FOR REFERENCE ONLY. A300 Basic Model ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING

Transcription

1 A300 Basic Model ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING Q3 & Q4 2016

2 Contents: 1 GENERAL 2 MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR 3 ENGINEERING NOTICES / QUALITY NOTICES 4 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE Page 2 of 9

3 1 General Note that ALT has no active contract for this type. 2 A300-Basic Model Maintenance Related MOR None for this period. 3 A300- Basic Model Engineering Notices / Quality Notices None for this period. 4 A300-Basic Model Airworthiness Directives The following pages lists the A300-Basic Model AD s issued from 17 June 2016 to 04 January If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website ( or you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded ADs have not been included as there is no material change.

4 AD No.: R1 ATA 53 Fuselage Tail Cone / Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Support Struts at Frame 91 Inspection / Modification Airbus A300, A and A310 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN). During scheduled maintenance, several support struts of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) were found cracked at the strut ends. The THS is supported and articulated at frame (FR) 91 in the tail cone. Lateral movement is prevented by four diagonal support struts. Investigations revealed that the cracks were caused by stress corrosion and propagated from the inside to the outside of the strut. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to the rupture of all four THS support struts at FR91, which would make the remaining structure unable to carry limit loads, possibly resulting in loss of the horizontal tailplane. To address this unsafe condition, EASA issued AD to require repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections of the THS support strut ends, installation of reinforcing clamps on strut ends and, depending on findings, replacement of damaged support struts. Installation of reinforcing clamps on strut ends is considered a temporary solution pending introduction of a redesigned support strut. Since that AD was issued, it was discovered that the AD appeared to also require HFEC inspections of steel struts, which are not prone to cracking. The unsafe condition exists only on support struts made of aluminium, which were introduced through Airbus modification (mod) 06101, but may also have been installed in service as replacement parts on aeroplanes in pre-mod configuration. Consequently, EASA issued AD , superseding AD , to clarify the need for an initial identification of the support struts installed on aeroplanes in pre-mod configuration. The related Airbus Service Bulletins (SB) remained unchanged. Continued.. Page 4 of 9

5 AD No.: R1 Continued Since that AD was issued, it was discovered that some Airbus A300F4-608ST aeroplanes are fitted with a strut configuration (SARMA Strut) other than the TAC (Technical Airborne Components Industries) strut, which caused the other strut not to be considered. For the reason described above, this AD is revised to exclude Airbus A300F4-608ST aeroplanes from the of this AD. A new AD has been issued to address the THS struts on those aeroplanes. Page 5 of 9

6 AD No.: ATA 53 Fuselage Frame 47 Upper Radius Inspection / Repair Airbus A300, A , and A ST aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers, except aeroplanes that have been repaired in accordance with the instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A or SB A , as applicable. During scheduled maintenance inspections on the fuselage, cracks initiating at the upper radius of frame (FR) 47 have been reported on several aeroplanes. Similar damage was also discovered on the A300 fatigue test fuselage. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the fuselage. Prompted by these findings, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A , SB A and SB A to provide inspection instructions and, consequently, DGAC France issued AD F to require repetitive inspections and corrective action. Since that AD was issued, further investigation led to the conclusion that the current ultrasonic inspection performed in accordance with Airbus SB A Revision 06, or SB A Revision 08, or SB A Revision 01, as applicable, was not reliable to detect deep crack going downward. Consequently, to ensure the crack depth is correctly measured whatever the crack direction, Airbus developed a new nondestructive testing method for this special detailed inspection (SDI) and revised the affected SBs accordingly. For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of DGAC France AD F , which is superseded, but requires the accomplishment of repetitive SDI to replace the previously required ultrasonic inspections. Page 6 of 9

7 AD No.: R1_1 ATA 53, 57 Fuselage, Wings Multiple Cracks Development Structural Parts / Joints Inspection / Modification Airbus A300 aeroplanes, all certified models, all Manufacturer Serial Numbers A widespread fatigue damage (WFD) analysis conducted on A300 aeroplanes identified areas which are susceptible to crack development. This condition, if not corrected, could affect the structural integrity of the aeroplane. To address this issue, Airbus developed a modification (mod) to reinforce the structure of the aeroplane. Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A to provide instructions for a cold expansion of the foot attachment holes of certain fuselage frames, and DGAC France issued AD F to require this mod. Since that AD was issued, Airbus released twelve other mods with corresponding SBs, to complete the set of inspections and repairs in the frame of the A300 WFD campaign. Consequently, EASA issued AD to require ten of these mods through section 3 of ALS Part 2, and decision is made to delete section 3 from ALS Part 2. For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD , retaining the requirements of DGAC France AD F , which was superseded, to require implementation of the additional inspection, modification and/or repair actions, as applicable to aeroplane model. This AD is revised to give credit for previous use of any earlier revision of an affected Airbus SB, based on the fact that no additional work is included in the later SB revisions. Page 7 of 9

8 AD No.: ATA 57 Wing Damage Limitations Changes in Structural Repair Manual Inspection / Repair Airbus A300, A , A ST and A310 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers. A static analysis performed by Airbus on A300, A310, A , and A ST aeroplanes, revealed that some areas of the wing structure cannot sustain the damage previously published in the A300, A310, A , and A ST Structural Repair Manuals (SRM). The SRMs were therefore amended to reduce the dimensions of allowable damage and to indicate the areas of the wing structure where damage is no longer acceptable. This condition, if not detected, could reduce the structural integrity of the wings. Consequently, Airbus issued Service Bulletins (SB) A , A , A , and A (hereafter referred to as the applicable Airbus SB ), as applicable for A300, A310, A , and A ST aeroplanes, to inspect the areas identified in these SBs and determine if the repair(s) or damage(s) found stay within the limits indicated in the latest SRM issue (including temporary revisions). For the reason described above, this AD requires accomplishment of an inspection of the aeroplane records. If aeroplane records are missing or incomplete, a Detail Inspection (DET) of specific wing areas is required to ensure that no repair or damage is beyond the limits allowed in the current revision of the SRM (including temporary revisions). Page 8 of 9

9 AD No.: ATA 34 Navigation Pitot Probe Heater Insulation Resistance Inspection Airbus A300 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers. An operator reported a reduction of the de-icing performance of the pitot probe over the time. Pitot probes are heated to prevent ice accretion. De-icing performances of the Pitot probe might be reduced if Pitot probe heater degrades over time. Investigation results highlighted that the magnitude of de-icing performance reduction depended on how much the heater is degraded. This degradation could remain hidden to the crew. Pitot probes heater degradation, if not detected and corrected, could lead to unreliable airspeed indications, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. To ensure nominal de-icing performances of the Pitot probe, Airbus developed an inspection process to check the pitot heater performance, and published Service Bulletin (SB) A to provide the necessary instructions to operators. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive detailed inspections (DET) of the pitot heater, and, depending on findings, replacement with a serviceable one. END Page 9 of 9