FOR REFERENCE ONLY. Boeing 727 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING

Transcription

1 Boeing 727 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING Q3 & Q4 2017

2 Contents: FOR REFERENCE ONLY 1 INTRODUCTION AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES UK MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR 4 SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETINS

3 1 Introduction This module covers aspects identified in the period since Q3 & Q and includes all engine types. 2 B727 Airworthiness Directives The following pages lists the Boeing 727 AD s issued from June 2017 to January If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website ( or you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there is no material change. US AD No.: Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at ATA 52 Manufacturer/s: Doors - Main Cargo Door Cam Support Assemblies - Inspection The Boeing Company Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 727, 727C, , C, , and F series airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with a main cargo door (MCD). Reason: This AD was prompted by analysis of the cam support assemblies of the main cargo door (MCD) that indicated the repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections required by the existing maintenance program are not adequate to detect cracks before two adjacent cam support assemblies of the MCD could fail. This AD requires repetitive ultrasonic inspections for cracking of the cam support assemblies of the MCD and replacement if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

4 UK Maintenance Related MOR s The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of the organisation without the express permission in writing of the Civil Aviation Authority Safety Data Office. ATA 27 Missing flap dead weight roller assembly. The missing Roller Assembly (Pt No. 65C ) on the #4 Flap Assembly (IPC Fig 1 Page 2 Item H) has been reported whilst the aircraft is on scheduled C Check Maintenance (Airframe Hrs: ; Cycles: 19498). The remains of one end of what is believed to be a Bolt - Special (Pt No ) was also found within the fairing on the #4 Flap System, it has clear evidence of shearing under load. Additional damage was found on the upper #4 Flap Guide Bearing Cage (Pt No. LA6991A), this is believed to have been caused by the operation of the Flaps with the missing Roller Assembly. 4. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins Information Bulletins can be viewed at FAA UPN & UPN Boeing Aeroplanes - Bushings manufactured by ESNA Aerospace (Fitz Manufacturing Ind.) sold by Wesco Aircraft Introduction Boeing bushings, part numbers BACB28AK04-042, BACB28AK04-329, BACB28AK05-021, BACB28AK04-075, BACB28AT14B060C, BACB28T10B049C 9 used on Boeing models 727, 737, 747, 757, 767, 777, 787 sold by Wesco Aircraft that were manufactured by ESNA Aerospace. Boeing bushings, part number BACB28AK07-465, sold by Wesco Aircraft and Fitz Aerospace This notification advises all aircraft owners, operators, manufacturers, maintenance organizations, parts suppliers, and distributors of Boeing bushings manufactured by ESNA Aerospace and sold by Wesco Aircraft without Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) production approval.

5 FAA NE Pratt & Whitney JT8D-200 series engines - Turbine Engine Combustion Section Introduction This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, owners, operators, and certificated repair facilities of airplanes equipped with certain Pratt & Whitney Division (P&W) JT8D series turbofan engines, that there is a potential for these engines to experience increased low-pressure turbine (LPT) stage 4 blade failure. At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. The blade failure may be caused by repaired combustion chambers that were returned to service outside of published repair limits. Affected engines are all JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and turbofan engines with combustion chambers that were repaired by Aircraft Technology Inc. (ATI), Hollywood, FL, USA (FAA repair station certificate no. ETQR115L /EASA certificate no. 4108). - END -