Initial Project Information Document (PID) Report No: AB735

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Project Name Region Sector Theme Project Borrower(s) Implementing Agency(ies) Environment Category Date Prepared March 3, 2004 Auth Appr/Negs Date May 4, 2004 Bank Approval Date July 15, Country and Sector Background Circumstances of the Conflict Initial Project Information Document () Report No: AB735 SENEGAL - Casamance Emergency Recovery Project Africa Regional Office Roads and highways (70%); General water, sanitation and flood protection sector (30%) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (P); Rural services and infrastructure (P); Trade facilitation and market access (S) P SENEGAL GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL-MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE Direction de la Coopération Address: Dakar, Sénégal Contact Person: Mamadou Bâ Tel: Fax: bobossn@yahoo.fr B (Partial Assessment) Nationalistic sentiments among the Casamance people have existed since colonial times, during which the local people resisted French influence. The geographical separation by the Gambia River and the British colony of The Gambia helped maintain languages and cultures but also hampered the Casamance The name Casamance refers to the natural and historical region, yet it does not have official significance from being incorporated into the rest of Senegal. Since the early 1980s, Casamance s development has suffered from a conflict aimed at independence from Senegal led by the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC). The separatist insurrection in Casamance has tested the military and political capacity of the Government and progressively paralyzed what used to be one of the country's most fertile zones. Until recently, the Casamance conflict was regarded as a purely domestic Senegalese issue; however, for economic and ethnic reasons, the confrontation between the Senegalese security forces and guerrillas of the MFDC has had an increasingly visible impact on the stability of neighboring countries. II. Economic Impact It is difficult to assess the economic impact of this conflict. The impact on the Government budget has been limited. The Senegalese National Army states that because of the low intensity of the conflict, it did not suffer major losses either material or human. Over the year, public investments were planned as usual but were hampered, delayed or even stalled. The main economic impact has come from the opportunity cost of the Casamance s economic potential, particularly agriculture which was affected by the conflict Casamance has always been a prime vacation location for both Senegalese and foreigners. And the tourism sector has also been affected by the insecurity.

2 2 III. Humanitarian Impact The Casamance population has suffered. As an example, more than a third of community health centers ( postes de santé) are closed within the Ziguinchor area and a sixth of the schools are directly affected (more than half are closed). Population has migrated from the combat zones. Many villages have had their surroundings mined. It is estimated that people were internally displaced. These populations have added strain on the local social facilities, especially schools and health centers. In addition, there are 10-15,000 refugees, split between Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia, the majority of which is living with relatives near the borders. Some have more or less settled as farmers on borrowed land. Some of these people already have started going back home since the intensification of negotiations between the Government and the MFDC. However, substantial support will be needed to allow massive returns once the peace agreement is firmly established. IV. Government and International Response The Government and the MFDC are currently negotiating a definitive peace agreement. Since May 2003, despite sporadic violence, the Government is willing to invest in Casamance s economic and social reconstruction. This has been demonstrated through various events during which the Senegalese army and some voluntary groups took part in physical reconstruction of homes in some markedly impacted Casamance villages. Some infrastructure is also under reconstruction and the Senegalese army has started de-mining. The Government held a major meeting in Ziguinchor in July 2003 during which it expressed its commitment to Casamance s rapid reconstruction. As early as the late 1990s, the previous Government contacted the donor community to design a workable program to launch economic and social activities in Casamance, and a donor group was created. Although a few meetings were held, they did not lead to major actions due to the continuing uncertainty on the peace process. Since then, new actors emerged while others lost their preeminence. In November 2000, the newly elected Government through the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), restarted the discussions and requested all interested donors under the auspices of the European Union (EU) and the UNDP to work on an action plan for Casamance. The MEF coordinates the Government intervention and heads the Groupe de Travail sur la Casamance (GTC) that consists of senior representatives of the main ministries. The GTC is in charge of supervising the preparation of the Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (PRAESC) that is the multi-sectoral framework of the Government-led interventions in this region. 2. Objectives The specific objectives will be to: (i) Clear land areas from mines; (ii) provide basic social infrastructures; and (iii) improve rural transport infrastructures, in order to increase access and mobility of people and goods. Other project objectives include specific post-conflict actions such as mine clearing, assistance and treatment of victims of mine accidents, demobilization of guerillas, and return of refugees. The program is proposed to be an ERC since Senegal, not being a conflict country, has no access to IDA post-conflict grant. that will last five years.

3 3 3. Rationale for Bank's Involvement The Bank s objective is to support the restoration of normal social and economic activities and to prepare for future development programs in Casamance. These programs should lower the risks of renewed combats. The Bank s strategy is designed to address the immediate social, infrastructure and economic emergency in Casamance, and to set the basis for long-term economic development. In coordination with the Government as well as other donors, the Bank intends to: (i) expand its on-going national projects if appropriate, feasible and relevant to the PRAESC; and (ii) launch a new project to address specific needs as pointed out by the PRAESC, that are not addressed either by other donors or in its current programs. A new CAS for Senegal for the period was approved in April 2003, in which this ERC is tentatively scheduled for FY04. The overall objectives of the Emergency Recovery Project in Casamance (ERPC) are to assist the Government of Senegal to: 1. complete mine clearance starting with the most urgent areas; 2. demobilize and reinsert 3,000 combatants and their families; 3. reintegrate socially and economically the combatants and their families as well as other refugees and internally displaced persons 4. support the Casamance communities affected by combats to rebuild their social and economic infrastructure through a community-based approach; 5. rebuild or rehabilitate major social and economic public infrastructures in Casamance in three major sectors: transport, health and education; and prepare a long-term development program aimed at upgrading the Casamance development level to the average of other Senegalese regions and abate the original causes of the conflict. 4. Description To achieve its objectives, the project will comprise five components: (i) Mine Clearing, (ii) Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of combatants, (iii) Community-Based Development Support, (iv) Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, and (v) Technical Support for Long-Term Development Program Preparation. Mine Clearing Component. The component would finance: 1. The implementation of structures and procedures in charge of performing the demining process; 2. The technical assistance, including training for mine clearers and instructors; 3. The mine awareness program aimed at limiting the number of mine related accidents; 4. The surveys level I and II aimed at quickly circumscribing the mined zones in order to allow as large a normal use by local people as possible; and 5. The clearing of mines starting with areas of high priority for economic reconstruction and the related quality assurance of cleared areas. Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Combatants. This component would finance a comprehensive and transparent program in three phases: A. Demobilization of combatants (formal discharge of 3,000 combatants and affiliates), which entails: 1. the establishment of demobilization centers; 2. transport of veterans from collection points to the centers; 3. activities such as registration, provision of an identity card, collection of socio-economic data, and health screening and counseling (including HIV/AIDS counseling); and 4. transport to the veterans' areas of origin. B. Reinsertion (transition of combatants to civilian life immediately following discharge over a 6-12 month period following the return of the war veterans to their community of choice). This Project will

4 4 facilitate the veterans' return to their communities by providing support in relation thereto. C. Reintegration (achieving sustainable livelihoods) of combatants. This sub-component will focus on information to the beneficiaries on existing employment opportunities (generated through either the implementation of components 3 and 4 or else) as well as their training in bankable, economic activities. Community-Based Development Support. The component will assist vulnerable households by financing activities aimed at preventing further deterioration in the welfare of those most affected. This support will have two dimensions: community social infrastructures and income-generating activities and infrastructures. Since numerous capable community-based development programs are already present in or around the area of PRAESC intervention, these component activities will be fully outsourced. Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. This component will finance the reconstruction and/or rehabilitation of major infrastructure in the transport, education and health sectors. Technical Support for Long-Term Development Program Preparation. This component will allow the preparation and design of the second phase of the Government program. It will especially focus on necessary policy and institutional reforms specific to the Casamance region. The areas of further study are: transport system improvement in and to Casamance, tourism, local private sector support, environment and natural resources management, and land ownership. This dual-phasing approach to the implementation will allow satisfying the emergency needs while preparing for a long-term solution to economic development of Casamance. The program is expected to be implemented over a period of five years, starting around June 2004 and ending September The overall size of the PRAESC is US$95.5 million, of which IDA would finance US$20 million through the ERPC. The following table provides indicative costs of the various components that are included under the Project. Table 1: Estimated PRAESC cost by Activity Of which support for long-term development program preparation Mine Clearing Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Community-Based Development Support Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation $0.44 M $55.56 M $4.88 M $15.90 M $24.28 M 5. Financing Source (Total ( US$m)) BORROWER ($0.00) IDA ($20.00) Total Project Cost: $ Implementation The PRAESC will be under the supervision of a national committee (Commission Nationale du PRAESC) chaired by the Prime Minister with members from various ministries including the Army, the MFDC and local Governments (régions) elected representatives. The implementation structure will be an executive secretariat (Secrétariat Exécutif du PRAESC SE-PRAESC) based in Ziguinchor. It will supervise all the components operations through four specialized

5 5 cells and an administrative and logistical unit. It will also be the promoter and active member of a coordination committee (Comité de Coordination du PRAESC) whose purpose will be to coordinate and harmonize the PRAESC activities with other non-praesc activities carried out by the civil society (mainly NGOs). Those, as well as the local representatives of Government agencies, local Governments, women-based associations, and projects active in Casamance, will be member of this committee. To coordinate and supervise field activities, the SE-PRAESC will have a local unit in each of the six départements of Casamance (Antennes Départementales AD). Although components will be coordinated, each will have its own structure under PRAESC s pilot to execute its specific activities. The Mine Clearing component will be the largest due to lack of local implementation capacities and since there is no need to mainstream capacity into the administration. All field activities (mine-awareness, surveys and mine clearance) will be outsourced to external private entities. The tasks of the PRAESC s demining structure will be limited to activity determination and critical quality control. The Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration component faces the same constraints as demining and therefore will follow the same pattern. However, the first two steps of the process are more demanding in terms of logistics, but will last only one year. Afterwards, this component s activities will be limited to close counseling of beneficiaries for three years. The two other components will have a very small structure. The Community-Based Development Support component will limit its activities to the selection of the communautés rurales where the PRAESC ought to intervene. It will then contract out its intervention through a community-based program already active in Casamance. In the same way, the Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation component will first prioritize the infrastructures to rehabilitate and then contract out (délégation de maîtrise d ouvrage) the selected work to already operational execution agencies. It is expected that these components will last 5 and 4 years respectively. The Technical Support for Long-Term Development Program Preparation activities that consist mainly of comprehensive studies will be performed directly by the SE-PRAESC. 7. Sustainability A. Benefits 1. The project will benefit both Senegal as a whole and in particular Casamance. Neighboring countries (Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia) will also benefit from a peaceful Casamance. 2. All combatants (approximately 3,000) and their families (estimated at 21,000) will be offered opportunities to reintegrate normal civil lives with appropriate economic activities. Approximately 30,000 displaced persons will be supported in their return to normal life in their original homes. 3. The Casamance economy will be stimulated through broad investment in social and economic infrastructures. A large majority of the Casamançais, directly involved in the conflict or not, should see their welfare improved by the end of the project. 4. The Casamance s economic recovery will benefit the Senegalese economy. At the end of the project, Casamance is expected to be an exporter of agricultural products abroad. Significant foreign direct investments in the tourism sector should also occur once regional stability is secured. B. Risks (a) External risks. Two types of conflict may resume: - A full-scale rebellion because of divergence between the MFDC and the Government. The project will limit this possibility by giving economic and social opportunities to Casamançais.

6 6 - Multiple attacks conducted by gangs of former combatants. Some combatants have been fighting for years and have no professions or training that could allow them to return to normal lives. The availability of small arms in the sub-region due to many local conflicts, the existence of such gangsters in neighboring areas and the unavoidable permeability of borders make it impossible to fully avoid this risk. (b) Project-related risks. They are the following: - Poor coordination among the various efforts taking place in Casamance. Due to the scale of the program and the multiplicity of agents, some contradictions between activities may occur. To minimize contradictions as well as maximize synergy between components and sub-components, the SE-PRAESC will be proactive in the Coordination Committee. - Lack of collaboration/trust between the administration and the beneficiaries. Since the Government will play a key role in some project components, it can be expected that lack of patience will exacerbate and compound usual implementation difficulties. The project will mitigate this risk through recourse to NGOs and other neutral organizations. The highest possible level of participation will be sought during planning and implementation stages. - Slowness of implementation and disbursement. Speed of implementation and disbursement is critical to establishing the Government s credibility and securing the peace process. Resort to existing projects should mitigate this risk because of their mature procedures and implementation teams. - Inability of displaced persons to return to their original homes. It is important that the vast majority of conflict-affected people, be they combatants or displaced persons, resume their normal lives quickly. However, it is likely that some of them may not retrieve their pre-war possessions, which were destroyed, mined or stolen. Comprehensive procedures will be designed to deal with such occurrences. The full scale of this issue will be known only during the project implementation. - Difficult transition toward long-term development activities. Due to conflict-induced poverty, some project activities such as community development may be implemented with fewer or less demanding requirements from beneficiaries than is usual when similar activities are performed in a regular development effort. As a result, transition from this project toward a future development program may be difficult because of dependence of beneficiaries. To mitigate such a risk, the program will limit as much as possible its relaxing of usual requirements while not increasing the trauma faced by the beneficiaries. (c) Measure of risks. In order to allow for prompt reaction to increased risks as described above, an objective measure for each of them will be designed and included in the Monitoring and Evaluation System. Simple procedures will be described in the PRAESC Manual of Procedures and it will be supported through a comprehensive Information Management System that will allow quick documented reactions to alleviate possible harmful consequences. 8. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector 9. Environment Aspects (including any public consultation) Issues : The classification of the project is Category B due to potential but a priori insignificant environmental impacts of rehabilitation or reconstruction of primary and community infrastructures. Due to the necessity to implement the PRAESC very quickly, it has been decided that no environmental assessment will be carried out prior to the project effectiveness. However, due to the multi-sectoral aspect of the PRAESC operations, a Regional Assessment will be performed in the first few months of

7 7 implementation in order to estimate possible impacts of the PRAESC activities. 10. List of factual technical documents: 11. Contact Point: Task Manager Moctar Thiam The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington D.C Telephone: Fax: For information on other project related documents contact: The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C Telephone: (202) Fax: (202) Web: Note: This is information on an evolving project. Certain components may not be necessarily included in the final project.