FLYING LESSONS for September 12, 2013 Suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports

Transcription

1 FLYING LESSONS for September 12, 2013 Suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports FLYING LESSONS uses the past week s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make. FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. This week s lessons: Many runway excursions may be the result of excessive braking by the pilot. Most modern airplane brakes are capable of locking up the wheels and preventing them from rotating, even at fairly high runway speeds. Tires pick up a tremendous amount of heat from friction very rapidly if they are unable to spin. Heating increases the air pressure inside the tire. Combined with flat-spotting from a few seconds of contact with the runway by a single part of the un-rotating tire, this will very quickly lead to a blown tire. Once a tire blows it becomes very difficult to maintain directional control. I was in the back seat of a Pressurized Baron once that blew a tire on landing. The airplane exited the runway to the right despite the quick response from both the pilot and his instructor. Another phenomenon that results from locking up the brakes on landing is called reverted rubber hydroplaning. The FAA tells us: Reverted rubber (steam) hydroplaning occurs during heavy braking that results in a prolonged locked-wheel skid. Only a thin film of water on the runway is required to facilitate this type of hydroplaning. The tire skidding generates enough heat to cause the rubber in contact with the runway to revert to its original uncured state. The reverted rubber acts as a seal between the tire and the runway, and delays water exit from the tire footprint area. The water heats and is converted to steam which supports the tire off the runway. Reverted rubber hydroplaning frequently follows an encounter with dynamic hydroplaning, during which time the pilot may have the brakes locked in an attempt to slow the airplane. Eventually the airplane slows enough to where the tires make contact with the runway surface and the airplane begins to skid. The remedy for this type of hydroplane is for the pilot to release the brakes and allow the wheels to spin up and apply moderate braking. Reverted rubber hydroplaning is insidious in that the pilot may not know when it begins, and it can persist to very slow groundspeeds (20 knots or less). Short-field landing technique usually calls for maximum braking. Maximum, however, is relative it s the maximum that permits effective braking, and that means not locking up the wheels. Like the old public-service television bits and Automobile Club ads in the pre-antilock Braking System (ABS) era told us, maximum braking occurs by pumping, or alternately applying and releasing the brakes. This causes the tires to grab for very short periods, then release and roll until another part of the tire makes contact for the next brake application. The tire does not flat-spot and the heat stays under control. Some airplane handbooks and manuals recommend retracting flaps after touchdown to maximum braking effectiveness. The idea is that putting more weight on the wheels helps slow the airplane. Other handbooks are moot on this subject. Full flaps may provide enough aerodynamic drag to give an equivalent effect to more weight on the wheels. The risk of inadvertent landing gear retraction may make it unwise to attempt this technique in retractablegear airplanes. Regardless of airplane type, retract the flaps during the landing roll only with extreme caution. The same concept applies to trying to make a taxiway turn-off before the aircraft has sufficiently slowed, or if you land long and find the end of the runway coming up faster than

2 planned. Aggressive braking requires pumping of the brakes, not continuous application. Standing on the brakes is counterproductive and may well result in loss of control. Many airplane wheels are made of light metals like magnesium that can heat to the point of combustion when overheated from excessive braking. Some airplane types carry advisories to avoid excessive braking to avoid wheel fires that have in some cases spread to engulf the entire airframe. Attain minimum landing distance by touching down near the beginning of the prepared surface at the recommended landing speed in the recommended landing configuration. Only if needed, apply brakes in extremely short bursts that avoid locking the brakes and prevent flatspotting and heating that can lead to a blown tire or brake fire. Comments? Mastery.flight.training@cox.net. Thanks to AVEMCO Insurance for helping bring you FLYING LESSONS Weekly. See Contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net for sponsorship information. Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS: Last week s LESSONS, as expected, prompted quite a bit of reader mail, including these: John Townsley asks some very good questions: I'm curious about why you chose to certify Max as competent in the aircraft. While he could operate the autopilot, he used it to violate numerous FARs...placing others and himself in jeopardy. Where was "judgment" in your assessment of competency? This event happened in 1991, but I remember we had significant discussion about whether to endorse the pilot at all. I was instructing for an international flight safety training company at the time. Company policy was that individual instructors endorsed pilots for a Flight Review if they completed all syllabus items to Private Pilot standards. The company s syllabus at the time was entirely task-based, i.e., a list of specific maneuvers, and did not provide for a subjective evaluation of judgment. I recall talking to the Center Manager and the Director of Training about this pilot and being told that, since the pilot had flown all syllabus items to standards that he would get the VFR-only completion certificate. I do see in my logbook that I did not endorse the pilot for a Flight Review. The tragic story did not end there. I took Max on as a mission. Although the company I worked for did not at the time provide instrument rating training in the Bonanza, I did talk with the pilot at length about his need for an instrument rating. I followed up every few months with a phone call. My message got through; Max eventually began telling me he d come back to Wichita to earn his instrument rating if the company began offering the training. About a year later we d added instructional staff and the capacity increased, and our manager announced we would indeed provide instrument rating training at low-volume times of the year. I immediately called Max, and he enrolled right away. I was in charge of Beech Bonanza initial and recurrent training, and another of the instructors on staff was assigned to conduct personalized IFR rating training. So I left on a vacation knowing Max would be about halfway through his training when I returned.

3 Except when I came back Max s assigned instructor was working at his desk when he should have been in the simulator with Max. Didn t you hear? he replied when I asked about Max. He flew into a mountain in instrument conditions on his way here for training. See I still feel somehow responsible. Should I have pushed Max even harder? Should have I turned him in to the FAA (see more of that in response to another Debriefer s comment below)? My employer did not permit us to instruct outside of our work how could I have proceeded with that restriction? Was there anything I could really do? Reader Townsley continues: I'm also curious why you acquiesced to the former Air Force pilot's bad judgment. Isn't one of the cardinal rules of Air Force crew training that any crew member can call "knock it off" at any point? Reflecting back, what are the lessons you would share? That s a lot easier for me to answer. I was not part of the crew; I was in the rearmost seat, without even a headset. I didn t know the pilot had not obtained in instrument clearance until I was driving away from the airport with the person who had ridden in the copilot seat, who told me what had happened in the air. California-based instructor Dan Ramirez writes: Tragic story about "Max" It still amazes me that there are many people like "Max" out there. Just because they have the means to own a plane, doesn't mean they should. I'm having a run on guys coming to me for an IPC/BFR that did not prepare whatsoever, with stories similar to "Max". Come on people, get serious about this stuff. Practice as if your life and that of others depends on it! because it does. Frequent Debriefer Tom Allen comments: What an article! I met a guy once who was reported to turn on his autopilot and then retire to the rear to work while en route. My first civilian aviation employer told me a friend of his died in a crash unknown flight in a pressurized twin, and that pilot had volunteered he regularly set an alarm and took naps on long VFR flights. It s amazing what the positions some people will put themselves in when flying a personal airplane exceedingly rare, I m sure, yet still amazing. Reader T Tung suggests there was more I could do: I love reading your articles in your newsletter. I wanted to respond to the story about Max. You said you spoke privately with him about the hazard, but after a point there is not much of any of us can do. I respectfully disagree. I believe that, after confronting the pilot as you did by voicing your concerns, it becomes evident that the pilot has not taken your concerns to heart and repeats the transgression, it is a duty of us as Airmen to document the conversation and report it to the FAA (if there is a [flying club] or employer involved, perhaps reporting to them as well). If it is evident to us that the person is likely to repeat his/her behavior, it cannot slide. Author Tony Kern has written several books about pilot discipline and one of his themes is not just checking our own rogue behavior in flight, but what is expected if we observe rogue behavior in others. It is not a question of judgment, as we already know that rules have been blatantly and deliberately violated and action to taken to cover it up. Each case is also different (the Air Force pilot s degree of transgression is certainly less than Max ) and the direction we take to carry out our duty is different every time (perhaps just debriefing that getting an IFR clearance is not that difficult to obtain in that situation would have been adequate). But I would say if I were in your shoes, I would have told the FAA about it. If more of us did this, it will not have to result in his fatality (or worse, the fatality of others). Perhaps you meant to convey this in your article, but it did not come through when I read it. Thanks and keep up the great work. This is an excellent point that comes up every now and then. Should pilots feel a responsibility to report a pilot to the FAA (or equivalent in non-u.s. jurisdictions)? If so, how should we go about doing so? The FAA website lists a toll-free phone number, TELL FAA ( ) and an address for the FAA Safety Hotline. One stated purpose of the Hotline is to report suspected violations of the Federal Air Regulations. The website s Frequently Asked

4 Questions (FAQ) section, however, provides no guidance about reporting incidents such as Max and the Air Force pilot except the omnibus Contact a Flight Standards District Office. I m not saying we shouldn t consider calling the FAA to report errant pilots if all other attempts at mitigation fail. I m leery, however, of encouraging reporting of regulations violations without a clear standard of proof. Even with Max s confession and what I learned about the former Air Force pilot of the Cessna twin, what proof did I have to take to the FAA? How can the FAA evaluate hearsay reported through the FSDO system to make a fair and accurate judgment that might result in pilot certificate action? That may seem like a cop-out on my part, and maybe it is but even if I had reported what I heard to the FAA, should they have take my word for it and launched an investigation? See Another frequent Debriefer, Robert Thorson, looks at the bigger picture of common pilot attitudes we must overcome to avoid becoming Max or the Air Force pilot ourselves: The two stories you related are at the heart of Safety Management Systems and are even more deeply related to Human Factors,... subjects that are treated like "voodoo". We know that all of us have some of those "cut the corner" characteristics in us. Yes... discipline is the answer, but not readily applied in today's culture. Why? Because the rewards in life are higher for those who break rules. They get away with it until it becomes the norm and then the end game comes up. "Max" didn't win the end game nor is any other pilot likely to do so unless they have those skills honed by experience and training and a huge portion of luck. My concerns in SMS are that we all see risk differently. The proponents tell me that SMS will standardize the risk. Yet the human will try to beat the system. There are always arbitrary and subjective standards that can be manipulated in systems to derive a result we can accept. It is in human nature to be lazy and to take risks. Pilots always think they are better than they actually are...particularly after watching TOP GUN or seeing an Airshow! (or You Tube) I wish I had a good solution. Mentoring and peer pressure are effective but few will come up to the "rogue" pilot at the airport and suggest a safer way to fly. Eventually Congress will pass regulations to lower the GA fatal accident rate. Or we will take the pilot out of the aircraft and fly autonomously. OR maybe we will have a behavioral test included in the medical. No good solutions...so let's try to get pilots to do what they are supposed to do... be responsible to their duties as a pilot, themselves, their families and those on the ground before outside actions force us into a safer realm. Airline pilot David Heberling adds: I always enjoy reading your weekly newsletter. It always makes me think about my attitudes towards flying and how I fly any airplane. I am sure that if your Air Force friend looked at his scenario from the vantage of an armchair, he would agree that it exhibited risky behavior. However, in the heat of the moment, he is no longer a dispassionate observer. This the problem we all face when performing a flight for a must get there reason. In retrospect it seems silly not to contact ATC to get out of a jam. Just look at the Cory Liddle accident in New York. All they had to do was pop up into class B airspace and ask for forgiveness. The accident in Arizona where the Turbo Commander flew into the mountain is another example of creating an artificial constraint your flight. This accident happened at night with the mountains close to Falcon Field, the airport of departure. That airplane has gobs of power and stellar performance. Filing IFR would have been far safer, but they chose to go VFR under the class B airspace. They missed their climb as the floor of the class B airspace rose above them. Was it really a bright idea to go VFR direct to their destination with tall rocks nearby at night? Everything would have worked out OK if they had hit their climb points on the money. Isn't that why we do preflight planning to begin with? Stuff happens and things do not go according to plan. What is your plan B? If you do not have one, your risk level is astronomical. Pilots who never have a plan B never think about risk. Great distillation, David. Thank you. Reader Woodie Diamond sums it all up: [It s] simple to explain [last] week s FLYING LESSON: At no time during our lives is it more important to always do the right thing, than when we are flying. [There is] no gray area! Great discussion, folks. Thank you. I look forward to hearing more from you on how we can self-police, and whether and how to call in the real police (FAA or equivalent) if our less official approach does not work. Comments? Mastery.flight.training@cox.net

5 It costs a great deal to host FLYING LESSONS Weekly. Reader donations help cover the expense of keeping FLYING LESSONS online. Be a FLYING LESSONS supporter through the secure PayPal donations button at For piston Beech pilots Thank you, generous supporters The Beech Weekly Accident Update is posted at Personal Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year FLYING LESSONS is 2013 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For more information see or contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net.