Boeing 777 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING

Transcription

1 Boeing 777 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING Q3&Q4 2018

2 Contents: 1 INTRODUCTION AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES UK MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR 4 SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETINS

3 1 Introduction This module covers aspects identified in the period since June 2018 and includes all engine types. 2 B777 Airworthiness Directives The following pages lists the Boeing 777 AD s issued from June 2018 to Dec If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website ( or you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there is no material change. AD No.: ATA 72 Engine - Full Authority Digital Engine Control - Software Upgrade Installation General Electric This AD applies to all GE GE90-76B, GE90-77B, GE90-85B, GE90-90B, and GE90-94B turbofan engines with full authority digital engine control (FADEC) software, version or earlier, installed. This AD requires upgrading the FADEC software to a software version eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by an icecrystal icing (ICI) event that caused damage to both engines, a single engine stall, and subsequent engine shutdown. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. US AD No.: ATA 72 Engine - Combustor Assembly - Removal / Replacement General Electric (1) This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) GE90-110B1, GE90-113B, and GE90-115B turbofan engines with a case combustor assembly (combustion case), part number (P/N)

4 FOR REFERENCE ONLY 2063M37G01 or 2082M19G04, installed with combustion case serial number (S/N) listed in: (i) Table 1 in paragraph 1.A., Planning Information, of GE GE Service Bulletin (SB) S/B , Revision 4, dated July 30, 2018; or (ii) Paragraph 1.A, Table 1 of GE SB GE SB R00, dated August 10, 2018; or (iii) Paragraph 1.A., Planning Information, of GE SB GE SB R00, dated May 4, (2) [Reserved.] This AD requires removal of affected combustion cases from service and their replacement with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a quality escape at a manufacturing facility involving unapproved welds on combustion cases. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products US AD No.: ATA 72 Engine - High Pressure Compressor Rotor Stage 2-5 Spools - Removal / Replacement General Electric This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) GE90-110B1 and GE90-115B turbofan engines with HPC rotor stage 2-5 spools, with: (1) A serial number (S/N) listed in either, paragraph 4, Appendix A of GE Service Bulletin (SB) No. GE SB R01, dated February 5, 2014; in paragraph 4, Appendix A of GE SB GE SB R01, dated February 18, 2016; or in paragraph 4, Appendix A, of GE SB GE S/B , Revision 01, dated February 16, (2) A part number (P/N) , P/N , P/N or P/N , with any S/N. AD required removing certain HPC rotor stage 2-5 spools from service at times determined by a drawdown plan. This AD requires removing certain HPC rotor stage 2-5 spools from service before reaching the new reduced life limit and replacing them with parts eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the publication of a GE service bulletin (SB) that increases the number of affected HPC rotor stage 2-5 spools and includes HPC rotor stage 2-5 spools that were inadvertently omitted from the applicability of AD We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

5 US AD No.: ATA 25 Equipment/Furnishings - Water Filter Assembly - Replacement The Boeing Company This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin , dated June 6, We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model ER series airplanes. This AD requires replacing the water filter assembly in certain steam ovens. This AD was prompted by a report that water can enter the steam oven cavity and become heated and then released when the oven door is opened. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. US AD No.: ATA 28 Airplane Flight Manual / Weight and Balance Control and Loading Manual - Fuel Operating Limitations - Revision The Boeing Company This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model LR series airplanes, certificated in any category, variable numbers (V/Ns) WD011 through WD015 inclusive, WD016 through WD018 inclusive, and WD049 through WD053 inclusive. We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model LR series airplanes. This AD requires revising certain documents to provide revised operating limitations. For certain airplanes, modification of the water and fuel scavenge systems in the fuel tanks, electrical changes in the main equipment center, and installation of new electrical load management system (ELMS2) software is an acceptable alternative to the documents revision. This AD was prompted by reports of unreliable performance of the water and fuel scavenge systems. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

6 US AD No.: ATA 73 Engine - Full Authority Digital Engine Control - Software Upgrade Installation General Electric This AD applies to all GE GE90-76B, GE90-77B, GE90-85B, GE90-90B, and GE90-94B turbofan engines with full authority digital engine control (FADEC) software, version or earlier, installed This AD requires upgrading the FADEC software to a software version eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by an icecrystal icing (ICI) event that caused damage to both engines, a single engine stall, and subsequent engine shutdown. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. US AD No.: ATA 72 Engine - Low-Pressure Compressor Fan Hub - Inspection / Replacement Pratt & Whitney This AD applies to all Pratt & Whitney Division (PW) PW4074D, PW4077D, PW4084D, PW4090, and PW turbofan engines with low-pressure compressor (LPC) fan hub, part number (P/N) 51B821 or P/N 52B521, installed. This AD was prompted by updated low-cycle fatigue analysis techniques that indicate certain LPC fan hubs could crack before their published life limit. This AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections (ECIs) and fluorescent penetrant inspections (FPIs) for cracks in certain LPC fan hubs and removal of LPC fan hubs from service that fail inspection. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. EASA AD No.: ATA 46 Information Systems Electronic Flight Bag Universal Serial Bus Receptacle Modification Fokker Services B. V. Fokker F27 Mark 050, F28 Mark 3000, F28 Mark 0070 and F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes; Airbus A318, A319, A320, A321, A330 and A340 aeroplanes; Avions de Transport Régional (ATR) ATR42 and ATR72 aeroplanes; Boeing 737, 757, 767 and 777 aeroplanes; and

7 FOR REFERENCE ONLY Bombardier (formerly Canadair) CL-600 and (formerly De Havilland Canada) DHC-8 aeroplanes; as identified in Appendix 1 of this AD. Several occurrences on various aeroplanes have been reported of smoke and fumes in the cockpit, due to overheating of an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) USB receptacle, which had been installed by FS Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), SB, or minor modification, either an Engineering Change Request (ECR) or Compliance Record Report (CRR), as applicable. Investigation results revealed that each of these events was caused by a short circuit in the EFB charging cable UK Maintenance Related MOR s The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of the organisation without the express permission in writing of the Civil Aviation Authority Safety Data Office. ATA 23 Screen and cradle cord overheat reported by crew. Screen and cradle cord overheat reported by crew. Visual inspection performed, no defect on screen and cord/handset. No burning smell/visible mark. Remote removed for t/s, found cord Insulation damaged. Badly around handset connection. Cradle replaced. ATA 32 EICAS message after doors closed due to aircraft loading configuration. Stab Green band EICAS message after doors closed. The stab green band was checked against the graph for a nuisance warning as per Boeing Bulletin ****. The graph indicated the warning was not a nuisance warning. The loading of the aircraft was checked and was found to be in accordance with the load sheet. Load control were contacted and they advised to move a pallet from the rear to the front hold. This rectified the problem. ATA 29 Loss of centre hydraulic system due multiple pump overheats. Aircraft departed with HYD PUMP DEM C2 status message, IAW DDG A. This fault had appeared during the turnaround in RUH. Once airborne, ISLN valves and APU reconfigured as per DDG. Shortly after, HYD OVERHEAT DEM C2 advisory displayed on EICAS and ECL actioned with C2 demand pump already being selected off. Within approximately 3 mins of each other followed HYD OVERHEAT PRI C2, PRI C1 and DEM C1. All ECLs were actioned, consequently HYD PRESS SYS C caution message displayed. HYD PRESS SYS C ECL actioned which

8 instructed either C1 or C2 air demand pump to be selected on, C1 selected as C2 had been declared u/s previously before flight, this cleared the HYD PRESS SYS C message. Flight continued with centre system being pressurised by C1 air demand pump for the remainder of the flight, despite still showing an overheat condition on EICAS and synoptic. Maintrol informed using SAT phone. Normal approach and landing at LHR. ATA 28 Fuel leak during maintenance. During engine change, a/c clearance to removed engine was not sufficient therefore decision was made to transfer fuel between r/h main tank to l/h main tank to provide adequate clearance for engine manoeuvring. As fuel was being transferred r/h main tank refuel valve failed to close when tank reached VTO meaning overfill protection is lost and fuel began to spill from r/h NACA duct onto hangar floor. Pumps were shut off and refuel/defuel valve closed not before approx. 200kgs of fuel loss. ***** called fire dept which responded with 10 mins and cleared area with peat and disposed of the waste. Fuel was contained to small area on floor between two bays with no injury to personnel or equipment. Add ***** raised for pressure refuel fault in log and a/c returned to LHR 3 days later. ATA 73 Fuel leak on ramp.trent 800 During walk around Engineering noticed fuel leak from right hand engine. Engineering removed fuel drain tank ejector pump, cleaned and refitted. During the removal of the pump approximately 2-3 litres of fuel gushed out of the pump, the collector (comprising of a small round red fuel can and small yellow funnel) Engineering used was insufficient to catch the fuel and was therefore deposited onto the ramp. Engineering used rags to mop up the fuel, TRM was advised to coordinate a ramp clean and the Fire Services attended to confirm that they were happy with the situation and that there was no further fire risk. Tech log completed for Engineering work. Engineering informed the Pilot who attended the scene that they used to have a larger vessel to collect the fuel whilst carrying out this maintenance action, however this was changed due to Health and Safety. This needs to be reviewed as one on the Engineers had his arms significantly contaminated by fuel. Furthermore, had there not of been a fuel spill, Fire Services would not of needed to attend - nearby minimising the delay and using valuable services that could of been required elsewhere. ATA 32 Wheel hub cap,tpis cable and clamp were found missing. Tire pressure sys' status message on take-off roll. #1 tyre pressure indication u/s went blank. On investigation, inspection of the #1 wheel found that the wheel hub cap, TPIS cable and clamp were found missing. Aircraft departed from Singapore. Maintrol contacted and informed SIN authorities who subsequently found the clamp on the taxiway. Wheel assy was replace 5 days previously.. ATA 72 UK Reportable Accident: Uncontained left engine failure and subsequent fire during take-off run. Captain called 'stop' at 80kts and initiated an evacuation on the runway. 170 POB, 1 serious injury and 19 minor injuries. United States NTSB investigation. GE90

9 CAA Closure: Investigations confirmed failure of the left engine high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 8-10 spool, which caused the main fuel supply line to become detached from the engine main fuel pump and release fuel, resulting in a fire on the left side of the airplane. The HPC stage 8-10 spool failed due to a sustained-peak low-cycle fatigue crack that initiated in the web of the stage 8 disk; the cause of the crack initiation could not be identified by physical inspection and stress and lifing analysis. Contributing to this accident was the lack of inspection procedures for the stage 8 disk web. 19 passengers sustained minor injuries and 1 flight attendant received a serious injury during the evacuation. F/A 1 reported that the 1R slide was wet and slippery from the extinguishing agent. She fell upon reaching the end of the slide/raft and fractured her left radius (forearm). She also suffered a compression fracture of the first lumbar vertebra in her back. NTSB Final Report, ref DCA15FA185. ATA 35 The passenger oxygen flight deck switch guard was locked closed with stainless steel locking wire. The aircraft in question arrived at Gatwick from MCO and whilst carrying out daily routine. Flight deck checks, it was observed that the passenger oxygen flight deck switch guard was locked closed with stainless steel locking wire, which would have prevented the flight crew from initiating a manual oxygen mask deployment. The locking wire was removed and correct tamper evident wire was used to secure the switch guard down. ATA 26 Ramp staff pushed the "Fire bottle discharge" in error. Flight cancelled. Ramp staff pushed the "Fire bottle discharge" by error. The aircraft arrived from LGW and passengers disembarked as usual. Once the aircraft was ready to be pushed to a remote bay for the day, the headset operator asked a ramp staff to "press on the black button" so that he could speak to the cockpit. The ramp staff obeyed and press the black "fire bottle discharge" instead of the cockpit call. MMS had arrived with a L Backup Gen INOP defect and with the fire bottle empty, the aircraft was declared NO GO. The aircraft was grounded for 2 days, waiting for the spare fire bottle. B777 departed at 21:45LT on 19JUN. 4. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins Information Bulletins can be viewed at No SAIB s during this period. - END -