Cuba : A Current Assessment

Transcription

1 University of Miami Scholarly Repository Cuban Studies Association Occasional Papers Institute of Cuban and Cuban American Studies Cuba : A Current Assessment Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami, jsuchlicki@miami.edu Recommended Citation Suchlicki, Jaime, "Cuba : A Current Assessment" (1997). Cuban Studies Association Occasional Papers This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute of Cuban and Cuban American Studies at Scholarly Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cuban Studies Association Occasional Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository. For more information, please contact repository.library@miami.edu.

2 , Cuba: A Current Assessment Jaime Suchlicki CSA Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 2, No. 4 May 15, 1997

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4 Cuban Studies Association Occasional Paper Series Volume 2, Number 4 May 15, 1997 OPS Editor Juan Carlos Espinosa, University of Miami OPS Advisory Board Luis Aguilar Ledn, Georgetown University (Emeritus) Enrique A. Baloyra, University of Miami Cuba: A Current Assessment Graciella Cruz-Taura, Florida Atlantic University Jose" Manuel Hernandez, Georgetown University (Emeritus) Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University Antonio Jorge, Florida International University Armando Lago, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy Lesbia Orta Varona, University of Miami Jaime Suchlicki, University of Miami C 1997 Cuban Studies Association

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6 CUBA: A CURRENT ASSESSMENT by Jaime Suchlicki In the mid 1990s, Fidel Castro faces some of the same problems that have plagued the Cuban Revolution in the past, as well as new and critical challenges. Internally, there is growing evidence of disillusionment with the exhortations of the Communist Party and of its leader Castro. Popular discontent, migration efforts by an ever increasing number of Cubans, and defections of government officials are growing. Youth apathy and absenteeism are also increasing. Castro seems to be losing the battle to create a new generation devoted to the Party and the Revolution. Despite more than 35 years of education and indoctrination, the "new man" is nowhere to be found. The loss of this new generation represents, perhaps, the greatest challenge for the future stability of the regime. The Revolution has also reached a critical economic juncture. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist governments of Eastern Europe, persistent structural problems in the economy, low prices for Cuba's export products, and Cuba's inability to obtain greater levels of foreign aid and import petroleum in sufficient quantities are forcing the government to re-examine basic economic goals. The deepening economic crisis has produced a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation in the hope of stimulating productivity and of muddling through this difficult period. The Cuban government has yet to demonstrate any significant resolve to embark on a path of market reforms, and instead has revived old strategies that have failed to generate real economic growth. Castro is calling on Cubans to work harder, sacrifice more, and expect less in the years ahead. Pessimism and cynicism have replaced revolutionary fervor. The economic crisis will continue for the foreseeable

7 future; Cubans can expect more austerity, greater food and consumer goods rationing, and, therefore, much harder times. There is a certain degree of contradiction among the stated economic goals of Cuban officials. Some indications suggest that Cuba is attempting to implement a slow transition from a command economy to what some in the Cuban leadership call a "mixed economy" composed of state, private and cooperative enterprises (public/private partnerships). Yet Castro and hardline supporters are resisting the adoption of market reforms, or what they derisively refer to as capitalism. Such resistance creates a major dilemma for Cuba's economic transition. Opposition to market reforms limit the extent to which the private sector emerges and functions effectively, and thereby slows, if not prevents, attaining a measurable degree of economic recovery. While Castro and hardliners recognize the need for economic recovery, they also see the likely erosion of political power and control that accompanies the restructuring of the economy along free market rules. Adoption of market reforms may well represent a solution to the economic crisis, but a full-blown reform process carries the risk of loss of control over society as well as the economy, and threatens to alienate some of the regime's key constituencies. Cuba's economic policies have undergone significant shifts during the past 35 years. The years immediately after the revolution were characterized by policies of income redistribution and collectivization. During the 1960s Cuba experimented with various socialist models, but by the mid-1970s moved to adopt strategies that had been pursued by the Soviets since Several reforms were introduced that briefly permitted greater individual freedom in the economy and favored a more decentralized form of economic organization. In 1986 the reforms that had been introduced gradually over the previous decade were abruptly reversed.1 The apparent Some of the more important reforms contemplated by the government's central planning agency -- cost accounting by enterprises, establishment of investment funds by state firms,

8 success of the reforms notwithstanding (the period marked the largest gains in gross output), the policies that had been pursued were characterized as inconsistent with the aims of the revolution and Castro declared that the course of Cuba's economy had to be rectified. The Cuban economy soon returned to a more centralized form of decision-making, and arguably, economic output suffered as a result. The government's economic policy response to the current crisis has been to further ration limited supplies of consumer goods in special stores previously reserved to tourists, and to increase its efforts to attract foreign investment especially in nontraditional industrial sectors (mainly tourism and mining). The first response to the crisis amounted virtually to a non-policy. That is, the government seeks the economic survival of the country by husbanding its meager resources. Rations have been reduced, labor brigades have been organized, security and repression have increased, and rhetoric is used to boost morale and maintain social unity. In mid-1994 the government permitted the establishment of farmers'^ markets where agricultural products are sold by growers directly to the public. Similar peasant markets flourished for about four years in the mid-1980s until Castro shut them down claiming that Cubans were becoming "little capitalists" and that the goals of the revolution were being undermined. The regime now hopes that a return to these "free agricultural markets" would help alleviate the critical food shortage and weaken the expanding black market. The economic reforms not related to foreign investment (FDI) have been extremely limited and designed to alleviate the most immediate problem: Cuba's lack of hard currency. In 1992, Cuba expanded the list of consumer goods which exiles could send to relatives on the island, including many foodstuffs (e.g., beans, rice and balanced budgets and price liberalization -- were for all practical purposes never implemented.

9 coffee) that were previously prohibited.2 Cuba allowed Cuban citizens to hold US dollars (and other hard currencies) and to use them for the purchase of goods in stores previously reserved only for tourists, diplomats and government functionaries. It has been reported that Cuban citizens will eventually have to redeem their U.S. dollars for vouchers that can be used in the diplotiendas or special stores. Cuban officials have also announced this year an increase in the number of visas that they would process for travel from the U.S. to Cuba. Cuban-Americans that travel to the island usually bring money and non-perishable goods to relatives on the island. The objective of these policies is to officially capture some of the dollars that now circulate in the black market and to encourage more exiles to visit the island or send money remittances to their relatives. However, in response to the 1994 exodus of Cuban refugees fleeing the island for the U.S., the Clinton Administration prohibited the sending of money to Cuba and canceled regular fights between Miami and Havana. Cuban officials realize their reforms run the risk of creating economic inequalities among the Cuban population, mainly benefiting those who work in the dollar earning sectors (principally tourism and related services) and/or those who have generous relatives abroad.3 The need for foreign exchange, however, is critical and officials are willing to accept the negative side effects for now. These reforms, moreover, are not likely to produce any noticeable improvements in Cuba's current economic situation. arriving in Cuba. The shipping charges, as high as US$ per pound, prohibit more goods from This policy may even aid those who engage in criminal activity from petty theft to narcotics trafficking and prostitution.

10 The most significant response to the crisis has been the reform in Cuba's foreign investment laws and the country's active posture in seeking joint ventures with foreign companies. One may speculate that Cuba would like to be as successful as China in attracting foreign investment, but it has yet to emulate the structural economic reforms that China has adopted. Cuban technocrats, as well as critics of the Castro government, have noted that there are significant differences between the two countries which work to the disadvantage of Cuba. Scrambling for Investors In the foreign relations arena, Castro seems to be scrambling to create new relationships and obtain foreign aid for his troubled economy. Foreign investors have taken advantage of the liberalized investment laws. Spaniards have invested in the tourist industry while Canadians have focused their investments in mining and hotels. Mexican enterprises have recently made investments in Cuba's cement plants and telecommunication industries, although some of the transactions involve an element of debt-for-equity swap. While still modest by Latin American standards, these investments are increasing and the Cuban regime continues to make overtures to European, Canadian, and Latin American investors, and placing on the auction block some of Cuba's best and most productive industries as well as beaches and resorts. In a recent speech, the head of the Economic Commission of Cuba's National Assembly of Popular Power (the parliament) reported the level of foreign direct investment at US$500 million. By comparison, the FDI inflow to all of Latin American and the Caribbean in 1993 was in excess of US$55 billion. Cuba's FDI efforts are also hampered by the economy's pronounced inefficiencies and its industries' inability to compete with those of other countries. When considered in light of other, more dynamic and more politically stable economies in the region, Cuba has a difficult time in attracting foreign investment.

11 FDI in Cuba faces serious obstacles. Unlike China, Brazil, Mexico and other large or medium-sized less developed economies, Cuba does not have a large internal market with which to lure multinational manufacturing enterprises. FDI in assembly or manufacturing would primarily be considered for the purpose of producing goods for export. However, foreign companies would take a hard look before taking equity positions in new or existing assembly or manufacturing enterprises in light of Cuba's deteriorated, technically obsolete, and inefficient Soviet-bloc plants, equipment and infrastructure, and its dire shortage of energy and raw materials. Cuba has a healthy, educated workforce, but its workers have lost much of their work ethic because of the absence of discipline, material incentives and the provision of basic needs that is not tied to worker performance. Cuba's highly centralized system presents institutional and legal problems for foreign investors similar to the problems encountered in the former communist states, including non-convertible currency, government price and wage regulation, state control over the allocation of human and material resources, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Foreign investors must also confront political uncertainties that do not exist in many other countries. They must contend with the possibility of the regime reversing its present "open-door" policy, the legal problems posed by the U.S. embargo, the legal questions surrounding previously confiscated properties, and potential sanctions against foreign investors that cooperated with the Castro government in the event that an anti-castro government eventually comes to power. Renewing Ties and Seeking Political Support From Latin American and Caribbean Nations A number of Latin American countries are in the process of normalizing diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. Calls for Cuba's re-admission into the inter-american system are often heard, and democratic countries like Colombia, 6

12 Brazil and Chile are willing to trade with and invest in Cuba. The English-speaking Caribbean countries have welcomed representatives from Cuba to their meetings and an attempt is being made to integrate Cuba with the Caribbean Community, (CARICOM). Cuba was recently welcomed into the newly formed Association of Caribbean States (ACS), despite U.S. protests. The immediate economic impact of improved foreign relations between Cuban and other Latin American nations, however, is not likely to result in a noticeable change in Cuba. Approximately one third of Cuba's foreign trade occurs with Latin America, and this trade occurs on a strictly commercial basis (i.e., payment in hard currency is required). Cuba, moreover, incurs a trade deficit with these countries, especially with respect to its trade in Mexico. The political effects may be more important than the economic effects, however. The general trend among new governments being elected throughout Latin America seems to be inclined toward pressuring the U.S., albeit mildly, to change its policy toward Cuba. The belief persists among some Latin American statesmen that Castro may change his policies and provide for a peaceful political transition in the island through negotiations and economic inducements. Optimistic appraisals of the possibility of a "deal" with Castro have also been encouraged to a large extent by the spectacle of Cuba's deepening economic crisis. This view holds that as the crisis deepens, Castro will have no choice but to liberalize both the economy and the political system. Thus far, however, we have seen little evidence in support of this view. The Castro Response: Myths and Realities The government's most recent response to the deepening crisis has been to tacitly permit Cubans to take to rafts to flee the island. The United States reacted to Cuba's policy by tightening its economic embargo of Cuba, by taking measures

13 designed to eliminate foreign remittances to Cuba by Cuban exiles, and Washington has shown no sign of softening its policy toward the Cuban government. The Castro government has shown no signs of making meaningful concessions in the political and human rights arena. There has been no indication that the government intends to truly open up its political system or promote a peaceful solution to the deepening crisis. History reveals various instances where strong and even autocratic political leaders have mellowed with age and soften their positions, but there has been no evidence that this is the case with Castro. On the contrary, as Castro has aged he has become more intransigent and difficult. At the 1995 Ibero- American summit in Cartagena he reaffirmed his opposition to the U.S. and his unwillingness to relinquish power even after 35 years at the helm of this troubled island. "There is an idea," Castro declared, "that socialism is declining and the time is right to exact from Cuba the price of more than 35 years of revolution. No price will be exacted here." In the past, Castro has pursued a dual strategy to deal with the United States. On the one hand, Havana has made verbal overtures seeking reduction of tensions. These pronouncements have taken concrete form in the migration treaty signed in December 1994 (in which Cuba agreed to accept undesirable marielitos in exchange for the U.S. acceptance of a number of Cuban political prisoners) and the visit of U.S. political and religious leaders to the island. On the other hand, Castro continues to attack the United States while maintaining an enormous military establishment, reaffirming Cuba's support to revolutionary movements worldwide, and refusing to allow any political opening internally. Again Castro seems willing to negotiate with the United States as he has in the past. The question, however, is not over negotiations but rather over Castro's willingness to make meaningful concessions to the United States - concessions concerning Cuba's repression and horrible human rights record, the remaining 8

14 Russian military presence on the island, and Castro's fomenting of revolutionary and terrorist insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. Castro is not ready or willing to make these concessions. It is interesting to note that Fidel's overtures to the United States are usually followed with the by-now standard qualifier: "Since certain things are sacred independence, the country's sovereignty, its revolutionary principles, its political and social systems cannot be renounced. Whoever destroys them will have to fight us." Recently Castro rejected any possibilities of change. "Cuba," he said, "will never adopt capitalist method, style, or philosophy... We are proud of our ideological purity." Yet, recurrently, United States administrations have hoped for an accommodation with Castro. Castro has periodically extended ostensible olive branches to the United States only to retract them. The expectation remains, however, that somehow a negotiated settlement can be found in order to moderate Castro and to allow for a peaceful transition to a more democratic system in Cuba. Optimistic appraisals of the possibility of a "deal" with Castro have also been encouraged to a large extent by the spectacle of Cuba's deepening economic crisis. Myth 1: Economics will dictate Castro's policies It is a measure of the strong and pervasive economic determinism in the American outlook that we still tend to assign priority to economics in trying to understand the motivations of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist regimes, like the one in Havana. The history of the past three decades offers clear proof that economic considerations have never dominated Castro's policies. On the contrary, political considerations usually dictate economic policies. Many of the initiatives and actions that the Cuban leadership has undertaken abroad, such as involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua, as well as constant mass mobilization at home have been costly, disruptive, and detrimental to orderly economic development. If

15 the economic welfare of the Cuban people had been the leitmotif of Castro's policies, we would be confronting a totally different Cuba today. Prior to the revolution most of Cuba's foreign trade was with Western nations, almost 70% with the United States. Since Castro's takeover, Cuba's trade was reoriented primarily toward Socialist countries. With the disappearance of the Socialist bloc, a significant portion of Cuba's trade is again with Western nations. To many American businesses, the possibility of reopening this market to American products seems natural, given the pre-revolutionary tradition, the geographical proximity of the island, and the needs of the Cuban economy for American goods, know-how and technology. The notion of trade with Cuba is also surrounded by certain mysticism that attaches gargantuan proportions to the Cuban market enhanced by the vision of selling to a state-controlled economy with its massive purchasing power. There is little question about Cuba's chronic need for U.S. technology, products, and services. Yet need alone does not determine the size or viability of a market. Cuba's large foreign debt, owed to both Western and former Socialist countries, the abysmal performance of its economy, and the low prices for its major exports make the "bountiful market" perception a mirage. Given Cuba's dismal economic picture, Castro's ability to use its scant foreign exchange to buy U.S. and Western products will remain very limited for the foreseeable future. The island's economy has fallen from a position of regional economic leadership to a level below the median Caribbean per capita income. In the process, Cuba has amassed a foreign debt in excess of $25 billion, of which an estimated $6.5 billion is owed to Western countries and the balance to the former Soviet Union. If a resumption of U.S.-Cuban economic relations were to take place, the United States must be prepared to barter its products for Cuban sugar. Given Cuba's 10

16 chronic shortage of hard currency, bartering is the only mechanism available to the Castro regime to acquire U.S. goods, but Cuba's gain of any share of the American sugar market must come at the expense of other sugar producer in the Caribbean as well as sugar producers in the United States itself. This arrangement would deal a considerable blow to the American sugar industry, but it would be particularly devastating to the economies of a score of friendly nations structurally dependent on sugar exports to the United States. These nations, such as the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador would face additional hardships, stifled growth and an enlarged debt burden that could threaten their political stability and U.S. security interests in the region. It is also important to point out that domestic protectionism in the United States has already resulted in reduced sugar quotas for most regional producers. Furthermore, given Cuba's political and ideological values, sugar exports would not be constrained by economic rationality. A specific danger is that Cuba could subsidize sugar exports. In other words, Cuba could employ below marginal cost. To some Caribbean sugar-states, this would represent and economic dislocation of the first magnitude. The same argument holds, in varying degrees, for other potential Cuban exports such as nickel, tobacco, rum, citrus and medical products. Ultimately, Cuba's products are neither economically nor strategically important to the United States. In the short term, with a world-wide sugar supply far in excess of demand, sugar prices are likely to remain depressed. In the long-term, the availability and desirability of low-calorie sugar substitutes points to further decreases in U.S. per capita sugar consumption. From the U.S. point of view, therefore, the re-establishment of commercial ties with Cuba would be at best problematic. It would create severe market distortions for an already precarious regional economy in the Caribbean and Central America since the U.S. would have to shift some of these countries' sugar quotas to Cuba. It 11

17 would provide the U.S. market products that are of little value and in abundant supply. And, while some U.S. firms could benefit from a resumption of trade, it would not help the American economy in any significant way. Cuba does not have the ability or resources to become an important potential client like China or Russia. Myth 2: Fidel will renounce his commitment to internationalism Over the past decades and particularly during American presidential election seasons Castro has appeared to moderate his position vis-a-vis the U.S. Yet if we are to understand Fidel's message, we must realize that Cuba is unwilling to exchange its international role for normalization of relations with the United States. In the past Castro played a great power role in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East albeit under the protective umbrella of the Soviet Union. It also led the non-aligned movement and supported violent revolution on three continents - a role totally out of proportion to Cuba's size and resources and at the expense of the Cuban people. It is unlikely that even without Russian support, a profoundly anti-american, megalomaniacal leader like Fidel Castro will abandon center stage to become simply another friendly authoritarian caudillo relegated to an insignificant role on a small Caribbean island. While his ability to influence regional conflicts has been greatly diminished with the loss of Soviet support and because of the enormous economic crisis facing the island. Castro's capabilities for mischief particularly in supporting terrorism and drug trafficking remain intact. The Cuban leadership sees its support for revolution as an integral and critical part of Cuba's foreign policy. Helping leftist insurgents throughout the world is a revolutionary commitment that ensures that these allies will come to Cuba's aid in times of need. But more importantly, worldwide revolution directed against the United States and its supporters weakens the United States, the principal enemy of the Cuban revolution, diverts its attention and resources and ultimately restrains its 12

18 policies and actions against the island. This in turn ensures the survival of the Cuban revolution and its present leadership, the most important objective of Cuba's foreign policy. American analysts generally neglect the personal factor as a key to the behavior of a revolutionary society dominated by the charisma and philosophy of a single personality. Notwithstanding the prominent attention that has been given to Castro the leader, there is still inadequate appreciation of Castro the man, and of the integral roles that violent revolution and "internationalism" exert in his personal makeup. Thus, we tend to forget that revolutionary violence has been Castro's preoccupation ever since, as a 22-year-old university student, he received military training and enrolled in a subsequently aborted expedition against Dominican dictator Rafael L. Trujillo. One year later, in 1948, he participated in the "Bogotazo"- a series of riots in Bogota, Colombia, following the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge E. Gaitan. In Bogota to attend an anti-american student meeting, Castro was caught up in the violence that rocked Colombian society. The young Castro joined the mobs and roamed the streets distributing anti-u.s. propaganda and inciting the populace to revolt. For Castro, violence represented the only road open to oppose Batista's 1952 military coup. By then a seasoned revolutionary, Castro reorganized a group of followers and, on July 26, 1953, attacked the Moncada Barracks in western Cuba. He was captured, tried and sentenced to prison. While in jail, he wrote to friends, urging them to create movements "where ideology, discipline, and leadership would be indispensable, especially the latter." "Be friendly to everyone," he emphasized, "there will be time enough later to crush all the roaches together." After being released during an amnesty in 1955, Castro traveled to Mexico to organize an expedition against Batista. In 1956, he and 81 followers landed in Oriente province to form the nucleus of the guerrilla operation which seized power 13

19 after the crumbling of the Batista regime and the collapse of the Cuban Armed Forces on January 1, "Guerrilla war," emphasized Castro "came to be fundamental in the armed struggle." And armed struggle, in turn, has remained fundamental to Castro's mystique, as well as the image that he has projected onto the larger world stage on which he is determined to play. Other revolutionary leaders may shed, in time, their doctrinaire excesses in favor of the pragmatic pursuit of comfortable rule, but there is truly nothing evident in Castro's personal makeup to suggest that he could forsake the global floodlights and resign himself to the role of just another authoritarianpaternalistic caudillo on an insignificant tropical island. Over the past decades, the tenets of Cuba's international relations have developed into several main themes: (1) the survival of the Castro revolution; (2) the internationalization of Castro's personal prestige and charisma and the resulting power and influence this conveys; (3) the preservation of anti-american posture in an attempt to weaken American power and influence worldwide; (4) the acquisition of influence and supportive allies particularly among third world states; (5) the development of a "new international economic order"; and (6) the continuous support of "movements of national liberation" in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The Cuban government offers one primary rationale for its activist foreign policy and its strong commitment to foreign countries and groups: proletarian internationalism. In practice, this has meant assistance to a broad range of "progressive forces," terrorist groups, and religious fanatics opposing the United States and its interests. Since the 1970s, however, the regime has been increasingly willing, in spite of its Marxist rhetoric, to establish ties with conservative Latin American states. It seems clear that ideology is not the sole factor shaping Cuba's external behavior. Cuban interest in developing such relations has been motivated 14

20 by a desire to foster Cuban and at times Soviet objectives and to undermine U.S. interests in the area. In the Malvinas/Falklands War, Cuba supported the reactionary Argentine military junta (not democratically elected but trading increasingly with the Soviet bloc) and opposed England, a close ally of the United States. Another interesting characteristic of Cuba's foreign policy is the attempt to achieve goals with low risks. Failures abroad would hurt Castro's prestige and weaken his leverage. Successes, on the other hand, feed the leader's ego and bring with them tangible rewards: worldwide influence and internal support, which compensates for the continuous economic failures and hardships endured by the Cuban people. Successes abroad justify sacrifices at home. In spite of the expansive role of Cuba and the daring successes of certain Cuban initiatives (especially in Africa), Cuban foreign policy has had its share of failures and has shown signs of possible trappings. The U.S. invasion of Grenada is a case of forced Cuban reversal. The defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua as well as the peace process in El Salvador show the limits of Cuba's internationalism. Persistent Realities To be sure, Cuba's economic crisis, Castro's isolation, the collapse of the communist world, as well as increasing unhappiness at home might logically tempt the Cuban regime to find some sort of accommodation with the United States. Rapprochement with the United States could lead to a loosening of the embargo and access to an important and proximate market for Cuba's goods. It could bolster Cuba's immediate security position and provide Castro with greater leverage in his dealings with Russia. Recognition by the United States might also translate into an important psychological victory for Castro. In Latin America, it would be interpreted as a defeat for "Yankee imperialism" and as an enforced acceptance of the Castro regime as a permanent, albeit irritating, neighbor in the Caribbean. 15

21 Yet a significant move toward the United States would be fraught with danger and uncertainties for the Cuban leadership. It would require the abandonment of support for violent revolution and the acceptance of a more pluralistic and less repressive system, conditions Fidel is not willing to accept. The hope that as a result of better U.S. - Cuban relations Castro will open his society to democratic ideals and materialistic enticements and therefore weaken the regime, fails to understand the nature of Cuban society or of its leader. Having witnessed the experience of Eastern Europe, Fidel will not allow the most minimal opening which could lead to U.S. influence and the weakening of his own personal power. He perceives U.S. requirements and maneuvers as attempts to deny Cuba its right to play a great power role, to isolate the revolution and to strengthen anti- Castro forces within the island, thus posing a severe threat to the stability of his regime. It is ironic that the same voices in the United States who claim that economic punishment hasn't worked in the past vis-a-vis Cuba are now advocating economic incentives to influence Castro. Neither punishment nor incentives work with Kadhafy or Hussein. They didn't work with Hitler in the 1930s. They are not likely to work with Castro now. Fidel, therefore does not appear able or willing to offer major concessions. Statements of intention or meaningless tactical concessions are no substitutes for substantive policy changes. Fidel's political style make him more prone to maintain a radical, militant posture. His awareness of Cuba's vulnerability is reinforced by the influence of Cuban-Americans in U.S. politics. Commitment to violent revolution internationalism and personal rule remain as the cornerstones of his policies. He cannot modify, let alone abandon these cornerstones without risking his power and obscuring his personal place in history, a consideration that is perhaps uppermost in Castro's outlook.

22 About the author... About the CSA... Jaime Suchlicki is Professor of History and International Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. A native of Cuba, Dr. Suchlicki is an accomplished Latin America scholar and Cuba expert. He was a student at the University of Havana until 1959 and has done considerable research in all aspects of Cuban studies. Among his numerous publications are University Students and the Revolution in Cuba, (1969); Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1974); Handbook and Bibliography of Writings on Modern Cuba (1988); The Cuban Economy: Dependency and Development, co-editor, (1989); The Cuban Military Under Castro, editor, (1989); Cuban Foreign Policy: The New Internationalism, co-editor; and Investing In Cuba: Problems and Prospects, Co-editor, (1994). His most recent work, Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, Chiapas and Beyond, (1996), is an academic best-seller. Dr. Suchlicki is currently working on the next edition of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro which is to be published in June 1997 by Brassey. He has also published numerous essays, articles and book chapters dealing with a broad spectrum of Latin American issues. Dr. Suchlicki served as Founding Executive Director of the University of Miami North-South Center from 1989 to 1992 and served as the Editor of the Journal of Inter- American and World Affairs from He is also the Latin American editor for Transaction Publishers and consults for the Mexican and U.S. governments. Dr. Suchlicki received his BA. (1964) and MA. (1965) from the University of Miami and was awarded a Ph.D. from Texas Christian University (1968). The Cuban Studies Association publishes the between works per year as part of its Occasional Papers Series. Annual subscriptions are $25; back issues are available for $3 per copy. Irving Louis Horowitz, "Political Pilgrimage to Cuba, " Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 1996). Joaquin Roy, "Espafia, la Union Europea y Cuba: la evolucion de una relation especial a una polftica de gestos y de presion." Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 1996). Antonio Jorge, "Methodology, Ideology, and the Economy: The Dismal State of Cuban Studies." Vol. 1 No. 3 (October 1996). Enrique A. Baloyra, "Twelve Monkeys: Cuban National Defense and the Military." Vol. 1, No. 4 (November 1996). Jose Manuel Hernandez, "Felix Varela: El primer cubano." Vol. 1, No. 5 (December 1996). Edward Gonzalez and Alberto Coll, "Two Views on Cuba's Inevitable Transition." Volume 2, No. 1 (February 1997). Gert Oostindie, "A Loss of Purpose: Crisis and Transition in Cuba." Vol. 2, No. 2 (March 1997). Marta Beatriz Roque and Arnaldo Ramos Lauzurique, "Documentos del Instituto Cubano de Economstas Independientes." Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 1997).

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24 CUBAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION The Cuban Studies Association (CSA) is an academic organization that seeks to promote the scholarly, multi-disciplinary study of Cuba and Cuba-related topics. The CSA was founded in 1995 by graduate students, staff, faculty, and alumni from the University of Miami community. The CSA is affiliated with the University's Graduate School of International Studies. The CSA has chosen to work towards this goal through the following efforts: Sponsorship of lectures, workshops, films, and conferences; Publication of a multi-disciplinary Occasional Paper Series (OPS); Annual conference to highlight a major theme of interest of the CSA membership and the public policy community; and Support acquisition, maintenance, and/or restoration of historical, cultural, and archival materials relating to Cuba in conjunction with the Amigos of the Cuban Collection of the University of Miami Richter Library. Cuban Studies Association P.O. Box Miami, FL Tel. 305/ Fax. 305/ csaum@umiami.ir.miami.edu

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