FLYING LESSONS for November 13, 2014 suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports

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1 FLYING LESSONS for November 13, 2014 suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports FLYING LESSONS uses the past week s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make. FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. This week s lessons: This week we re going to learn from the observations of FLYING LESSONS readers. So, straight on to the Debrief. Questions? Comments? Let us know, at mastery.flight.training@cox.net See bootcamp/update Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS: Close to Home Thank you to the very many readers who commended my reflections last week on the October 30 King Air crash at Wichita, Kansas. See Many readers added their insights: I just read your piece today on the V MC demo and I was impressed with how you used the accident to bring home the need for the pilot community to not consider this a "circus trick." This is a very good article and I hope it is read and appreciated appropriately. I am really sorry that you have had the experience a week ago that you did. Reading accident reports is far different from being involved as an active observer. I have personally gone to several GA accidents and have come away with a very different and more visceral sense of loss. -- Dr. Earl Weener, Member, National Transportation Safety Board Thank you very much, Earl, for your kind words about turning this event--more "real" to me than most I write about--into some positive LESSONS. I ve certainly renewed and expanded my respect and admiration for you and all Air Safety Investigators, after watching the immediate aftermath of this crash as well as NTSB-jacketed investigators poring over the burned-out remains of the simulator bay for several days afterward. Thanks for a extremely well thought-out LESSON. May I add a caution? Here in South Africa there was a nasty fatal V MC demo crash during an IF Proficiency Test [instrument proficiency check] by a DFE [Designated Flight Examiner]. It was conducted in the Koeberg GFA which has a 3000' upper limit quite close to Cape Town airport. The BE90 [King Air] was equipped with McCauley Black Mac 4-bladed props.

2 Before the test the crew discussed the V MC demo which was part of the Proficiency check. As I flew the identical configuration BE90 with the same props, my take on their fatal roll-over and steep inverted dive into terrain, could well have been caused by the extreme drag from a flight-idle prop above the red-line speed. The Black Mac props apparently would go into a 1-degree positive angle, thereby causing this extreme drag at flight idle. Other pilots I've spoken to experienced a similar event, but recovered from being inverted by fortunately having 20,000 feet [of altitude] available, and that was barely sufficient height! I considered [this observation] important enough to warn your Flight Examiners (DFE 's in South Africa) about this even if rare. -- Theo Truter ATP + 26,780 total time hours as a Flight Instructor Thank you, Theo. I don t know King Air systems or modifications like you do, and have no data with which to confirm or refute your observation. Regardless, all multiengine instructors need to exercise extreme vigilance when presenting and monitoring the V MC Demonstration maneuver. Reader John Townsley writes: I read your epistle immediately upon its arrival. As always, I learned some good information and had my assumptions challenged. I agree with all of your points about proficiency. It s essential. But with regard to whether it was a proficiency issue in this accident, I think we need to look more deeply. That s the role of the NTSB and other Air Safety Investigators. Hopefully their deliberate labors will reveal the cause and, more importantly, ways to avoid repeating this tragedy. I don t know if the pilot had a problem with proficiency. I do know from your description of events that the individual had a problem with expectation. You said very early in your epistle that turbines aren t supposed to fail. We all know that s false. Anything and everything mechanical can and WILL fail. I had written Common comments I ve heard include this isn t supposed to happen in a turboprop Despite that common comment, we indeed know that it isn t true. Our challenge is to be ready for a failure that very likely will never occur! If, after 8,000+ flights not a single takeoff or landing went wrong what s a reasonable expectation?? It s tough to be spring-loaded for failure every time, on every takeoff, especially if our own experience says the equipment won t fail. But, spring-loaded we must be. I expect the accident pilot could slow flight all day, execute emergency procedures flawlessly, and knew all about V MC, critical engines, feathering, and all the other critical stuff necessary to fly a complex, capable, expensive machine like the King Air. The real problem, I ll say again, was that the engineering on that capable, complex, expensive machine was (almost) flawless. The pilot s expectation, well founded in experience and embedded in his or her psyche, was for a normal takeoff. It wasn t a check ride; a rightseater wasn t going to pull power at an inconvenient moment. The pilot wasn t in the simulator proving his or her stuff for the check pilot at the console. Unfortunately the pilot knew it. In the very few seconds between mechanical failure and crash the pilot was mentally unprepared. The rest is history. The pilot fell rapidly and fatally behind the plane. The danger of discussing accidents before the investigation is complete is to declare a probable cause before all the information is in. Like you, I suspect that expectation error may have played a part in the crash under consideration. Regardless, you identified an important point the King Air crash makes us ponder, regardless of the actual circumstances of that crash. It s a great LESSON to note the dichotomy between training mentality and day-to-day flying mindsets. This dichotomy is the subject of an article Pilots are Pessimists and Optimists I co-wrote with FLYING LESSONS reader Dr. Lorne Sheren in 2011, published by AOPA. Thank you for your observations, John. See: Frequent Debriefer Robert Thorson adds: Accidents bring out various emotions in all of us, particularly close to home as in your case. It disturbs me as well. In these early hours everyone searches for the truth of what happened. Even though I have several thousand hours in King Airs without incident I forced myself to go back and look at the Part 23 certification

3 requirements. I had some surprisingly wrong concepts on single-engine climb performance as I was thinking about aircraft under 6000 pounds, and not takeoff and climb requirements for turboprops over 6000 lbs. The net climb gradient is very low on one engine. Coupled with the shock of losing an engine and other emotional factors it is hard to determine what anyone would do in a similar situation. History does tell us that as pilots we want to save ourselves and the aircraft. It takes remarkable discipline to climb out straight ahead so close to obstacles and being patient to get above 400 feet before turning or running a checklist single-pilot. That is the critical point of training to thoroughly ingrain the procedures so emotionally we don t start turning to get back to the airport. According to Part 23 the takeoff and climb configuration has the gear down and flaps in the takeoff position, propeller feathered if an automatic system is installed. Acceleration to a higher airspeed is required. So after we get all the maintenance issues versus systems answered then we can look at flight operational issues. I just wonder if in training all these items are brought out by instructors, and if they are making students fly this engine out on takeoff profile. Is it being done in simulation? It is my belief when we get to the V MC demonstration point the aircraft is so slow it can no longer climb. Again, we should reserve judgment on this particular crash until the investigative results are published. We should not wait, however, to have this type of discussion about the things that might have contributed to the King Air crash which is always the intent of FLYING LESSONS. So thanks, Robert. You bring up several important points, one of which is the training pilots receive on this type of maneuver. I wonder how many times a typical turboprop pilot is presented an engine failure immediately after takeoff combined with failure of the autofeather and/or rudder boost mechanisms (qualified observers noted the Wichita King Air s propellers were both turning all the way to impact). Or are most pilots trained to deal with engine failure on takeoff under the assumption these systems will work, a scenario still not without its challenges? Another point you raise is that once we get to the V MC demonstration point the aircraft is so slow it can no longer climb. That s correct. What the V MC recovery would do in such a case is to permit the airplane to descend straight ahead, under control. It s not entirely clear whether or not the pilot was under control when the big turboprop slammed into the training center. Thanks again, Robert. Reader Fred Scott adds: I have no idea why the King Air was lost in Wichita, nor why his flaps were deployed (as a witness reported). I do agree with you that training in the slow flight regimes seems to be solely for the purpose of passing check rides and may not continue in our recurrent work. I have never understood why that is. I am not an instructor and I don't take aim at anyone by saying this: but I routinely fly solo Lazy Eights and Pylon Turns in my personal King Air. I fly solo slow flight whenever I feel like it, with the stall warning screaming. It's fun. I suppose I do become more comfortable in slow speed, high Alpha, regimes by doing these exercises. I really always assumed that most pilots do much the same. But as I helped promote the use of Alpha-displays over the last few years, I became aware that many pilots stay as far away from the "slow flight" regimes as they can. I don't understand that. Personally, I'd like to see more of us become comfortable in slow, and ultra-slow symmetrical flight. If that were to become the norm, then asymmetrical slow flight Vmc demos becomes just one more step towards a higher skill level. After all, on every Takeoff and on every Landing, we transition through these regimes. But it does not follow in any way that we must treat this area as "There Be Dragons Here". Some aviators use slow flight to great advantage. Bush pilots use slow flight to turn back out of a weather-blocked canyon, for example. The turn radius goes way down when we slow down. Thanks, Fred. If you were an instructor, and conducted a lot of required Flight Reviews, you d be amazed at how infrequently most pilots practice the basics.

4 Instructor Alan Davis writes: Excellent piece, and I can imagine he shock of it happening so "close to home". I agree with your analysis (epiphany) of part of the problem - the "circus trick" aspect - i.e. not relating training maneuvers that must be done on the check ride to the real scenario. Do you remember when we did (and the PTS named them) "Takeoff-Departure" and "Approach to Landing" stalls instead of Power Off and Power On [stalls]? My instructor even had verbiage that went on during the demonstration of those that tied them in situationally - for example, the clearing turns for approach to landing were the turn to downwind and the turn to base, and then on the turn to final, etc. When we (FAA) took the names off of them, they lost part of their effectiveness and became just something to be done for and on a check ride - a circus trick - and where do we lose a lot of pilots? I still teach them, and other maneuvers, the old way to make sure my students understand both the stall and the place where and reason it might occur. Thanks, Alan. Although the FAA has not restored the original name of the maneuver, a subtle yet significant mid-2012 change in the FAA Practical Test Standards makes at least the power off evaluation much more reflective of the actual scenario. Instead of the pre-2012 requirement to enter the stall from level flight a circus trick if there ever was one the new procedure calls for entering a final approach configuration and descent, stalling from the descent (with altitude loss prior to the stall no longer a completion standard) and recovery into a climb precisely the scenario of the Approach to Landing stall we hope to instill by training and evaluating this maneuver.

5 Reader Robert Vuksanovic goes back to the Levels of Learning discussed in last week s LESSONS. Correlation is the highest level of learning, when a student (and we are all students) takes what is learned in one context and uses that knowledge or skill in another. Application is one level of learning short of correlation, when a student uses what he is learned to properly manage or respond to the situation in which that knowledge or skill was presented. I wrote last week that we need to correlate the skills we learn on Practical Tests to other sets of conditions. But perhaps, Robert writes, part of the solution is simply to get application right: Application, that is in my opinion the number one causal factor I have seen in observation. These people are trained if they are checked out and meet Insurance requirements. Upset Recovery Training as we offer at GFR is paramount to Application. If there is a medical situation with a single pilot operation, there are a few things one can do in certain cases to attempt survival, coughing, oxygen, etc. However, what I see is, if panic sets in, application is not engaged in until it is too late, or incorrect application is applied. Again as I said before! Currency does not make you safe. Proficiency does! Thank you, Robert. Reader and engineering flight test manager (and my former mentoree) Allan Herbert writes: [Last] week's LESSON was particularly good. As I'm working through my commercial checkride prep, it is sometimes hard to identify why doing a Lazy 8, or a Power Off 180, or 55 degree steep turns matters so much. It s a good reminder that though the maneuver itself may never get used in the "real world," the skills learned doing the maneuvers are the real goal of the training. This was a good reminder to stay focused on the underlying skills instead of the mechanical maneuver. You ve got it, Allen. Best of luck with your Commercial test. What do you think? Let us know at mastery.flight.training@cox.net. Be a FLYING LESSONS supporter through the secure PayPal donations button at Thank you, generous supporters Next week I ll make the time to develop LESSONS as a result of more I learned at the NBAA Single-Pilot Safety Stand-down in October, as it relates to a widely reported accident that took place this past week. And I ll have more from the backlog of Debrief items, many concerning the Cirrus/helicopter collision in the Class D pattern at Frederick, Maryland a few weeks ago. Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend Personal Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year FLYING LESSONS is 2014 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For more information see or contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net.