Managing changes in Civil Aviation -India Perspective. Capt.A.Ranganathan

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1 Managing changes in Civil Aviation -India Perspective Capt.A.Ranganathan

2 Cochin Kanpur Mangalore Lengpui Trichy Guwahati PAST Imperfect PRESENT Tense Indian Safety collage FUTURE Clouded by lack of Transparency? Surat Lengpui Mumbai Cochin Agathi

3 Right Professional for the job J. Randolph "Randy" Babbitt FAA Chief My number one priority is to focus on safety. This is a business where one mistake is one too many." Former Airline pilot and the head of Air Line Pilots Association

4 Right Professional for the job Former, Director of the Air Navigation Bureau at the International Civil Aviation Organization; U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), focusing on air traffic management and control A certified air transport pilot, a certified flight and ground instructor, a licensed airframe and power plant mechanic, and a qualified FAA control tower operator. William Voss CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation

5 NTSB Identification: OPS11IA401 WASHINGTON FLIGHT PROGRAM Incident occurred Wednesday, March 23, 2011 in Arlington, VA Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/17/2011 unable to establish contact with the supervisory controller working alone in the control tower. Two air carrier aircraft landed during the period without tower contact

6 Postincident investigation revealed that the controller on duty had the necessary preconditions for the development of fatigue at the time of the event, specifically acute sleep loss in the 24 hours before the event and circadian disruption as a result of working the midnight shift.

7 The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows: The tower controller's loss of consciousness induced by lack of sleep, fatigue resulting from working successive midnight shifts, and air traffic control scheduling practices

8 Proactive Action by an Independent investigation board and a Safety system where Safety is the priority What we have is a Reactive Procrastination where Commercial & Political interests outweigh Safety

9 The Darkroom Boys Govt. of India should recognise due importance of ATC profession and accord special status to it preferably by examining the feasibility of de-linking ATC from the normal organisational set-up and creating an independent cadre to be governed by separate provisions. Justice Lahoti

10 The responsibility of a pilot-in-command is limited to the safety of his aircraft and passengers on board thereon, that of the controller extends to all the aircraft (and passengers) under his control at any given time Justice Lahoti

11 The Scapegoats Ground Pilots De-Roster ATCOs

12 What we lack Professionalism Transparency Quality Investigations Correct perspective

13 Managing Safety Lessons from the past left unlearned

14 25 th June 2011 AIE flight makes a steep approach and a hard landing at Mangalore. The captain decides to take off again but the copilot slams the brakes and the aircraft manages to stop by the end of the runway. Almost repeats the crash sequence of AIE 812

15 If the aircraft had overshot the end of the runway, this image would have repeated

16 The Pilot was blamed AIE 812

17 Rate of Descent 4000 feet per minute Rate of Descent 4000 feet per minute Rate of Descent > 1000 feet per minute ILS Glide Path Rate of Descent 600 feet per minute AX 812 descends at 4000 feet per minute up to 600 feet and maintains more than 1000 feet per minute up to 60 feet before rounding off to reduce the Descent Rate

18 The COI chose to ignore this vital fact 06:04:29 EGPWS Forty 06:04:31 EGPWS Twenty 06:04:32 EGPWS Ten 06:04:30 EGPWS Thirty AX 812 descends 10 feet for every second from Forty feet up to Ten feet but floats for the next 8 seconds before touching down

19 The touchdown was with Power-ON

20 The fatigued and overworked ATCO still mans the tower

21 Flights are still landing beyond the Touchdown Zone 2000ft from threshold and 30ft high

22 The failure of the COI to be transparent in identifying ALL the factors that contributed to the crash, prolongs the dangerous flight conditions

23 Precision Approach Radar

24 Polish President s flight 10 th April 2010

25 On track, On Glide path The crew were experienced and the Russian Air Force Radar controller was highly trained

26 4.6 km from the threshold of RWY26 60 m above the glide path and 130 m to the left of runway centerline, the Controller of Landing Zone called: FOUR on track, glide path

27 3.5 km from the threshold of RWY26 35 m above the glide path and 100 m to the left of runway centerline, the Controller of Landing Zone called: THREE - on track, glide path

28 2.5 km from the threshold of RWY26 20 m above the glide path and 80 m to the left of runway centerline, the Controller of Landing Zone called: TWO - on track, glide path

30 Report of the Polish Authorities According to the Polish report the main cause of accident was trial approach and the descent below the allowed altitude at an excessive rate of descent in bad weather conditions, in conjunction with late execution of the go-around procedure

31 Report of the Polish Authorities Circumstances that led to this are incorrect training of Polish Pilots but also wrong work of Russian Air Traffic Controllers who gave bad information to crew of Tu-154m

32 Radar Datum 1 Radar Datum 2 Datum 1 Horizontal Aircraft Position Datum 2 Positional Discrepancy 100m m

33 Precision Approach Radar Defense airfield charts are based on EVER-MD Coordinates and not on WGS 84 as laid down by ICAO

34 Use Of GPS In Non-WGS84 Reference Datum Airspace In non-wgs 84 airspace, the local datum (position basis) used to survey the navigation data base position information may result in significant position errors from a survey done using the WGS 84 datum Airbus & Boeing

35 To the pilot, this means that the position of runways, airports, waypoints, or navigation aids, may not be as accurate as depicted on the map display and may not agree with the GPSposition.

36 This navigation accuracy may not be accurate for approaches Srinagar Runway 31

39 Are Airlines being safe and the Regulator ensuring safety when a Precision approach is permitted to be conducted in unsafe conditions with untrained crew who have no SOPs?

40 UNDERSTANDING ENERGY MANAGEMENT SPEED CONTROL IN ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS

41 Typical Schedule for Deceleration on Three-Degree Glide Path from Outer Marker to Stabilisation Height ( 1000 feet ) Deceleration Segment ( 10kts / nm ) OM MM 1000ft above Airport elevation 3 6 V APP at 1000ft= 130kts V MAX at OM=160kts Source- Flight Safety Foundation

42 SPEED PROFILE TO BE ADHERED DURING MIXED MODE OPERATIONS 10-4 NM from touchdown 160 Kts IAS

43 With Speed of 160 kts at 4 nm and in Tailwind conditions, the aircraft cannot be in Stabilised condition by 1000ft AGL

44 AVIATION ENVIRONMENT CIRCULAR 3 OF 2011

45 1.1 Thrust reversal, also known as reverse thrust, is a momentary process

46 1.3 Thrust reversers also provide additional stopping force on wet and slippery runways along with added safety and control margins during aborted takeoffs and landings.

47 5.1 The flight crew shall be mentally prepared to land without using thrust reverser and bring the aircraft at low power low drag with clean configuration.

48 6.2 It will be the sole responsibility of the airport operator to maintain the data pertaining to landing of aircraft without application of thrust reverser..

49 Landing Advisory data assumptions 1000 feet Touch down Threshold Crossing height 50feet Speed Vref Spoilers Deployment- Automatic or Manual within 2 seconds Reverse thrust within 2 seconds Wheel brakes within 1 second

50 With heavy rubber deposits in the touchdown area at Delhi, the Environment Circular will result in a disaster in wet conditions

51 Haven t they understood the reasons of Runway Excursion?

52 Air China Flight

58 Calicut Airport

59 There was NO RESA at the end of Runway 28

60 Any overrun would have resulted in a disaster

61 Calicut continues to be an Unlicensed field

62 Calicut continues to be an Unlicensed field A0372/10 CALICUT AIRPORT IS LICENSED FOR PUBLIC USE FM 29 TH JUN 2009 AND VALID UPTO 26 TH JUN FEB 12: UNTIL PERM CREATED 25 FEB 14:

63 Safety Audits and Inspections by AAI and DGCA Were they honest and Transparent?

64 "Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise." Thomas Gray's poem (1742)

65 Cochin Kanpur Mangalore Lengpui Trichy Guwahati We need a new perspective a mindset change to prevent the Horoscope from becoming a Horrorscope? Surat Lengpui Mumbai Cochin Agathi

66 We need Horses for the Courses

67 Pilots cannot be replaced from the cockpit AND It is time the Government recognised that the Air Traffic Control is Unique and ATM is best handled by the ATCOs

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This page intentionally left blank. An unstabilized approach and excessive airspeed on touchdown were the probable causes of an overrun that resulted in substantial damage to a Raytheon Premier 1, said