountered during operations. Armed with this knowledge, they can initiate systemic solutions, rather than short-term fixes that may only hide the real problems. Encouraging the free flow of safety information The trust of employees in the incident reporting system is fundamental to the quality, accuracy and substance of data reported. If hazard and incident data are collected in a corporate atmosphere where employees feel free to openly share safety information, the data will contain much useful detail. Since it will represent the actual environment, it will be helpful in determining contributing factors and areas of safety concern On the other hand, if the company uses incident reports for disciplinary purposes, the company incident reporting system will only receive the minimum information required to comply with company rules. Little useful information from a safety perspective could be expected The trust necessary for the free flow of safety information is very fragile. It may take years to establish; yet, one breach of that trust may undermine the effectiveness of the system for a long time. To be effective, as a minimum, an operator's reporting programme should include hazard and incident reports from flight operations personnel, AMEs and cabin crew.

227 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 223 Commercially available systems An increasing number of commercially available incident reporting systems that run on personal computers (PCs) and are available at relatively low cost, have proven to be well suited for company reporting systems. These offthe-shelf software packages collect and store data, generate reports, and can be used for trend analysis and safety performance monitoring Three examples of such systems are listed below: (a) British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS) website at (b) (c) INDICATE (Identifying Needed Defences in the Civil Aviation Transport Environment), developed in Australia, website at Aircrew Incident Reporting System (AIRS) was developed by Airbus Industrie 11.9 FLIGHT DATA ANALYSIS (FDA) PROGRAMME Flight Data Analysis (FDA) programmes, sometimes referred to as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), or Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA), provide another tool for the proactive identification of hazards. FDA is a logical complement to hazard and incident reporting and to LOSA LINE OPERATIONS SAFETY AUDIT (LOSA) PROGRAMME As has been discussed earlier, the negative consequences of human behaviour can be proactively managed. Hazards can be identified, analysed and validated based on data collected through the monitoring of day-today operations. Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) are one method for monitoring normal flight operations for safety purposes. LOSA programmes then provide another proactive safety management tool. ICAO endorses LOSA as a way to monitor normal flight operations.

228 224 Aviation Safety and Security Management CABIN SAFETY PROGRAMME General Cabin safety is aimed at minimizing risks to the occupants of the aircraft. By reducing or eliminating hazards with the potential for creating injuries or causing damage, cabin safety focuses on providing a safer environment for the occupants of the aircraft The range of threats to the aircraft and its occupants include: (a) in-flight turbulence; (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) smoke or fire in the cabin; decompression; emergency landings; emergency evacuations; and unruly passengers The work environment and working conditions for cabin crew are influenced by a diverse set of human performance issues that may affect how cabin crew respond to threats, errors and other undesirable situations The cabin crew are usually the only company representatives that passengers see while in the aircraft. From the passengers' perspective, the cabin crew are there to provide in-flight service. From a regulatory and operational perspective, cabin crew are on board to manage adverse situations that may develop in the aircraft cabin and to provide direction and assistance to passengers during an emergency. ICAO requirements Although ICAO does not require cabin crew to be licensed, Chapter 12 of Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft specifies requirements with respect to: (a) assignment of emergency duties;

229 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 225 (b) (c) (d) (e) role during emergency evacuations; use of emergency equipment; flight- and duty-time limits; and training Safety inspections, safety surveys and safety audits are tools that can be used to ensure that requisite cabin safety standards are being maintained. Once an operator is certificated, cabin safety standards may be confirmed through an ongoing programme of: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) aircraft inspections (e.g. emergency exits, emergency equipment, and galleys); pre-flight (ramp) inspections; in-flight cabin inspections (e.g. passenger briefings and demonstrations, crew briefings and use of checklists, crew communications, discipline, and situational awareness); training inspections (e.g. facilities, quality of instruction, and records); and base inspections (e.g. crew scheduling, dispatch, safety incident reporting and response), etc A company's internal safety audit programme should include the cabin crew department. The audit process should include a review of all cabin operations, as well as an audit of cabin safety procedures, training, the cabin crew's operating manual, etc DGCA's Programme for Safety Regulation And Oversight Of Flight Operations for Indian Operators. DGCA vide their Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) Section 8, - Aircraft Operations Series 'A' Part II Issue I, Dated 16th October, 1995, issued their Programme for Safety Regulation

230 226 Aviation Safety and Security Management And Oversight Of Flight Operations for Indian Operators, with motto of the Strict adherence to the laid down operating procedures and limitations and compliance with the rules and regulations. The main objective of the programme was to ensure: (a) (b) effective implementation of the safety related Standards and Recommended Practices contained in the ICAO Annexes, particularly Annexes 1 and 6 and the relevant rules, regulations, procedures and requirements laid down in the various national regulatory documents; that safety weaknesses in the flight operations are identified and necessary corrective measures are taken in time before they become a potential safety hazard; and (c) that the capability of the operator to conduct the operations safely be maintained at or above the level required by the regulations The Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR) identified the important operational aspects which needed close monitoring and described broadly the system of safety oversight required to be exercised on the air transport operations by the operators and the DGCA officers. Compliance of the requirements of the CAR was made applicable to all Indian operators engaged in scheduled air transport services for carriage of passengers, mail or cargo and to Non-Scheduled/Air Taxi Operators. For new operators seeking permission to commence operations, it was to be a pre-requisite for the grant of the operating permit. The main points of the CAR are given below; SAFETY REGULATION OF FLIGHT OPERA- TIONS Various statutory/regulator documents, namely, the Aircraft ACT 1934, the Aircraft Rules 1937, Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) India, Aeronautical Information Circulars (AIC), Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) etc. stipulate the safety and operational requirements applicable to different

231 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 227 types of operations, which shall be complied with by the operators. In addition, implementation of the following important safety and operational requirements shall be closely monitored by the operators and DGCA Officers to enhance safety of operations In accordance with Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937, no person shall operate any air transport service in India without obtaining the necessary permit for operating such services. The operating permit shall be maintained current and valid and the operations shall be conducted within the scope and provisions of the permit The operators shall demonstrate, before grant of the permit, their capability to safely operate the air transport services sought to be operated. It shall be ensured that the manpower, infrastructure, facilities, systems and operating capability does not degrade below the required level at any time and is enhanced continually commensurate with expansion of operations The operators shall clearly outline in their operations manual their policy relating to flight operations in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 6, Aircraft Rules, 1937 and the applicable CARs and shall also lay down the procedures for implementation of the same The Chief of Operations shall be overall responsible for implementation of the flight operations policy. For this purpose, the operators shall have flight operations offices at the main base and also at the regional stations exercising control on the flight operations. The operations offices shall bemoaned by adequate number of operations officers, flight dispatchers approved by DGCA and other supporting staff. The strength of such officers shall have to be increased as the size of operating fleet grows The operations manual, CARs, AIP - India, Aircraft Rules, AICs, flight manual, Jeppeson manual, relevant ICAO Annexes and related guidance material, check-lists and other operations documents shall be kept up-to-date by the operations offices. The operator shall remain on the mailing list of the suppliers of these documents for the purpose of

232 228 Aviation Safety and Security Management receiving regular amendments, wherever such a service is available A master folder for each type of regulatory/policy document viz. CARs, AICs, Operations Circulars, and Safety Bulletins etc. shall be maintained by the operations offices for reference by crew members and other personnel Whenever any new aircraft operations requirement or circular is issued by the aircraft manufacturer, DGCA or the operator, the operations offices shall bring the same to the notice of all their concerned personnel and ensure compliance. The operations manual shall also be amended from time to time, as required There shall be a proper system of distribution of the circulars and other documents to all crew members and other concerned personnel Whenever a new crew or an operations officer is appointed, the operator shall give him/her a thorough familiarization of the operations manual, the standing operations circulars and other relevant documents The operations offices shall have a proper system of maintaining operational and flight records of personnel and shall monitor records of each crew member (including foreign crew, if employed) in order to ensure that: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) the flight and duty time limitations are complied with; their licences, instrument ratings etc. are maintained valid; Validity of their medical checks. all proficiency checks are carried out as per the procedures and within the stipulated periods; and periodic refreshers are undergone as required. For this purpose, a fool-proof system of record keeping in proper formats, preferably a computer based system, shall be established and followed All the flight crew members shall undergo periodic refresher and flight safety courses as stipulated. During the

233 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 229 crew training and refresher courses, all the new operations and safety circulars and bulletins, major accident/incident case studies shall be discussed The operators shall specify procedures for ensuring flight crew proficiency for: i. Commencement of operations after long leave/ grounding i.e. more than 30 days; ii. Corrective training and checks after failure in a proficiency check The operators shall establish specific operating procedures/precautions for: i. Operations to critical airports of their operating network i.e. airports surrounded by hilly/difficult terrain, satellite airfields etc; ii. iii. iv. Operations to airfields having marginal runway length; Operations during monsoon period; and Operations during winter to airfields which become fog bound The operators shall lay down and obtain DGCA approval of their airport weather minimums and ensure adherence to the same by their flight crewmembers Suitable alternate aerodrome for each airport on their network shall be designated by the operators, which shall meet the minimum safety requirements for safe operation of the aircraft type, keeping also in view the watch hours of the airport Minimum reserve fuel as laid down in AIP India shall always be carried on each flight The operators shall have facilities and doctors for carrying out pre-flight medical checks of their crew members as per the requirements. The equipment used for the purpose must be reliable to give accurate digital record of observations. It shall be calibrated frequently, at least once in a year or as per the manufacturer's requirements.

234 230 Aviation Safety and Security Management The operators shall have, trained/qualified and DGCA approved load and trim sheet personnel at each airport for the type of aircraft operated. The operator shall ensure that in no case the aircraft is loaded beyond the maximum permissible limits determined from runway length (takeoff/ landing) requirement, climb and enroute obstacle clearance or any other limitation. It would be desirable that the operators should have appropriate charts for each airport giving the RTOLW (Rejected Take off and Landing Weight) at different ambient temperatures and wind conditions Only trained, qualified and DGCA approved cabin crew shall be employed and they shall undergo periodical refresher and flight safety courses The operators shall train adequate number of experienced pilots and obtain approval from DGCA for them to act as Check Pilots, Instructors and Examiners on the type of aircraft operated to carry out the training and proficiency checks of pilots and also for monitoring the flight operations. In case an operator does not have its own experienced pilots suitable for training as Check Pilot/Instructor/Examiner, the operator may use pilots of the other operators or foreign pilots approved by the DGCA to discharge these functions on the type of aircraft The operators engaged in carriage of cargo only and those authorized to carry dangerous goods, shall train adequate number of personnel in handling dangerous goods and shall ensure that all stipulated requirements with regard to packaging, handling, loading/unloading and transportation of such goods are complied with The operators engaged in over-water operations with twin engined aircraft shall ensure compliance of the requirements relating to ETOP operations (Extended Range Twin- Engine Operations) The operators shall carry out regular in flight monitoring of their flight operations to ensure compliance with the operating procedures through the senior commanders and the internal safety audit team. Records of the deficiencies observed and the corrective actions taken shall be maintained.

235 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle In addition to other information, extensive use of the data recorded on the flight recorders (CVR/ FDR) should be made by the Chief of Operations in the performance monitoring the flight crew, thus permitting early detection of safety hazards and the initiation of appropriate accident prevention measures. Corrective measures shall be taken immediately when any deficiency is observed Based on the experience of flight operations, the operators shall issue operations circulars to eliminate any weak or potentially dangerous area in their operations The operators shall prepare operational flight plan for each route including diversion sectors giving information on route navigation, fuel requirements, flight time/speed/ distance between different reporting points, maximum permissible weights, airport weather minimas and other safety related information Before commencing operations to a new station, the operator shall carry out assessment of the suitability of the airport for safe operations of the type of aircraft intended to be operated particularly from the point of view of runway length and strength, one engine inoperative approach, take off and climb procedures and capability, adequacy of fire fighting and rescue facilities, clearance of enroute obstacles in case of an engine failure and the other safety related conditions. Requirements of CAR Section 3, Series 'E', Part I, dated 1st March 1994 ("Minimum Requirements for Grant of Permit to Operate Scheduled Passenger Air Transport Services.") shall be complied with before commencing operations to new stations In cases where the aircraft used by an operator have been procured on wet lease the operations office shall ensure compliance with the applicable operations requirements for operations with wet-leased aircraft If a foreign pilot is employed by an Operator, the operator shall ensure that the pilot has at least 500 hours

236 232 Aviation Safety and Security Management experience as PIC on the type (with licence, ratings and medical current) and has adequate working knowledge of the English language, DGCA may grant exemption from this requirement in specific cases where the operator satisfies the Director General that safety will not be compromised An operator employing any foreign pilot shall obtain for him the required security clearance through DGCA before that pilot is scheduled for operations. That pilot shall also be given thorough familiarization about Indian Rules and Regulations, operating procedures, facilities available at different airports, prohibited areas, current Notams and the operations manual of the operator. After the Chief of Operations is satisfied with and has certified the aforesaid briefing, the pilot shall be required to pass an oral check by a DGCA board and then only his licence shall be revalidated to fly Indian registered aircraft For scheduling a foreign pilot for operations unto a period of three months, the operator, in addition to fulfilling the requirements of Para , shall ensure that an Indian pilot forms part of the crew complement A foreign pilot shall be permitted to operate Indian registered aircraft regularly as a line pilot for more than three months only if has passed the DGCA's written examination in Air Regulations Whenever any crew member of an operator joins another operator, that crewmember shall be familiarized with the operations manual of the new operator which shall be followed by the oral check by a DGCA board before that crewmember is scheduled for operations The operators shall have a system of frequent exchange of information between pilots and engineers to improve coordination and understanding of operational and airworthiness aspects. A record of such discussions shall be maintained Any differences between various aircraft of the same type in the fleet of an operator, shall be circulated to all the flight crew members. Adequate briefing should be given to them as required.

237 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle The operators shall emphasize to all their pilots that they should meticulously record the snags in the aircraft as and when observed While accepting an aircraft, the pilots shall ensure that snags carried forward, if any, are not beyond the scope of MEL and the aircraft is loaded within the permissible limits of weight and seats. The engineering and commercial personnel shall also ensure compliance of these aspects respectively The operators shall prepare a Flight Safety Manual giving amongst other information, policies and procedures relating to investigation of incidents/accidents, implementation of safety recommendations, safety awareness and accident/ incident prevention programmes. The Chief of flight Safety of the operators shall be responsible for implementation of the policies laid down in their Flight Safety Manuals and all safety measures relating to their flight operations The Chief of Flight Safety shall ensure compliance with the safety recommendations made in the investigation reports, safety audit reports, spot checks etc. Proper record of such implementation shall be maintained The Chief of Flight Safety shall arrange periodic safety audits and make reports on the same. The deficiencies observed shall be brought to the notice of the concerned departments and appropriate corrective measures shall be taken promptly The operators shall take all necessary measures to implement the ICAO programme for prevention of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents including the related ICAO provisions. The operators shall discuss the important operational aspects of the CFIT programme during initial and recurrent training of flight crew The operators shall make every effort to enhance accident/incident prevention measures, particularly in the areas of information feed-back and analysis, voluntary reporting system and prompt investigation of incidents and implementation of safety recommendations.

238 234 Aviation Safety and Security Management The operators shall take into account relevant human factors aspects when developing operating procedures and training of personnel. The operators are encouraged to engage in cooperation and mutual exchange of information on problems related to influence of human factors on the safety of aircraft operations The operators shall lay down in their Training Manuals, the policies relating to the initial and recurrent training of their flight crew and operations personnel The Chief of Training shall prepare necessary training programmes for their flight crew and other operations personnel keeping in view the background of the persons recruited and the operating requirements. Approval of the training programmes shall be obtained from DGCA before commencing the training. The Chief of Training shall also be responsible for training of Check Pilots/Instructors/Examiners as per the DGCA requirements Before sending trainees for training to any institute, the Chief of Training shall ensure that the institute has the requisite facilities and qualified and approved Instructors and Examiners and the institute is approved by the Aeronautical Authority of the Country and also by the DGCA India for imparting such training. The training records shall be maintained and submitted to DGCA as per the standing requirements The Chief of Training shall ensure that necessary changes in the training programmes are carried out, where necessary, based on the experience and the observations made during implementation of the safety oversight programme and safety audits In case of any violation, the operator shall promptly take effective corrective action including punitive action as necessary to prevent similar occurrences in future. A record of such action shall be maintained To confirm continued capability to conduct the operations authorized under the Operating Permit, the

239 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle 235 operators shall submit to the DGCA, while applying for renewal of the Operating Permit, the following information: (a) (b) Continued compliance of the requirements contained in CAR Section 3, Air Transport, Series 'C' Part II for grant of permission and to operate scheduled air transport services. Report of the in-house safety audit team of the operator on the safety audit carried out within 60 days prior to expiry of the Operating Permit and the action taken thereon The Operating Permit of any operator, shall be liable to revocation if the operator subsequently fails or is unable to meet the applicable laid down requirements during the course of its operations under the Permit IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFETY OVERSIGHT PROGRAMME OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS. Effective safety regulation and oversight of flight operations can be achieved only by joint efforts on the part of the operators and the regulatory authority. It is, therefore, essential that in addition to the safety oversight programme of DGCA, the operators should also have their in-house monitoring programme commensurate with the type and scale of their operations. Broadly, the safety oversight of flight operations shall be conducted on the following lines: The operators shall lay down their policies and procedures for compliance of the operational, safety and training requirements in their operations manual, flight safety manual and training manual. The responsibility of implementation of the policies and procedures contained in these manuals may be assigned to their officials as indicated below:-a) Operations Manual - Chief of Flight Operations b) Flight Safety Manual - Chief of Flight Safety c) Training Manual - Chief of Training The division of responsibility for this purpose shall be clearly reflected in the relevant manuals The day-to-day safety regulation and in-house monitoring of the flight operations should be exercised by

240 236 Aviation Safety and Security Management the Chief of Operations through the senior Pilots, Check Pilots, Instructors, Examiners and operations officers. Necessary check lists should be devised for carrying out such monitoring. There shall be a proper system of documentation and recordkeeping of the deficiencies observed and the corrective measures taken In addition to the day-to-day monitoring, periodic inhouse safety audits shall be carried out by the dedicated safety audit teams of the operators to ensure that the safety regulations are being complied with. Corrective action shall be taken immediately by the Chief of Flight Safety on the deficiencies observed during the audit. Relevant records and data in proper formats shall be maintained in this regard In order to discharge the responsibility for safety oversight in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex.6, surveillance of flight operations including training shall be carried out by the DGCA officers viz. Flight Inspectors, safety audit teams and other authorised officers. The Operations Manual for Flight Inspectors stipulates the method of surveillance of airline flight operations. The flight inspectors shall frequently fly with the airline pilots to carry out the surveillance in accordance with their Operations Manual. Deficiencies observed shall be intimated to the operators for corrective action. Deputy Director Flight Crew Standards in DGCA Headquarters shall ensure that necessary actions are taken on the observations made by the Flight Inspectors The DGCA safety audit teams or other authorized persons shall carry out safety audits of the operators periodically. The deficiencies observed during these audits shall be brought to the notice of the concerned operator for taking necessary corrective measures. The Director of Air Safety in the DGCA Headquarters shall take appropriate measures to ensure that necessary actions are taken by the operators to remove the deficiencies and to implement the safety recommendations. Where punitive action is required to be taken for serious lapses, the Director of Air Safety shall initiate the same promptly.

241 UNIT 11 Air Transport Safety Management Principle INDUSTRY CONSULTATION AND REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE SAFETY REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT PROGRAMME. Review of implementation of the safety regulations and oversight programme shall be carried out as and when required by the DGCA Headquarters jointly with the operators to assess functioning and effectiveness of the programmes. The Deputy Director, Flight Crew Standards shall coordinate this review. This would also provide an opportunity to the operators to learn from the experience of others and to improve their own systems. During the review, it would also be assessed whether the national rules, regulations, procedures and requirements are adequate and effective in the implementation of the relevant ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and if found necessary, appropriate amendments would be suggested. References: ICAO Doc 9859-AN/460-Safety Management Manual (SMM) CAA, UK CAP 712, Safety Management Systems for Commercial Air Transport Operations-A Guide to Implementation prepared by the Air Transport Operations - Safety Management Group DGCA Civil Aviation Requirements, Section 8 - Aircraft Operations, Series 'A' Part Ii, Issue I, Dated 16th October, 1995 Covering Subject:-Safety Regulation And Oversight Of Flight Operations. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Website: on Air Transport Oversight System. ICAO Document DOC 9859-AN/460 (Safety Management Manual). Various DGCA Circulars and notifications on "Safety Management System".

242 238 Questions General Questions. Aviation Safety and Security Management 1. What is the difference between the Safety Performance Indictors and Safety Targets? Give examples. 2. What is meant by Safety Management System (SMS)? What are its advantages and describe various steps involved in implementation of SMS? 3. In establishing States' requirements for the management of safety, how ICAO differentiates between safety programmes and safety management systems (SMS). 4. How Aircraft Accidents and incidents are related to each other state in the context of 1:600 Rule. Objective Type of questions a. Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP) is the program for. b. The main features of SMS are Systematic, --- and Explicit. Answers to Objective Type of questions a. auditing the implementation of safety related standards of an organization. b. Proactive

243 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 239 Unit 12 Principles of System Safety 12.1 Definition of System Safety System safety is a specialty within system engineering that supports program risk management. It is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria and techniques to optimize safety. The goal of System Safety is to optimize safety by the identification of safety related risks, eliminating or controlling them by design and/or procedures, based on acceptable system safety precedence. System Safety Management as a critical functional discipline to be applied during all phases of the life cycle of an acquisition. SSM contains a five step approach: 1. Plan: The safety risk management process shall be predetermined, documented in a plan that must include the criteria for acceptable risk. 2. Hazard identification: The hazard analyses and assessments required in the plan shall identify the safety risks associated with the system or operations under evaluation. 3. Analysis: The risks shall be characterized in terms of severity of consequence and likelihood of occurrence in accordance with the plan. 4. Comparative Safety Assessment: The Comparative Safety Assessment of the hazards examined shall be compared to the acceptability criteria specified in the plan and the results provided in a manner and method easily adapted for decision making. 5. Decision: The risk management decision shall include the safety Comparative Safety Assessment. Comparative Safety Assessments may be used to compare and contrast options.

244 240 Aviation Safety and Security Management The system safety principles involved in each of these steps are discussed in the following paragraphs Planning System safety must be planned. It is an integrated and comprehensive engineering effort that requires a trained staff experienced in the application of safety engineering principles. The effort is interrelated, sequential and continuing throughout all program phases. The plan must influence facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel. Planning should include transportation, logistics support, storage, packing, and handling, and should address Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) and Non-developmental Items (NDI). A System Safety Management Plan is needed in the Pre-investment Decision phases to address the management objectives, responsibilities, program requirements, and schedule (who?, what?, when?, where?, and why?). After the Investment Decision is made and a program is approved for implementation, a System Safety Program Plan is needed. Managing Authority (MA) Role The term Managing Authority (MA) is used to identify the responsible entity for managing the system safety effort. In all cases, the MA has responsibility for the program, project or activity. Managerial and technical procedures to be used must be approved by the MA. The MA resolves conflicts between safety requirements and other design requirements, and resolves conflicts between associate contractors when applicable. Defining System Safety Requirements System safety requirements must be consistent with other program requirements. A balanced program attempts to optimize safety, performance and cost. System safety program balance is the product of the interplay between system safety and the other three familiar program elements of cost, schedule, and performance as shown in the figure below.

245 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 241 Figure 12-1: Cost vs. Safety Effort (Seeking Balance) Programs cannot afford accidents that will prevent the achievement of the primary mission goals. However, neither can we afford systems that cannot perform due to unreasonable and unnecessary safety requirements. Safety must be placed in its proper perspective. A correct safety balance cannot be achieved unless acceptable and unacceptable conditions are established early enough in the program to allow for the selection of the optimum design solution and/or operational alternatives. Defining acceptable and unacceptable risk is as important for cost-effective accident prevention as is defining cost and performance parameters Hazard Analysis Both elements of risk (hazard severity and likelihood of occurrence) must be characterized. The inability to quantify and/or lack of historical data on a particular hazard does not exclude the hazard from this requirement. Hazards are subdivided into sub-categories related to environment such as system states, environmental conditions or initiating and contributing hazards. Realistically, a certain degree of safety risk must be accepted. Determining the acceptable level of risk is generally the responsibility of management. Any

246 242 Aviation Safety and Security Management management decisions, including those related to safety must consider other essential program elements. The marginal costs of implementing hazard control requirements in a system must be weighed against the expected costs of not implementing such controls. The cost of not implementing hazard controls is often difficult to quantify before the fact. In order to quantify expected accident costs before the fact, two factors must be considered. These are related to risk and are the potential consequences of an accident and the probability of its occurrence. The more severe the consequences of an accident (in terms of dollars, injury, or national prestige, etc.) the lower the probability of its occurrence must be for the risk to be acceptable. In this case, it will be worthwhile to spend money to reduce the probability by implementing hazard controls. Conversely, accidents whose consequences are less severe may be acceptable risks at higher probabilities of occurrence and will consequently justify a lesser expenditure to further reduce the frequency of occurrence. Using this concept as a baseline, design limits must be defined Accident Scenario Relationships In conducting hazard analysis, an accident scenario as shown in Figure 12-2 is a useful model for analyzing risk of harm due to hazards. Throughout this System Safety notes, the term hazard will be used to describe scenarios that may cause harm. It is defined as a Condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event. Seldom does a single hazard cause an accident. More often, an accident occurs as the result of a sequence of causes termed initiating and contributory hazards. As shown in Figure 12-2, contributory hazards involve consideration of the system state (e.g., operating environment) as well as failures or malfunctions.

247 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 243 Figure 12-2: Hazard Scenario Model Definitions for Use Acquisition Process The FAA System Engineering Council (SEC) has approved specific definitions for Severity and Likelihood to be used during all phases of the acquisition life cycle. These are shown in Table 12-2 and Table Table 12-2: Severity Definitions for FAA AMS (Acquisition Management System) Process Catastrophic Hazardous Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the system Reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope with adverse conditions to the extent that there would be: Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators cannot be relied upon to perform required tasks accurately or completely (1) Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft (except operators) (2) Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public Major Reduces the capability of the system or the operators to cope with adverse operating condition to the extent that there would be Significant reduction in safety margin or functional capability

248 244 Aviation Safety and Security Management Minor No Safety Effect Probable Remote Significant increase in operator workload Conditions impairing operator efficiency or creating significant discomfort Physical distress to occupants of aircraft (except operator) including injuries Major occupational illness and/or major environmental damage, and/or major property damage Does not significantly reduce system safety. Actions required by operators are well within their capabilities. Include Slight reduction in safety margin or functional capabilities Slight increase in workload such as routine flight plan changes. Some physical discomfort to occupants or aircraft (except operators) Minor occupational illness and/or minor environmental damage, and/or minor property damage Has no effect on safety Table 12-3: Likelihood of Occurrence Definitions Qualitative: Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire system/operational life of an item. Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is greater that 1 x 10-5 Qualitative: Unlikely to occur to each item during its total life. May occur several time in the life of an entire system or fleet. Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than 1 x 10-5, but greater than 1 x 10-7 Extremely Remote Qualitative: Not anticipated to occur to each item during its total life. May occur a few times in the life of an entire system or fleet. Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than 1 x 10-7 but greater than 1 x 10-9 Extremely Improbable Qualitative: So unlikely that it is not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of an entire system or fleet. Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than 1 x 10-9

249 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 245 Definitions of Severity and Likelihood An example taken from MIL-STD-882C of the definitions used to define Severity of Consequence and Event Likelihood are in Tables 12-4 and 12-5, respectively. Table 12-4: Severity of Consequence Description Category Definition Catastrophic I Death, and/or system loss, and/or severe environmental damage. Critical II Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system and/or environmental damage. Marginal III Minor injury, minor occupational illness, and/or minor system damage, and/or environmental damage. Negligible IV Less then minor injury, occupational illness, or less then minor system or environmental damage. Table 12-5: Event Likelihood (Probability) Description Level Specific Event Frequent A Likely to occur frequently Probable B Will occur several times in the life of system. Occasional C Likely to occur some time in the life of the system. Remote D Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of the system. Inprobable E So unlikely, it can be assumed that occurrence may not be experienced Comparison of FAR and JAR Severity Classifications Other studies have been conducted to define severity and event likelihood for use by the FAA. A comparison of the severity classifications for the FARs and JARs from one such study 2 is contained in Table FAA Federal Aviation Administration, USA JARs Joint Aviation Regulations with European countries FAR Federal Aviation Administration Regulations.

250 246 Aviation Safety and Security Management 2 Aircraft Performance Comparative Safety Assessment Model (APRAM), Rannoch Corporation, February 28, 2000 Table 12-6 Most Severe Consequence Used for Classification 12.4 Comparative Safety Assessment Selection of some alternate design elements, e.g., operational parameters and/or architecture components or configuration in lieu of others implies recognition on the part of management that one set of alternatives will result in either more or less risk of an accident. The risk management concept emphasizes the identification of the change in risk with a change in alternative solutions. Safety Comparative Safety Assessment is made more complicated considering that a lesser safety risk may not be the optimum choice from a mission assurance standpoint. Recognition of this is the keystone of safety risk management. These factors make system safety a decision making tool. It must be recognized, however, that selection of the greater safety risk alternative carries with it the responsibility of assuring inclusion of adequate warnings, personnel protective systems, and procedural controls. Safety Comparative Safety Assessment is also a planning tool. It requires planning for the development of safety operating procedures and test programs to resolve uncertainty when safety risk cannot be completely controlled by design. It provides a control system to track and measure progress towards the resolution of uncertainty and to measure the reduction of safety risk. Assessment of risk is made by combining the severity of consequence with the likelihood of occurrence in a matrix.

251 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 247 Risk acceptance criteria to be used in the FAA AMS (Acquisition Management System) process are shown in Figure 12-3 and Figure Figure 12-3: Risk Acceptability Matrix Figure 12-4: Risk Acceptance Criteria An example based on MIL-STD-882C is shown in Figure The matrix may be referred to as a Hazard Risk Index (HRI), a Risk Rating Factor (RRF), or other terminology, but in all cases, it is the criteria used by management to determine acceptability of risk. The Comparative Safety Assessment Matrix of Figure 12-5 illustrates an acceptance criteria methodology. Region R1 on the matrix is an area of high risk and may be considered unacceptable by the managing authority. Region R2 may be acceptable with management review of controls and/or mitigations, and R3 may be acceptable with management review. R4 is a low risk region that is usually acceptable without review.

252 248 Aviation Safety and Security Management Figure 12-5: Example of a Comparative Safety Assessment Matrix Early in a development phase, performance objectives may tend to overshadow efforts to reduce safety risk. This is because sometimes safety represents a constraint on a design. For this reason, safety risk reduction is often ignored or overlooked. In other cases, safety risk may be appraised, but not fully enough to serve as a significant input to the decision making process. As a result, the sudden identification of a significant safety risk, or the occurrence of an actual incident, late in the program can provide an overpowering impact on schedule, cost, and sometimes performance. To avoid this situation, methods to reduce safety risk must be applied commensurate with the task being performed in each program phase. In the early development phase (investment analysis and the early part of solution implementation), the system safety activities are usually directed toward: 1. establishing risk acceptability parameters; 2. practical tradeoffs between engineering design and defined safety risk parameters; 3. avoidance of alternative approaches with high safety risk potential; 4. defining system test requirements to demonstrate safety characteristics; and, 5. safety planning for follow-on phases. The culmination of this effort is the safety Comparative Safety Assessment that is a summary of the work done toward minimization of unresolved safety concerns and a

253 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 249 calculated appraisal of the risk. Properly done, it allows intelligent management decisions concerning acceptability of the risk. The general principles of safety risk management are: All system operations represent some degree of risk. Recognize that human interaction with elements of the system entails some element of risk. Keep hazards in proper perspective. Do not overreact to each identified risk, but make a conscious decision on how to deal with it. Weigh the risks and make judgments according to your own knowledge, inputs from subject matter experts, experience, and program need. It is more important to establish clear objectives and parameters for Comparative Safety Assessment related to a specific program than to use generic approaches and procedures. There may be no single solution to a safety problem. There are usually a variety of directions to pursue. Each of these directions may produce varying degrees of risk reduction. A combination of approaches may provide the best solution. Point out to designers the safety goals and how they can be achieved rather than tell him his approach will not work. There are no safety problems in system planning or design. There are only engineering or management problems that, if left unresolved, may lead to accidents. The determination of severity is made on a worst credible case/condition in accordance with MIL-STD- 882, and AMJ Many hazards may be associated with a single risk. In predictive analysis, risks are hypothesized accidents,

254 250 Aviation Safety and Security Management and are therefore potential in nature. Severity assessment is made regarding the potential of the hazards to do harm Risk Management Decision Making Risk Management is a concept that has gained acceptance in many fields of business and industry. It seems largely from financial concerns and a realization that losses from different areas in a business must be either reduced or accepted. Risk Management is the overall process of identifying, evaluation, controlling or reducing and accepting risks. It is a general term given to the process of making management decisions about risk that have been identified and analysed. For any system safety effort to succeed there must be a commitment on the part of management. There must be mutual confidence between program managers and system safety management. Program managers need to have confidence that safety decisions are made with professional competence. System safety management and engineering must know that their actions will receive full program management attention and support. Safety personnel need to have a clear understanding of the system safety task along with the authority and resources to accomplish the task. Decision-makers need to be fully aware of the risk they are taking when they make their decisions. They have to manage program safety risk. For effective safety risk management, program managers should: Ensure that competent, responsible, and qualified engineers be assigned in program offices and contractor organizations to manage the system safety program. Ensure that system safety managers are placed within the organizational structure so that they have the authority and organizational flexibility to perform effectively. Ensure that all known hazards and their associated risks are defined, documented, and tracked as a program policy so that the decision-makers are made aware of the risks being assumed when the system becomes operational.

255 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 251 Require that an assessment of safety risk be presented as a part of program reviews and at decision milestones. Make decisions on risk acceptability for the program and accept responsibility for that decision Safety Order of Precedence One of the fundamental principles of system safety is the Safety Order of Precedence in eliminating, controlling or mitigating a hazard. The Safety Order of Precedence is shown in Table Table 12-7: Safety Order of Precedence Description Priority Definition Design for minimum risk 1 Design to eliminate risks. If the identified risk cannot be eliminated, reduce it to an acceptable level through design selection. Incorporate safety devices 2 If identified risks cannot be eliminated through design selection, reduce the risk via the use of fixed, automatic, or other safety design features or devices. Provisions shall be made for periodic functional checks of safety devices. Provide warning devices 3 W hen neither design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate identified risks or adequately reduce risk, devices shall be used to detect the condition and to produce an adequate warning signal. Warning signals and their application shall be designed to minimize the likelihood of inappropriate human reaction and response. W arning signs and placards shall be provided to alert operational and support personnel of such risks as exposure to high voltage and heavy objects. Develop procedures and training 4 Where it is impractical to eliminate risks through design selection or specific safety and warning devices, procedures and training are used. However, concurrence of authority is usually required when procedures and training are applied to reduce risks of catastrophic, hazardous, major, or critical severity.

256 252 Aviation Safety and Security Management Examples: Design for Minimum Risk: Design hardware systems as per specifications, e.g. use low voltage rather than high voltage where access is provided for maintenance activities. Incorporate Safety Devices If low voltage is unsuitable, provide interlocks. Provide warning devices If safety devices are not practical, provide warning placards Develop procedures and training Train maintainers to shut off power before opening high voltage panels 12.7 Behavioural-Based Safety Safety management must be based on the behaviour of people and the organizational culture. Everyone has a responsibility for safety and should participate in safety management efforts. Modern organization safety strategy has progressed from safety by compliance to more of an appropriate concept of prevention by planning. Reliance on compliance could translate to after-the-fact hazard detection, which does not identify organizational errors, that are often times, the contributors to accidents. Modern safety management, i.e. system safety management adopts techniques of system theory, statistical analysis, behavioural sciences and the continuous improvement concept. Two elements critical to this modern approach are a good organizational safety culture and people involvement. The establishment of system safety working groups, analysis teams, and product teams accomplishes a positive cultural involvement when there are consensus efforts to conduct hazard analysis and manage system safety programs. Real-time safety analysis is conducted when operational personnel are involved in the identification of hazards and risks, which is the key to behavioural-based safety. The concept consists of a train-the trainer format. The behavioural-based safety process allows an organization to create and maintain a positive safety culture that continually reinforces safe behaviours over unsafe

257 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 253 behaviours. This will ultimately result in a reduction of risk. For further information concerning behavioural-based safety contact the FAA s Office of System Safety Models Used by System Safety for Analysis The AMS (Acquisition Management System) system safety program uses models to describe a system under study. These models are known as the 5M model and the SHELL model. While there are many other models available, these two recognize the interrelationships and integration of the hardware, software, human, environment and procedures inherent in FAA systems. FAA policy and the system safety approach is to identify and control the risks associated with each element of a system on a individual, interface and system level. The first step in performing safety risk management is describing the system under consideration. This description should include at a minimum, the functions, general physical characteristics, and operations of the system. Normally, detailed physical descriptions are not required unless the safety analysis is focused on this area. Keep in mind that the reason for performing safety analyses is to identify hazards and risks and to communicate that information to the audience. At a minimum, the safety assessment should describe the system in sufficient detail that the projected audience can understand the safety risks. A system description has both breadth and depth. The breadth of a system description refers to the system boundaries. Bounding means limiting the system to those elements of the system model that affect or interact with each other to accomplish the central mission(s) or function. Depth refers to the level of detail in the description. In general, the level of detail in the description varies inversely with the breadth of the system. For a system as broad as the National Airspace System (NAS) our description would be very general in nature with little detail on individual components. On the other hand, a simple system, such as a valve in a landing gear design, could include a lot of detail to support the assessment.

258 254 Aviation Safety and Security Management The SYSTEM is defined as: A composite at any level of complexity, of personnel, procedures, material, tools, equipment, facilities, and software. The elements of this composite entity are used together in the intended operation or support environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific production, support, or mission requirement. Graphically, this is represented by the 5M and SHELL models, which depict, in general, the types of elements that should be considered within most systems Five M Model Figure 12-6: The Five-M Model Mission: The mission is the purpose or central function of the system. This is the reason that all the other elements are brought together. Man: This is the human element of a system. If a system requires humans for operation, maintenance, or installation this element must be considered in the system description. In aviation, this includes not only the pilot, but all other persons directly involved with the operation of aircraft like flight crew, ground crew, ATC, meteorologist etc. Machine: This is the hardware and software (including firmware) element of a system. In aviation, this includes the aircraft including its systems & associated software. Management: Management includes the procedures, policy, and regulations involved in operating, maintaining, installing, and decommissioning a system.

259 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety 255 Media- Media is the environment in which a system will be operated, maintained, and installed. This environment includes operational and ambient conditions. Operational environment means the conditions in which the mission or function is planned and executed. Operational conditions are those involving things such as air traffic density, communication congestion, workload, etc. Part of the operational environment could be described by the type of operation (air traffic control, air carrier, general aviation, etc.) and phase (ground taxiing, takeoff, approach, enroute, transoceanic, landing, etc.). Ambient conditions are those involving temperature, humidity, lightning, electromagnetic effects, radiation, precipitation, vibration, etc SHELL Model In the SHELL model, the match or mismatch of the blocks (interface) is just as important as the characteristics described by the blocks themselves. These blocks may be rearranged as required to describe the system. A connection between blocks indicates an interface between the two elements. Each element of the system should be described both functionally and physically if possible. A function is defined as An action or purpose for which a system, subsystem, or element is designed to perform. Functional description: A functional description should describe what the system is intended to do, and should

260 256 Aviation Safety and Security Management include subsystem functions as they relate to and support the system function. Review the FAA System Engineering Manual (SEM) for details on functional analysis. Physical characteristics: A physical description provides the audience with information on the real composition and organization of the tangible system elements. As before, the level of detail varies with the size and complexity of the system, with the end objective being adequate audience understanding of the safety risk. Both models describe interfaces. These interfaces come in many forms. The table below is a list of interface types that the system engineer may encounter. Interface Type Mechanical Control Data Physical Electrical Aerodynamic Hydraulic Pneumatic Electromagnetic References: Examples Transmission of torque via a driveshaft. Rocket motor in an ejection seat. A control signal sent from a flight control computer to an actuator. A human operator selecting a flight management system mode. A position transducer reporting an actuator movement to a computer. A cockpit visual display to a pilot. An avionics rack retaining several electronic boxes and modules. A computer sitting on a desk. A brace for an air cooling vent. A flapping hinge on a rotor. A DC power bus supplying energy to an anti-collision light. A fan plugged into an AC outlet for current. An electrical circuit closing a solenoid. A stall indicator on a wing. A fairing designed to prevent vortices from impacting a control surface on an aircraft. Pressurized fluid supplying power to an flight control actuator. A fuel system pulling fuel from a tank to the engine. An adiabatic expansion cooling unit supplying cold air to an avionics bay. An air compressor supplying pressurized air to an engine air turbine starter. RF signals from a VOR. A radar transmission. 1. FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 3: Principles of System Safety December 30, Air Force System Safety Handbook Air Force Safety Agency, Kirtland AFB NM , Revised July 2000

261 UNIT 12 Principles of System Safety Dryden Handbook Codes, System Safety Handbook, NASA 4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular AC No: AC 150/ Date: February 28, 2007, Introduction To Safety Management Systems (SMS) For Airport Operators Questions General Questions. 1. Describe various elements of 5M Model of System Engineering. 2. Give a brief description of the four elements of the SHELL Model of a system. 3. What are the Severity Definitions for FAA AMS (Acquisition Management System) Process? 4. What is concept of Risk Management System Objective Type of questions a. 5M Model of System Engineering consists of Man, Machine, management, and. b. The four elements of the SHELL Model of a system represent Software, Hardware, and. Answers to Objective Type of questions a. Mission & Media. b. Liveware & Environ.

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263 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 259 Unit 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories Reliability Theory Reliability theory is the probabilistic and statistical foundation of reliability engineering, which is a branch of engineering practice that has become increasingly important as the complexity and necessary precision of engineering artefacts has increased. In order to get an insight of the developments that have taken place over the passage of years, let us take the case of the modern aeroplanes. The aeroplane of the yester years, (Say in 1915) were single or double seater, built of wood and canvas with a simple rotary internal combustion engine, wire operated manual simple control surfaces, fixed undercarriage, and no brakes. The aeroplanes of 1940 were multi-engined, high speed, built of metal, had a complex propeller driven engine, still had manual, wire operated, simple controls, but had retractable undercarriage with brakes, often hydraulically operated, and could carry a number of passengers. The aeroplanes of 1960 (e.g. DC-8, B707) were pressurized, used to fly at very high altitude with jet speed, built of riveted metal sheet, powered by an axial flow jet engine, had powered assisted controls but still linked by rods to the control column, hydraulically operated undercarriage, and carried radars and radios and electronic navigation etc. On the other hand the modern aeroplanes (e.g. Airbus A- 320) are a sophisticated structure of milled metal and composite material components, with power operated controls, computer controlled stability and manoeuvring laws, many hydraulically and electrically operated subsystems, radars, radios and electronic navigation systems (Fly By Wire Technology, GPS and satellite assisted) etc. Keeping the aeroplane of 1915 fit to fly was a straight forward task comparable to keeping a car on the road. On the

264 260 Aviation Safety and Security Management contrary, keeping a modern aeroplane fit to fly is a complex task which, in the worst cases, could make the operational time to maintenance time ratio too small to be economic or practical. Consideration of reliability and maintainability has to be a primary design criterion of such aircraft alongside the other operational requirements and parameters. These stimuli led to the development of reliability and maintainability engineering as a distinct engineering specialization. Although the stimulus came from particular application areas, the consequences of the better understanding of reliability engineering have filtered into almost every branch of engineering. The modern motor car has benefited enormously from the improvements in reliability developed in other arenas. In the 1950s a typical car required servicing at 3000 mile intervals (including greasing of many chassis parts), would require a major engine overhaul (removing the engine from the car, dismantling and refurbishing many parts) at 60,000 mile intervals, used mechanical analogue ignition timing devices (called a distributor ), and often became a basket case due to chassis rusting at about 6-8 years old. The developments in reliability have extended the service intervals to 12,000 or 20,000 miles, the typical life of the engine to 200,000 miles or more, the life of the main structure to years, and made it practical to incorporate power assistance for steering, brakes, window operation, soft top operation, etc. Other everyday engineering artefacts (e.g. washing machines, dish washers, freezers) have similarly benefited. What is Reliability theory Reliability theory suggests that biological systems start their adult life with a high load of initial damage. Reliability theory is a general theory about systems failure. It allows researchers to predict the age-related failure kinetics for a system of given architecture (reliability structure) and given reliability of its components. Reliability theory predicts that even those systems that are entirely composed of non-aging elements (with a constant failure rate) will also deteriorate (fail more often) with age, if these systems are redundant in irreplaceable elements. Aging, therefore, is a direct consequence of systems redundancy.

265 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 261 Reliability theory also predicts the late-life mortality deceleration with subsequent levelling-off, as well as the latelife mortality plateaus, as an inevitable consequence of redundancy exhaustion at extreme old ages. The theory explains why mortality rates increase exponentially with age (the Gompertz law) in many species, by taking into account the initial flaws (defects) in newly formed systems. It also explains why organisms prefer to die according to the Gompertz** law, while technical devices usually fail according to the Weibull*** (power) law. Reliability theory allows to specify conditions when organisms die according to the Weibull law: organisms should be relatively free of initial flaws and defects. The theory makes it possible to find a general failure law applicable to all adult and extreme old ages, where the Gompertz and the Weibull laws are just special cases of this more general failure law. The theory explains why relative differences in mortality rates of compared populations (within a given species) vanish with age (compensation law of mortality), and mortality convergence is observed due to the exhaustion of initial differences in redundancy levels. [**Benjamin Gompertz (March 5, July 14, 1865, England), was a self educated mathematician, and a Fellow of the Royal Society. Gompertz is today mostly known for his Gompertz s law of mortality, a demographic model, which establishes the relationship between number of individuals at time, the intrinsic growth rate and the number of individuals in equilibrium. This model was used by insurance companies to calculate the cost of life insurance. ] [***Waloddi Weibull born on June 18, 1887 originally came from Denmark. Weibull s Power Law states that the logarithm of failure rates increases linearly with the logarithm of age.] Reliability theory is developed apart from the mainstream of probability and statistics. It was originally a tool to help nineteenth century maritime insurance and life insurance companies compute profitable rates to charge their customers. Even today, the terms failure rate and hazard rate are often used interchangeably.

266 262 Aviation Safety and Security Management The failure of mechanical devices such as ships, trains, and cars, is similar in many ways to the life or death of biological organisms. Statistical models appropriate for any of these topics are generically called time-to-event models. Death or failure is called an event, and the goal is to project or forecast the rate of events for a given population or the probability of an event for an individual. When reliability is considered from the perspective of the consumer of a technology or service, actual reliability measures may differ dramatically from perceived reliability. One bad experience can be magnified in the mind of the customer, inflating the perceived unreliability of the product. One plane crash where hundreds of passengers die will immediately instil fear in a large percentage of the flying consumer population, regardless of actual reliability data about the safety of air travel. Reliability theory of aging and longevity Reliability theory of aging and longevity is a scientific approach aimed to gain theoretical insights into mechanisms of biological aging and species survival patterns by applying a general theory of systems failure, known as reliability theory as mentioned above. Reliability theory allows researchers to predict the agerelated failure kinetics for a system of given architecture (reliability structure) and given reliability of its components. Applications of reliability-theory approach to the problem of biological aging and species longevity lead to the following conclusions: 1. Redundancy is a key of the notion for understanding aging and the systemic nature of aging in particular. Systems, which are redundant in numbers of irreplaceable elements, do deteriorate (i.e., are aging) over time, even if they are built of non-aging elements. 2. Paradoxically, the apparent aging rate or expression of aging (measured as relative differences in failure rates

267 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 263 between compared age groups) is higher for systems with higher redundancy levels. 3. Redundancy exhaustion over the life course explains the observed compensation law of mortality (mortality convergence at later life, when death rates are becoming relatively similar at advanced ages for different populations of the same biological species), as well as the observed late-life mortality deceleration, levellingoff, and mortality plateaus. 4. Living organisms seem to be formed with a high initial load of damage (HIDL hypothesis), and therefore their lifespan and aging patterns may be sensitive to earlylife conditions that determine this initial damage load during early development. The idea of early-life programming of aging and longevity may have important practical implications for developing early-life interventions promoting health and longevity. 5. Reliability theory explains why mortality rates increase exponentially with age (the Gompertz law) in many species, by taking into account the initial flaws (defects) in newly formed systems. It also explains why organisms prefer to die according to the Gompertz law, while technical devices usually fail according to the Weibull (power) law. Theoretical conditions are specified when organisms die according to the Weibull law: organisms should be relatively free of initial flaws and defects. The theory makes it possible to find a general failure law applicable to all adult and extreme old ages, where the Gompertz and the Weibull laws are just special cases of this more general failure law. 6. Reliability theory helps evolutionary theories to explain how the age of onset of deleterious mutations could be postponed during evolution, which could be easily achieved by a simple increase in initial redundancy levels. From the reliability perspective, the increase in initial redundancy levels is the simplest way to improve survival at particularly early reproductive ages (with gains fading at older ages). This matches exactly with

268 264 Aviation Safety and Security Management the higher fitness priority of early reproductive ages emphasized by evolutionary theories. Evolutionary and reliability ideas also help in understanding why organisms seem to choose a simple but short-term solution of the survival problem through enhancing the systems redundancy, instead of a more permanent but complicated solution based on rigorous repair (with the potential of achieving negligible senescence). Thus there are promising opportunities for merging the reliability and evolutionary theories of aging. Overall, the reliability theory provides a parsimonious explanation for many important aging-related phenomena and suggests a number of interesting testable predictions. Therefore, reliability theory seems to be a promising approach for developing a comprehensive theory of aging and longevity integrating mathematical methods with specific biological knowledge and evolutionary ideas. Reliability theory of aging provides an optimistic perspective on the opportunities for healthy life-extension. According to reliability theory, human lifespan is not fixed, and it could be further increased through better body maintenance, repair, and replacement of the failed body parts in the future. Failure rate Failure rate is the frequency with which an engineered system or component fails, expressed for example in failures per hour. It is often denoted by the Greek letter ë (lambda) and is important in reliability theory. In practice, the reciprocal rate MTBF is more commonly expressed and used for high quality components or systems. Failure rate is usually time dependent, and an intuitive corollary is that both rates change over time versus the expected life cycle of a system. For example, as an automobile grows older, the failure rate in its fifth year of service may be many times greater than its failure rate during its first year of service one simply does not expect to replace an exhaust pipe, overhaul the brakes, or have major power plant-transmission problems in a new vehicle. So in the

269 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 265 special case when the likelihood of failure remains constant with respect to time (for example, in some product like a brick or protected steel beam), failure rate is simply the inverse of the mean time between failure (MTBF), expressed for example in hours per failure. MTBF is an important specification parameter in all aspects of high importance engineering design such as naval architecture, aerospace engineering, automotive design, etc. in short, any task where failure in a key part or of the whole of a system needs be minimized and severely curtailed, particularly where lives might be lost if such factors are not taken into account. These factors account for many safety and maintenance practices in engineering and industry practices and government regulations, such as how often certain inspections and overhauls are required on an aircraft. A similar ratio used in the transport industries, especially in railways and trucking is Mean Distance Between Failure, a variation which attempts to correlate actual loaded distances to similar reliability needs and practices. Failure rates and their projective manifestations are important factors in insurance, business, and regulation practices as well as fundamental to design of safe systems throughout a national or international economy. Safety engineering Safety engineering is an applied science strongly related to systems engineering and the subset System Safety Engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system behaves as needed even when pieces fail. In the real world the term safety engineering refers to any act of accident prevention by a person qualified in the field. Safety engineering is often reactionary to adverse events, also described as incidents, as reflected in accident statistics. This arises largely because of the complexity and difficulty of collecting and analyzing data on near misses. Increasingly, the importance of a safety review is being recognized as an important risk management tool. Failure to identify risks to safety, and the according inability to address or control these risks, can result in massive costs,

270 266 Aviation Safety and Security Management both human and economic. The multidisciplinary nature of safety engineering means that a very broad array of professionals are actively involved in accident prevention or safety engineering. Safety engineers distinguish different extents of defective operation: A failure is the inability of a system or component to perform its required functions within specified performance requirements, while a fault is a defect in a device or component, for example: a short circuit or a broken wire. System-level failures are caused by lower-level faults, which are ultimately caused by basic component faults. The unexpected failure of a device that was operating within its design limits is a primary failure, while the expected failure of a component stressed beyond its design limits is a secondary failure. A device which appears to malfunction because it has responded as designed to a bad input is suffering from a command fault. A critical fault endangers one or a few people. A catastrophic fault endangers, harms or kills a significant number of people. Safety engineers also identify different modes of safe operation: A probabilistically safe system has no single point of failure, and enough redundant sensors, computers and effectors so that it is very unlikely to cause harm (usually very unlikely means, on average, less than one human life lost in a billion hours of operation). An inherently safe system is a clever mechanical arrangement that cannot be made to cause harm obviously the best arrangement, but this is not always possible. A fail-safe system is one that cannot cause harm when it fails. A fault-tolerant system can continue to operate with faults, though its operation may be degraded in some fashion. These terms combine to describe the safety needed by systems: For example, most biomedical equipment is only critical, and often another identical piece of equipment is nearby, so it can be merely probabilistically fail-safe. Train signals can cause catastrophic accidents (imagine chemical releases from tank-cars) and are usually inherently safe. Aircraft failures are catastrophic, so aircraft are usually probabilistically fault-tolerant. Without any safety features,

271 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 267 nuclear reactors might have catastrophic failures, so real nuclear reactors are required to be at least probabilistically fail-safe. The process Ideally, safety-engineers take an early design of a system, analyze it to find what faults can occur, and then propose safety requirements in design specifications up front and changes to existing systems to make the system safer. In an early design stage, often a fail-safe system can be made acceptably safe with a few sensors and some software to read them. Probabilistic fault-tolerant systems can often be made by using more, but smaller and less-expensive pieces of equipment. Far too often, rather than actually influencing the design, safety engineers are assigned to prove that an existing, completed design is safe. If a safety engineer then discovers significant safety problems late in the design process, correcting them can be very expensive. This type of error has the potential to waste large sums of money. The exception to this conventional approach is the way some large government agencies approach safety engineering from a more proactive and proven process perspective. This is known as System Safety. The System Safety philosophy, supported by the System Safety Society, is to be applied to complex and critical systems, such as commercial airliners, military aircraft, munitions and complex weapon systems, spacecraft and space systems, rail and transportation systems, air traffic control system and more complex and safety-critical industrial systems. The proven System Safety methods and techniques are to prevent, eliminate and control hazards and risks through designed influences by a collaboration of key engineering disciplines and product teams. Software safety is fast growing field since modern systems functionality are increasingly being put under control of software. The whole concept of system safety and software safety, as a subset of systems engineering, is to influence safety-critical systems designs by conducting several types of hazard analyses to identify risks and to specify design safety features and

272 268 Aviation Safety and Security Management procedures to strategically mitigate risk to acceptable levels before the system is certified. Additionally, failure mitigation can go beyond design recommendations, particularly in the area of maintenance. There is an entire realm of safety and reliability engineering known as Reliability Cantered Maintenance (RCM), which is a discipline that is a direct result of analyzing potential failures within a system and determining maintenance actions that can mitigate the risk of failure. This methodology is used extensively on aircraft and involves understanding the failure modes of the serviceable replaceable assemblies in addition to the means to detect or predict an impending failure. Every automobile owner is familiar with this concept when they take in their car to have the oil changed or brakes checked. Even filling up one s car with gas is a simple example of a failure mode (failure due to fuel starvation), a means of detection (fuel gauge), and a maintenance action. For large scale complex systems, hundreds if not thousands of maintenance actions can result from the failure analysis. These maintenance actions are based on conditions (e.g., gauge reading or leaky valve), hard conditions (e.g., a component is known to fail after 100 hrs of operation with 95% certainty), or require inspection to determine the maintenance action (e.g., metal fatigue). The Reliability Cantered Maintenance concept then analyzes each individual maintenance item for its risk contribution to safety, mission, operational readiness, or cost to repair if a failure does occur. Then the sum total of all the maintenance actions are bundled into maintenance intervals so that maintenance is not occurring around the clock, but rather, at regular intervals. This bundling process introduces further complexity, as it might stretch some maintenance cycles, thereby increasing risk, but reduce others, thereby potentially reducing risk, with the end result being a comprehensive maintenance schedule, purpose built to reduce operational risk and ensure acceptable levels of operational readiness and availability. Data Analysis The data can then be studied and analysed. The results will provide us the steps to be taken for controlling the risk.

273 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 269 Safety certification Usually a failure in safety-certified systems is acceptable if, on average, less than one life per 10 9 hours of continuous operation is lost to failure. Most Western nuclear reactors, medical equipment, and commercial aircraft are certified to this level. The cost versus loss of lives has been considered appropriate at this level by FAA for aircraft under Federal Aviation Regulations. Other countries also more or less follow similar procedures. The Bow-Tie Diagram In 2004, the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) mandated that its regulated entities employ a technique known as the Bow-Tie Diagram as the main mechanism for safety analyses (FAST 2004). This technique is also recommended by other bodies responsible for safety in air traffic control (EuroControl 2004) and safety management in hazardous industries. Causes: potential causes of an undesirable Incident; Proactive Controls: actions taken to reduce the likelihood of an undesirable Incident occurring; Incident: an event that can cause undesirable Outcomes; Reactive Controls: actions taken to reduce the impact of an undesirable Incident; and Outcomes: potential results of an undesirable Incident.

274 270 Aviation Safety and Security Management The left-hand side of the diagram is often called a Fault Tree, which is a detailed analysis of the combination of causes ( faults ) that can possibly give rise to an undesirable incident, while the right hand side is often called an Event Tree, which is a detailed analysis of the Outcomes or Consequences of an undesirable Incident. (The Bow-Tie sequence is also termed: Hazard Preventative Controls Incident Mitigating Controls Consequences in some Safety Management areas.) In essence, the diagram attempts to answer the two fundamental questions : what is the potential frequency of a particular scenario occurring [i.e. left side/fault Tree] and secondly, what is its potential loss severity [i.e. right side/ Event Tree]? In industrial applications, Bow-Tie analyses are most often employed to identify and assess the potentially disastrous impact of the failure of mechanical components, such as chemical containment vessels or airframe components. In this relatively simple example, there is the potentially disastrous incident of a flat tyre occurring during airplane take-off. The causes are identified on the left and, on the right, the conditions that give rise to various outcomes, some

275 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 271 much worse than others. In practice, of course, a diagram would be much more complex than this one. Advantages of using the bow tie assessment are often identified as (e.g. Euro Control 2004): It provides a common language for communication between independent risk managers and operational experts; The full range of Causes (i.e. inherent risks ) and Proactive Controls (i.e. residual risks ) can be shown and discussed; The combination and interaction of Causes and Proactive Controls can be clearly illustrated; and Likewise the full range of Outcomes (i.e. Losses in Basel terminology) and Reactive Controls can be illustrated and discussed. In summary, the complex linkages between possible Causes and potential Outcomes can be made explicit and that assists in drawing a clear picture for the precise drivers that generate losses. Furthermore, if each stage of analysis, e.g. moving from left to right, is carried out by experts and then brought together into a coherent whole by independent risk analysts/moderators then such a process should qualify for being robust and methodical for Basel purposes. Weaknesses Of course the bow-tie technique is not a panacea; it is merely a way of making risk management assumptions, analyses and conclusions explicit. It has known weaknesses, including: The quality of the final analysis will totally depend on the quality of the analysis process and the analysts and experts taking part: garbage in - garbage out; The technique does not help in uncovering underlying causes, merely in making their consequences explicit, there is therefore an earlier analysis step (i.e. Risk Identification) required;

276 272 Aviation Safety and Security Management It is a semi-quantitative methodology and hence requires an additional step of estimating the impact of each outcome numerically as required by Basel II, and It can be gamed by staff members who may have a different agenda, so requires additional supporting information to be captured such as external data or other documented factors which can suffice as evidence. A methodical approach to estimating risk in any Scenario Analysis exercise is extremely important. Research in risk perception shows, for example, that people will invariably overestimate the likelihood of an event with which they have some familiarity rather than a completely alien one and will extrapolate from known situations to estimate an unknown one, invariably not making a large enough adjustment (i.e. will underestimate the risk). Furthermore, researchers have found that experts are over confident in their ability to estimate accurately from small data samples. Nor does using a number of experts, rather than one, to estimate risks necessarily lead to a better estimation, as the well-known phenomenon of groupthink can lead groups to make completely wrong, but agreed, conclusions. The use of a Bow-Tie approach does not, of course, eliminate these problems, merely reduces the likelihood of error by segregating risk analysis into smaller, discrete, independent components and reducing cross-contamination between them. Of course it should be recognized, especially for low-probability events, small errors in one part may be amplified in others a problem with all subjective techniques. Therefore a good taxonomy is required for homogenous loss data collection that can show when correlation factors are present for broad impacts that cross over from one risk classification into another. Application of the Bow-Tie Diagram in Scenario Analysis A Bow-Tie diagram is a graphical representation of a Scenario. Having identified a Scenario, such as flat tyre in the FAA example, the situation can be analysed in a methodical manner, by experts, as follows:

277 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories 273 Identify potential Causes: using operational/business experts, risk managers and, if appropriate, external experts; Assess the effectiveness of Proactive and Reactive Controls: using independent internal/ external auditors and risk managers; Identify and assess possible Outcomes: using operational/business experts, risk managers and, where possible, internal and external experience; Build a Bow-Tie model of the Scenario (i.e. Causes, Controls and Outcomes): using business and independent assessments and, where available, historical data and evaluate the range/distribution of potential Outcomes and their sensitivity to assumptions of the key parameters; and Refine the Model: based on business/risk management feedback and any additional analyses required. In order to satisfy the requirements, such a process would have to be judged: Methodical: with each component step performed to agreed procedures with well-defined separation of responsibilities; Robust: able to be replicated by different analysts and experts, producing results that are not too dissimilar; Comprehensive and Consistent: used in the same way across all business units; Well-documented: in a consistent fashion with sufficient detail; to permit Independent Review and Validation: by external and independent experts. It is therefore desirable that a firm should build a database of scenario based events that can be reviewed periodically and modified as business conditions change. The consistent use of a Bow-Tie technique should aid the development of

278 274 Aviation Safety and Security Management such a database, allowing rational discussion between risk analysts and business managers to take place when discussing new initiatives, which is a major benefit of such an approach, overcoming a major hurdle in subjective assessment. Since financial firms are subject to similar risks (although their individual control environment and consequent range of potential outcomes may vary significantly), there is the potential for developing a database of scenarios that are applicable across the industry. For example, the loss of a shared industry service such as an Exchange or Clearing house. Such a scenario is the same for all participating firms, but the impact may vary wildly, depending on: for example, transaction volumes, customer impact and the quality of their BCP (Business Continuity Planning). References 1. Radatz, Jane (Sep 28, 1990). IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology (PDF), New York, NY, USA: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 84 pages. ISBN X. 2. Vesely, W.E.; F. F. Goldberg, N. H. Roberts, D. F. Haasl (Jan, 1981). Fault Tree Handbook (PDF), Washington, DC, USA: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, page V- 3. NUREG Retrieved on Gompertz, B., (1825). On the Nature of the Function Expressive of the Law of Human Mortality, and on a New Mode of Determining the Value of Life Contingencies. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 115 (1825). 4. Weibull, W. (1951) A statistical distribution function of wide applicability J. Appl. Mech.-Trans. ASME 18(3), Safety First Scenario Analysis under Basel II Patrick Mc Connell, and Martin Davies April EUROCONTROL (2004) Review Of Techniques To Support The EATMAP Safety Assessment Methodology Volume 4 European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation;

279 UNIT 13 Reliability Fundamental Theories FAST (2004) Toolsets / System Safety Management Program- Section 4, Federal Aviation Authority Acquisition System Toolset; fast.faa.gov Questions General Questions. 1. What do you mean by the reliability theory? 2. What do you mean by Failure rates? 3. How Failure rate and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), are mathematically related with each other. 4. What is a bow-tie diagram? How the application of the Bow-Tie Diagram can be used in Scenario Analysis Objective Type of questions a. Reliability theory is developed apart from the mainstream of. Answers to Objective Type of questions b. Probability and statistics.

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281 Appendix 277 APPENDIX 1 DEFINITIONS. Aerodrome. A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft. Aerodrome beacon. Aeronautical beacon used to indicate the location of an aerodrome from the air. Aerodrome certificate. A certificate issued by the appropriate authority under applicable regulations for the operation of an aerodrome. Aerodrome elevation. The elevation of the highest point of the landing area. Aerodrome identification sign. A sign placed on an aerodrome to aid in identifying the aerodrome from the air. Aerodrome reference point. The designated geographical location of an aerodrome. Aerodrome traffic density. (a) (b) (c) Light: Where the number of movements in the mean busy hour is not greater than 15 per runway or typically less than 20 total aerodrome movements. Medium: Where the number of movements in the mean busy hour is of the order of 16 to 25 per runway or typically between 20 to 35 total aerodrome movements. Heavy: Where the number of movements in the mean busy hour is of the order of 26 or more per runway or typically more than 35 total aerodrome movements. Note 1: The number of movements in the mean busy hour is the arithmetic mean over the year of the number of movements in the daily busiest hour. Note 2: Either a take-off or a landing constitutes a movement. Aeronautical ground light. Any light specially provided as an aid to air navigation, other than a light displayed on an aircraft.

282 278 Aviation Safety and Security Management Aeroplane reference field length. The minimum field length required for take-off at maximum certificated takeoff mass, sea level, standard atmospheric conditions, still air and zero runway slope, as shown in the appropriate aeroplane flight manual prescribed by the certificating authority or equivalent data from the aeroplane manufacturer. Field length means balanced field length for aeroplanes, if applicable, or take-off distance in other cases. Aircraft classification number (ACN). A number expressing the relative effect of an aircraft on a pavement for a specified standard subgrade category. Note. The aircraft classification number is calculated with respect to the centre of gravity (CG) position which yields the critical loading on the critical gear. Normally the aftmost CG position appropriate to the maximum gross apron (ramp) mass is used to calculate the ACN. In exceptional cases the forward-most CG position may result in the nose gear loading being more critical. Aircraft stand. A designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft. Also known as Parking Bay or Gate. Aircraft stands are named as Stand Nos 1,2, 3,...,31,..,45 etc. Apron. A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance. Apron management service. A service provided to regulate the activities and the movement of aircraft and vehicles on an apron. Barrette. Three or more aeronautical ground lights closely spaced in a transverse line so that from a distance they appear as a short bar of light. Capacitor discharge light. A lamp in which high-intensity flashes of extremely short duration are produced by the discharge of electricity at high voltage through a gas enclosed in a tube. Certified aerodrome. An aerodrome whose operator has been granted an aerodrome certificate.

283 Appendix 279 Clearway. A defined rectangular area on the ground or water under the control of the appropriate authority, selected or prepared as a suitable area over which an aeroplane may make a portion of its initial climb to a specified height. Compass locator (LOM): a low power, low or medium frequency radio beacon installed in conjunction with the instrument landing system. When LOM is used, the locator is at the Outer Marker; when LMM is used, the locator is at the Middle Marker. Cyclic redundancy check (CRC). A mathematical algorithm applied to the digital expression of data that provides a level of assurance against loss or alteration of data. De-icing/anti-icing facility. A facility where frost, ice or snow is removed (de-icing) from the aeroplane to provide clean surfaces, and/or where clean surfaces of the aeroplane receive protection (anti-icing) against the formation of frost or ice and accumulation of snow or slush for a limited period of time. De-icing/anti-icing pad. An area comprising an inner area for the parking of an aeroplane to receive de-icing/anti-icing treatment and an outer area for the manoeuvring of two or more mobile de-icing/anti-icing equipment. Declared distances. (a) Take-off run available (TORA): The length of runway declared available and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane taking off. (b) (c) (d) Take-off distance available (TODA): The length of the take-off run available plus the length of the clearway, if provided. Accelerate-stop distance available (ASDA): The length of the take-off run available plus the length of the stopway, if provided. Landing distance available (LDA): The length of runway which is declared available and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane landing.

284 280 Aviation Safety and Security Management Displaced threshold. A threshold not located at the extremity of a runway. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME): equipment (airborne and ground) used to measure, in nautical miles, the slant range distance of an aircraft from the DME navigational aid. DNL: day-night noise level. The daily average noise metric in which that noise occurring between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. is penalized by 10 times. Downwind leg: a flight path parallel to the landing runway in the direction opposite to landing. The downwind leg normally extends between the crosswind leg and the base leg. Enplaned passengers: the total number of revenue passengers boarding aircraft, including originating, stopover, and transfer passengers, in scheduled and nonscheduled services. General aviation: that portion of civil aviation which encompasses all facets of aviation except air carriers holding a certificate of convenience and necessity, and large aircraft commercial operators. Glide slope equipment: electrical equipment that emits signals which provide vertical guidance by reference to airborne instruments during instrument approaches (such as an ILS) or visual ground aids (such as VASI) which provide vertical guidance for a VFR approach, or for the visual portion of an instrument approach and landing. Global positioning system (GPS): a navigational technology based on a constellation of satellites orbiting approximately 11,000 miles above the surface of the earth. Ground effect: the excess attenuation attributed to absorption or reflection of noise by man-made or natural features on the ground surface. Hazard beacon. An aeronautical beacon used to designate a danger to air navigation.

285 Appendix 281 Heliport. An aerodrome or a defined area on a structure intended to be used wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters. Holding bay. A defined area where aircraft can be held, or bypassed, to facilitate efficient surface movement of aircraft. Human Factors principles. Principles which apply to aeronautical design, certification, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration to human performance. Human performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and efficiency of aeronautical operations. Identification beacon. An aeronautical beacon emitting a coded signal by means of which a particular point of reference can be identified. Instrument runway. One of the following types of runways intended for the operation of aircraft using instrument approach procedures: (a) (b) (c) (d) Non-precision approach runway: An instrument runway served by visual aids and a non-visual aid providing at least directional guidance adequate for a straight-in approach. Precision approach runway, category I: An instrument runway served by ILS and/or MLS and visual aids intended for operations with a decision height not lower than 60 m (200 ft) and either a visibility not less than 800 m or a runway visual range not less than 550 m. Precision approach runway, category II: An instrument runway served by ILS and/or MLS and visual aids intended for operations with a decision height lower than 60 m (200 ft) but not lower than 30 m (100 ft) and a runway visual range not less than 350 m. Precision approach runway, category III: An instrument runway served by ILS and/or MLS to and along the surface of the runway and:

286 282 Aviation Safety and Security Management A intended for operations with a decision height lower than 30 m (100 ft), or no decision height and a runway visual range not less than 200 m. B intended for operations with a decision height lower than 15 m (50 ft), or no decision height and a runway visual range less than 200 m but not less than 50 m. C intended for operations with no decision height and no runway visual range limitations. Note 2: Visual aids need not necessarily be matched to the scale of non-visual aids provided. The criterion for the selection of visual aids is the conditions in which operations are intended to be conducted. Intermediate holding position. A designated position intended for traffic control at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall stop and hold until further cleared to proceed, when so instructed by the aerodrome control tower. Instrument approach procedure (IAP): a series of predetermined manoeuvres for the orderly transfer of an aircraft under instrument flight conditions from the beginning of the initial approach to a landing, or to a point from which a landing may be made visually. It is prescribed and approved for a specific airport by competent authority. Instrument flight rules (IFR): rules governing the procedures for conducting instrument flight. Also a term used by pilots and controllers to indicate type of flight plan. Instrument landing system (ILS): a precision instrument approach system which normally consists of the following electronic components and visual aids: localizer, glide slope, outer marker, middle marker, and approach lights. Landing area. That part of a movement area intended for the landing or take-off of aircraft. Landing direction indicator. A device to indicate visually the direction currently designated for landing and for takeoff. Localizer (LOC): the component of an ILS which provides horizontal guidance to the runway centreline for aircraft

287 Appendix 283 during approach and landing by radiating a directional pattern of radio waves modulated by two signals which, when received with equal intensity, are displayed by compatible airborne equipment as an on-course indication, and when received in unequal intensity are displayed as an off-course indication. Manoeuvring area. That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons. Marker. An object displayed above ground level in order to indicate an obstacle or delineate a boundary. Marking. A symbol or group of symbols displayed on the surface of the movement area in order to convey aeronautical information. Microwave landing system (MLS): a precision instrument approach system that provides precision guidance in azimuth, elevation, and distance measurement. Missed approach: a manoeuvre conducted by a pilot when an instrument approach can not be completed to a landing. This may be due to visual contact not established at authorized minimums or instructions from air traffic control, or other reasons. Movement area. That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the manoeuvring area and the apron(s). Near-parallel runways. Non-intersecting runways whose extended centre lines have an angle of convergence/ divergence of 15 degrees or less. Non-directional beacon (NDB): a radio beacon transmitting non-directional signals that a pilot of an aircraft equipped with direction finding equipment can determine his/her bearing to or from the radio beacon and home on or track to or from the station. When the radio beacon is installed in conjunction with the instrument landing system marker, it is normally called a compass locator.

288 284 Aviation Safety and Security Management Non-instrument runway. A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using visual approach procedures. Nonprecision approach procedure: a standard instrument approach procedure in which no electronic glide slope is provided, such as VOR, GPS, RNAV, ASR, LDA, SDF, TACAN, NDB, or LOC. Obstacle. All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft or that extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight. Obstacle free zone (OFZ). The airspace above the inner approach surface, inner transitional surfaces, and balked landing surface and that portion of the strip bounded by these surfaces, which is not penetrated by any fixed obstacle other than a low-mass and frangibly mounted one required for air navigation purposes. Operation: a take-off or a landing. Outer marker (OM): an ILS navigation facility in the terminal area navigation system located four to seven miles from the runway threshold on the extended centreline of the runway, indicating to the pilot, that he/she is passing over the facility and can begin final approach. Pavement classification number (PCN). A number expressing the bearing strength of a pavement for unrestricted operations. Precision approach path indicator (PAPI): an airport lighting facility in the terminal area navigation system used primarily under VFR conditions. The PAPI provides visual decent guidance to aircraft on approach to landing through a single row of two to four lights, radiating a high intensity red or white beam to indicate whether the pilot is above or below the required approach path to the runway. The PAPI has an effective visual range of 5 miles during the day and 20 miles at night. Precision approach procedure: a standard instrument approach procedure in which an electronic glide slope is provided, such as ILS or MLS.

289 Appendix 285 Precision instrument runway: a runway having a existing instrument landing system (ILS). Primary runway(s). Runway(s) used in preference to others whenever conditions permit. Road. An established surface route on the movement area meant for the exclusive use of vehicles. Road-holding position. A designated position at which vehicles may be required to hold. Runway. A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-off of aircraft. The runways are named according to their Magnetic Bearings with reference to North rounded to nearest Thus each runway has two names separated by For example the Runway at Delhi (IGI Airport) are 09/27 & 10/28. and Runway at Mumbai are 09/27 & 14/32. Runway end safety area (RESA). An area symmetrical about the extended runway centre line and adjacent to the end of the strip primarily intended to reduce the risk of damage to an aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway. Runway guard lights. A light system intended to caution pilots or vehicle drivers that they are about to enter an active runway. Runway-holding position. A designated position intended to protect a runway, an obstacle limitation surface, or an ILS/ MLS critical/sensitive area at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall stop and hold, unless otherwise authorized by the aerodrome control tower. Runway strip. A defined area including the runway and stopway, if provided, intended: (a) (b) to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft running off a runway; and to protect aircraft flying over it during take-off or landing operations.

290 286 Aviation Safety and Security Management Runway turn pad. A defined area on a land aerodrome adjacent to a runway for the purpose of completing a 180- degree turn on a runway. Runway visual range (RVR). The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of a runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centre line. Safety Management System. A system for the management of safety at aerodromes, including the organizational structure, responsibilities, procedures, processes and provisions for the implementation of aerodrome safety policies by an aerodrome operator, which provides for control of safety at, and the safe use of aerodrome. Segregated parallel operations. Simultaneous operations on parallel or near-parallel instrument runways in which one runway is used exclusively for approaches and the other runway is used exclusively for departures. Shoulder. An area adjacent to the edge of a pavement so prepared as to provide a transition between the pavement and the adjacent surface. Sign. (a) (b) Fixed message sign: A sign presenting only one message. Variable message sign: A sign capable of presenting several pre-determined messages or no message, as applicable. Signal area. An area on an aerodrome used for the display of ground signals. Slush. Water-saturated snow which with a heel-and-toe slapdown motion against the ground will be displaced with a splatter; specific gravity: 0.5 up to 0.8. Note. Combinations of ice, snow and/or standing water may, especially when rain, rain and snow, or snow is falling, produce substances with specific gravities in excess of 0.8. These substances, due to their high water/ice content, will have a transparent rather than a cloudy appearance and, at

291 Appendix 287 the higher specific gravities, will be readily distinguishable from slush. Snow (on the ground) (a) (b) (c) Dry snow: Snow which can be blown if loose or, if compacted by hand, will fall apart again upon release; specific gravity: up to but not including Wet snow: Snow which, if compacted by hand, will stick together and tend to or form a snowball; specific gravity: 0.35 up to but not including 0.5. Compacted snow: Snow which has been compressed into a solid mass that resists further compression and will hold together or break up into lumps if picked up; specific gravity: 0.5 and over. Stopway. A defined rectangular area on the ground at the end of take-off run available prepared as a suitable area in which an aircraft can be stopped in the case of an abandoned take off. Take-off runway. A runway intended for take-off only. Taxiway. A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxiing of aircraft and intended to provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another, including: (a) (b) (c) Aircraft stand taxilane: A portion of an apron designated as a taxiway and intended to provide access to aircraft stands only. Apron taxiway: A portion of a taxiway system located on an apron and intended to provide a through taxi route across the apron. Rapid exit taxiway: A taxiway connected to a runway at an acute angle and designed to allow landing aeroplanes to turn off at higher speeds than are achieved on other exit taxiways thereby minimizing runway occupancy times. Taxiways are named as per alphabetical letters e.g. Taxiways-A, Taxiways-B, Taxiways-C1 etc. Taxiway intersection. A junction of two or more taxiways.

292 288 Aviation Safety and Security Management Taxiway strip. An area including a taxiway intended to protect an aircraft operating on the taxiway and to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft accidentally running off the taxiway. Threshold. The beginning of that portion of the runway usable for landing. Touchdown zone. The portion of a runway, beyond the threshold, where it is intended landing aeroplanes first contact the runway. Usability factor. The percentage of time during which the use of a runway or system of runways is not restricted because of the cross-wind component. Note. Cross-wind component means the surface wind component at right angles to the runway centre line. Vector: a heading issued to an aircraft to provide navigational guidance by radar. Visual approach: an approach wherein an aircraft on an IFR flight plan, operating in VFR conditions under the control of an air traffic facility and having an air traffic control authorization, may proceed to the airport of destination in VFR conditions. Visual approach slope indicator (VASI): an airport lighting facility in the terminal area navigation system used primarily under VFR conditions. It provides vertical visual guidance to aircraft during approach and landing, by radiating a pattern of high intensity red and white focused light beams which indicate to the pilot that he/she is above, on, or below the glide path. Visual flight rules (VFR): rules that govern the procedures for conducting flight under visual conditions.

293 Appendix 289 APPENDIX 2 This AIC is issued under the provisions of Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 for information, guidance and compliance by the concerned operators operating air transport services to, through within and over flying the Indian airspace. The information contained in this AIC has also been circulated vide Civil Aviation Requirements, Section 2 - Airworthiness, Series I Part VIII Revision 3 dated 27th April, Cancellation: AIC 3 of 2001 is hereby cancelled (K Gohain) DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION Subject: Installation of Airborne Collision Avoidance System. 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 With the liberalisation of air transport operations in the country, the domestic operations have increased considerably. Besides, there is congestion in the Indian airspace on account of large number of international flights over flying or transiting through India. While the air traffic services and associated facilities are continuously being upgraded and modernised by the Airports Authority of India for ensuring safety of aircraft operations in the Indian airspace, it is also considered necessary to upgrade the airborne equipment of aeroplanes to reduce the risk of midair collisions between aircraft. Installation of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), which is an airborne equipment

294 290 Aviation Safety and Security Management that functions independently of the ground based air traffic control system, can help in 2 preventing mid-air collisions. However, the level of protection provided by ACAS equipment depends on the type of transponder the intruder aeroplane is carrying. 1.2 This CAR is issued under the provision of Rule 29C and Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules APPLICABILITY The requirements of this CAR are applicable to aeroplanes referred in Paras 5 and 6 and engaged in commercial and general aviation operations to, through, within and overflying the Indian airspace. 3. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this CAR, the following terms shall have the meanings as given against each:- 3.1 Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) : An aeroplane system based on Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder signals which operates independently of ground-based equipment to provide advice to the pilot on potential conflicting aeroplane that are equipped with SSR transponder 3.2 ACAS I: An ACAS which provides information as an aid to see and avoid action but does not include the capability for generating resolution advisories (RAs). 3.3 ACAS II: An ACAS which provides vertical resolution advisories (RAs) in addition to the traffic advisories. TCAS II with change 7 is equivalent to ACAS II. 3.4 Commercial air transport operation. An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire. 3.5 General aviation operation.

295 Appendix 291 An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport operation or an aerial work operation. 3.6 Intruder: An SSR transponder-equipped aeroplane within the surveillance range of ACAS for which, ACAS has an established track. 3.7 Resolution Advisory (RA): An indication given to the flight crew recommending: (a) a manoeuvre intended to provide separation from all threats; or (b) a manoeuvre restriction intended to maintain existing separation 3.8 Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR): A surveillance radar system which uses transmitters/ receivers (interrogators) and transponders. 3.9 Traffic Advisory (TA): An indication given to the flight crew that a certain intruder is a potential threat. 4. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS of ACAS I and ACAS II 4.1 ACAS I shall perform the following functions: (a) (b) surveillance of nearby SSR transponder equipped aeroplanes; and provide indications to the flight crew identifying the approximate position of nearby aeroplanes as an aid to the visual acquisition. 4.2 ACAS II shall perform the following functions: (a) (b) (c) (d) surveillance; generation of TAs; threat detection; generation of RAs;

296 292 (e) (f) co-ordination; and Aviation Safety and Security Management communication with ground stations. 4.3 Airborne Collision Avoidance System should be of an approved type meeting the specifications contained in Annex 10 (Volume IV) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation or FAA TSO C-119 or any other equivalent specification acceptable to DGCA. 5. Aeroplanes engaged in Commercial air transport operation: 5.1 All turbine-engined aeroplanes having a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of kg or authorized to carry more than 30 passengers or maximum payload capacity of more than 3 tonnes shall be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II). 5.2 All turbine-engined aeroplanes having a maximum certificated take off mass in excess of 5700 kg but not exceeding kg or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers, which are imported on or after 1st April 2006, shall be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II). 5.3 All turbine-engined aeroplanes having a maximum certificated take off mass in excess of 5700 kg but not exceeding kg or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers, which are imported before 1st April 2006, shall be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS I). 5.4 All turbine-engined aeroplanes having a maximum certificated take off mass 5700 kg or less and authorized to carry 10 to 19 passengers shall be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS I). 5.5 All twin jet-engined aeroplanes having a maximum certificated take off mass 5700 kg or less and authorized to carry less than 10 passengers shall be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS I). 5.6 It is recommended that all aeroplanes covered under Paras 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 should be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II).

297 Appendix An airborne collision avoidance system shall operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Annex 10, Volume IV. 6. Aeroplanes engaged in General aviation operation: 6.1 All turbine-engined aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of kg, or authorized to carry more than 30 passengers, for which the individual airworthiness certificate is first issued after 24 November 2005, shall be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II). 6.2 It is recommended that all turbine-engined aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take off mass in excess of 5700 kg but not exceeding kg, or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers, for which the individual airworthiness certificate is first issued after 01 January 2008, should be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II). Note 1. The term individual airworthiness certificate is first issued means certificate of airworthiness issued to the individual aircraft after manufacture. Note 2. The term turbine-engined includes turbojet, turbo-prop and turbo-fan engines. Note 3. The term authorised to carry number of passengers implies the passengers seating capacity as per type certificate. 7. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 7.1 The Airplane Flight Manual shall contain the appropriate procedures for the ACAS II or ACAS I, as applicable, duly approved by the concerned regulatory authority. 7.2 The Operations Manual and the Training Manual of the operator shall respectively include the operational procedures and the training required for the flight crew on the ACAS.

298 294 Aviation Safety and Security Management 7.3 The operating crew shall be adequately trained and kept proficient on the functioning of the ACAS. It should be emphasised that maximum benefit of 5 ACAS is obtained when pilots of both the aeroplanes respond promptly and correctly to their respective TAs/RAs. Note 1: Procedures for the use of ACAS equipment are specified in the procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft operations (PANS OPS, Doc 8168), Volume I Flight procedures. ACAS Training Guidelines for pilots are provided in PANS OPS, Volume I, Attachment A to Part VIII. Note 2: Appropriate training, to the satisfaction of DGCA, to competency in the use of ACAS equipment and the avoidance of collisions may be evidenced, for example by: (a) (b) (c) possession of a type rating for an aeroplane equipped with ACAS, where the operation and use of ACAS are included in the training syllabus for the type rating; or possession of a document issued by a training organization or a person approved by the DGCA to conduct training for pilots in the use of ACAS, indicating that the holder has been trained in accordance with the guidelines referred to in Note. 1; or a comprehensive pre-flight briefing by a pilot who has been trained in the use of ACAS in accordance with the guidelines referred to in Note In addition to the other applicable requirements, the following procedures shall be followed by the flight crew for the operation of ACAS: (a) (b) The pilots shall not manoeuvre the aeroplanes in response to a TA only. The pilots, however, shall search for the approaching traffic. In the event of RA to alter the flight path, the search for the conflicting traffic shall include a visual scan

299 Appendix 295 (c) (d) (e) of the airspace into which own ACAS aeroplane might manoeuvre. The alteration of the flight path shall be limited to the minimum extent necessary to comply with the RA. Pilots who deviate from an ATC clearance in response to an RA, shall promptly return to the terms of the previous ATC instruction or clearance when the conflict is resolved. The pilots shall, as soon as practicable, notify the ATC unit of the direction of the RA, and, when the conflict is resolved, that they are returning to the terms of the current ATC clearance. Note: When RA is initiated and in response thereof the pilot deviates from ATC clearance, he is not considered to be violating the ATC instructions. 7.5 The ACAS system shall be kept ON while operating in the Indian airspace. 7.6 Every flight plan for a flight in the Indian airspace shall indicate that the aeroplane is equipped with a serviceable ACAS equipment required as per this CAR. 7.7 Any pilot experiencing RA while flying in Indian airspace, shall file a report on R/T with the handling Air Traffic Control Unit in India followed by a written report to the DGCA India and Airports Authority of India. A proforma for filing the written report is given as Appendix A. 7.8 The ATC controllers shall be adequately trained on the capabilities and limitations of ACAS and on the procedures to be applied for the provision of Air Traffic Services to aeroplanes equipped with ACAS in accordance with the ICAO requirements. 7.9 Once an aeroplane departs from an assigned ATC clearance in compliance with an RA, the ATC controller ceases to be responsible for providing ATC separation between that aeroplane and other aeroplane affected by the direct consequence of that RA manoeuvre.

300 296 Aviation Safety and Security Management Controller s responsibility for providing separation for all affected aeroplanes resumes when either: i. the aeroplane returns to the assigned clearance; or ii. the pilot reports the ATC Controller that the RA manoeuvre is completed and the ATC controller confirms that separation is established. 8. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS 8.1 The ACAS equipment shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer s maintenance programme. The inspection schedules shall include the manufacturer s maintenance requirements. 8.2 The performance of the ACAS is highly sensitive to altimetry error both for the ACAS-equipped aeroplane and intruder aeroplane. It is therefore necessary that the accuracy of the aeroplane altimetry system be sufficiently high for successful operational use of ACAS. This aspect should be highlighted in the maintenance system manual and to all concerned personnel. 8.3 The Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (AME) holding licence in Category R / V on the type of aeroplane shall undergo adequate training on the maintenance of the 7 ACAS. After successful completion of the training and oral check, the Quality Control Manager of the organisation shall issue a certificate after which the AME licence is deemed to cover the inspection and certification of ACAS. A copy of the certificate shall be forwarded to the Regional Airworthiness office of the DGCA. 8.4 The type training of AMEs on Radio/Avionics System shall include training on ACAS installed on the aeroplane. 8.5 The provisions contained in the MEL with regard to unserviceability of ACAS as approved by the concerned Civil Aviation Authorities shall be acceptable. However, in no case the ACAS shall be unserviceable for more than ten days.

301 Appendix 297 APPENDIX A PILOT/OBSERVER RA REPORT Aircraft Operator Pilot Observer Name Telephone SSR (Information requested on this line is optional) Aircraft ID Aircraft Type Aerodrome of Departure Destination Date and time of event UTC Own aircraft altitude Own aircraft position FIR VOR Radial DME Or LAT LONG Phase of Flight Take-off Climb Cruise Descent Hold Final Missed approach Clearance ft/fl TA Information TA issued? YES NO Visual contact prior to RA? YES NO ATS advisory? YES NO RA Information Intruder bearing o clock Intruder range NM Relative altitude _ ft Type of RA (climb, crossing climb, VSL500, etc.) Did you follow the RA? If applicable, did ATS instruction conflict with the RA? YES NO YES NO

302 298 Was RA necessary? General information Aviation Safety and Security Management YES NO Flight conditions: IMC VMC Day Night Visibility: NM Air traffic service provided : En-route control Aerodrome/ approach control Flight information Remarks Note: The report should be forwarded to the Director of Air Safety, Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation, Opp. Safdarjung Airport, Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi (Phone , Fax No ). With a copy to the Director of Air Routes and Aerodrome (Operations), Airport Authority of India, Rajiv Gandhi Bhavan, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi (Phone ,Fax ) ***

303 Appendix 299 APPENDIX 3 The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules, 2003 (Promulgated by DGCA vide Aeronautical Information Circular AIC 03 of 2004 Dated 24 th Feb 2004) The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules, Short title, extent and application: (1) These rules may be called the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules, (2) They extend to whole of India and apply also (a) (b) (c) to aircraft registered in India or aircraft operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent place of residence in India, wherever they may be; to all aircraft for the time being in or over India; and to persons operating air transport services to, from, within and over India, shippers of dangerous goods or their agents (3) They shall come into force on the date of their final publication in the Official Gazette. 2. Definitions and interpretation; In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context (1) aerodrome means any definite or limited ground or water area intended to be used, either wholly or in part, for the landing or departure of aircraft, and includes all buildings, sheds, vessels, piers and other structures thereon or appertaining thereto; (2) aircraft means any machine which can derive support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air other than reactions of the air against the earth s surface and includes balloons whether fixed or free, airships, kites, gliders and flying machines;

304 300 Aviation Safety and Security Management (3) cargo aircraft means any aircraft, other than a passenger aircraft, which is carrying goods or property; (4) crew member means a person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during a flight duty period; (5) dangerous goods means articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are listed as such in the Technical Instructions or which are classified according to the Technical Instructions; (6) dangerous goods accident means an occurrence associated with and related to the transport of dangerous goods by air which results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property damage; (7) dangerous goods incident means an occurrence, other than a dangerous goods accident, associated with and related to the transport of dangerous goods by air, not necessarily occurring on board an aircraft, which results in injury to a person, damage to property, fire, breakage, spillage, leakage of fluid or radiation or other evidence that the integrity of the packaging has not been maintained and also includes any occurrence relating to the transport of dangerous goods which seriously jeopardizes the aircraft or its occupants; (8) Director-General means Director General of Civil Aviation; (9) flight crew member means a licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the operation of an aircraft during a flight duty period; (10) operator means a person, organisation or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation; (11) overpack means an enclosure used by a single shipper to contain one or more packages and to form

305 Appendix 301 one handling unit for convenience of handling and stowage; (12) package means the complete product of the packing operation consisting of the packaging and its contents prepared for transport; (13) packaging means receptacles and any other components or materials necessary for the receptacle to perform its containment function; (14) passenger aircraft means an aircraft that carries any person other than a crew member, an operator s employee in an official capacity, an authorized representative of an appropriate national authority or a person accompanying a consignment or other cargo; (15) pilot-in-command means the pilot designated by the operator, or in the case of general aviation by the owner, as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight; (16) serious injury means an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and which: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the date the injury was received; or results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose); or involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage; or involves injury to any internal organ; or involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than five per cent of the body surface; or involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation; (16A) State of origin means the State in the territory

306 302 Aviation Safety and Security Management of which the dangerous goods were first loaded on an aircraft (17) State of the operator means the State in which the operator s principal place of business is located or, if there is no such place of business, the operator s permanent place of residence; (18) Technical Instructions means the Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air issued by the International Civil Aviation Organisation; (19) UN number means the four-digit number assigned by the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods to identify a substance or a particular group of substances; (20) Unit load device means any type of freight container, aircraft container or aircraft pallet with a net, but excluding an overpack, designed for loading on an aircraft. 3. Carriage of dangerous goods by air: (1) No operator shall engage in the carriage of dangerous goods unless it has been certified by the aeronautical authority of the State of the operator to carry the dangerous goods (2) No operator shall carry and no person shall cause or permit to be carried in any aircraft to, from, within or over India or deliver or cause to be delivered for loading on such aircraft any dangerous goods, except in accordance with and subject to the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions: Provided that dangerous goods classified as explosives shall not be carried in any aircraft to, from, within or over India except in accordance with and subject to the terms and conditions of a permission in writing granted by the Central Government under rule 8 of the Aircraft Rules, Provided further that where dangerous goods classified as radioactive material are to be

307 Appendix 303 carried in any aircraft to, from or within India, the operator shall ensure that the consignor or the consignee, as the case may be, has written consent of the Central Government to carry such goods under section 16 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962). Provided also that where there is extreme emergency such as national or international crisis or natural calamities or otherwise necessitating transportation by air of such goods and full compliance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions may adversely affect the public interest, the Director- General or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government may, by general or special order in writing, grant exemption from complying with these requirements provided that he is satisfied that every effort has been made to achieve an overall level of safety in the transportation of such goods which is equivalent to the level of safety specified in the Technical Instructions (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2), the articles and substances that are specifically identified by name or by generic description in the Technical Instructions as being forbidden for transport by air under any circumstances, shall not be carried on any aircraft (4) The provisions of sub-rules (1) and (2) shall not apply to- (a) (b) the articles and substances classified as dangerous goods but otherwise required to be on board the aircraft in accordance with the pertinent airworthiness requirements and the operating regulations, or for such specialised purposes as are identified in the Technical Instructions specific articles and substances carried by passengers or crew members to the extent specified in the Technical Instructions

308 304 Aviation Safety and Security Management (5) Where dangerous goods are carried under sub-rule (2), it shall be the duty of the shipper, the operator and every person concerned with packing, marking, labelling, acceptance, handling, loading, unloading, storage, transportation or any other process connected directly or indirectly with carriage of such dangerous goods, to take all precautions to avoid danger to the aircraft or to the persons on board or to any other person or property. 4. Custody of unauthorised Dangerous Goods: Where any officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government has reason to believe that the provisions of this rule are, or are about to be, contravened, he may cause the dangerous goods in question to be placed under his custody pending detailed examination of the nature of the goods or pending a decision regarding the action, if any, to be taken in the matter. 4A. Classification of Dangerous goods: The dangerous goods shall be classified in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Instructions. 5. Packing: (1) Dangerous goods shall be packed in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions in addition to the provisions of this rule (2) It shall be ensured that no harmful quantity of a dangerous substance adheres to the outside of the packagings used for the transport of the dangerous goods (3) Packagings used for the transport of dangerous goods by air shall be of good quality and shall be constructed and securely closed so as to prevent leakage which might be caused in normal conditions of transport by changes in temperature, humidity or pressure, or by vibration (4) The packagings shall be suitable for the contents and the packagings in direct contact with dangerous goods shall be resistant to any chemical or other action of such goods

309 Appendix 305 (4A) Packagings shall meet the material and construction specifications contained in the Technical Instructions (4B) Packagings shall be tested in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Instructions (4C) Packagings for which retention of a liquid is a basic function, shall be capable of withstanding, without leaking, the pressure specified in the Technical Instructions (5) Inner packagings used for the transport of the dangerous goods shall be packed, secured or cushioned in such a manner that no breakage or leakage shall be caused and these shall also control the movement of the dangerous goods within the outer packaging(s) during normal conditions of air transport and also the cushioning and absorbent materials shall not react dangerously with the contents of the receptacles (6) No packaging used for the transport of the dangerous goods shall be re-used unless, (a) (b) it has been inspected and found free from corrosion or other damage; and all necessary precautions have been taken to prevent contamination of subsequent contents: Provided that where it is not possible to properly clean a packaging already used for the transport of dangerous goods, then such an uncleaned empty packaging shall be transported by air following the same procedure as laid down for the transport of the dangerous goods for which such packagings has been used earlier. 6. Labelling: Unless otherwise provided in the Technical Instructions, each package of dangerous goods shall be labelled in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions. 7. Marking:

310 306 Aviation Safety and Security Management (1) Save as otherwise provided in the Technical Instructions, each package of dangerous goods shall be marked with the proper shipping name of its contents and, when assigned, the UN number and such other markings as may be specified in those Instructions (2) Save as otherwise provided in the Technical Instructions, each packaging manufactured to the specifications of the Technical Instructions shall be marked in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Instructions and no other packagings shall be so marked (3) In addition to the languages required by the State of origin, English shall also be used for the markings related to dangerous goods. 8. Shipper s responsibilities: (1) No shipper or his agent shall offer any package or overpack of dangerous goods for transport by air unless he has ensured that such dangerous goods are not forbidden for transport by air and are properly classified, packed, marked and labelled in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions (2) Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no shipper or his agent shall offer dangerous goods for transport by air unless he has completed, signed and provided to the operator a dangerous goods transport document, as specified in the Technical Instructions (3) The dangerous goods transport document shall bear a declaration signed by the shipper or his agent indicating that the dangerous goods are fully and accurately described by their proper shipping names and that they are classified, packed, marked, labelled and in proper condition for transport by air as per requirements of the Technical Instructions

311 Appendix 307 (4) In addition to the languages required by the State of origin, English shall also be used in the dangerous goods transport document. 9. Operator s Responsibilities: (1) No operator shall accept dangerous goods for transport by air unless, - (a) the dangerous goods are accompanied by a completed dangerous goods transport document, except where the Technical Instructions specify that such a document is not required; and (b) the package, overpack or freight container containing the dangerous goods has been inspected in accordance with the acceptance procedures specified in the Technical Instructions (2) The operator shall ensure that an acceptance checklist as required by the Technical Instructions has been developed and is being used by his acceptance staff (3) Packages and overpacks containing dangerous goods and freight containers containing radioactive materials shall be inspected for evidence of leakage or damage before loading on an aircraft or into a unit load device and such packages, overpacks or freight containers shall be loaded and stowed on an aircraft in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions (4) The operator shall ensure that no leaking or damaged packages, overpacks or freight containers containing dangerous goods shall be loaded on an aircraft (5) A unit load device shall not be loaded aboard an aircraft unless the device has been inspected and found free from any evidence of leakage from, or damage to, any dangerous goods contained therein

312 308 Aviation Safety and Security Management (6) Where any package of dangerous goods loaded on an aircraft appears to be damaged or leaking, the operator shall remove such package from the aircraft, or arrange for its removal by an appropriate authority or organisation, as the case may be, and thereafter shall ensure that the remainder of the consignment is in a proper condition for transport by air and that no other package has been contaminated (7) Packages or overpacks containing dangerous goods and freight containers containing radioactive materials shall be inspected for signs of damage or leakage upon unloading from the aircraft or unit load device and if evidence of damage or leakage is found, the area where the dangerous goods or unit load device were stowed on the aircraft shall be inspected for damage or contamination (8) No dangerous goods shall be carried in an aircraft cabin occupied by passengers or on the flight deck of an aircraft, except those specified in sub-rule (4) of rule 3 (9) Any hazardous contamination found on an aircraft as a result of leakage or damage to dangerous goods shall be removed without delay (10) An aircraft which has been contaminated by radioactive materials shall immediately be taken out of service and not returned to service until the radiation level at any accessible surface and the nonfixed contamination are not more than the values specified in the Technical Instructions (11) Packages containing dangerous goods which might react dangerously with one another shall not be stowed on an aircraft next to each other or in a position that would allow interaction between them in the event of leakage (12) Packages of toxic and infectious substances shall be stowed on an aircraft in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions

313 Appendix 309 (13) Packages of radioactive materials shall be stowed on an aircraft so that they are separated from persons, live animals and undeveloped film, in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Instructions (14) Subject to the provisions of these rules, when dangerous goods are loaded in an aircraft, the operator shall protect the dangerous goods from being damaged, and shall secure such goods in the aircraft in such a manner that will prevent any movement in flight which would change the orientation of the packages. For packages containing radioactive materials, the securing shall be adequate to ensure that the separation requirements of sub-rule (13) are met at all times (15) Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Instructions, packages of dangerous goods bearing the Cargo aircraft only label shall be loaded in such a manner that a crew member or other authorised person can see, handle and, where size and weight permit, separate such packages from other cargo in flight. 10. Provision of Information: (1) The operator of the aircraft in which dangerous goods are to be carried shall provide information in writing to the pilot-in- command as early as practicable before departure of the aircraft as required by the Technical Instructions (2) The operator shall provide such information in the Operations Manual so as to enable the flight crew member to carry out their responsibilities with regard to the transport of dangerous goods and shall also provide instructions as to the action to be taken in the event of emergencies arising involving dangerous goods (3) Operators shall ensure that information is promulgated in such a manner that passengers are warned as to the types of goods which they are

314 310 Aviation Safety and Security Management forbidden from transporting aboard an aircraft as provided in the Technical Instructions (4) Operators, shippers or other organisations involved in the transport of dangerous goods by air shall provide such information to their personnel so as to enable them to carry out their responsibilities with regard to the transport of dangerous goods and shall also provide instructions as to the action to be taken in the event of emergencies arising involving dangerous goods (5) If an in-flight emergency occurs, the pilot-incommand shall, as soon as the situation permits, inform the appropriate air traffic services unit, for the information of aerodrome authorities, of any dangerous goods on board the aircraft, as provided in the Technical Instructions (6) In the event of an aircraft accident or a serious incident where dangerous goods carried as cargo are involved, the operator of the aircraft shall provide information, without delay, to the emergency services responding to the accident or serious incident, and, as soon as possible, to the appropriate authorities of the State of the operator and the State in which the accident or serious incident occurred, about the dangerous goods on board, as shown on the written information to the pilot-in-command (7) In the event of an aircraft incident, the operator of an aircraft carrying dangerous goods as cargo shall, upon request, provide information, without delay, to the emergency services responding to the incident and also to the appropriate authority of the State in which the incident occurred, about the dangerous goods on board, as shown on the written information to the pilot-in-command. 10A.Inspection: (1) The Director-General or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government

315 Appendix 311 by general or special order in writing, may, at any reasonable time, enter any place to which access is necessary and inspect any services, equipment, documents and records (2) The operator, shipper, training establishment and every other person concerned with carriage of dangerous goods shall allow the person so authorised, access to any part of the aircraft, building or any facility including equipment, records, documents and personnel, and shall cooperate in exercising his powers or carrying out his duties under these rules. 11. Dangerous Goods Accidents and Incidents: (1) In the event of a dangerous goods accident or dangerous goods incident, as the case may be, the pilot-in-command of the aircraft and the operator of the aircraft or of the aerodrome, as the case may be, shall submit a report in writing to the Director- General on such accident or incident (2) The report under sub-rule (1) shall, in addition to any other relevant information, contain the following information, namely: - (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) the type, nationality and registration marks of aircraft; the name of the owner, operator and hirer of the aircraft; the name of the pilot-in-command of the aircraft; the nature and purpose of the flight; the date and time of the dangerous goods accident or incident; the place where the accident occurred: the last point of departure and the next point of intended landing of the aircraft;

316 312 (h) (I) (J) (k) (l) Aviation Safety and Security Management the details of the dangerous goods on board the aircraft viz. their proper shipping name, UN number, quantity etc the known cause of the dangerous goods accident or incident; details of other cargo on board the aircraft; the extent of known damage to the aircraft, other property and persons on board the aircraft; any other information required to be included by the Director- General (3) On receipt of the report under sub-rule (1), the Director-General may, if considered necessary, order an investigation to determine the causes of such accident or incident and take preventive measures to avoid re-occurrence of such accident or incident. 12. Establishment of Training Programmes (1) No person shall engage himself in any manner in the transport of dangerous goods unless he has undergone proper training in accordance with the Technical Instructions (2) Initial and recurrent dangerous goods training programmes shall be established and maintained by or on behalf of (a) (b) (c) (d) shippers of dangerous goods including packers and persons or organizations undertaking the responsibilities of the shipper; operators; ground handling agencies which perform, on behalf of the operator, the act of accepting, handling, loading, unloading, transferring or other processing of cargo; ground handling agencies located at an airport which perform, on behalf of the operator, the act of processing passengers;

317 Appendix 313 (e) (f) agencies, not located at an airport, which perform, on behalf of the operator, the act of checking in passengers; freight forwarders; and (g) agencies engaged in the security screening of passengers and their baggage, and cargo (3) Training shall be provided in the requirements commensurate with the responsibilities of the personnel being trained and such training shall include (a) general familiarization training aimed at providing familiarity with the general provisions; (b) (c) funcation-specific training providing detailed training in the requirements applicable to the function for which that person is responsible; and safety training covering the hazards presented by dangerous goods, safe handling and emergency response procedures (4) Training shall be provided or verified upon the employment of a person in a position involving the transport of dangerous goods by air and recurrent training shall take place within twenty-four months of previous training to ensure knowledge is current (5) The training programmes established and maintained by or on behalf of operators shall be subjected to review and approval by the State of the operator and the training programmes established and maintained by or on behalf of agencies other than operators shall be subjected to review and approval by the Director-General. 13. Directions by Director-General: The Director General may, through Aeronautical Information Circulars (AICs) and publication entitled Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs), issue special directions, not inconsistent with

318 314 Aviation Safety and Security Management the provisions of the Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934), the Aircraft Rules, 1937 or these rules, relating to packing, marking, labelling, acceptance, handling, loading, unloading, storage, training and any other process or procedure connected directly or indirectly with the carriage of dangerous goods by air. 14. General Power to exempt: The Central Government may, by general or special order in writing, exempt any aircraft or class of aircraft or any person or class of persons from the operation of these rules, either wholly or partially, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in that order. 15. Cancellation or suspension of licence, certificate and approval: Where the Director-General, after giving an opportunity of being heard, is satisfied that any person has contravened or failed to comply with the provisions of these rules, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, cancel or suspend any licence, certificate or approval issued under these rules or under the Aircraft Rules, [Principal Rule published vide GSR 206(E) dated Amended by (i) GSR No. 795(E) dated , (ii) GSR No. 796(E) dated (iii) GSR 600(E) dated (iv) GSR 231(E) dated ]

319 Appendix 315 APPENDIX 4 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION AIR SAFETY CIRCULAR 2 OF 1962 (Air Safety Directorate) (No. 5/25/60-Acc) Sub: Instructions regarding handling of radioactive materials The following extracts from ICAO Aircraft accident Investigation manual are forwarded for information of investigation. Radioactive isotopes are being carried as freight with increasing frequency in transport aircraft and the investigator should be on guard against the possibility of such material being present in the wreckage. A routine preliminary check of freight manifest or an enquiry to Air Carrier s agent will resolve the question. If it is established that the radioactive materials were being carried, steps must be taken immediately to make sure that they are removed to a place of safety before they can cause harm to persons working in close proximity to the wreckage. Radioactivity can not be detected by the human senses but by means of a special instrument known as a Geiger Counter. The radiation can not be stopped or slowed down by any known means but its distance can be reduced to a harmless level by distance or by suitable screening. A radioactive source, if spilled or scattered may cling to any object including clothing, food and the human body with obviously harmful results. The small size of an isotope likely to be carried in an aircraft, the strength of its package and the shielding incorporated in it, minimize the possibility of damage even when subjected to the impact of an aircraft accident. As long as the package and shielding remain intact there is likely to be little danger from the radiation. Where fire follows the impact, however, the package and shielding

320 316 Aviation Safety and Security Management may be damaged. The radioactive isotopes may then be changed into gaseous form by heat, in which the radiation may spread in the downwind direction. Splashing of the radioactive material with water would, in such circumstances, increase the risk of radiation spreading throughout the wreckage. In case where an accident resulting in fire occurs to an aircraft carrying radioactive isotopes, no examination of the wreckage should be commenced until the degree of radiation has been checked by an expert. Sd. Y.R. Malhotra Director of Air Safety New Delhi Dated The 24 th November 1962.

321 Appendix 317 APPENDIX 5 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION EAST BLOCK II & III, R.K.PURAM, NEW DELHI-66. AIR SAFETY DIRECTORATE Air Safety Circular No. 2 of 1989 AV /1/87-AS 13th January, Subject:-Emergency Response Procedures for Transport of Radioactive materials. Radioactive materials are required to be transported from one place to another. The packages in which radioactive materials are transported are designed to withstand all routine and foreseeable accident condition of transport. However, in view of the need for developing action plans for an emergency involving radioactive consignments, the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India appointed an Inter- Ministerial Working Group (consisting of representatives of the Department of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Surface Transport, Railway Board and the Department of Atomic Energy) for preparation of emergency procedures. The working group has approved the document entitled Emergency Response Procedure for Transport of Radioactive Materials. The portions of the documents which are relevant to emergency during transportation of radio-active material by air are enclosed. All airlines (scheduled/non-scheduled) operating in India and all airport management authorities should ensure that all their concerned officials are made fully familiar of the emergency response procedure enclosed. Sd/- (H.S.Khola) Deputy Director General. Encls. as above.

322 318 Aviation Safety and Security Management Action Plans for an Emergency involving Radioactive Consignments This enclosure is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides a general explanation of the role of each concerned party who may have a role to play in an emergency involving radioactive consignments. Part 2 indicates the action plans for each type of shipment relevant to your organisation identifying the concerned responding person. Part 3 specifies the action plans appropriate to the shipments. Part 1 Persons involved to the action plans Introduction The response action plan will depend upon the nature of the shipment. The different radioactive shipments are grouped as those associated with nuclear fuel cycle and others. In the following discussions, consignor means the officer-in-charge at the origin of the shipment and identified as such in the transport documents. In all events, since the consigner knows about the actual departure of the shipment, he is required to be notified by the persons at the accident site. The consigner s address is inscribed on the package as is given in the transport documents too. Depending upon the location of the accident site, the consigner himself may despatch a rescue team, if one is required to be sent or may request the consignee (that is, the officer-in-charge at the intended destination of the shipment) and/or the Head, DRP, BARC, Bombay to despatch the rescue team to the accident site Action Plans The Action Plans prescribed in this document are assigned to the following agencies identified as responding persons (R.P.) : They include the crew of the vehicle carrying the radioactive material and the escort personnel, where such personnel are deputed to accompany the shipment. They should take the initial action.

323 Appendix 319 This person may represent Police or other local authorities at the site of accident. If the persons accompanying the shipment are disabled, then police or other local authorities who would be called to the site of accident would need guidelines. These guidelines are inscribed on the TERMCARD which is carried in the vehicle transporting the radioactive consignment. Immediately upon receipt of intimation regarding the accident, the consignor should, in consultation with the officer-in-charge of the local health physics unit/person-incharge of radiological safety at the consignor s organisation, take the measures prescribed in the action plan given in this document. The measures prescribed in the action plans should be taken by the rescue team, if such a team is despatched to the accident site. These measures are to be taken by the R.P. 4, if R.P. 1 are not in a position to take these measures. The Airport Manager of the concerned Indian airport would be activated into response action, if an emergency involving a radioactive consignment arises in the airport. The manager of the concerned Indian seaport would be activated into response action, if an emergency involving a radioactive consignment arises in the harbour The action plans are serially numbered as AP-1, AP-2 etc and provided at the end of the document. In some instances, the action plan is based entirely on the TREMCARD carried in the vehicle. These are the action plans for R.P.2. The tremcard instructions are also provided at the end of the document. The tremcards are numbered serially as TRC-1, TRC-2 etc.

324 320 Chapter IV Aviation Safety and Security Management Part 2 Emergency during transport of radioactive materials through India Action Plans for Airport Managers of Indian Airports In an emergency involving a shipment originating in a foreign country bound for a foreign country which is in transit in an Indian Airport, the Airport Manager should implement the procedures specified in action plan AP-6. Action Plan : AP-6 Part 3 If the package is received in an Indian Airport in a damaged condition or is damaged upon arrival or during storage or is involved in an accident, the following measures should be taken by the Airport Manager: Rescue the injured, if the package was involved in an accident. Fight fire if any. Cordon off a space of 3 m around the package. Inform the consignor and the consignee (address may be obtained from the transport documents or on the packages) requesting the consigner to arrange to collect the package immediately. Inform Head, DRP,BARC,Bombay (Telephone : , telegram: HEAD DRP BARC Bombay, CHEMBUR) regarding the incident, seeking his advice and act accordingly. If the labels on the package are defaced or if the address of the consignor/consignee cannot be obtained, inform Head, DRP, BARC, Bombay regarding the incident, seek his advice and act accordingly. In no case should be package be auctioned or otherwise disposed of without obtaining specific clearance from Head, DRP, BARC, Bombay

325 Appendix 321 APPENDIX 6 LIST OF PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ITEMS AS PER B.C.A.S. (This includes security related items also) Prohibited items are weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and include items that are seemingly harmless but may be used as weapons the so-called dual use items. You may not bring these items to security checkpoints without authorization. If you bring a prohibited item to the checkpoint, you may be criminally prosecuted or, at the least, asked to rid yourself of the item. A screener and/or Law Enforcement Officer will make this determination, depending on what the item is and the circumstances. This is because bringing a prohibited item to a security checkpoint even accidentally is illegal. Your prohibited item may be detained for use in an investigation and, if necessary, as evidence in your criminal prosecution. If permitted by the screener or Law Enforcement Officer, you may be allowed to: consult with the airlines for possible assistance in placing the prohibited item in checked baggage; withdraw with the item from the screening checkpoint at that time; make other arrangements for the item, such as taking it to your car; or, voluntarily abandon the item. Items that are voluntarily abandoned cannot be recovered and will not be returned to you. The following chart outlines items that are permitted and items that are prohibited in your carry-on or checked baggage. You should note that some items are allowed in your checked baggage, but not your carry-on. Also pay careful attention to the included at the bottom of each section they contain important information about restrictions. The prohibited and permitted items chart is not intended to be all-inclusive and is updated as necessary. To ensure everyone s security, the screener may determine that an item not on the prohibited items chart is prohibited. In addition, the screener may also determine that an item on the permitted chart is dangerous and therefore may not be brought through the security checkpoint.

326 322 Aviation Safety and Security Management The chart applies to flights originating within India. Please check with your airline or travel agent for restrictions at destinations outside India. Chart showing permitted and prohibited items. Can I take it? Personal Items Carryon Cigar Cutters Yes Yes Corkscrews Yes Yes Eyeglass Repair Tools (including screwdrivers) Yes Yes Checked Eyelash Curlers Yes Yes Knitting and Crochet Needles No Yes Knives, round-bladed butter or plastic Yes Yes Lighters * Yes * No Nail Clippers Yes Yes Nail Files Yes Yes Personal care or toiletries with aerosols, in limited quantities (such as hairsprays, deodorants) Yes Yes Safety Razors (including disposable razors) but excluding straight razors & razor blades not in cartridge Yes Yes Scissors-plastic or metal with blunt tips Yes Yes Scissors-metal with pointed tips No Yes Toy Transformer Robots Yes Yes Toy Weapons (if not realistic replicas) Yes Yes Tweezers Yes Yes Baby carrier (collapsible) Yes Yes Feeding bottle, baby food Yes Yes Reasonable reading material Yes Yes Binoculars Yes Yes Overcoat, Rug, Blanket Yes Yes Ladies Purse, Vanity bag Yes Yes

327 Appendix 323 Umbrellas (allowed in carry-on baggage once they have been inspected to ensure that prohibited items are not concealed) Yes Yes Walking Canes (allowed in carry-on baggage once they have been inspected to ensure that prohibited items are not concealed) Yes Yes Pickles Yes Yes * one lighter or one match box is allowed in your carry-on baggage NOT checked baggage. Disposable lighters and absorbed liquid lighters are allowed in your carryon baggage. Lighters with unabsorbed liquid fuel are NOT permitted. Strike anywhere matches are NOT permitted. Note: Some personal care items containing aerosol are regulated as hazardous materials. Medication and Special Needs Devices Braille Note-Taker, Slate and Stylus, Augmentation Devices Yes Yes Diabetes-Related Supplies/Equipment, (once inspected to ensure prohibited items are not concealed) including: insulin and insulin loaded dispensing products; vials or box of individual vials; jet injectors; pens; infusers; and preloaded syringes; and an unlimited number of unused syringes, when accompanied by insulin; lancets; blood glucose meters; blood glucose meter test strips; insulin pumps; and insulin pump supplies. Insulin in any form or dispenser must be properly marked with a professionally printed label identifying the medication or manufacturer s name o r pharmaceutical label. Yes Yes Nitro-glycerine pills or spray for medical use (if properly marked with a professionally printed label identifying the medication or manufacturer s name or pharmaceutical label) Yes Yes Prosthetic Device Tools and Appliances, including drill, Allen wrenches, pull sleeves used to put on or remove prosthetic devices, if carried by the individual with the prosthetic device or his or her companion Yes Yes Can I take it? Carryon Checked Electronic Devices Camcorders Yes Yes

328 324 Aviation Safety and Security Management Two-in-One, Tape recorder, transistor with battery cells Camera Equipment with battery cells Yes Yes The checked baggage screening equipment will damage undeveloped film in camera equipment. We recommend that you either put undeveloped film and cameras containing undeveloped film in your carry-on baggage or take undeveloped film with you to the checkpoint and ask the screener to conduct a hand-inspection. Yes Yes Laptop Computers Yes Yes Mobile Phones Yes Yes Pagers Yes Yes Personal Data Assistants (PDA s) Yes Yes Note: Check with your airline or travel agent for restrictions on the use of these and other electronic items during your flight. Sharp Objects Box Cutters No Yes Ice Axes/Ice Picks No Yes Knives (any length and type except round-bladed, butter, and plastic cutlery) No Yes Meat Cleavers No Yes Razor-Type Blades, such as box cutters, utility knives, razor blades not in cartridge, but excluding safety razors No Yes Scissors metal with pointed tips Scissors with plastic or metal blunt tips are permitted in your carry-on. No Yes Swords No Yes Note: Any sharp objects in checked baggage should be sheathed or securely wrapped to prevent injury to baggage handlers and inspectors. Sikh passengers have been permitted to carry a Kirpan (upto 6 blade and 3 handle) in domestic flights only. Sporting Goods Baseball Bats No Yes Bows and Arrows No Yes

329 Appendix 325 Cricket Bats No Yes Golf Clubs No Yes Hockey Sticks No Yes Pool Cues No Yes Ski Poles No Yes Spear Guns No Yes Note: Any sharp objects in checked baggage should be sheathed or securely wrapped to prevent injury to baggage handlers and security screeners. Can I take it? Carryon Checked Guns and Firearms Fire arms & ammunitions - Though regulations permit you to carry a licensed/ authorized firearm and/or ammunition in your checked baggage but even then Check with your airline or travel agent to see if firearms are permitted in checked baggage on the airline you are flying.. It must be declared to the airline at X-ray screening point at the airport. The firearm must be in unloaded condition. And packed separately from the ammunition.. Both the firearm & ammunition must be securely packed separately in fibre, wood or metal boxes, or other packaging specifically designed to carry such items. If you are a sportsman and carrying firearms & ammunition for bonafide sports activities, you must have documents like Photo ID card, passport, driving licence or PAN card with photograph to establish your identity, and a certificate from the concerned Sports Club or Association to prove your bonafide for carriage of such arms & ammunitions. No Yes BB guns No Yes Compressed Air Guns No Yes Flare Guns No No Gun Lighters No No Gun Powder No No Parts of Guns and Firearms No Yes Pellet Guns No Yes

330 326 Aviation Safety and Security Management Realistic Replicas of Firearms No Yes Starter Pistols No Yes Tools Axes and Hatchets No Yes Crowbars No Yes Hammers No Yes Drills (including cordless portable power drills) No Yes Saws (including cordless portable power saws) No Yes Screwdrivers (except those in eyeglass repair kits) No Yes Tools (including but not limited to wrenches and pliers) No Yes Wrenches and Pliers No Yes Note Any sharp objects in checked baggage should be sheathed or securely wrapped to prevent injury to baggage handlers and security screeners. Martial Arts/Self Defence Items Billy Clubs No Yes Black Jacks No Yes Brass Knuckles No Yes Kubatons No Yes Mace/Pepper Spray One 118 ml or 4 Fl. oz. container of mace or pepper spray is permitted in checked baggage provided it is equipped with a safety mechanism to prevent accidental discharge. No Yes Martial Arts Weapons No Yes Night Sticks No Yes Stun Guns/Shocking Devices No Yes Throwing Stars No Yes Note: Any sharp objects in checked baggage should be sheathed or securely wrapped to prevent injury to baggage handlers and security screeners. Explosive Materials Blasting Caps No No Dynamite No No Fireworks No No

331 Appendix 327 Flares (in any form) No No Hand Grenades No No Plastic Explosives No No Realistic Replicas of Explosives No No Flammable Items Aerosol (any except for personal care or toiletries i n limited quantities) No No Fuels (including cooking fuels and any flammable liquid fuel) No No Gasoline No No Gas Torches No No Lighter Fluid No No Strike-anywhere Matches No No Turpentine and Paint Thinner No No Realistic Replicas of Incendiaries No No Disabling Chemicals and Other Dangerous Items Chlorine for Pools and Spas No No Compressed Gas Cylinders (including fire extinguishers) No No Liquid Bleach No No Spillable Batteries (except those in wheelchairs) No No Spray Paint No No Tear Gas No No Note: There are other hazardous materials that are regulated by the DGCA.

332 328 APPENDIX 7 Telephone No. 2: Telegraphic Address: Commercial : AIRCIVIL NEW DELHI Aeronautical : VIDDYAYX E Mail: dri@dgca.nic.in Fax : Aviation Safety and Security Management GOVERNMENT OF INDIA Sl. No. 06 /2006 AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION SERVICES DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION OPPOSITE SAFDARJUNG AIRPORT NEW DELHI October, 2006 File No AV.15022/ 46 /2006-AS This AIC is issued under the provisions of Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 for information, guidance and compliance by all concerned while operating at Indian airports. (K Gohain) DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION SUBJECT: RUNWAY INCURSIONS Runway incursion is defined as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface, designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. With the growth in traffic runway incursions have been showing a growing trend the world over, and have been causing safety concerns. Prevention of runway incursions has become a priority area. Runway incursion prevention programme involves 4 groups of persons/services. 1. Pilots of aircraft.

333 Appendix Drivers of vehicle /Pedestrians/Personal working at the airports. 3. Aerodrome owner/operator. 4. Air Traffic Controllers. Miscommunication between controller and pilot, improper use of ICAO phraseology, read back and hear back error, lack of knowledge of the operational area by airport staff engaged in different airport operations were found to be the contributory factors. In order to avoid Runway incursion causing safety hazard which may eventfully lead to serious incident/accident this AIC details guidelines to be observed by all concerned while operating at Indian Airports I. Guidelines for Pilots: Detailed investigations of runway incursions have identified three major areas where pilots can help. Communications Airport knowledge Cockpit procedures for maintaining orientation. 1. Communications: Effective pilot/controller communications are key to safe surface operations. Clear understanding of instructions should never be compromised, especially during busy times when the frequency is congested. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Listen before you transmit. If able, monitor RT communication to have mental picture of Airport activity. Keep communications with the controller clear and concise. Ensure you understand all instructions. Never assume. Read back runway hold short instructions verbatim.

334 330 Aviation Safety and Security Management 2. Airport knowledge: Ground operations can be the most demanding and complex phase of the flight. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Review airport diagrams before taxing or landing. Keep the airport diagrams including taxi routings readily available. Be alert to airport vehicle and pedestrian activity. Maintain situational awareness of proximity to Runway at all times. Comply with Holding Point markings/signage 3. Cockpit procedures: Pilots can use proven and effective procedures in the cockpit to help conduct safe operations on the ground and during takeoff and landing. (a) Avoid unnecessary conversation, during movements, takeoff, and landing. (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Constantly scan outside the cockpit, especially when on runways. If lost notify Air Traffic Control immediately. Make your aircraft visible by proper use of aircraft lights. If unfamiliar with the airport do not hesitate to request progressive taxi instructions. Insure proper radio telephony operation and check audio panel, volume control and squelch settings. 4. Stay alert especially when visibility is low: Extra vigilance is required when visibility decreases and the ability for pilots and controllers to maintain desired level of situational awareness becomes significantly more difficult. 5. Report confusing or deteriorating surface markings and signs: Report confusing or deteriorating surface markings and signs and inaccurate airport diagrams to the tower or airport manager.

335 Appendix 331 II. Guidelines applicable to Airport owners/ Operators and Airside vehicle Drivers 1. The term ground aids commonly refers to Aerodrome Signs, Markings, Lightings and any other appearance or object that is utilized to help guide the users of the Airport. 2. It is important to emphasize that effective and consistent training in the use of aerodrome ground aids is crucial in reducing the runway incursion problem. It is therefore important that all personnel having access to aerodrome operational areas and aerodrome ground aids undergo training in correct interpretation of information provided by signs markings and lightings. The training programme should be well coordinated and should make ample use of SARPS and guidance material as outlined in Annex 14 and associated technical manuals. A runway includes a runway strip, it is not just the pavement surface, but includes grass/gravel areas. Edge of the strip is marked, which needs to be always followed. 3. One of the primary causes of runway incursion is the lack of familiarization with the aerodrome lay out, it is important for the ground vehicle drivers to have on sight training experience in getting to know the aerodrome signs, markings and lighting. Maintain situational awareness of proximity to Runway at all times 4. All operations by vehicles on the runways or taxiways require individual authorization from control tower, even for pass holders in each individual case. 5. Pilots of aircraft and vehicles operating on or near the runway are expected to keep watch for light or other signals that might be issued from control tower according to local procedures. Radio equipped aircraft and vehicles should maintain continuous listening watch on Tower or Ground Control frequencies. 6. Faded signs and incorrectly placed signs often lead to runway incursion. Frequent and random inspection shall be carried out to prevent the above

336 332 Aviation Safety and Security Management 7. Deficiency in the aerodrome marking and visual aids often lead to runway incursion. 8. All runway markings are white. This is to differentiate them from taxiway markings. 9. Equip all airside vehicle with ICAO compliant markings and lighting. 10. Provide airside escort vehicle to, vehicles/ aircraft unfamiliar with aerodrome layout/ procedure. 11. Runway side strip markings shall always be provided for precision approach runway. 12. All taxiway markings are yellow to differentiate them from runway markings. 13. Runway holding position marking shall be in yellow colour. 14. Aerodrome signs are divided in to mandatory instruction signs and information signs. 15. Mandatory instruction signs are made in red background with white inscriptions. Aircraft and vehicles are not allowed to proceed beyond these points unless specifically authorized by control tower. These include runway designation sign, runway holding position sign, no entry sign and road holding position sign. 16. Information signs are made of combination of yellow and black colours. Information sign includes location signs, destination signs and direction signs. Location sign is in black background with yellow inscription and when it is stand-alone will have yellow border. All other information signs will have black inscription on yellow background. 17. A location sign shall be provided in conjunction with a direction sign except it may be omitted when aeronautical studies indicate that it is not needed. 18. Aerodrome lights include the stop bar lights or runway guard lights. All traffic shall stop and hold at all lit stop

337 Appendix 333 bars and only proceed when specifically authorized by aerodrome control tower. III. Guidelines for Air Traffic Controllers 1. Apply existing ICAO standards and recommended practices and procedures. 2. Vehicles and aircraft shall not be permitted to hold closer to the runway than the applicable runway holding positions. 3. Do not use conditional phrases such as: - behind landing aircraft or after departing aircraft for movements affecting active runways unless appropriate pilot or the controller both see the aircraft concerned. 4. Controller shall listen to the read back of clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take-off, hold short of, cross and back-track on any runway whether active or not to ascertain that the clearance or instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew and shall take immediate action to correct any discrepancy revealed by the read back. 5. ROGER and WILCO do not constitute a read-back. Correct read-backs are mandatory. 6. Controller shall listen to the read back instructions carefully to avoid Read back and Hear back error i.e. controller confirming instructions as right although it is wrong. 7. Be alert for similar call signs, change call signs temporarily if required. 8. Avoid expectation bias i.e. hearing what is expected instead of what is really said. 9. In poor visibility conditions visual surveillance may be augmented by Radar if available. 10. If Surface Movement radar is either not provided or unserviceable during low visibility operations, all aircraft and vehicles must report having vacated active

338 334 Aviation Safety and Security Management runway. Also by having the aircraft report airborne, the controller can be assured that the aircraft is no longer on the active runway. 11. When a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit beyond a runway, it shall contain an explicit clearance to either cross or hold short of that runway. 12. To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, the takeoff clearance shall include the designator of the departure runway. 13. If the control tower is unable to determine, either visually or by Radar that a vacating or crossing aircraft has cleared the runway, the aircraft shall be requested to report when it has vacated the runway. The report shall be made when the entire aircraft is beyond the relevant runway holding position. 14. One of the reasons for misunderstanding due to differences in FAA and ICAO phraseology has now been done away with. The phrase TAXI TO HOLDING POINT RUNWAY 27 shall be used instead of TAXI TO HOLDING POSITION. All runway incursion incidents come under the category of incidents and must be reported as per procedure established for ATS incidents. For additional information on avoidance of Runway Incursion, the ICAO Runway Safety Tool Kit be referred.

339 Appendix 335 APPENDIX-8 Subject:-SAFETY REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS. 1. OBJECTIVE 1.1 The main objective of the safety regulation and oversight of flight operations to ensure: (a) (b) (c) effective implementation of the safety related Standards and Recommended Practices contained in the ICAO Annexes, particularly Annexes 1 and 6 and the relevant rules, regulations, procedures and requirements laid down in the various national regulatory documents; that safety weaknesses in the flight operations are and necessary corrective measures are taken in time before they become a potential safety hazard; and that the capability of the operator to conduct the operations safely be maintained at or above the level required by the regulations. 1.2 Strict adherence to the laid down operating procedures and limitations and compliance with the rules and regulations shall be the motto and watchword of safety regulation and oversight of flight operations.

340 336 Aviation Safety and Security Management 1.3 This Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR) identifies the important operational aspects which need close monitoring and describes broadly the system of safety oversight required to be exercised on the air transport operations by the operators and the DGCA officers. The CAR is issued under the provisions of Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937, and Section 5A of the Aircraft Act, 1934 for information, guidance and compliance by the concerned agencies. 2. APPLICABILITY All Indian operators engaged in scheduled air transport services for carriage of passengers, mail or cargo shall comply with the requirements of this CAR. The safety requirements are equally applicable to the Non-Scheduled/ Air Taxi Operators who are also encouraged to adopt similar in house monitoring system as far as practical and applicable to their operations. For new operators seeking permission to commerce operations, it shall be a prerequisite for the grant of the operating permit to furnish information confirming that they have established the necessary systems and have adequate qualified manpower and infra-structure to implement the safety regulations and for in-house monitoring of their flight operations as stipulated in this CAR. Concerned DGCA officers shall exercise safety oversight on flight operations as described in this CAR. 3. SAFETY REGULATION OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS Various statutory/regulator documents, namely, the Aircraft ACT 1934, the Aircraft Rules 1937, Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) India, Aeronautical Information Circulars (AIC), Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) etc. stipulate the safety and operational requirements applicable to different types of operations, which shall be complied with by the operators. In addition, implementation of the following important safety and operational requirements shall be closely monitored by the operators and DGCA Officers to enhance safety of operations.

341 Appendix In accordance with Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937, no person shall operate any air transport service in India without obtaining the necessary permit for operating such services. The operating permit shall be maintained current and valid and the operations shall be conducted within the scope and provisions of the permit. 3.2 The operators shall demonstrate, before grant of the permit, their capability to safely operate the air transport services sought to be operated. It shall be ensured that the manpower, infrastructure, facilities, systems and operating capability does not degrade below the required level at any time and is enhanced continually commensurate with expansion of operations. 3.3 The operators shall clearly outline in their operations manual their policy relating to flight operations in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 6, Aircraft Rules, 1937 and the applicable CARs and shall also lay down the procedures for implementation of the same. 3.4 The Chief of Operations shall be overall responsible for implementation of the flight operations policy. For this purpose, the operators shall have flight operations offices at the main base and also at the regional stations exercising control on the flight operations. The operations offices shall be manned by adequate number of operations officers, flight despatchers approved by DGCA and other supporting staff. The strength of such officers shall have to be increased as the size of operating fleet grows. 3.5 The operations manual, CARs, AIP - India, Aircraft Rules, AICs, flight manual, Jeppeson manual, relevant ICAO Annexes and related guidance material, checklists and other operations documents shall be kept upto-date by the operations offices. The operator shall remain on the mailing list of the suppliers of these documents for the purpose of receiving regular amendments, wherever such a service is available.

342 338 Aviation Safety and Security Management 3.6 A master folder for each type of regulatory/policy document viz. CARs, AICs, Operations Circulars, Safety Bulletins etc. shall be maintained by the operations offices for reference by crew members and other personnel. 3.7 Whenever any new aircraft operations requirement or circular is issued by the aircraft manufacturer, DGCA or the operator, the operations offices shall bring the same to the notice of all their concerned personnel and ensure compliance. The operations manual shall also be amended from time to time, as required. 3.8 There shall be a proper system of distribution of the circulars and other documents to all crew members and other concerned personnel. 3.9 Whenever a new crew or an operations officer is appointed, the operator shall give him/her a thorough familiarization of the operations manual, the standing operations circulars and other relevant documents The operations offices shall have a proper system of maintaining operational and flight records of personnel and shall monitor records of each crew member (including foreign crew, if employed) in order to ensure that: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) the flight and duty time limitations are complied with; their licences, instrument ratings etc. are maintained valid; Validity of their medical checks. all proficiency checks are carried out as per the procedures and within the stipulated periods; and periodic refreshers are undergone as required. For this purpose, a fool-proof system of record keeping in proper formats, preferably a computer based system, shall be established and followed.

343 Appendix All the flight crew members shall undergo periodic refresher and flight safety courses as stipulated. During the crew training and refresher courses, all the new operations and safety circulars and bulletins, major accident/incident case studies shall be discussed The operators shall specify procedures for ensuring flight crew proficiency for : i) Commencement of operations after long leave/ grounding i.e. more than 30 days; ii) Corrective training and checks after failure in a proficiency check The operators shall establish specific operating procedures/ precautions for: (i) (ii) Operations to critical airports of their operating network i.e. airports surrounded by hilly/difficult terrain, satellite airfields etc; Operations to airfields having marginal runway length; (iii) Operations during monsoon period; and iv) Operations during winter to airfields which become fog bound The operators shall lay down and obtain DGCA approval of their airport weather minimums and ensure adherence to the same by their flight crew members Suitable alternate aerodrome for each airport on their network shall be designated by the operators, which shall meet the minimum safety and other requirements for safe operation of the aircraft type, keeping also in view the watch hours of the airport Minimum reserve fuel as laid down in AIP India shall always be carried on each flight The operators shall have facilities and doctors for carrying out pre-flight medical checks of their crew

344 340 Aviation Safety and Security Management members as per the requirements. The equipment used for the purpose must be reliable to give accurate digital record of observations. It shall be calibrated frequently, at least once in a year or as per the manufacturer s requirements The operators shall have, trained/qualified and DGCA approved load and trim sheet personnel at each airport for the type of aircraft operated. The operator shall ensure that in no case the aircraft is loaded beyond the maximum permissible limits determined from runway length (takeoff/ landing) requirement, climb and enroute obstacle clearance or any other limitation. It would be desirable that the operators should have appropriate charts for each airport giving the RTOLW at different ambient temperatures and wind conditions Only trained, qualified and DGCA approved cabin crew shall be employed and they shall undergo periodical refresher and flight safety courses The operators shall train adequate number of experienced pilots and obtain approval from DGCA for them to act as Check Pilots, Instructors and Examiners on the type of aircraft operated to carry out the training and proficiency checks of pilots and also for monitoring the flight operations. In case an operator does not have its own experienced pilots suitable for training as Check Pilot/ Instructor/Examiner, the operator may use pilots of the other operators or foreign pilots approved by the DGCA to discharge these functions on the type of aircraft The operators engaged in carriage of cargo only and those authorised to carry dangerous goods, shall train adequate number of personnel in handling dangerous goods and shall ensure that all stipulated requirements with regard to packaging, handling, loading/unloading and transportation of such goods are complied with The operators engaged in over-water operations with twin engined aircraft shall ensure compliance of the requirements relating to ETOP operations.

345 Appendix The operators shall carry out regular in flight monitoring of their flight operations to ensure compliance with the operating procedures through the senior commanders and the internal safety audit team. Records of the deficiencies observed and the corrective actions taken shall be maintained In addition to other information, extensive use of the data recorded on the flight recorders (CVR/FDR) should be made by the Chief of Operations in the performance monitoring the flight crew, thus permitting early detection of safety hazards and the initiation of appropriate accident prevention measures. Corrective measures shall be taken immediately when any deficiency is observed Based on the experience of flight operations, the operators shall issue operations circulars to eliminate any weak or potentially dangerous area in their operations The operators shall prepare operational flight plan for each route including diversion sectors giving information on route navigation, fuel requirements, flight time/speed/distance between different reporting points, maximum permissible weights, airport weather minimas and other safety related information Before commencing operations to a new station, the operator shall carry out assessment of the suitability of the airport for safe operations of the type of aircraft intended to be operated particularly from the point of view of runway length and strength, one engine inoperative approach, take off and climb procedures and capability, adequacy of fire fighting and rescue facilities, clearance of enroute obstacles in case of an engine failure and the other safety related conditions. Requirements of CAR Section 3, Series E, Part I, shall be complied with before commencing operations to new stations In cases where the aircraft used by an operator have been procured on wet lease the operations office shall

346 342 Aviation Safety and Security Management ensure compliance with the applicable operations requirements for operations with wet-leased aircraft here a foreign pilot is employed by an Operator, the operator shall ensure that the pilot has at least 500 hours experience as PIC on the type (with licence, ratings and medical current) and has adequate working knowledge of the English language, DGCA may grant exemption from this requirement in specific cases where the operator satisfies the Director General that safety will not be compromised An operator employing any foreign pilot shall obtain for him the required security clearance through DGCA before that pilot is scheduled for operations. That pilot shall also be given thorough familiarisation about Indian Rules and Regulations, operating procedures, facilities available at different airports, prohibited areas, current Notams and the operations manual of the operator. After the Chief of Operations is satisfied with and has certified the aforesaid briefing, the pilot shall be required to pass an oral check by a DGCA board and then only his licence shall be revalidated to fly Indian registered aircraft For scheduling a foreign pilot for operations upto a period of three months, the operator, in addition to fulfilling the requirements of Para 3.30, shall ensure that an Indian pilot forms part of the crew complement A foreign pilot shall be permitted to operate Indian registered aircraft regularly as a line pilot for more than three months only if has passed the DGCA s written examination in Air Regulations Whenever any crew member of an operator joins another operator, that crew member shall be familiarised with the operations manual of the new operator which shall be followed by the oral check by a DGCA board before that crew member is scheduled for operations The operators shall have a system of frequent exchange of information between pilots and engineers to improve coordination and understanding of operational and

347 Appendix 343 airworthiness aspects. A record of such discussions shall be maintained Any differences between various aircraft of the same type in the fleet of an operator, shall be circulated to all the flight crew members. Adequate briefing should be given to them as required The operators shall emphasise to all their pilots that they should meticulously record the snags in the aircraft as and when observed While accepting an aircraft, the pilots shall ensure that snags carried forward, if any, are not beyond the scope of MEL and the aircraft is loaded within the permissible limits of weight and seats. The engineering and commercial personnel shall also ensure compliance of these aspects respectively The operators shall prepare a Flight Safety Manual giving amongst other information, policies and procedures relating to investigation of incidents/ accidents, implementation of safety recommendations, safety awareness and accident/incident prevention programmes. The Chief of Flight Safety of the operators shall be responsible for implementation of the policies laid down in their Flight Safety Manuals and all safety measures relating to their flight operations The Chief of Flight Safety shall ensure compliance with the safety recommendations made in the investigation reports, safety audit reports, spot checks etc. Proper record of such implementation shall be maintained The Chief of Flight Safety shall arrange periodic safety audits and make reports on the same. The deficiencies observed shall be brought to the notice of the concerned departments and appropriate corrective measures shall be taken promptly The operators shall take all necessary measures to implement the ICAO programme for prevention of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents including the related ICAO provisions. The operators

348 344 Aviation Safety and Security Management shall discuss the important operational aspects of the CFIT programme during initial and recurrent training of flight crew The operators shall make every effort to enhance accident/incident prevention measures, particularly in the areas of information feed-back and analysis, voluntary reporting system and prompt investigation of incidents and implementation of safety recommendations The operators shall take into account relevant human factors aspects when developing operating procedures and training of personnel. The operators are encouraged to engage in cooperation and mutual exchange of information on problems related to influence of human factors on the safety of aircraft operations The operators shall lay down in their Training Manuals, the policies relating to the initial and recurrent training of their flight crew and operations personnel The Chief of Training shall prepare necessary training programmes for their flight crew and other operations personnel keeping in view the background of the persons recruited and the operating requirements. Approval of the training programmes shall be obtained from DGCA before commencing the training. The Chief of Training shall also be responsible for training of Check Pilots/ Instructors/Examiners as per the DGCA requirements Before sending trainees for training to any institute, the Chief of Training shall ensure that the institute has the requisite facilities and qualified and approved Instructors and Examiners and the institute is approved by the Aeronautical Authority of the Country and also by the DGCA India for imparting such training. The training records shall be maintained and submitted of DGCA as per the standing requirements The Chief of Training shall ensure that necessary changes in the training programmes are carried out,

349 Appendix 345 where necessary, based on the experience and the observations made during implementation of the safety oversight programme and safety audits In case of any violation, the operator shall promptly take effective corrective action including punitive action as necessary to prevent similar occurrences in future. A record of such action shall be maintained To confirm continued capability to conduct the operations authorised under the Operating Permit, the operators shall submit to the DGCA, while applying for renewal of the Operating Permit, the following information: (a) Continued compliance of the requirements contained in CAR Section 3, Air Transport, Series C Part II for grant of permission and to operate scheduled air transport services. (b) Report of the in-house safety audit team of the operator on the safety audit carried out within 60 days prior to expiry of the Operating Permit and the action taken thereon The Operating Permit of any operator, shall be liable to revocation if the operator subsequently fails or is unable to meet the applicable laid down requirements during the course of its operations under the Permit. 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFETY OVERSIGHT PROGRAMME OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS. Effective safety regulation and oversight of flight operations can be achieved only by joint efforts on the part of the operators and the regulatory authority. It is, therefore, essential that in addition to the safety oversight programme of DGCA, the operators should also have their in-house monitoring programme commensurate with the type and scale of their operations. Broadly, the safety oversight of flight operations shall be conducted on the following lines: 4.1 The operators shall lay down their policies and procedures for compliance of the operational, safety and

350 346 Aviation Safety and Security Management training requirements in their operations manual, flight safety manual and training manual. The responsibility of implementation of the policies and procedures contained in these manuals may be assigned to their officials as indicated below:- (a) (b) (c) Operations Manual - Chief of Flight Operations Flight Safety Manual - Chief of Flight Safety Training Manual - Chief of Training The division of responsibility for this purpose shall be clearly reflected in the relevant manuals. 4.2 The day-to-day safety regulation and in-house monitoring of the flight operations should be exercised by the Chief of Operations through the senior Pilots, Check Pilots, Instructors, Examiners and operations officers. Necessary check lists should be devised for carrying out such monitoring. There shall be a proper system of documentation and record keeping of the deficiencies observed and the corrective measures taken. 4.3 In addition to the day-to-day monitoring, periodic inhouse safety audits shall be carried out by the dedicated safety audit teams of the operators to ensure that the safety regulations are being complied with. Corrective action shall be taken immediately by the Chief of Flight Safety on the deficiencies observed during the audit. Relevant records and data in proper formats shall be maintained in this regard. 4.4 In order to discharge the responsibility for safety oversight in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex.6, surveillance of flight operations including training shall be carried out by the DGCA officers viz. Flight Inspectors, safety audit teams and other authorised officers. The Operations Manual for Flight Inspectors stipulates the method of surveillance of airline flight operations. The flight inspectors shall frequently fly with the airline pilots to carry out the surveillance in accordance with their Operations