RUNWAY EXCURSION ANALYSIS REPORT

Transcription

1 RUNWAY EXCURSION ANALYSIS REPORT (RERR 2nd Edition Issued 2011)

2 NOTE DISCLAIMER. The information contained in this publication is subject to constant review in the light of changing government requirements and regulations. No subscriber or other reader should act on the basis of any such information without referring to applicable laws and regulations and without taking appropriate professional advice. Although every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, the International Air Transport Association and the contributors to this publication shall not be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by errors, omissions, misprints or misinterpretation of the contents hereof. Furthermore, the International Air Transport Association and the contributors to this publication expressly disclaim any and all liability to any person or entity, whether a purchaser of this publication or not, in respect of anything done or omitted, and the consequences of anything done or omitted, by any such person or entity in reliance on the contents of this publication. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other contributors opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the International Air Transport Association. The mention of specific companies, products in this publication does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the International Air Transport Association in preference to others of a similar nature which are not mentioned. International Air Transport Association All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, recast, reformatted or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission from: Senior Vice President Safety, Operations and Infrastructure International Air Transport Association 800 Place Victoria, P.O. Box 113 Montréal, Québec RE Analysis Report ii RERR 2 nd Edition

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION RUNWAY EXCURSION DEFINITION DATA EXCLUSIONS FUNDAMENTALS Runway excursions relative to all accidents Runway excursions by aircraft type Runway excursions by phase of flight Accidents by type of excursion Runway excursions by outcome hull loss and fatality Fatalities by phase of flight: REGIONAL ANALYSIS Runway excursions by region CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AIRCRAFT GENERATION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONCLUSIONS Appendix A IATA Accident Criteria and Definitions Appendix B IATA REGIONS Appendix C Aircraft Generations Appendix D Factors Involved in Runway Excursions Appendix E 2010 Excursion Accidents vs Incidents RE Analysis Report iii RERR 2 nd Edition

4 RE Analysis Report iv RERR 2 nd Edition

5 1 INTRODUCTION A runway excursion accident is defined as an accident where an aircraft on the runway surface departs the end of the runway or side of the runway surface. It is the most frequent accident category for worldwide accidents during the period of Several accidents have brought the issue of runway excursions to the forefront of aviation safety. Although runway excursions are the most common type of accident, the fatality rate associated with runway excursions is much lower than in other accident types such as Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) or Loss of Control (LOC). Runway excursions can result in loss of life and/or injury to persons either on board the aircraft or on the ground. The effect of runway excursions can result in damage to aircraft, airfield or off-airfield installations including other aircraft, buildings or other items struck by the aircraft. Runway excursions during takeoff and landing continue to be the highest category of aircraft accidents and often exceed 25% of all annual commercial air transport accidents. In 2009, in response to a continuing high number of runway excursions, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) published the first edition of the Runway Excursion Risk Reduction (RERR) toolkit. The toolkit was designed to raise industry awareness of the magnitude and causes of the phenomenon and to offer some guidance and best practices to mitigate the risks. The IATA Safety Report for 2009 showed a continued high number of runway excursions, costing 19 lives and an estimated US$900 million in 2009 alone, and it was determined that an updated RERR toolkit was warranted. The data in the first edition of the toolkit was compiled by the FSF and covered a broad spectrum of aircraft operations. The FSF Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions report was included in the 1st edition of the RERR toolkit, used data from runway excursions for all jet and turboprop aircraft for the period of 1995 to 2008, including business jets and light twin aircraft. It has also been included as a reference in the RERR 2nd edition toolkit. This new Runway Excursion Analysis Report was compiled to provide a closer look at commercial passenger and cargo operations, and is intended to complement the 2009 FSF report. In a number of areas, comparisons were made with data from this report and the FSF report. It is important to note that these two reports used different timeframes and accident categories, and therefore the results will not align perfectly. Therefore, the data in this report is more accurate when directly addressing the accident rate in the commercial air transport industry. The IATA/ICAO RERR toolkit 2 nd edition contains two very useful additional analyses of these types of accidents: The Eurocontrol Study of Excursions from a European Perspective, and A two part report on Runway Excursion from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (AR ). For accuracy of the data, a timeframe of 2004 to 2009 was selected. For an accident to be included in this report, it must have occurred to a commercial air transport industry passenger or cargo operator, in a large aircraft, during commercial operations. See appendix A for the full IATA accident definition used for data in this report RE Analysis Report 1 RERR 2 nd Edition

6 Preliminary industry-wide IATA runway excursion data for 2010 recorded a total of 116 incidents and accidents, with 24 of these events resulting in accidents. The 116 occurences may not represent 100% of the industry events due to under-reporting. In any case, these events represent one of leading causes of accidents. A display of preliminary runway excursion incident events is presented in Appendix E. 1.1 RUNWAY EXCURSION DEFINITION For the purposes of this report a runway excursion event occurs when an aircraft on the runway surface departs the end or side of the runway surface during takeoff or landing. They consist of two types of events: Veer Off: A runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the side of a runway Overrun: A runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the end of a runway It excludes both accidents where the aircraft did not initially land on a runway surface, and takeoff excursions that did not start on a runway (e.g., inadvertent takeoffs from taxiways). 1.2 DATA The data from which the report was generated included worldwide reported accidents resulting in hull loss or substantial damage to all (western and eastern built) jet aircraft greater than 15,000 kgs and turboprop aircraft greater than 5,700 kgs, from January 2004 to December 2009 inclusive. This included a total of 594 accidents, of which 164 (28%) were identified to have constituted a runway excursion. However, due to incomplete information for ten of those, the data for 154 accidents was used for part of the analysis findings are annotated to indicate which data set was used. 1.3 EXCLUSIONS The data in this report specifically excludes the following: Private flights Business or military aviation Illegal flights Humanitarian relief flights Crop spraying or other agricultural flights Experimental or other test flights RE Analysis Report 2 RERR 2 nd Edition

7 2 FUNDAMENTALS 2.1 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS RELATIVE TO ALL ACCIDENTS During the preceding six years (2004 through 2009), commercial transport aircraft were involved in a total of 594 accidents involving hull loss or substantial damage. Of those, 164 accidents (28%) were runway excursion accidents. A total of 20 of the 164 accidents involved fatalities resulting in the death of 483 passengers and crew. The accidents used in this analysis were included when there was sufficient information available to make analytical determinations and category classifications; 154 runway excursion accidents were used in the analysis. Figure 1 shows the number of runway excursion accidents involving commercial jet and turboprop aircraft by year. Analyzing this data, the number of runway excursions initially declined year to year, reaching a minimum total of 21 in 2006 but thereafter increasing or remaining constant. The peak annual total maintained in 2008 and 2009 was 29 accidents. Runway excursions increased from 24% of all accidents in 2007 to 32% in The close relationship between the annual number of runway excursions and their percentage of the total is indicative of a consistent worldwide accident rate of approximately 100 per year. The FSF report also indicated a similar pattern in runway excursion accidents. Figure 1: Runway excursions by year RE Analysis Report 3 RERR 2 nd Edition

8 Figure 2 shows that 67% of runway excursions occurred in daylight vs. 24% in darkness. 9% were unspecified. Figure 2: Runway excursions during daylight vs. darkness 2.2 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE Turboprop aircraft were involved in 43% of the runway excursions and jets in the remaining 57%. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of jets and turboprops involved in the runway excursion accidents. The FSF report indicated a similar distribution of 45% turboprop and 55% jet aircraft. Figure 3: Breakdown of runway excursions by jets and turboprops RE Analysis Report 4 RERR 2 nd Edition

9 Over the past six years, the annual percentage of accidents is approximately 15% runway excursion accidents for jets and 12% for turboprops in the commercial aircraft fleet. Figure 4 depicts the proportions of runway excursion accidents for jet and turboprop commercial aircraft. This does not account for the relative fleet size or number of sectors flown by jets or turboprops. Figure 4: Runway excursion accidents for jets and turboprops 2.3 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY PHASE OF FLIGHT A total of 28 (or 17%) of runway excursions occurred during takeoff, and 136 (or 83%) of runway excursion accidents occurred during landing, with two of them occurring during a balked (or rejected) landing (statistically included in the landing phase). Figure 5 shows the percentage of runway excursions during landing vs. takeoff. Figure 5: Breakdown of runway excursion accidents by flight phase The runway excursion probability was almost five times greater during landing than during takeoff. The FSF report indicated 21% of runway excursions occurred on takeoff and 79% on landing RE Analysis Report 5 RERR 2 nd Edition

10 Viewed annually, takeoff excursion accidents decreased from 13 in 2004 to just one in 2006, but increased again to an average of four per year in the next three years. From 2006 to 2009, the number of landing excursion accidents grew at an increasing rate, to a peak total of 26. Figure 6 depicts the runway excursion accidents by phase of flight per year. The FSF report showed an increasing trend in runway excursions on landing and a decreasing trend on takeoff. Figure 6: Runway excursion accidents per year by flight phase Of the 124 accidents with sufficient information, 90 or 72% of landing excursions occurred during daytime, and 34 or 27% of landing excursions occurred during darkness. Figure 7: Take off and landing excursions during daylight vs. darkness RE Analysis Report 6 RERR 2 nd Edition

11 2.4 ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF EXCURSION Runway excursions were almost equally divided, with 54% veer-off and 46% overrun. This became even closer to parity when analysis indicated that in approximately 3% of veer-off accidents the pilots had deliberately steered off the side of the runway to avoid perceived hazards in the overrun. Figure 8 shows a minor difference between veer-off accidents and runway overrun accidents. The two types of excursions were also almost equally divided in both the takeoff and landing phases. The FSF report differed in this regard, showing an almost even distribution on landing but a significantly greater proportion of overruns (63%) on takeoff. Figure 8: Runway excursions veer-off vs. overrun When analyzed by aircraft type, jet aircraft were significantly more prone to overrun accidents than turboprops (52 accidents as opposed to 23), potentially due to the higher aircraft energy at takeoff and landing and generally longer takeoff and landing distances. Figure 9 compares the turboprop with the jet aircraft in regards to veer-off accidents vs. overrun accidents. Figure 9: Runway excursions turboprops & jets overruns vs. veer-off RE Analysis Report 7 RERR 2 nd Edition

12 2.5 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY OUTCOME HULL LOSS AND FATALITY Runway excursion accidents were frequently survivable, even if the outcome was a hull loss. The data in Figure 10 represents runway excursion hull loss and substantial damage accidents involving western - and eastern-built jet and turboprop aircraft from Figure 10: Jet and turboprop hull loss vs. substantial damage accidents Approximately 50% of the runway excursion accidents resulted in a hull loss, as opposed to substantial damage, but only 20 accidents (12% of the total) included one or more fatalities. Figure 11 presents the hull loss and fatal runway excursion accidents. A total of 483 lives were lost in runway excursions between 2004 and 2009 inclusive, the vast majority (469) resulted from the 15 fatal jet aircraft accidents. Figure 12 presents the breakdown of the fatalities resulting from runway excursion accidents per year. Figure 11: Fatal and non-fatal hull loss runway excursion accidents RE Analysis Report 8 RERR 2 nd Edition

13 Figure 12: Breakdown of the fatalities lost in runway excursion accidents per year Fatal veer-off accidents (total seven across both jets and turboprops) were just over half the number of fatal overrun accidents (13) but resulted in proportionately greater numbers of fatalities an average of 32.5 fatalities per veer-off as opposed to 19.7 for overruns. Figure 13 presents the number of fatal accidents per runway excursion accident type. Figure 13: Fatal veer-off vs. overrun accidents In the five fatal takeoff runway excursions 23 fatalities occurred an average of 4.6 per accident whereas the 15 fatal landing accidents accounted for 460 fatalities, or 30.6 per accident. Figure 14 shows the fatal accidents per phase of flight. The landing fatalities were divided almost equally between veer-offs (224) and overruns (236). The two worst accidents in terms of fatalities (124 and 187) both occurred to jet aircraft on landing and were respectively an overrun and a veer-off. Table 1 in the next section shows the comparison between jet vs turboprop overrun and veer off fatalities RE Analysis Report 9 RERR 2 nd Edition

14 Figure 14: Fatal accidents per flight phase 2.6 FATALITIES BY PHASE OF FLIGHT: Fatalities by aircraft type: Total ( ): 483 Jet: 469 (97%) Turboprop: 14 (3%) Note that jet operations accounted for 43% of total accidents, but 97% of total fatalities. Table 1 shows the comparison between jet fatalities and turboprop fatalities. Jet Fatalities Turboprop Fatalities LND T/O LND T/O Overrun Overrun 1 7 Veer-off Veer-off 6 0 Total Total 7 7 Table 1: Jet and turboprop fatalities Two major jet accidents accounted for 300 of these 469 jet fatalities. If these two accidents are excluded, jet operations would account for 35% of fatalities RE Analysis Report 10 RERR 2 nd Edition

15 3 REGIONAL ANALYSIS 3.1 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS BY REGION Regional distribution of runway excursions may be analyzed in two ways: the region of registration of the operator and the region of occurrence. IATA regions are listed in Appendix B. The same data normalized to reflect the accident rate per million sectors, or the statistical probability of an operator encountering a runway excursion on any given flight, indicated the highest accident rates for operators from Africa (AFI) (3.76 per million sectors) and Middle East & North Africa (MENA) (3.39 per million sectors). Figure 15 presents the accident rate per million sectors based on region of operator (region of registration of operator). Figure 15: Runway excursion rates by IATA region It is worthwhile to analyze runway excursions occurrences in all parts of the world and to involve operators from all regions. Figure 16 presents the overall distribution by geographic region of excursion occurrences. The Asia Pacific (ASPAC) region witnessed the greatest number of occurrences (44 accidents) at 26.8% of the total, and combined with Latin America & the Caribbean (LATAM) (29 accidents) the two regions accounted for 44.5% of worldwide runway excursion accidents RE Analysis Report 11 RERR 2 nd Edition

16 Figure 16: Runway excursion counts by IATA Region Figure 17 is a comparison of the geographic distribution between the region of operator and the distribution of involved operators, based on their country of origin. Analyzed by region of operator, ASPAC remained almost the same (43 accidents) whereas LATAM significantly decreased (23 accidents) and North America (NAM) proportionately increased (from 20 to 26 accidents), indicating that NAM operators may have encountered their greatest runway excursion risk on flights to LATAM. However, these figures do not account of traffic density. Figure 17: Runway excursion comparison: region of accident versus region of operator RE Analysis Report 12 RERR 2 nd Edition

17 4 CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS The most frequently occurring factor (121 accidents) was embedded piloting skills, indicating that the majority of runway excursion accidents were due in some part to the inability of the pilots to execute their basic flying skills. Other factors which might exacerbate a weakness in flying skills, for example pilot fatigue, may have been present but were not identified in the accident report as contributing factors. The second most frequent human factor was aircraft handling (85 accidents), and these two factors were indicated in virtually all fatal excursion accidents. Flight crew procedures, more indicative of non-compliance rather than ability, was present in 59 accidents, and three quarters of these were recorded in jet aircraft accidents. Pilot adherence to procedures and crosscheck as Non-flying Pilot (NFP) were also listed as factors in these accidents. 227 fatalities occurred in ten accidents including this category. The two regions of occurrence (as reported in the accident reports) least affected by flight crew procedures as a factor were North Asia (NASIA) and Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) with just two accidents in this category; all others were approximately equal close to ten. When analyzed by region of operator CIS continued to show the lowest correlation with this contributing factor, while MENA increased to equal the other regions. In 72 of the accidents (44%) loss of control on ground (LOC-G) was identified as a factor. Three quarters of these occurred on landing, reflecting a relationship close to the total of landing versus takeoff accidents, and perhaps unsurprisingly 76% resulted in veer-off accidents rather than overruns. This factor category was divided equally between jets and turboprops and five of the LOC-G accidents caused a total of 59 fatalities. In figure 18, the components of Human factors are illustrated; figure 19 presents the breakdown of the frequency of Human factors components as per phase of flight, as well as excursion type, and figure 20 presents the number of runway excursions per jets vs. turboprop. While in figure 21, the distribution of the Human factors by the IATA geographic region identified by region of operator. Figure 18: Component of human factors RE Analysis Report 13 RERR 2 nd Edition

18 Figure 19: Breakdown of the frequency of human factors Figure 20: Component of human factors per fleet type Figure 21: Distribution of human factors RE Analysis Report 14 RERR 2 nd Edition

19 Weather was identified as a factor in 72 accidents (47%), most frequently (48 accidents) associated with rain. This indicates that rain was present in 48 of 164 total accidents (29% of all accidents). The second most common weather factor was windshear (34 accidents), with the overwhelming majority of windshear related accidents (88%) occurring on landing. Jet aircraft were slightly more prone to windshear as a factor with 20 accidents, as opposed to 14 for turboprops. Six of the windshear related accidents accounted for a total of 166 fatalities. 62 accidents indicated contaminated runway as a factor, with the majority as wet or standing water, and 11 a combination of slush, snow or ice. Of the 164 total runway excursion accidents, 62 (38%) reported some type of runway contamination. 22 accidents indicated poor visibility as a factor. Figure 22, illustrates weather related factors in runway excursion accidents; figure 23 presents the breakdown of the frequency of weather factors components as per phase of flight, as well as excursion type, and figure 24 presents the number of runway excursions per jets vs. turboprop. While in figure 25, the distribution of the factors by the IATA geographic region identified by region of operator. Figure 22: Weather related factors in runway excursion accidents Figure 23: Breakdown of the frequency of weather related factors RE Analysis Report 15 RERR 2 nd Edition

20 Figure 24: Component of weather related factors per fleet type Figure 25: The distribution of the weather related factors Note: no data in NASIA in the weather related category Aircraft malfunction was identified in 58 accidents (37% of the total) with the most common factors being gear/tire issues (33 accidents), gear collapse (32 accidents) and engine malfunction (21 accidents). Most of the gear collapses occurred on landing (27), only two of them associated with hard landings, whereas the engine malfunctions were evenly divided between takeoff and landing. Analyzed by region of operator CIS and North Asia (NASIA) recorded only one accident each attributed in part to aircraft malfunction, whereas MENA, North America (NAM) and Asia Pacific (ASPAC) each recorded 11 maintenance related accidents. Figure 26, illustrates technical related factors in runway excursion accidents; figure 27 presents the breakdown of the frequency of technical factors components as per phase of flight, as well as excursion type, and figure 28 presents the number of runway excursions per jets vs. turboprop. While in figure 29, the distribution of the factors by the IATA geographic region identified by region of operator RE Analysis Report 16 RERR 2 nd Edition

21 Figure 26: Technical related factors in runway excursion accidents Figure 27: Breakdown of the frequency of technical related factors Figure 28: Component of technical related factors per fleet type RE Analysis Report 17 RERR 2 nd Edition

22 Figure 29: The distribution of the technical related factors Unstable approach appeared as a factor in 40 accidents (29%), and all but two of these were also categorized as unstable approach continued and failure to go-around. Those two were the balked landing accidents, when in spite of the initiation of a go-around it was too late to avoid runway contact and a subsequent excursion. Almost three quarters of unstable approach (28 accidents) events also indicated the factor long float and 30 included the factor bounce, flare, fast, long touchdown. Unstable approach continued accounted for 125 fatalities from 6 accidents. 60% of this factor category occurred on jet aircraft. Figure 30: Unstable approach Inadequate landing overrun safety area, ditches, berms, buildings location and no overrun were all indicated as factors in 38 accidents. More than half of these occurred in LATAM (11 accidents) and ASPAC (10) combined. Six accidents in this category resulted in a total of 30 fatalities RE Analysis Report 18 RERR 2 nd Edition

23 Figure 31: Inadequate Runway End Safety Area (RESA) Late RTO was indicated as a factor in 11 accidents, two of which accounted for ten fatalities. The FSF report indicated this factor in almost 50% of all takeoff runway excursion accidents. 5 AIRCRAFT GENERATION The year of design, and overall aircraft generation, was assessed to see if any trends were obvious. A categorization of aircraft generations and types is presented in Appendix C. Figure 32: Aircraft generation Aircraft generation as a factor in runway excursion accidents demonstrated an erratic distribution over the period, with the exception that the first generation aircraft are statistically less likely to be involved RE Analysis Report 19 RERR 2 nd Edition

24 6 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS Runway excursions as an accident category annually accounted for between one quarter and one third of all substantial damage and hull loss accidents, and although frequently survivable, excursion accidents by their sheer number caused 483 fatalities. It is essential therefore that the industry focuses its attention on developing strategies to mitigate the risk. From the foregoing contributory factors it can be seen that minimizing human factors in flying skills and decision making is vital to this effort. Advances in automation and system technologies have without a doubt brought greater opportunity for safe flight but the consequent erosion of manual flying skills and decision making under pressure must be addressed. A pilot only learns and maintains skills by repetition. Therefore initial and recurrent training must require pilots to develop and regularly demonstrate a high proficiency in manual flying and decision making. Their decisions must be based upon well-founded information and it is essential that corporate policies and procedures provide adequate and unambiguous background for each decision. In order to ensure that the policies are correct, management require comprehensive operational data from a robust reporting system and universal flight data analysis, but this will only be achieved within a sound corporate safety culture. In particular, operators need to be sure that pilots will always make the right decision in two fundamental cases: to go-around from an unstable approach, and to continue the takeoff after V 1 (e.g., the Rejected Take Off {RTO} decision). Failure to go-around from an unstable approach can be driven by a number of factors: lack of situational awareness and failure to recognize an unstable approach; subconscious desire to complete the task even in the face of contra-indications; deliberate non-compliance; fear of retribution or ridicule; absence of clear policy. The RTO decision differs from the go-around decision in that there is less time to decide, and therefore the reaction must be conditioned by repetitive practice using varied scenarios, to alter the response from a cognitive process to a learned behavior. Procedural non-compliance may be the result of individual bad practice, inappropriate procedures and/or general practical drift. Once again, the identification and management of non-compliance can only be achieved with a good reporting system and flight data analysis within a sound safety culture. With the exception of extremes like micro-burst or very heavy rain, weather phenomena alone should rarely be the sole cause of a runway excursion. However, the study showed weather (especially rain) to be at least a contributing factor in numerous accidents and this is illustrative of the importance of identifying cumulative runway excursion risks. A known but otherwise not severe environmental risk factor (e.g., a short runway or steep approach), may be escalated to an unacceptable risk in the presence of a tailwind or heavy rain. Although that decision can only be made on the day by the pilot, considered analysis in advance of the potential for short term increases in risk may help to raise awareness, using crew information tools. The RERR Toolkit 2 nd edition includes a sample Risk Management Process to help operators develop a process to address the unique risks associated with their operations RE Analysis Report 20 RERR 2 nd Edition

25 With the recognition that runway excursions do occur, then it falls to airports to ensure that the likelihood of aircraft damage and injuries is minimized. A significant number of accidents included the factor inadequate overrun area and much accident damage was the result of the obstacles encountered after the aircraft left the runway. Every effort must be made to ensure that the runway end safety area meets and wherever possible exceeds ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). Where this is not possible alternative means of reducing post-excursion damage, such as engineered materials arrestor system, should be employed. 7 CONCLUSIONS The greatest runway excursion risk and the greatest risk of fatalities occurred during the landing phase. The most common single factor in landing excursions was an unstable approach and an associated failure to go-around. The most significant weather factors contributing to runway excursions are rain and windshear. The majority of runway excursions included a significant element of human factors, especially in flying skills and decision making. Airport design, especially compliance with ICAO required and recommended practices, is critical to minimizing post-excursion damage RE Analysis Report 21 RERR 2 nd Edition

26 APPENDIX A IATA ACCIDENT CRITERIA AND DEFINITIONS TYPE OF OPERATION CRITERIA In order for an event to be considered an accident, the flight must be listed as a scheduled or unscheduled passenger or cargo flight, or a positioning flight. All other types of operation (e.g. training, maintenance, etc ) are excluded. Furthermore, single-pilot operations are excluded. AIRCRAFT CRITERIA In order for an event to be considered as an accident, the aircraft involved must meet the following criteria: Jets: Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) above 15,000 KG Twin-engine Turbine powered only Turboprops: MTOW above 5,700 KG Twin-engine Turbine powered only Exclusions: cases of contained engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennae, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible; or acts of war, sabotage or unlawful interference are not considered accidents. DEFINITIONS Eastern-built Aircraft designed in a current CIS country or in the former Soviet Union. Certain aircraft made in Eastern Europe or China (e.g. Xian aircraft) that are based on copies of Soviet designs are considered eastern-built aircraft. Western-built Aircraft designed in a country other than the current CIS or former Soviet Union. Aircraft from Indonesia and Israel are considered western-built RE Analysis Report 22 RERR 2 nd Edition

27 Hull Loss An accident where the aircraft is completely destroyed or will not be repaired (economic write-off). Substantial Damage An accident where the aircraft has been damaged to the point where the performance, structural integrity or flight characteristics of the aircraft and/or substantial repair is needed. Damage must be listed as Major or Total (Repaired) RE Analysis Report 23 RERR 2 nd Edition

28 APPENDIX B IATA REGIONS Region AFI (Africa) AFI (Africa) Country Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Côte d Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda São Tomé and Príncipe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Swaziland Region ASPAC (Asia Pacific) ASPAC (Asia / Pacific) Country Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Australia 1 Bangladesh Bhutan Brunei Darussalam Burma Cambodia East Timor Fiji Islands India Indonesia Japan Kiribati Laos Malaysia Maldives Marshall Islands Micronesia Nauru Nepal New Zealand 2 Pakistan Palau Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa Singapore Solomon Islands South Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Tonga Tuvalu, Ellice Islands Vanuatu Vietnam RE Analysis Report 24 RERR 2 nd Edition

29 Region CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) EUR (Europe) EUR (Europe) Country Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan Albania Andorra Austria Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark 3 Estonia Finland France 4 Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Kosovo Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Malta Monaco Montenegro Netherlands 5 Norway Poland Portugal Romania San Marino Serbia Slovakia Region LATAM (Latin America & the Caribbean) Country Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom 6 Vatican City Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela RE Analysis Report 25 RERR 2 nd Edition

30 Region MENA (Middle East & North Africa) NAM (North American) NASIA (North Asia) Country Afghanistan Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen Canada United States of America 7 China 8 Mongolia North Korea RE Analysis Report 26 RERR 2 nd Edition

31 1 Australia includes: Christmas Island Cocos (Keeling) Islands Norfolk Island Ashmore and Cartier Islands Coral Sea Islands Heard Island and McDonald Islands 2 New Zealand includes: Cook Islands Niue Tokelau 3 Denmark includes: Faroe Islands Greenland 4 France includes: French Polynesia New Caledonia Saint-Barthélemy Saint Martin Saint Pierre and Miquelon Wallis and Futuna French Southern and Antarctic Lands 5 Netherlands include: Gibraltar Montserrat Pitcairn Islands Saint Helena South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Turks and Caicos Islands British Antarctic Territory Guernsey Isle of Man Jersey 7 United States of America include: American Samoa Guam Northern Mariana Islands Puerto Rico United States Virgin Islands 8 China includes: Hong Kong Macau Taiwan Aruba Netherlands Antilles 6 United Kingdom includes: England Scotland Wales Northern Ireland Akrotiri and Dhekelia Anguilla Bermuda British Indian Ocean Territory British Virgin Islands Cayman Islands Falkland Islands RE Analysis Report 27 RERR 2 nd Edition

32 APPENDIX C AIRCRAFT GENERATIONS Where the report refers to aircraft generation the worldwide fleet was divided as follows: Aircraft Type First Second Generation An-12 An-24 An-26 B707 F-27 HS 748 SE-210 Caravelle 11R YS-11 An-140 An-28 An-32 B727 B B B Bae 146 CASA 212 DC-9 DHC-6 DHC-8 Emb-110 F-27 F-28 F-50 Hawker 125 II-62 Il-76 Jetstream 31 Let 410 Metro Metro II Metro III Shorts 360 Tu-154 Aircraft Type Third Fourth Generation A300 A310 ATR-42 ATR-72 B B B BAe-146 Beech 1900 DC-10 Do-328 ERJ-135 F-100 MD-11 MD-80 MD-90 Saab 340 A318 A319 A320 A321 A330 A A A CRJ Regional Jet B B B B EMB-170 EMB RE Analysis Report 28 RERR 2 nd Edition

33 APPENDIX D FACTORS INVOLVED IN RUNWAY EXCURSIONS The factors listed below were cited in one or more of the runway excursion accidents in this report. Runway excursions are usually the result of one or more of the following factors: Aircraft Malfunction Power-on touchdown (i.e., preventing the auto-extension of ground spoilers, as applicable) Failure to detect non-deployment of ground spoilers (e.g., absence of related standard call) Human Factors Flying pilot adherence to procedures Non-Flying Pilot (NFP) crosscheck Embedded piloting skills Pilot fatigue Aircraft handling Crew Technique/Decision Factors Rejected take off (RTO) initiated at speed greater than V 1 Un-stablized approaches No go-around decision when warranted Inadequate pilot directional control Approach - high Approach - fast Touchdown - fast Touchdown - hard Landing long Bouncing and incorrect bounce recovery Ineffective braking on runway contamination Pilot techniques in wind shear conditions Pilot technique on wet/contaminated runways Use of the nosewheel-steering tiller at an excessive airspeed Airspeed too fast on the runway to exit safely Extended flare (allowing the aircraft to float and to decelerate [bleed excess airspeed] in the air uses typically three times more runway than decelerating on the ground) Late braking (or late takeover from autobrake system, if required) Increased landing distance resulting from the use of differential braking or the discontinued use of reverse thrust to maintain directional control in crosswind conditions Weather Factors Runway condition (wet or contaminated by standing water, snow, slush or ice) Wind shear Weather information availability and accuracy Reverse-thrust effect in wind and on a wet runway or a contaminated runway RE Analysis Report 29 RERR 2 nd Edition

34 Air Traffic Management Lack of awareness of stabilized approach criteria Failure to provide timely or accurate runway condition information to pilots Failure to provide timely and accurate weather condition to pilots Airports / Regulators Runways are not maintained to minimize effective friction and drainage Inaccurate runway condition reports Inadequate runway end safety areas (RESAs) Lack of timely NOTAM issuance of on Runway condition RE Analysis Report 30 RERR 2 nd Edition

35 APPENDIX E 2010 EXCURSION ACCIDENTS VS INCIDENTS Note: this graph includes preliminary data as of December 31st, It is provided only as a means of indicating the relative number and location of runway excursion accidents as compared to incidents. Data in this graph was drawn from publicly available runway excursion incident and accident reports. However, since many runway excursions do not result in damage, and are therefore not reported, this data is not considered to be comprehensive. Incidents Accidents RE Analysis Report 31 RERR 2 nd Edition

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