Early warning program. F A S T Update. Kosovo. Semi-annual Risk Assessment November 2004 to April swisspeace

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1 F A S T Update Early warning program Kosovo Semi-annual Risk Assessment November 2004 to April 2005 F T A S

2 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions 3 All Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Actions 5 All International Conflictive and Cooperative Actions 7 Appendix: Description of indicators used 9 The FAST International Early Warning Program 10 Subscription: Contact FAST International: Phone: Fax: mailto:fast@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Dr. Florian Bieber

3 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 3 Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions Average number of reported events per month: 67 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: As indicated by the Country Stability curve, the situation on the ground remains volatile. This development is also reflected by the Relative Conflictual Actions curve which continues to remain at a relatively high level. The absence of major set backs similar to the March 2004 crisis cannot disguise the considerable level of overall instability. The key event during the past six months was the indictment of the newly elected Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj and his rapid resignation and surrender to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in March The absence of violent protests can be largely attributed to his call for calm and rejection of any violence. The government formed after the October 2004 elections in December, a coalition between the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) of re-elected President Ibrahim Rugova and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by former UCK commander Ramush Haradinaj, does for the first time not include all Kosovo Albanian parties. Thus, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Hashim Thaci and the ORA movement of Veton Surroi went into the opposition. The government coalition was originally considered to be weak due to the fact that the two parties had strained relations in the past, mainly over attacks by former UCK members against members of the LDK. Furthermore, rumors over an indictment of Haradinaj had surfaced even before he took office, reducing the credibility and stability of the new government. Nevertheless, UNMIK, domestic and international observers noted that the Haradinaj government appeared to be more effective and reform-oriented than the previous government. Although Haradinaj s rapid and peaceful departure following his indictment was welcomed by the international community, the government was considerably weakened by his departure and his replacement by the less well-known Bajram Kosumi, the vice-president of the AAK. He is unlikely to enjoy the same level of support and legitimacy as Haradinaj to advance the status discussions and push for the fulfillment of standards. While there have been instances of violence against Serbs - in some cases it remains unclear whether ethnically motivated - there has been a marked decline in comparison to earlier reporting periods. A number of incidents against Kosovo Serbs in May 2005 might, however, indicate a renewed increase of attacks, suggesting that the previous decline does not suggest a lasting change.

4 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 4 In 2005, discussions in Serbia over the final status intensified. While both government and president insist that Kosovo must remain a part of Serbia, there are increasing signs of recognition of the possibility of independence - although not in public - and the concession that Kosovo will at least retain de-facto independence. Following different positions among Serbian politicians over the Serb participation in Kosovo s elections, there have been attempts to increase coordination between the government and the president of Serbia on Kosovo. There has been a considerable build-up over the expected beginning of discussions on the final status of Kosovo in Progress in implementing the internationally set standards for Kosovo, a precondition of status discussions, has been limited so far. This might either result in the postponement of the talks or, more likely, reduce the strength of Kosovo Albanian calls for unconditional and immediate independence. Thus, the status discussions are likely to increase the stakes among Kosovo Albanian political parties, among Kosovo Serbs and in Serbia, all of which bear a considerable risk of conflict and a decline in stability.

5 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 5 All Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Actions Average number of reported events per month: 67 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: Domestic Conflictive Actions have been at a stable, low level over the past six months, however seeing a sharp increase in April 2005, linked to a series of bomb blasts and politically motivated violence. Domestic Cooperative Actions continue to be lower than Domestic Conflictive Actions, not showing any sign of a lasting increase. Although a surprisingly stable government has been formed following the October 2004 elections, which were held without major incidents, political violence persists and the relations between political parties remains tense. The dynamics of a regular parliamentary government and opposition are only slowly emerging, as no party has had any long-term experience with parliamentarism, and due to the fact that the government included all major parties. The LDK of Hashim Thaci has been sharply criticizing the new government. In a document submitted to UNMIK in April 2005, the party accuses the government of having spent 125 Mio. Euros in December 2004 without clear accounting and holds some ministers responsible for crimes, including the bomb attack against Rugova (see below). The seriousness of the accusations is indicative of the degree of confrontation between these political parties. Cooperation between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serb political parties continues to be minimal. After the election boycott by most Serbs, the parliament includes Serb representatives by virtue of the reserved seats, but lacking the necessary legitimacy among the population and backing from Serbia to fully participate in the institutions. The election of Haradinaj worsened the relations as he is widely viewed as a war criminal in Serbia and among Kosovo Serbs, who were therefore mostly refused to cooperate with his government. The dominant Serbian List for Kosovo, led by the former vice-president of the Kosovo parliament, Oliver Ivanovic, has been reluctant to take its seats in parliament, but finally began attending some parliament sessions in February It still did not fully commit to a return to the institutions. Subsequent discussions over participation in government were also inconclusive. Only the Serb Civic Initiative, led by Slavisa Petkovic, which gained less than 400 votes in October 2004, took their seats in the assembly and in January 2005 Petkovic entered the government as minister for refugee return. Its two deputies also voted for Kosumi when he was elected to replace Haradinaj in March A key conflict between Kosovo authorities and Kosovo Serbs has been the decision of the electricity company to turn off electricity in villages and houses which failed to pay their bills.

6 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 6 As this particularly affected a number of Serb villages, Kosovo Serb and Serbian politicians accused Kosovo authorities of targeting Serbs. While the households were eventually re-connected, the incident highlights how divided Kosovo remains. Politically motivated violence continues to affect the stability in Kosovo. In addition to a number of small scale incidents, several larger incidents threatened to destabilize Kosovo. In March 2005, one year after a similar attack, a bomb exploded next to a convoy carrying president Rugova, who remained unhurt. The attack was later claimed by the Albanian National Army, a shadowy group which already earlier claimed responsibility for attacks against Serbs. Only little is known on the group and whether it indeed exists. In a possibly related incident the party offices of ORA were heavily damaged by a bomb blast in April Whether the murder of Ramush Haradinaj s brother Enver in an ambush the same month is also related to these events, remains unclear. The largely unknown group Homeland Security has also been mentioned as being responsible for some of the attacks. Both opposition and governing parties have been accusing each other of involvement with the group and implicit or explicit support for the organization and/or for the attacks. Much remains unclear about the motivations or the goals behind the bomb assaults against Rugova and ORA. The upcoming status talks are the possible backdrop for the violence as extremist groups might be seeking to put pressure on moderate politicians. In unrelated attacks, the car of one of the main Kosovo Serb politicians, Oliver Ivanovic was blown up, possibly linked to his more flexible stance towards Kosovo authorities. A witness to one of the KLA trials was killed in Peja, highlighting the broader dimension of political violence and reminiscent of a series of murders and intimidation against witnesses at war crimes trials. The most striking event with regard to domestic conflict was the absence of any violence in response to the surrender of Haradinaj to the ICTY. While some thousand supporters gathered at the departure of Haradinaj at Prishtina airport, no violent protests took place. The fact that Haradinaj explicitly rejected any violent protests and surrendered voluntarily eased the conflict potential of the situation. Furthermore, intensive international negotiations and the restraint or control of local activists who might have organized violent protests, as had been the case in March 2004, prevented violence. This episode suggests the degree of organization behind the violence of 2004 and the ability to avert such incidents if key actors in the Kosovo Albanian political elite explicitly reject the use of force. A higher level of Domestic Conflict is the result of continued political violence, tense relations between the key Albanian parties and the limited cooperation between Serb and Albanian parties. The recent escalation of political violence and the looming status talks suggest that the level of Domestic Conflictual Actions might increase in the coming months.

7 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 7 All International Conflictive and Cooperative Actions Average number of reported events per month: 67 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: Due to the uncertain status of Kosovo and the impending status discussions, the international environment for Kosovo remains volatile. In particular relations with Serbia continue to be tense. Since the riots in March 2004, there has been an improvement in terms of a steady decline of International Conflictive Actions. The fact that this trend is not resulting in a clear improvement is evidenced by the degree of fluctuation and the overall lower level of International Cooperative Actions. Relations between Serbia and Kosovo s authorities remain tense. In particular the election of Ramush Haradinaj as prime minister was considered as a provocation by the Serbian government and president. They refused talks with his government as they considered him a war criminal who had been indicted in Serbia. At the same time, Haradinaj professed considerable readiness to enter discussions with Serbia. A highly publicized visit of Serbian President Boris Tadic to Kosovo in February 2005 was the first time that a Serbian head of state had been in Kosovo since The symbolic distribution of Serbian flags to Serb enclaves has raised fears among Kosovo Albanians about a return of Serb sovereignty and has increased hopes among Serbs for a stronger role of Serb authorities in Kosovo. Following the division between President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica prior to the elections with Tadic calling on Serbs to participate and Kostunica supporting a boycott, lately both have attempted to pursue a joint policy on Kosovo. Both continuously note their opposition to independence for Kosovo and recently began suggesting a final status for Kosovo, which would constitute less than independence and more than autonomy, a proposal rejected by Kosovo Albanian parties. The fact that the Kostunica government stopped insisting on the creation of autonomous zones for Serbs in Kosovo, a plan met with opposition among Albanians and the international community, constitutes an easing of tensions. Furthermore, President Tadic and the government signaled their willingness to engage in a dialogue with Kosovo Albanian politicians, especially with president Rugova. In the run-up to possible status talks, the topic of Kosovo has become more present in Serbia. The suggestion of the International Commission on the Balkans and one of its members, former Yugoslav minister for Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanovic, that Kosovo should become independent for the first time put this option on the public agenda in Serbia but also drew vicious attacks against Svilanovic, highlighting the emotional nature of the topic.

8 Kosovo November 2004 to April 2005 Page 8 A sign of realism in Serbia s public opinion is a recent opinion poll published in the daily Blic which suggests that while only some 5 percent favor independence for Kosovo, over 70 percent believe that Kosovo will either become independent or only formally remain with Serbia. In light of the attacks against Svilanovic and as only just above 1 percent of the population endorse state officials supporting Kosovo s independence, there is little reason to believe that members of the political elite will concede independence. A sign of improvement was the resumption of the Vienna process, i.e. the technical working groups with members from Serbia and Kosovo. The first meeting on missing persons after a year-long break following the March 2004 riots was held in March 2005 shortly after the surrender of Haradinaj. The resignation of Haradinaj did re-open the possibility for direct contacts between Serbia and Kosovo, but it also might reduce the maneuvering space for the Kosovo government in negotiations due to its less high-profile leadership. Considering that status talks are likely to begin soon, a further polarization on the Serbian side due to the fear of possible independence might seriously impact the relations between the two. Ties with other countries in the region have been overall good and improving. Macedonia opened a liaison office in Kosovo in February 2005, focusing on economic cooperation. Similarly, an offer by Montenegro to host talks between Kosovo and Serbia was met with a positive response by Kosovo authorities, considering Montenegro an unbiased neighbor. Within Kosovo itself, ties between the international community and Kosovo authorities and society have improved considerably since the violence of March 2004, which had also targeted international organizations. In January 2005, KFOR removed some barricades at the bridge connecting Serb controlled North and Albanian South Mitrovica and downgraded security measures elsewhere in a sign of confidence in the stability of the region. The setting on fire of two UNMIK vehicles in April 2005 demonstrates that there is still hostility towards the international administration which can escalate to violence. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Soren Jessen Petersen, has been more actively engaged and won more sympathies among the key Kosovo Albanian actors than his predecessors. He furthermore established close working relations with Prime Minister Haradinaj, reducing some of the earlier tensions and competition between UNMIK and domestic institutions. The key in International Cooperative and Conflictive Actions in the coming months will be the modalities and structure of the status discussions. In particular the cohesion among the members of the Contact Group, including Russia, which has been at least publicly supportive of Serbia s claims and fears the precedent of Kosovo s independence for Chechnya, will be crucial in the discussions.

9 Appendix : Description of indicators used Page 9 Variable Name Description / Definition All Actions WEIS categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories). Relative Actions Proportion of All Actions to All Events. Country Stability The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Relative Cooperative Proportion of all actions belonging to all cooperative categories yield, comment consult, approve, Actions promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose to All Events. Relative Conflictual Actions Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to All Events.

10 The FAST International Early Warning Program Page 10 Who are we? FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). What do we want? FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding. How do we work? FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the mix of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts. What are our products? FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST s country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular s. s are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription. Which countries do we monitor? Africa: Asia: Europe: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region