FLYING LESSONS for May 26, 2011 suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports

Transcription

1 FLYING LESSONS for May 26, 2011 suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports FLYING LESSONS uses the past week s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers data and recommendations taking precedence. You are the pilot-in-command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make. FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. This week s lessons: There are situations when fuel in the tanks, even above the unusable fuel sump level, become unusable in flight. Before you scoff, consider that fuel starvation an engine failure resulting when fuel is available somewhere on board the airplane but for some reason does not make it to the engine is responsible for as much as 40% of all off-airport landings according to some researchers. I call power interruption from fuel starvation a pilot-induced engine failure. Removing cases when the pilot selects an empty fuel tank and does not restore fuel flow before an unscheduled landing, there are other scenarios that can lead to an "unusable fuel" state and engine failure: Slips With Low Fuel Levels: As long as the airplane is in coordinated flight, fuel will flow normally from the tanks into the fuel delivery system. In other than straight-and-level attitudes, centripetal force will replace gravity to force fuel "down" relative to the airplane. But if aileron and rudder are not coordinated, forces acting on the airplane may pull fuel away from the fuel lines. This unporting of fuel can cause fuel starvation and engine stoppage. Obviously the risk is greatest when fuel levels are low. Fuel unporting is most commonly seen in a slip when landing into a crosswind when the pilot has inadvertently selected the "downhill" fuel tank, or -- if turning steeply immediately after takeoff or in a go-around -- the pilot is not careful to maintain rudder coordination. Practice maneuvers with low fuel levels in the selected tank(s) can also lead to uncoordinated flight, fuel sloshing away from the tank pick-ups, and fuel starvation. The "fix" is to keep the ball centered with coordinated use of aileron and rudder, so that "down" for the fuel is toward the bottom of the tanks and the fuel lines, and to select the "uphill" tank when planning a slip to landing. Turning-Type Takeoffs: Another low-fuel unporting "gotcha" happens if you make a fast turn onto the runway for takeoff and fuel sloshes toward the outboard end of the tank. A fast turn on the ground will naturally be uncoordinated (you're moving in two, not three, dimensions before takeoff), and again the risk is greater with less fuel in the tanks. Some airplanes have baffles in the tanks to inhibit "sloshing," but it's still a good idea to get aligned with the runway completely before adding power for takeoff. Not only does this avoid the fuel unporting issue, it also puts much less side-load on your landing gear. Auxiliary fuel tanks: Many airplane types have main and auxiliary fuel tanks. In every model I'm familiar with, the Pilot s Operating Handbook (POH) calls for fuel selectors to be moved to a main tank position for everything except straight-and-level flight. If the airplane has been modified with additional fuel tanks after it first left the factory, this limitation will appear in the POH supplement for the modification. Auxiliary fuel tanks often are located, plumbed or vented such that fuel flow may become interrupted in high angles of attack. Vapor lock, or an interruption in fuel flow caused by air in the fuel lines, often results when a fuel tank is unported or drained completely and the fuel pump is allowed to draw air into the lines. This is especially common in airplanes with auxiliary fuel systems that have long fuel delivery

2 lines from the tank to the fuel selector. In some cases fixing a vapor lock is easy (switching to a fuel-filled tank and running a boost pump), but in others it make take a complicated purging process and may not even be possible until you're on the ground. To avoid the dangerous potential for vapor lock, avoid unporting fuel tanks or running a fuel tank completely dry in flight. To avoid making all your fuel "unusable" for takeoff, maneuvering or landing, following the POH's guidance and double-check positions before takeoff, climbs, descents, and when entering the approach or traffic pattern. Many older airplanes have less ergonomically friendly fuel systems, with complicated and sometimes hidden fuel selectors, unusual fuel pump operating procedures, and fuel gauges that must be manually switched to display fuel level in the tank being used. Review your airplane s fuel system operations and limitations thoroughly during initial checkout (insist your instructor point them out to you in the POH and/or supplements), and again at least annually. If you re tasked with providing instruction, read the POH and supplements for that specific serial number airplane and aftermarket system before meeting with your flight instruction customer, especially in older airplanes and those equipped with auxiliary fuel systems. Use a printed Before Takeoff, Before Practice Maneuvering and Descent checklist to ensure selecting a main fuel tank with enough gas to complete the operation before departing the ground or straight-and-level, cruise flight. Don t fall victim to a pilot-induced engine failure. Comments? Questions? Tell us what you think at mastery.flight.training@cox.net. Thanks to AVEMCO Insurance for helping bring you FLYING LESSONS Weekly. See Do you have an aviation safety-related product or service you d like to see associated with FLYING LESSONS Weekly? Contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net for sponsorship information. Readers, you can help too. Every little bit helps cover the expenses of keeping FLYING LESSONS online. Show your personal support through a secure PayPal donations button at Thank you, generous supporters! Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS: Several readers wrote about last week s discussion of pitch trim runaway emergency procedures. The procedure and picture below, repeated from last week, applies to a post-1983 Beech A36 Bonanza. But the concept applies to all airplane equipped with an electric trim system see the Pilot s Operating Handbook and autopilot/trim system supplements for the correct procedure in the airplane(s) you fly. A few readers commented: I fly an F33A Bonanza and I have never been exposed to the runaway trim procedure you described today. Thank you for sharing that experience and your preflight process. I plan to add that to my preflight procedure at once. Thanks again for everything you do to help us all fly safer. Don Ward Tom, This is a VERY valuable, concise procedure. Many thanks. Andy Reardon We ve added a slide and your procedure to our Emergency Procedures presentation Hank Canterbury, Beechcraft Pilot Proficiency Program

3 Sample Autopilot Malfunction/Electric Trim Runaway Procedure ( A36 Bonanza) Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For training purposes only. Adhere to your airplane s POH and/or supplement procedure. Readers, what s your opinion? Tell us at mastery.flight.training@cox.net. Reader Lorne Sheren writes: We re still receiving reader comments about the seventh most common cause of fatal general aviation accidents, according to a 2010 FAA study. So we ll hold off a week on moving on to Cause #6, and run some reader insights about attempted visual flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions. Well said as usual. Being a current instrument rated pilot flying a capable airplane, I had always dismissed VFR flight into IMC as a "can't happen to me" event. Not true. In fact this can happen very easily during the final phase of flight, [when] weather looks good, IFR has been cancelled (going into an non-towered field), and, "poof" a wisp of ground fog, innocuous when viewed from above but deadly when viewed from the side. Unless a go around is immediately initiated under these circumstances there is no terrain or obstacle clearance and you are perilously near the ground. A second can make a difference. And although we all give it lip service, at that point in time how many of us are really spring loaded to go missed? Another, more subtle point- going IFR into a non-towered field: what is VFR? How many of us cancel IFR while still in the air? Most of us, right? It's easier, and more considerate if there are departures waiting. But suppose something, anything, happens, before or during landing. You lost the benefit of having someone know you are missing. So I would urge us all not to cancel that valuable IFR [clearance] until you are safely on the ground. It's not like we have to sprint out to the pay phone anymore [to cancel], and the difference to the fellow departing a mere minutes. In fact my wife gets really angry now when I cancel in the air. Reader Joseph M. Foresto of FAA Headquarters AFS-810, Flight Standards Liaison to the Office of Runway Safety, reminds us of a handy tool to help avoid VFR into IMC. Joseph writes: I want to congratulate you on a great learning site. Regarding VFR into IMC, allow me to offer your readers this: Estimating In-Flight Visibility [posted on the Mastery Flight Training Tools for Flying Safely page]. It s easy to remember, if you have to fly less than 3000 AGL to maintain contact with the ground, your inflight visibility is less than three statute miles. See Thanks, Joseph, for this excellent weather evaluation tool.

4 Reader Bill Caton adds about the Categorical Outlook Flying decision-making matrix that was the subject of our VFR into IMC discussion last week: Several [of my] friends are going to your matrix and love it. One owns the Comanche I had [previously owned] and the other owns the Arrow I owned. They passed it along to their friends. Thank you, Bill. I m glad you find this valuable. See Next week, we ll begin our look at ways to avoid the sixth most common cause of fatal general aviation accidents: Initial Climb Aerodynamic Stall. Pilot Training Reform Reader Jim Herd chimes in about the recent Reforming Pilot Training symposium, that has created such discussion in FLYING LESSONS: My initial reaction to the SAFE Symposium is based on the summary of their work product contained in Paul Bertorelli s Avweb blog: Frankly, I am under-whelmed. I realize it was sponsored and heavily attended by instructors. As one of the Avweb readers wrote: If you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail. So the very heavy weighting on improving instruction is perhaps to be expected, and the result on pilots would be a very significant increase in the burden of training and retraining. To borrow another cliché: If you go to a cardiologist he will discover a heart problem! But from what I have read so far, the event really didn t uncover some of the profoundly important changes needed to improve G.A. safety. For example, the idea of a new focus on the critical few over the trivial many that pervade aviation education and the FARs. Or the notion that instructors must develop tools to cause a significant emotional event in the mind of every student regarding those critical few messages that will almost-surely kill them if they don t absolutely internalize. For example, exceeding gross weight, stall-spin on base-to-final, inadvertent IMC, etc. And what about the concept of problem resolution that you have been employing in FLYING LESSONS recently? I am referring to listing the top causes of accidents, injuries, and death, and then addressing every one of them explicitly. And why don t we set a new culture and goal in G.A. no more repeat accidents! A formal goal like this is far more powerful than simply reduce our accident rate because that is unimaginative and generic with no clue as to how it will be accomplished, and no specificity. Paul Bertorelli raises the point that improved safety won t arrest the persistent and very significant decline in G.A., as was claimed by the folks at SAFE. There may be partial truth on both sides, but what is surely not in dispute is that an added burden of mandated training/retraining, even if well-meaning and fully justified, will steepen the decline of G.A. just as surely as any other added burden. Perhaps I will be more encouraged as I learn more about the initiatives by SAFE. See Thanks, Jim. You raise several valid points many of which were addressed in the symposium at Atlanta. The focus was on flight instruction primarily, in my opinion, because it will take a change in the way we train pilots to make any meaningful difference in the mishap record, and to change the culture of flight training we need to change the flight instructors themselves. Setting the record straight Flight instructor, aviation safety advocate and FLYING LESSONS reader Bob Miller, author of the monthly Over the Airwaves aviation e-newsletter, attended the Atlanta symposium. He came as a skeptic and, as he stated in the closing general session, left very encouraged about the move toward more effective flight instruction aimed squarely at reducing the fatal general aviation accident rate. Bob and I shared an enthusiastic and positive lunch conversation where we discussed what it d take to make a real difference.

5 Last week, however, Bob made public his resignation from AOPA, publishing his letter as a guest editorial on a popular aviation news website. Among other concerns, Bob writes: The fact that we GA pilots have a horrible and unrelenting accident rate receives barely a mention from AOPA. That's troubling in itself. The fact that others like SAFE (Society of Aviation and Flight Educators) are trying to do something about this problem and AOPA's CEO cannot find the time to participate is even more troubling. See: This is a mischaracterization that must be corrected. I sent Bob Miller this on May 19 th : Hi, Bob. I greatly enjoyed meeting you at Atlanta. I read your Over the Airwaves letter, published on Aero News Network, announcing your resignation from AOPA. Although your concern seems centered on the amount of junk , mailings and non-aviation promotions from our aviation organization, a concern I share, your letter makes a mis-statement I feel needs to be publicly addressed. You state AOPA was a no-show at the recent Reforming Pilot Training symposium, specifically chiding Craig Fuller for not participating in the event. I wrote the following response as a Discussion item on ANN yesterday morning [May 18] but, at least as of today, it has not been successful at getting past comments [review]. I thought about posting this on your Facebook page but felt instead I would it directly to you so you can correct your mis-statements yourself. Perhaps [ANN] is already giving you that opportunity, which is why my comment has not yet appeared on ANN. Anyway, here is my response to your letter: Who is the better person to have participated in the instructors' symposium: AOPA CEO Craig Fuller, or the Chief Flight Instructor of AOPA's Air Safety Institute, JJ Greenway? JJ not only participated, but was a breakout session leader and made the first of the five committee reports to the general session on the last day. Further, AOPA sent Jennifer Storm, Director of Flight Training Initiatives and the leader of AOPA's recent Flight Training survey and investigation. Jennifer led the breakout session on growing the student pilot population, and presented that committee's report on the final day. I met Bob Miller for the first time at the SAFE event and respect his work toward flying safety, as he tells me he respects mine. I simply want to correct the erroneous perception that AOPA did not participate in the Reforming Pilot Training symposium. Look through ANN's own videos and interviews from the event and you'll see AOPA was there in a big way. Thomas P. Turner Mastery Flight Training, Inc. I look forward to seeing the record corrected, and reading my next issue of Over the Airways. Thank you. As of this writing (early evening, May 24 th ) my comments still do not appear on ANN, nor has there been any correction of the characterization of AOPA on I m posting this merely so any person reading Bob Miller s call for a mass resignation from AOPA will temper it with accurate information concerning AOPA and the Air Safety Institute s significant participation in the recent Reforming Pilot Training conference.

6 Setting Personal Minimums FLYING LESSONS reader and newly minted private pilot Jay Graph makes an astute observation, and asks: I wonder if pilots sometimes get in dangerous situations, such as flying into IMC, because they evaluate the weather subjectively (e.g. "It looks good enough"), instead of objectively (e.g. "I will not fly if clouds are lower than X feet AGL"). I hear a lot about "personal minimums", but I don't really know what this means. Can you give me some examples? What does a personal minimum look like for someone like me with less than 100 hours? Congratulations on beginning the adventure of a life in the air, Jay! Setting personal minimums is one of those things we all hear about, but few instructors provide any guidance to new pilots on how to go about it. Luckily FAA Safety Briefing editor and FLYING LESSONS reader Susan Parsons addressed the issue recently in the FAA s general aviation safety magazine. See her article Getting the Maximum from Personal Minimums. I also wrote an article a couple of years ago that may help, as part of my Leading Edge series on AVweb. See After the Checkride: Your Next 100 Hours. Hopefully these two items will get you started on a strategy to create and employ safe decisionmaking limits in your flying, and to slowly expand your personal minimums envelope as you gain experience. Let me know if you have any questions or suggestions. See: Question of the Week This week s Question: What do you think would be the most effective way to reduce fatal general aviation accidents? Last week we asked: Do you have a ritual for an abnormal or emergency procedure you follow every time you get into an aircraft? A member wrote: I use the 200' rule. To use this successfully, you need to only know "one number." That number is: How many feet (elevation) will I lose in a (complete and instantaneous) engine loss scenario, allowing five seconds for recognition, to turn upwind (The "Impossible Turn") complete the turns necessary to realign with the runway and complete a safe landing, using a 45 degree bank. Ercoupes need about 380'. My previous Symphony needed about 710'. My current Piper Dakota, heavy dog that she is, requires about 1,070'. I use the word "about" because wind direction and speed have a big effect. Once you know that (return to field) elevation loss number and the runway you will be using, I make a mental note for every 200'. As an example at Henderson, NV runway 17R: At 200' I will make a slight left turn and go for the smooth dirt road on the east side of the concrete water pathway. (2 miles long) At 400', I will make a 90 degree right turn and land on the 2,600' long road (that has no houses on it). At 600', I use the same 2,600 foot road using flaps and/or S turns. At 800' I will make a 180 left turn and land on the parallel runway (35R). At 1,000' same as 800'. At 1,200' I can do any of the above "or" I return to the field and land (the opposite way) on the runway I took off from (17R-35L).

7 Please notice that for every 200' I gain in altitude, I gain another choice. Taking 15 seconds to think about this prior to starting down the runway may someday make a really big difference. Thanks! Readers, send your input to mftsurvey@cox.net. For piston Beech pilots The Beech Weekly Accident Update is now posted. See Flying has risks. Choose wisely. Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year FLYING LESSONS is 2011 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For reprint permission contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net.