UNITED STATES PARACHUTE ASSOCIATION 5401 Southpoint Centre Blvd., Frederickaburg, VA Phone: Fax:

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UNITED STATES PARACHUTE ASSOCIATION 5401 Southpoint Centre Blvd., Frederickaburg, VA 22407 Phone: 540-604-9740 Fax: 540-604-9741 E-mail: uspa@uspa.org December 20, 2011 John Dermody, Manager Federal Aviation Administration Airport Engineering Division (AAS-100) 800 Independence Avenue SW Washington DC 20591 Dear John, I understand you were only recently assigned responsibility for developing parachute landing areas (PLAs) on airports, but in our conversation with you last Friday about the revised draft Appendix 18 language, we learned some disturbing new information that causes us to have deep concern about the FAA Airports Division s ( Airports ) approach to the concept of skydiving on public airports. I m taking the liberty of cc ing others within Airports that have been involved, so they may understand the gravity of our concern. We learned from you on Friday that it is Airports intent to conduct an aeronautical study each time a skydiving business is proposed at a federally-obligated airport. And we heard you declare that skydivers are hazardous to aircraft on taxiways and runways; that taxiways and runways are only to accommodate aircraft and skydivers are not to be allowed on them. These two new elements give us great concern that Airports efforts to define and restrict PLAs will result in second-class status for skydiving and result in reduced access to public airports. It will force many existing skydiving operators who have operated safely on airports for years to close their doors. Airport Management Approval vs. Aeronautical Study For the first time on Friday, it became known to us that the intent of Airports is to conduct an aeronautical study each time a skydiving business is proposed at a federallyobligated airport. When asked why a proposed use of an airport skydiving would require an aeronautical study, you said that an accommodating airport s Airport Layout Plan (ALP) would need revision to include a PLA, and that any revised ALP would require Airports to conduct an aeronautical study to approve the PLA. This is shocking news to us and would be a profound change in the way skydiving businesses have accessed airports over the past 60 years. Currently, as has been the case for the past several decades, 14 CFR 105.23(b) requires a skydiving proponent to simply obtain prior approval from airport management before conducting operations. We estimate some dozen such requests are made of airport

managers in a typical year, and the majority of such requests are granted. Approvals are often verbal, but approvals also take the form of written operating agreements and lease agreements. Parachute landing areas are worked out by the skydiving proponent and the airport manager. Where approvals are granted, there is almost never any FAA involvement, because none is called for by regulation or by procedures. It is only when approvals are denied that the FAA Airports Division becomes involved, usually when the skydiving proponent asks for assistance in ensuring that the airport sponsor is meeting its grant obligations. Fairly recently, Airports itself has ruled that skydiving proposals do not trigger studies under either Part 77 or Part 157. The March 21, 2011 memo authored by Paul Friedman (then-manager of the Airport Engineering Division) states the establishment of a parachute drop zone does not require notification under part 157. Additionally the memo adds the establishment of a parachute drop zone is not considered a construction or alteration under part 77.13 and does not require form 7460-1 to be submitted by the airport. The August 5, 2010 memo authored by Rick Marinelli (then-manager of the Airport Engineering Division) states that the establishment of a parachute drop zone does not require notification under part 157. It also states that Flight Standards has determined that it is acceptable for parachutists to land in the OFA. This sentence refers to the Skydive Paris v. Henry County Part 16 final determination, in which the FAA (both Airports and Flight Standards) disagreed with an airport sponsor s assertion that skydivers could not land in an object-free area on the airport. In fact, in a memo for that Part 16 record, Peter Dula, then-manager of the General Aviation and Commercial Division for FAA s Flight Standards Service stated, there exists a long-standing precedent for affording skydivers the same operational latitude given to an aircraft in flight or while taxiing. For example, a skydiver is expected to see and avoid other air traffic. The Part 16 final determination which was issued and signed by David L. Bennett, then-director of the Office of Airport Safety and Standards, also goes on to state Flight Standards Service also noted that in certain cases, it is operationally sound and not inherently unsafe for flight operations to take place in the OFAs. Among other examples Flight Standards Service referenced that banner towing operations and airship ground handling sometimes take place in areas adjacent to runways and taxiways. They asserted It seems only logical that if the guidance provided in AC 150/5300-13 permits these types of operations in the OFAs, skydiving operations could also be safely accommodated. We note that OFAs are defined as an area on the ground centered on a runway, taxiway, or taxilane centerline which means an OFA includes the runway and taxiway itself. In effect both Flight Standards and Airports agreed that it is operationally sound for skydivers to land in an OFA, including the runway and taxiway, otherwise the final determination would have contained a qualifier. But it did not. Of course, this makes sense when an airport approves skydiving, since as Peter Dula stated, both aircraft and skydivers have the responsibility of seeing and avoiding each other. Not only has it been that way for 65 years, but the lack of an accident history reflects that it works. Now though, Airports proposes conducting an aeronautical study each time an airport receives a skydiving business proposal, based on the need to study the placement of a PLA and approve a revised ALP. First, this is in direct conflict with 14 CFR 105.23(b), so it would seem that rulemaking would be required to achieve this change. Beyond that, a requirement for an aeronautical study will increase FAA workload, create unacceptable delays, and will give any skydiving opponents an opportunity to foment airport user and public opinion against the skydiving proposal. Finally, it costs the airport sponsor to revise an ALP what happens if the airport sponsor delays an ALP revision due to the cost? Skydiving businesses have accessed many hundreds of airports over the past six decades without the necessity of FAA involvement. No one has presented a valid reason why this should change.

Does Airports currently evaluate all other proposed aeronautical uses at an airport whether for helicopter, ultralight, glider, flight school, or airship use? If not, then Airports should cede to 14 CFR 105.23(b) and allow airport management alone to evaluate the proposal and grant approval, and only get involved if the airport sponsor and the skydiving proponent cannot agree to terms allowing access to a federally-obligated airport. Skydivers and Taxiways and Runways John, you asserted that Airports considers skydivers to be a hazard to taxing aircraft because skydivers can t communicate with aircraft. You also said that skydivers should not be allowed access to taxiways because skydivers are not aircraft. You cited these conclusions as the reasons that Airports does not want a PLA to encompass taxiways. If these are Airports conclusions, then it appears that Airports is engaged in an effort to make skydiving a lesser class of aeronautical activity than all other aeronautical activities by denying skydiving access to a significant portion of any airport. These conclusions also ignore current regulatory provisions that allow aircraft to not be radio-equipped and still use airports, and that allow non-radio-equipped ultralights (which are not considered to be aircraft ) access to taxiways and runways. (We note that the 1980 s FAA decision to allow ultralight use of taxiways and runways was met with an outcry from some aviation groups that safety would be diminished. Although there have been some accidents over the years, they have had an overall good safety record. Yet the ultralight safety record pales by comparison to the safety record of skydiving operations on airports.) While there is a long history of aircraft repeatedly colliding with other aircraft on airports, as shown by this video of a near-hit between a taxiing aircraft and taxiing helicopter, we see no action by Airports to restrict helicopters from taxiways. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1rj34kl0oo&feature=related When any other aeronautical activity accesses an airport, whether airplane, helicopter, glider, non-radio-equipped homebuilt aircraft, ultralight, balloon, or airship, there is no restriction placed on use of airside facilities, including taxiways and runways. As an aeronautical activity of equal stature, skydiving does not deserve efforts to restrict our use of facilities when necessary. USPA takes great exception to any assertion that skydivers are hazardous to aircraft, and to any specific assertion that skydivers are a hazard to taxiing aircraft. Taxiways are a slow-speed environment where see and avoid requirements prevail, regardless of whether radio-equipped or not. Any assertion by Airports that skydivers are a hazard to taxiing aircraft ignores the decades-long history of tens of millions of parachute jumps at airports with no known instance of a skydiver colliding with a taxiing aircraft. Airports efforts to create and enforce a separation standard regarding skydivers and taxiways are not supported by any history of such accidents, incidents, or other precursors of unsafe conditions. Such efforts by Airports display a tendency to economically discriminate against skydiving by denying public airside facilities to a legitimate aeronautical activity. 65 Years of Exemplary History In this, the 65 th anniversary of the formation of USPA, we can point to over six decades of parachuting activity on public airports with no derogation of safety to aircraft operating on those airports. Since 2000, there have been nearly 2.5 million jumps made at U.S. airports each year; in earlier years there were anywhere from 1 million to 1.5 million jumps made each year. And yet, USPA knows of no instance where a skydiver and a nonparticipating aircraft have collided on the ground in all of that time. We also know of no

instance where a skydiver has collided with and damaged an on-airport navaid. We believe there are a number of factors that contribute to this excellent safety record including: The overwhelming majority of skydiving activities occur during daylight hours in weather conditions that greatly exceed visual meteorological conditions, i.e. 1000 ft. ceiling and three mile visibility, and generally occur in either calm or light wind conditions. Such conditions promote visual conspicuity and enable both skydivers and pilots to recognize potential conflicts before they occur and take any necessary evasive actions to eliminate the potential conflict. This is consistent with FAA regulations based upon see and avoid that prevail on and over general aviation airports. Under these visual conditions and light winds pilots are generally able to keep their aircraft on the centerline while taxiing or operating on the runway, as opposed to operating in instrument conditions that often are accompanied by blustery winds and contaminated pavement surfaces that heighten the possibility of aircraft departing the centerline or the pavement altogether. The maneuverability of modern parachutes allows the skydiver to control his/her flight path with precision. The desire of the skydiver to avoid landing on paved areas of the airfield since such landing can result in damage to the skydiver s equipment by pavement scuffing. The cost associated with such damage is borne by the individual skydiver. Yet Airports apparently believes there is an unsafe condition that needs to be addressed by separating a skydiving hazard from aircraft on a taxiway. The record reflects otherwise. No FAA Data USPA has asked multiple times for any data being used by Airports to justify these actions. We ve never received an acknowledgment, let alone a response. The Technical Center report that was commissioned by Airports refers to data collection as a basis for its recommendations but the report provides no data to support its recommendations. It would seem that, if the Tech Center collected information about accidents, incidents, near-hits, and precursors to unsafe conditions, that information would have been provided or at least referenced. The only response to our request for data is the answer We are being proactive. At this point, we must question whether Airports has any data reflecting that skydiving on any airport has produced a hazard. Nor has Airports provided any data suggesting that above ground navigation aids such as edge lights, airfield signs, PAPI s, VASI s, AWOS equipment, ILS antennas, etc. have been or are being damaged by skydivers. USPA does not believe that being proactive negates the need for any supporting data, especially when being proactive means restricting the activity, whether it is skydiving or any other aviation use. Conclusion In view of this exemplary 65-year safety record, it is questionable as to why any safety buffers need to be instituted in establishing standards for PLAs on airports. However, USPA is willing to consider that a PLA should not include any portion of an airport s primary runway(s) and that some buffer may appear to be beneficial between the edge of the primary runway(s) and the PLA. However, Airports has not provided any data to support why this buffer concept should also be applied to secondary runways, taxiways,

and above ground navigational equipment other than the rationale that this is the way we always do it. Further, Airports has done nothing to assess the impact of their proposed measures on skydiving operations. We re convinced and we ve shown that skydiving businesses will be negatively affected and will either have to close or relocate their decades-long parachute landing area to a remote part of the airport, if such an area is even available. Basically, under the guise of improving safety, Airports is instituting a measure that will close general aviation businesses and eliminate general aviation jobs without showing that any of the current operations are unsafe. USPA is preparing comments to your revised Appendix 18 draft and will provide those to you by next week. Sincerely, Ed Scott Executive Director The United States Parachute Association is a voluntary, not-for-profit association dedicated to the safe enjoyment of skydiving. www.uspa.org