SFAR 88 AND EWIS CONTINUATION TRAINING

Transcription

1 SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. SFAR 88 AND EWIS CONTINUATION TRAINING DATED: Jan 2012

2 SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. Contents: 1 INTRODUCTION WHERE TO GET YOUR CDCCL INFORMATION ELECTRICAL WIRING INTERCONNECTION SYSTEMS CASE STUDY ATTACHMENT 1 NITROGEN GENERATION SYSTEM... 7

3 SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. 1 Introduction The start of the continuation training will cover the basic principals so far. They are as follows: Any CDCCL items authorised MUST have an SRP entry that STATES that it is a CDCCL item and as such, has been authorised with due consideration of all special requirements listed in the AMM or SB or Work card Keep in mind that you must verify that the item you are going to authorise is possibly a CDCCL item. NEVER ASSUME YOU KNOW ALWAYS VERIFY All Form 1 s for fuel related items that are signed after 30 March 2008 should have some reference to CDCCL requirements (however use your discretion here or contact the ALT Quality Manager) 2 Where to get your CDCCL information. By now, most manufacturers will have AMM amendments in place that stipulate CDCCL requirements (Don t assume that there have not been any changes read the AMM and Technical information) The operators will have made changes to the work cards to reflect this requirement and work cards should draw attention to CDCCL requirements Read DHL Air DAEP 61 (B757) Read DHL Air B767 Tech Note Read EAT CAME Part 1, page 17 Tech Log completion (Maintenance Checks) Read ALT Engineering Bulletin GEN Read ALT engineering Memo dated 1 January 2008 Read ALT Engineering Memo dated 7 March 2008 Contact the ALT Quality Manager for assistance if unsure Check your component Form 1 s carefully

4 SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. 3 Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems 3.1 Background: Over the year there have been a number of in flight smoke and fire events where contamination sustained and caused the fire to spread. Regulators and accident investigators have conducted aircraft inspections and found wiring contaminated with items such as dust, dirt, metal shavings, lavatory waste water, coffee, soft drinks and napkins. In some cases, dust has been found completely covering wire bundles and the surrounding area. Research has also demonstrated that wiring can be harmed by collateral damage when maintenance is being performed on other aircraft systems. For example a person performing an inspection of an electrical power centre or avionics compartment may inadvertently cause damage to wiring in an adjacent area. Aviation accident investigations have specifically cited the need for improved training of personnel to ensure adequate recognition and repair of potentially unsafe wiring conditions. 3.2 Objectives: Depending on the group, the person shows competency in the following skills: 1) Know or demonstrate the safe handling of aeroplane electrical systems, line replaceable units, tooling, troubleshooting procedures and electrical measurement. (ESDS) 2) Know or demonstrate the construction and navigation of the applicable aircraft wiring system manual or wiring practices 3) Recognise other possible contamination sources 4) Know the planning procedures to be followed 5) Know the protection procedures and processes to protect EWIS during maintenance and repair 6) Know the process of cleaning wiring systems during maintenance and repair.

5 4 Case Study SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. Damage to wiring The visual inspections carried out by ATSRAC showed that aircraft wiring deteriorates with time and, particularly, in areas subject to high levels of maintenance activity. This is reflected in the incident to G-BOAC, where the airworthiness issues highlighted are not limited to Concorde, which is no longer in service, but reflect broader concerns on all aircraft types regarding wiring maintenance, particularly as aircraft age and modifications are introduced. The possibility for a wire to chafe was introduced during a maintenance input two years prior to this incident, when the wiring was last disturbed. This ultimately led to a short duration in-flight fuel fire. Similar factors were identified in the incident to a B737, G-DOCH, where a maintenance input led to the mis-routing of the water supply line. This resulted in abrasion between the wires and the hose, and in the shorting and severing of a number of the wires. The hose was too long for this application and the excess length had been looped through the overhead area and then secured by a tie-wrap to adjacent wire bundles. It was most likely that that this was simply a short-term expedient while systems were being disconnected and disassembled and that the 'temporary' tie-wrap was then missed during reassembly. Loss of the pressurisation system on another B737, G-DOCE, resulted from the abrasion of the insulation of two or more wires in the affected loom. As in the other incidents, there was the possibility that the loom may have been damaged whilst maintenance was carried out in the area, and that this may have started the process which led to the conductors being exposed. The incident to B737 G-LGTI occurred prior to flight, when the flight crew became aware of an electrical burning smell and smoke. The aircraft was shut down and the passengers evacuated. Pre-existing damage to the electrical galley feeder cables was identified which provided for the possibility of electrical arcing. All these incidents show how prone electrical wiring is to damage, occurring over time or being introduced during maintenance or modification action. Periodic zonal inspections are carried out but damage and debris is often hidden within wiring bundles and is difficult to detect without disturbing the looms. The draft ACs, generated by the ATSRAC work, address wiring standards issues of the type identified by these incidents, notably by the EZAP procedure, and this has been adopted into the latest revision of MSG-3 guidelines. However, the draft ACs have not yet been published, despite draft documents having been developed and issued by ATSRAC in Therefore the following recommendations are made: Safety Recommendation It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accelerate the publication and adoption of the guidance material produced by the Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) on developing an electrical systems standard wiring practices manual, developing an effective wiring systems training programme and on changes to existing maintenance practices and analysis methods, which could be applied to both in-service aircraft and new design, to ensure adequate consideration of the potential deterioration of electrical wiring systems.

6 SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. Safety Recommendation It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety (EASA) expedite the transcription by Agency the European Ageing Systems Co-ordination Group (EASCG) of the material in the FAA Advisory Circulars (ACs) produced by the Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC), which gives guidance for operators and maintenance organisations on developing an electrical systems standard wiring practices manual, developing an effective wiring systems training programme and on changes to existing maintenance practices and analysis methods. This guidance should be applied to both in-service aircraft and new designs, to ensure adequate consideration is given to potential in-service deterioration of electrical wiring systems. In response to this recommendation, EASA have stated that the EASCG have already drafted several documents, related to the four subject incidents, and that a meeting was scheduled for April 2004 to begin the Notice of Proposed Action (NPA) process within the EASA framework1.

7 SFAR 88 Additional Fuel Tank Safety Continuation Training. 5 Attachment 1 Nitrogen Generation System Please see attached Frequently Asked Questions in relation to Nitrogen Generation System which we hope will be of interest to you.

8 Nitrogen Generation System Frequently Asked Questions General Q. Are any references available describing the FAA Flammability Final Rule and the Rule s implications to Boeing and Airlines? Boeing has provided a 4-Square format summary chart to operators. The chart summarizes the Rule and its implications to Boeing and customers. The chart is comprised of 4 topic areas; Regulatory Activity, Boeing Actions, Operator Actions, and NGS Incorporation. Boeing production and retrofit program plans as well as Rule deadlines are noted therein. A copy of this chart was distributed by MOM in 4Q 2008 and the chart is also maintained on the My Boeing Fleet under the NGS link located on the Fuels Working Group SFAR 88 webpage Q. Where can I find the FAA final rule pertaining to Flammability Reduction? The Final Rule was published in the US Federal Register on 21 Jul 2008, pages , under the title Reduction of Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport Category Airplanes. A correcting amendment (consisting of a 3-month extension to the compliance deadlines) to the Final Rule was published in the US Federal Register on 06 Jul 2009, pages The current US Federal Register and archives can be accessed at the US Government Printing Office website: Q. Why is NGS required? NGS is required per the new FAA flammability reduction final rule which was published 21 Jul 2008 in the US Federal Register. Q. When I purchase a new airplane can I request that NGS not be installed? Once NGS is implemented in production, the NGS will installation will be basic and stable for and-on deliveries with no removal option. Q. Is NGS required for both passenger and freighter airplanes, do I have an option to opt out? NGS is required on certain new production airplanes per the Final Rule. Once NGS is implemented in production, NGS will be basic and stable for all and-on passenger and freighter configurations. Retrofit is required by the FAA. See also the Summary Chart attached to this FTD. Q. Once I have taken ownership of a new airplane, can I remove/in-opt the NGS from the airplane? If the airplane operator is regulated by the FAA, then production installed NGS can not be removed. If the airplane operator is not regulated by the FAA then we recommend consulting the local regulatory authority for requirements clarification. Q. Is there any NGS training video available? There are two training videos available on My Boeing Fleet under the NGS link located on the Fuels Working Group SFAR 88 webpage. One video is 737NG specific and the

9 other is applicable to the 747/767/777. The wide body video is common as the NGS systems are sufficiently similar to be covered under one video. Both videos are considered introductory and should be complemented with additional training as determined. Q. Why is the center wing tank the only fuel tank requiring an inerting system? All airplane fuel tanks were analyzed to determine inherent flammability risk. Analysis revealed that while main tanks were below flammability threshold requirements, certain model center tanks were found to exceed the flammability threshold. The center tanks differ from wing tanks in that the center tank is exposed to waste heat from with other airplane systems (esp. ECS). This raises the energy of the fuel in the center tank, thereby slightly increasing its flammability risk. Operation Q. Is there any crew interface display associated with the NGS, for example oxygen concentration display for the fuel tank? No, the system does not require flight crew monitoring. Q. How will I be notified that the NGS is operating correctly? For airplanes with an NGS operability indicator in the wheel well (737/NG, 767), a green indicator light advises that the system is operating correctly, while an amber or red indicator light indicates that the system is not operating correctly. For airplanes with EICAS (747/757/777), the absence of NGS status messages indicates that the NGS is operating correctly, while the presence of NGS status messages indicates that the NGS is not operating correctly. Q. Can the NGS be turned On/Off from the flight deck? No. Q. Is it possible that NGS could fail in a way that would cause an oxygen deficient environment in the flight deck, passenger cabin, or cargo hold? No, all NGS components which generate oxygen deficient air are located outside the pressurized fuselage, i.e. the flight deck, passenger cabin, and cargo hold. Q. Will the passengers be aware of the NGS due to noise, odor, or other? No, NGS like many airplane systems will be transparent to the passengers. Q. Is their any NGS MMEL relief? Yes, airplanes can be dispatched with the NGS degraded or inoperative. If the NGS performance is degraded but still operational then the NGS can be dispatched under a 10-day MEL with no other action. If the NGS is inoperative, then the airplane can be dispatched under a 10-day MEL provided the NGS is manually lock-out with the shutoff valve in the CLOSED position. The FAA has allowed a Category C 10-day extendable MMEL for degraded NGS faults, and a Category A 10-day non-extendable MMEL for NGS inoperative faults.

10 Service/Maintenance Q. How can I determine whether an airplane has an NGS installed? Besides confirming the configuration of the airplane from service documents, NGS caution placards on the Pack Bay fairing panels and NGS danger placards on the lower wing surface alerts maintenance and service personnel to the NGS configuration. Q. Are there any special tools required to service the NGS? No. Q. How do I deactivate the NGS prior to related maintenance activities? Manually lock the NGS shutoff valve in the CLOSED position and/or open the appropriate NGS circuit breakers per the Chapter 47 AMM. Q. Does the NGS have the ability to troubleshoot itself and isolate faults to assist the mechanic? Yes, the BDU (BITE Display Unit) allows the mechanic to interface with the NGS to manually operate the system and to interrogate for/troubleshoot faults. Q. How do I query the system to collect shop faults? From the BDU and for airplanes equipped with a Central Maintenance Computer (CMC), also from the flight deck (777 and 747-8). Q. Is there any service required to support the NGS prior to dispatching the airplane? No. Q. Are there any special restrictions or dangers on an airplane which has NGS installed? Yes, the NGS generates nitrogen enriched air (NEA) which is harmful to humans because it displaces air and reduces oxygen concentrations to hazardous levels in confined spaces. It is important that maintenance personnel understand and observe all tank entry procedures (incl. notes, warnings, and cautions) to ensure safety of the personnel and equipment. Procedures for safe entry into the center tank will be similar to existing procedures requiring complete purging and venting of the tank. In addition, the NGS will be required to be deactivated prior to purging and venting and throughout the fuel tank maintenance period. Q. What are the anticipated significant maintenance costs associated with the NGS? The Air Separation Module (ASM) is the most expensive LRU on the NGS per the available cost data. Also see: %20Parker%20Spare%20Prices% pdf 737CL: qty $34, NG: qty $51, : qty $34,794 ea = $104, : qty $34,794 ea = $104,382 (same part number as 747)

11 767: qty $34,794 ea (same part number as 737CL) 757: qty $34,794 ea (same part number as 747) (Prices as of 2009, subject to change) The ASMs have a design service-life of 27,000 operation hours. ASM replacement is on-condition and is indicated by an integrated oxygen sensor that detects ASM performance degradation. Components Q. What companies supply the ASMs for the different models? Honeywell is the supplier for 737CL, 737NG, , 747-8, 757, 767, and 777. o Sub tier supplier is Air Products for all but 737NG, which is Electroid Hamilton-Sundstrand is the supplier for the 787, sub tier Air Products. Q. Will the same ASMs be used on all Boeing fleets so they can be used interchangeably? The required capacity and performance for each model's NGS is a function of the fuel tank size and other operating factors specific to each airplane model. Accordingly, the 737NG NGS design results in an ASM that is unique to that model. All other Boeing models use one of two variations of the same ASM. Specifically, the current 737CL and 767 NGS designs incorporate a common [shorter] ASM configuration, while a common [longer] configuration ASM is used on the , 747-8, 757 and 777. The , 747-8, 767 and 777 designs all use 3-ASM s, while the other models each use 1-ASM. Retrofit Q. What are Boeing's plans to ensure an adequate number of Service Bulletin Kits and ASM's for all operators? Boeing has conducted manufacturing capability analysis of the NGS supplier and their sub-tier suppliers to ensure the supply chain has the necessary capacity to meet projected demand. Boeing is estimating the retrofit fleet requirements based on a relatively constant incorporation rate over the duration of the compliance period. The fleet requirement estimate will be provided to the NGS supplier for preliminary kit planning. Boeing has made Top Kit part numbers available on the Boeing Parts Page for early ordering ahead of service bulletin release. With a lead time of one year from the date of purchase order, Boeing recommends that operators consider their needs and place orders early. Early ordering from operators will ensure the supply base is prepared to meet the demand. Q. How much does the NGS cost to retrofit?

12 The updated NGS kit pricing and availability has been posted on My Boeing Fleet under the NGS link located on the Fuels Working Group SFAR 88 webpage. This information was most recently revised on 09 Jul Q. There are several 767 Center Fuel Tank configurations, do all require FRS retrofit? Straight freighter configuration 767s do not require FRS retrofit per exemption as detailed in the Final Rule. Also, OEM flammability analysis was conducted by Boeing to determine that FRS is not required for those 767s which are equipped with cheek auxiliary tanks only. However the other 767 variants that incorporate a center bay fuel tank (aft most 2 or all 4 center bays wetted) require FRS retrofit. Airplanes delivered under the following variable blocks were configured with cheek tanks only and do not require FRS retrofit if they remain unmodified: VA001-VD999 VK001-VK999 VR401-VR999 Q. There are two different configurations of the 777 Center Fuel Tank, do all require FRS retrofit? No, for the same reason as the 767, 777 airplanes with no fuel directly above the air conditioning packs do not require FRS retrofit. Models in the WA001-WA999 variable block do not require FRS.