HACAN ClearSkies. The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South East Consultation Documents

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1 HACAN ClearSkies Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise (HACAN ClearSkies) P.0. Box No. 339, TWICKENHAM, Middlesex, TW1 2XF The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South East Consultation Documents HACAN Clear Skies is submitting a general response and six supplementary responses to the Department for Transport Consultation Documents LIST OF SUPPLEMENTRARY RESPONSES 1: Effect of a Third Runway on Exposure to Noise 2: Effect of a Third Runway on Exposure to Nitrogen Dioxide 3: Airline Tax Exemptions, Passenger Demand and Runway Capacity 4: Runway Capacity and the UK Economy 5: Hub Airports in South East England 6: Alternatives Policies to Runway Expansion in South East England HACAN ClearSkies Supplementary Response 2 THE EFFECT OF A THIRD RUNWAY AT HEATHROW AIRPORT ON EXPOSURE TO NITROGEN DIOXIDE June 2003

2 1. OVERVIEW OF THIRD RUNWAY AND NITROGEN DIOXIDE EXPOSURE Introduction and Purpose 1.1 The first and second editions of the Department for Transport Consultation Document The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South East set out options for building additional runway capacity in South East England at Heathrow, Gatwick, Stanstead and Cliffe. The Consultation Documents include assessments of the effects of additional runways on the surrounding levels of nitrogen dioxide. The Consultation Documents state that a third runway at Heathrow could not be authorised unless the Government is confident that the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow with three runways would not exceed the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. 1.2 This paper sets out an assessment by HACAN ClearSkies of how far the Consultation Documents: Understate the extent to which the nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow would increase if a third runway is built. Fail to provide sufficient information to meet the requirements of European Community Directive 85/337/EEC on the effects of a third runway on the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow and on alternatives to a third runway. 1.3 The purpose of this paper is fourfold: To ensure that the Government recognises that a third runway would have a significantly worse effect on the nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow than the Consultation Documents have identified. To remind the Government of its obligations under Directive 1999/30/EC to ensure that nitrogen dioxide in the ambient air does not exceed the levels set down in the Directive. To remind the Government of its obligation under Directive 85/337/EEC to assess and consult, before deciding whether to authorise additional runway capacity in the South East, on the effect of runway development on nitrogen dioxide levels and consideration of the alternatives to development. To form the basis of a complaint to the European Commission if the Government authorises a third runway at Heathrow without first assessing and consulting on the effect on nitrogen dioxide levels and the alternatives to a third runway to the level of detail required by Directive 85/337/EEC. The complaint would also cite the failure by the Government to comply with Directive 85/337/EEC as evidence that the Government may have not implemented correctly Directive 85/337/EEC or Directive 1999/30/EC. Main Findings 1.4 The Heathrow Terminal 5 public inquiry heard evidence that the ambient nitrogen levels in the early 1990s were higher than are permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC and would exceed the permitted levels in 2016, with or without Terminal 5. The Consultation Documents give no details about how many people around Heathrow are presently exposed to higher than permitted nitrogen dioxide levels, but forecast that if a third runway is in operation in 2015, the number of people exposed to higher than permitted nitrogen dioxide levels would be 35,000 under conservative assumptions about future reductions in aircraft emissions; and 5,000 under aggressive assumptions about future reductions in aircraft emissions. 1.5 These forecasts would understate the number of exposures if: Passenger numbers exceed 116 million in 2015 and/or there are more than 655,000 aircraft movements (the Consultation Documents state that passenger demand at Heathrow would be 126 million in 2015 and 202 million in 2030).

3 Reductions in aircraft emissions do not take place on the scale of the conservative assumptions in the Consultation Documents. 1.6 The Consultation Documents do not say what measures are in place to ensure that the permitted nitrogen dioxide levels are not exceeded after either 31 December 2005 (the deadline in the Government White Paper on air pollution) or 31 December 2009 (the deadline in Directive 1999/30/EC). The Consultation Documents say that industry must offer assurances that the air quality around Heathrow with a third runway would comply with Directive 1999/30/EC by agreeing that: Aircraft that do not meet the most exacting emissions standards could be banned from Heathrow. Industry would purchase all homes and other properties in areas around Heathrow exposed to higher than permitted nitrogen dioxide levels. Main Omissions from the Consultation Documents 1.7 As regards consideration of the alternatives to building additional runway capacity at Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted or Cliffe, the Consultation Documents fail to identify any options for managing passenger demand within existing capacity (e.g. increasing air passenger duty to collect the amount of tax that the airlines would pay if not exempt from fuel duty and VAT; introducing a passenger congestion charge; reducing flights of less than 600 km distance between London and mainland UK cities; reducing international transfer passengers at London). 1.8 As regards an assessment of the overall impact of a third runway on the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow, the Consultation Documents fail to: Assess the number of and long-term effect on children living or attending schools near Heathrow, adults with breathing difficulties living near Heathrow, or people working at or near Heathrow who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels close to or above the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. Assess the number and location of properties around Heathrow exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels above the permitted levels that industry would have to be purchase. Use the 2001 Census for the most recent information about the number of people who would be exposed to levels of nitrogen dioxide not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. 1.9 As regards the measures proposed in the Consultation Documents for managing the air quality at Heathrow if a third runway is built, no fallback measures are identified in case: Passenger numbers exceed 116 million and/ or aircraft movements exceed 655,000. Aircraft do not become less polluting on the scale envisaged in the Consultation Document. Banning the most polluting aircraft is not practical or legal. De-populating areas with high nitrogen dioxide levels does not comply with Directive 1999/30/EC; or is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. Main Conclusions 1.10 On the basis of the information and lack of information in the Consultation Documents, it is difficult to see how the Government can be confident at this stage that nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow with only two runways will comply with Directive 1999/30/EC. The air transport White Paper can therefore do no more than keep a third runway open as an option, pending reviews of the air quality around Heathrow after 31 December 2005 and 31 December The Consultation Documents say that industry is looking for certainty now, but the only certainty that the White Paper could give at this stage is that a third runway is unlikely to be viable on air quality grounds.

4 2. OBLIGATION ON GOVERNMENT TO ASSESS THE EFFECT OF A THIRD RUNWAY ON NITROGEN DIOXIDE EXPOSURE 2.1 The first edition Consultation Document states that the Government will publish a White Paper on air transport in the light of responses to the Consultation Document; and that the White Paper will need to reach a view on whether Heathrow should continue to be the premier UK airport or whether an alternative airport should be developed to assume that role, and the implication for Heathrow 1. Other statements and inferences in the Consultation Document confirm that the White Paper is intended to have the final say on whether a third runway should be developed at Heathrow: Only Government can take a strategic decision about whether and where additional runway capacity should be developed 2. If the White Paper announces that additional runway capacity would be developed at certain sites it would remove present uncertainty for the air transport industry and for residents living near all potential development sites 3. If the White Paper announces the development of additional runway capacity at certain sites, the Government would take steps to safeguard any land needed for the runway 4. The development of a new runway would need planning authorisation, but prior Government commitment to runway expansion would guarantee planning approval at sites pre-determined by the Government 5. Any public inquiry would not examine the environmental effects of a new runway at sites predetermined by the Government to the same level of detail as the public inquiry into Terminal Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of projects on the environment requires a public authority that initiates a project likely to have significant effects on the environment to undertake and consult on an assessment of the effects on the environment and measures to mitigate the effects before a decision is taken on whether to authorise the project. Directive 85/337/EEC also requires the developer to publish an outline of the alternatives he considered and the reasons for his final choice. If the White Paper recommends that Heathrow should have a third runway, the Government would in effect initiate the development of a third runway. In particular, a developer would have no alternative to consider if the Government announces that a third runway should be built at Heathrow. 2.3 Directive 1999/30/EC on limit values for pollutants in ambient air sets levels of nitrogen dioxide that must not be exceeded in Member States after 31 December 2009 or after any earlier date adopted by individual Member States; and requires Member States to specify penalties for breaches of the levels that must not be exceeded. The Government White Paper on air pollution said that the levels of nitrogen dioxide in the United Kingdom will not exceed the levels permitted by the Directive after 31 December Page 31, paragraph Page 14, paragraph Page 134, paragraph Paragraph Page 14, paragraph Page 11, paragraph National Air Quality Strategy: Working Together for Clean Air, 2000: The objectives we are now setting are not aspirational; they are binding.

5 3. OBLIGATION ON GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO A THIRD RUNWAY Directive 85/337/EEC 3.1 Under Directive 85/337/EEC, developers of projects likely to have a major effect on the environment must make available for public comment - before the development is authorised - the main alternatives to the proposed development that the developer considered; and the main reasons for his choice of the proposed development, taking into account the effects on the environment. Passenger Demand and Runway Capacity in South East England 3.2 The Consultation Documents state that passenger demand at airports in South England is expected to grow from 114 million in 2000 to 300 million in 2030; that existing runway capacity in South East England could handle no more than 200 million passengers; and that, without additional runway capacity in South East England, there will be an excess of passenger demand over runway capacity of 100 million passengers by Options for Runway Development in South East England 3.3 The Consultation Documents set out a number of options for runway development at Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and a possible new airport at Cliffe for handling the forecast increases in passenger numbers down to 2030; and for deciding whether a new hub airport should be developed in South East England or whether Heathrow should continue to operate as the UK s premier hub. Information in the Consultation Documents indicates that development would have an adverse effect on the nitrogen dioxide levels at Heathrow and Gatwick. But the nitrogen dioxide data is too incomplete to allow a comparison on the same systematic basis as the Consultation Documents set out for the economic costs and benefits of developing each location and combination of locations. The Government therefore cannot claim that the Consultation Documents have assessed and compared the nitrogen dioxide effects (or the other environmental effects) at the four possible locations with the same rigour as the economic costs and benefits. 3.4 The Consultation Documents make the following claim for a third runway at Heathrow (with or without development at one or more of the other locations is not clear): Our proposals for Heathrow recognise that the option for another runway there offers both much greater economic benefits than a runway at any other location, but also much more significant impacts on air quality and noise. Effectively, what we are proposing is to use a substantial proportion of the higher economic benefits to reduce the environmental impacts to acceptable levels 8. It is not clear on what basis the Consultation Documents feel able to make this claim, because no figure is given for the substantial proportion of the economic benefits that would be used to reduce nitrogen dioxide to acceptable levels, which are not defined. The only specific proposal in the Consultation Documents for reducing nitrogen dioxide levels is to ban the most polluting aircraft from using Heathrow, but the cost of a ban is not given. Moreover, the Consultation Documents fail to explain why a ban (if practical and legal) would be introduced only if a third runway is built at Heathrow, and would not be introduced if no expansion takes place at Heathrow, Gatwick or Stansted. Congestion and Tax Exemptions 3.5 The Consultation Documents fail to consider the effect of tax exemptions in stimulating passenger demand. The airlines pay about 1 billion per year in air passenger duty, but are exempt from paying about 9 billion per year in fuel duty and VAT. If the Government increased air passenger duty to collect 9 billion per year (e.g. in order to fund improvements to schools and hospitals, to pay for higher education fees, to increase the state pension; or to reduce National Insurance contributions or income tax), the annual costs the airlines recover from passengers would increase by more than 50 per cent. 8 First edition, paragraph 16.38, page 122.

6 3.6 The Department of Transport estimates that a one per cent increase or decrease in ticket prices results in a one per cent decrease or increase in demand (mainly among leisure passengers). A 50 per cent increase in ticket prices would therefore produce a 50 per cent decrease in demand, from 300 million to 150 million in South East England in 2030; turning the forecast runway deficit of 100 million passengers at South East airports in 2030 to a 50 million surplus. Bearing in mind that additional runway capacity would be needed only if the airlines continue to be under-taxed over the next thirty years, it is not clear why the Consultation Documents did not consider an increase in air passenger duty as an option for managing passenger demand within existing runway capacity. Congestion Charging 3.7 The Consultation Documents state that the price of air tickets for flights at airports in South East England would increase by 100 per person by 2030 if no additional runway capacity is developed in South East England. The Consultation Documents do not explain why prices should increase by 100, because the air transport industry would face no significant new costs if no additional runway capacity is built. The Consultation Documents presumably estimate that 200 million of the 300 million passengers forecast to want to use airports in South East England in 2030 would be prepared to pay an additional 100 per person for the available 200 million capacity, enabling the airlines to pocket an additional profit of 20 billion per year ((i.e. 100 from each of 200 million passengers). 3.8 It is understandable that the Government would fear criticism for appearing to sanction profiteering by the airlines if it refused to sanction the building of additional runway capacity in South East England on environmental grounds. But the Government could avoid this criticism by introducing a congestion charge on airports of 100 per passenger; and spelling out the public benefits of 20 billion additional revenue (e.g. improving basic public services - such as health, education and National Insurance pensions - without having to raise other taxes; or reducing income tax and National Insurance contributions; or a combination of both). Bearing in mind that congestion charging is on the Government s agenda for road traffic, it is not clear why the Consultation Documents did not consider a congestion charge for air traffic as an option for managing passenger demand within existing runway capacity. Congestion and Inter-City Flying within the UK 3.9 The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has announced that domestic flights in Germany will be phased out, as a measure to manage air traffic congestion, encourage greater use of intercity railways, and protect the environment from the effects of air traffic. The greatest distance between any two German cities is 600 km, between Hamburg in the north and Munich in the south. In the UK in 2000, more than 9 million passengers flew less than 600 km between airports in mainland Britain (including Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, East Midlands, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds/ Bradford, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Teesside) and one of South East England s main airports. 9 million passengers represented eight per cent of all passengers (114 million) at South East England s main airports in The Consultation Documents do not say what proportion of the 300 million passengers forecast to want to use an airport in South East England in 2030 would fly less than 600 km between London and an airport in mainland Britain. There seems no reason to believe that the demand would drop below eight per cent of total demand in 2000, indicating a demand of 24 million out of 300 million in Phasing out flights between South East England and airports in mainland Britain less than 600 km from London would therefore reduce passenger demand at airports in South East England in 2030 by 24 million (from 300 million to 276 million). Bearing in mind the precedent being set by Germany, it is not clear why the Consultation Document did not consider the option phasing out flights of less than 600 km between airports in the South East and other parts of mainland Britain as an option for managing passenger demand within existing runway capacity.

7 Congestion and International Transfer Passengers 3.11 The Consultation Documents state that airports in South East England - particularly Heathrow - handle more international transfer passengers than any other airport in Europe 9. The Consultation Document explains that international transfer passengers enable airlines to offer flights from Heathrow to destinations for which there is little demand in South East England, but which attract overseas businessmen and investment to the UK because foreign businessmen prefer direct flights to transfer flights. But the Consultation Document does not explain why an increasing number of foreign businessmen transfer through Heathrow, without doing business with or investing in the UK; or why other parts of the UK attract foreign business and investment despite offering fewer direct flights to international destinations than Heathrow According to the Department for Transport, UK airlines have developed the international transfer market since the early 1990s, in response to depressed demand and surplus capacity at the time of Iraq s invasion of Kuwait 10. The Government exempts the airlines from paying air passenger duty on international transfer passengers so as not to depress the transfer market 11. Mike Moore, the former Director General of the World Trade Organisation, has criticised the airlines for manipulating routes to make passengers from developing countries transfer via airports in Europe and the US 12. Oxford Economic Forecasting states that airlines would drop international transfers if no additional runway capacity is built in South East England, because they are the least profitable category of passenger (even though the airlines pay no air passenger duty on international transfers) The number of international transfer passengers using airports in South East England (mainly Heathrow and Gatwick) grew from 3.5 million in 1992 to 21.5 million in That is to say, 19 per cent of the 114 million passengers who used South East England s airports in 2000 did so for the sole purpose of taking a connecting flight from one overseas location to another overseas location. According to the Consultation Documents, international transfers will grow to 60 million out of the expected 300 million passengers at airports in South East England in 2030, more than half the number of passengers (116 million) that the Consultation Documents forecast that Heathrow would handle with three runways in Phasing out the international transfer market at Heathrow and Gatwick would reduce passenger demand at South East England s airports in 2030 from 300 million to 240 million. Bearing in mind that the international transfer market is an artificial creation that threatens to squeeze out UK residents or overseas passengers who wish to visit the UK for a purpose other than taking a connecting flight to another overseas destination, it is not clear why the Consultation Documents did not consider phasing out international transfer passengers (e.g. by extending air passenger duty to international transfers) as an option for managing passenger demand within existing runway capacity. Conclusions on Alternatives to a Third Runway 3.15 The Consultation Documents argue that additional runway capacity (including a possible third runway at Heathrow) is needed in South East England to meet the forecast shortfall between forecast passenger demand of 300 million in 2030 against existing runway capacity to handle no more than 200 million passengers. But demand by 84 million passengers would not exist in 2030 if the Government took action to phase out flights by 24 million passengers to destinations within mainland Britain less than 600 km from London; and by 60 million international transfer passengers. That is to say, two demand management initiatives could reduce the shortfall between capacity and demand from 100 million down to 16 million. 9 International transfer passengers arrive at a UK airport from an overseas airport in order to take a second flight to another overseas airport. The connecting flight is generally taken within hours of arriving at the UK airport, so transfer passengers do not leave the airport. 10 Air Traffic Forecasts for the United Kingdom 1997, paragraph To protect the position of the United Kingdom s international hub airports, there will be a exemption [from air passenger duty] for transfer and transit passengers. Sir John Cope MP, Paymaster General, House of Commons, Debate on the Budget Statement, Hansard, 1 December 1993, Column Mike Moore article, Aviation Industry Must Stop Flying Solo, The Times, 2 August the airlines would aim to concentrate the loss of passengers on those who yield the least revenue - transfer passengers, followed by some leisure passengers. Oxford Economic Forecasting, The Contribution of the Aviation Industry to the UK Economy (Final Report), November 1999, page 45.

8 3.16 In view of the fact that Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted already suffer from unacceptable levels of air traffic noise and that the Consultation Documents show that runway development at the four main locations under consideration in South East England would all result in a deterioration in the noise climate, demand from the additional 16 million passengers would disappear if the Government either introduced an airport congestion charge on the airlines; or removed the benefits the air lines enjoy from their exemption from fuel duty and VAT by raising the rate of air passenger duty HACAN ClearSkies considers that the Consultation Documents should have considered demand management options as an alternative to building additional runway capacity at one or more location in South East England; and that the failure to do so is a serious omission from the Government s assessment of and consultation on the effect of a third runway at Heathrow and is a breach of the Government s obligations under Directive 85/337/EEC.

9 4. EXPOSURE TO NITROGEN DIOXIDE Present Nitrogen Dioxide Exposure 4.1 Both editions of the Consultation Document contain forecasts of the number of people living around Heathrow who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC with two or three runways in operation in 2015 and But neither edition says how many people are exposed at present to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive. It is therefore not clear from the Consultation Documents whether the air quality around Heathrow will improve or deteriorate in future - with or without a third runway - compared with the present. 4.2 The public inquiry into the proposed fifth passenger terminal at Heathrow (Terminal 5) heard evidence that the area around Heathrow had become an air pollution hot spot by the early 1990s, due to high background levels of nitrogen dioxide supplemented by emissions from air and road traffic accessing Heathrow. The Planning Inspector who conducted the public inquiry advised the Government that nitrogen dioxide levels in 2016 would exceed the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC by 8 per cent with four terminals and by 21 per cent with five terminals; but that the nitrogen dioxide levels would be lower in 2016 (with four or five terminals) than in 1993 (with four terminals). The Planning Inspector did not establish how many people were exposed in 1993 or would be exposed in 2016 to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive If there has been no improvement in the air quality around Heathrow since , the Planning Inspector s report would indicate that present nitrogen dioxide levels must exceed by more than 21 per cent the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC 16. If there has been an improvement in the air quality since 1993, present nitrogen dioxide levels may exceed by less than 21 per cent the levels permitted by the Directive, indicating that present nitrogen dioxide levels may increase and that present air quality may deteriorate when Terminal 5 is operational Neither edition of the Consultation Document acknowledges the extent to which the present nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow exceed the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. HACAN considers that the Directive requires the Government to establish how many people living and working around Heathrow are exposed to higher nitrogen dioxide levels than are permitted by the Directive, regardless of whether a third runway is built. HACAN further considers that Directive 85/337/EEC (see paragraph 2.2 above) requires the Government to establish present nitrogen dioxide exposure numbers as part of the debate about whether a third runway should be built. Future Nitrogen Dioxide Exposure 4.5 Both editions of the Consultation Document state that the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow in 2015 with two or three runways will exceed the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. Unlike the Terminal 5 Planning Inspector, the Consultation Document does not state by what per cent the forecast nitrogen dioxide levels would exceed the levels permitted by the Directive. But the forecasts are consistent with the advice of the Planning Inspector that the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow in 2016 with two runways will exceed the levels permitted by the Directive. 4.6 Both editions of the Consultation Document state that forecasts based on conservative assumptions about future emissions per aircraft indicate that the number of people living around Heathrow in 2015 who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive would be 14,000 with two runways in operation and 35,000 with three runways in operation. 14 The Planning Inspector rejected estimates submitted by the local authorities. 15 The air traffic at Heathrow has increased from 396,000 aircraft movements carrying 45 million at an average passenger load of 114 per aircraft in 1993 to 458,00 aircraft movements carrying 60 million passengers at an average passenger load of 131 per aircraft in 2001 (the most recent year for which complete figures have been published). But there has been no indication from the Government on whether the increase in air traffic has improved or worsened the air quality around Heathrow. 16 The Planning Inspector said that the level of exceedence in 2016 with five terminals - 21 per cent - would be less than the level of exceedence with four terminals in The Planning Inspector said that the level of exceedence in 2016 with five terminals would be 21 per cent.

10 4.7 Both editions of the Consultation Document state that forecasts based on aggressive assumptions about future emissions per aircraft indicate that the number of people living around Heathrow in 2015 who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive would be 5,000 with three runways in operation. Neither edition of the Consultation Document provides an aggressive forecast of the number of exposures in 2015 with two runways in operation The first edition of the Consultation Document states that forecasts based on conservative assumptions about future emissions per aircraft indicate that the number of people living around Heathrow in 2030 who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive would be 33,000 with three runways in operation. Neither edition of the Consultation Document provides a conservative forecast for the number of people exposed in 2030 with two runways in operation; or aggressive forecasts for the number of people exposed in 2030 with two and three runways in operation. Nitrogen Dioxide Forecasting Methods 4.9 Directive 85/337/EEC requires that methods used to predict the effects of major developments on the environment should be published. The two editions of the Consultation Document do not explain how the nitrogen dioxide forecasts were modelled, but state that there are uncertainties when modelling future pollution concentrations. Neither edition explains what the uncertainties are, or whether the uncertainties are unique to airports. But both editions infer that the model may over-state future nitrogen dioxide concentrations Air pollution modelling is an established and widely used technique, so it is not clear why the Consultation Document casts doubts on modelling nitrogen dioxide. The Planning Inspector who conducted the public inquiry into Terminal 5 had no difficulty in accepting BAA s modelled forecasts that nitrogen dioxide concentrations around Heathrow in 2016 would exceed the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC by 8 per cent with four terminals; and by 21 per cent with five terminals. The Planning Inspector explained his confidence in BAA s modelling in his report to the Government in 2000: Having considered all of the issues related to the prediction of concentrations, I am satisfied that the model does provide an acceptable basis for the assessment of the effects of Terminal 5 and its associated road schemes. It is subject to a range of uncertainties but I find no reason to believe that these are more likely to produce over-estimates than under-estimates The Government authorised Terminal 5 in 2001 without questioning the confidence the Planning Inspector placed in BAA s nitrogen dioxide modelling. On the contrary, the Government criticised the Planning Inspector for not placing sufficient weight on the legal obligation on the UK to comply with Directive 1999/30/EC. Therefore - against the background of the Government s acceptance of the Planning Inspector s advice that nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow in 2016 would exceed the levels permitted by the Directive by 21 per cent with two runways, five terminals, 80 million passengers and 480,000 aircraft movements - HACAN considers that the Consultation Document forecasts appear to be sufficiently consistent with the Terminal 5 modelling to indicate that: An unquantified number of people around Heathrow are and will continue to be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive, with or without a third runway; and with or without aggressive reductions in emissions per aircraft. Three runways would expose more people to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive than two runways would. Three runways would expose people within the near vicinity of Heathrow to higher levels of exceedence (and higher health risks) than two runways would. 18 Applying the ratio difference (5:2) between the conservative forecasts with and without a third runway (35,000 and 14,000 exposures - see paragraph 4.6 above) to the aggressive forecast with a third runway (5,000 exposures) produces an aggressive forecast of 2,000 people exposed in 2015 without a third runway.

11 Two runways and 77 million passengers in 2015 could expose between 2,000 and 14,000 people to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive. Three runways and 116 million passengers in 2015 could expose between 5,000 and 35,000 people to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive. Three runways and more than 116 million passengers in 2015 could expose more than between 5,000 and 35,000 people to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive. Forecasts Depend on Optimistic Assumptions About Reduced Emissions 4.12 The conservative assumptions in the Consultation Documents about future emissions per aircraft type appear to be based on present rates of emission per aircraft type. The aggressive assumptions appear to be based on possible reductions in future rates of emission per aircraft type. But the Consultation Documents do not guarantee that the aggressive assumptions will be met in 2015 or 2030; or explain why the aggressive assumptions are more likely to prevail than the conservative assumptions. That is to say, the Consultation Documents admit that the aggressive assumptions are a theoretical possibility that may reflect the nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow in 2015 and 2030; but are not an inevitable or even a probable reflection of the nitrogen dioxide levels in 2015 and The Consultation Document does not explain why the Government is so confident that aircraft in future will be significantly less polluting. But even the aggressive forecast predicts that Heathrow with a third runway would expose 5,000 people in 2015 to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EEC. That is to say, the aggressive assumptions show that even an ambitious development programme to manufacture less polluting aircraft would not prevent an increase in the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow if a third runway is built. It must also follow that - if less polluting aircraft do not materialise on the scale assumed by the aggressive forecasts - the increase in the nitrogen dioxide levels by 2015 and 2030 would be even greater than the increase under the aggressive assumptions. Forecasts Under-State Future Passenger Demand 4.14 The nitrogen dioxide forecasts in the Consultation Documents are based on the assumption that in 2015 Heathrow with three runways would handle 655,000 aircraft movements, carrying 116 million passengers at an average load of 177 passengers per aircraft; and that the same figures would apply in 2030 (i.e. there would be no increase in aircraft movements or passenger numbers at Heathrow between 2015 and 2030) It must follow that if Heathrow handled more than 116 million passengers in 2015 or 2030 there would be more than 655,000 aircraft movements and/or more than 177 passengers per aircraft. More aircraft movements and/or larger passenger loads would increase the nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow above the levels forecast by the Consultation Documents Neither edition of the Consultation Document explains why passenger numbers at Heathrow would peak at 116 million in 2015 and would not exceed 116 million in On the contrary, there are indications from the Consultation Documents that passenger numbers will exceed 116 million, even in 2015: Both Consultation Documents justify a third runway on the grounds that two runways would not enable Heathrow to handle future passenger demand to maintain its status as the world s largest international airport (measured in passenger numbers). The first edition of the Consultation Document states that passenger demand at Heathrow will be 126 million in 2015 and 202 million in The Consultation Document says that amount of growth is insupportable, but does not explain at what point the growth in passenger numbers from 116 million to 202 million becomes unsupportable; or how the Government could prevent 19 First edition: page 51, table 7.1.

12 126 or 202 million passengers from using Heathrow if 126 or 202 million passengers want to use Heathrow 20. The first edition of the Consultation Document says that passenger demand at all UK airports will be 335 million in 2015 and 501 million in Table 1 below shows that limiting the number of passengers at Heathrow to 116 million would reduce Heathrow s share of passengers at all UK airports from 33 per cent in 2001 to 23 per cent in But if Heathrow maintains its 33 per cent share of passengers at all UK airports, it would handle 110 million in 2015 and 165 million in Both editions of the Consultation Document state that, with Terminal 5 fully operational, the existing two runways would handle 77 million passengers in 2015 and 89 million passengers in , implying that a third runway would increase passenger numbers by no more than an additional 27 million per year (i.e. to 116 million), which may not be sufficient to cover the costs of building a third runway 23. The first edition of the Consultation Document states that passenger numbers with two runways and Terminal 5 fully operational could be boosted by an additional 12 million per year (i.e. to 101 million), 24 implying that a third runway would increase passenger numbers by no more than an additional 15 million per year (i.e. to 116 million), which may not be sufficient to cover the costs of building a third runway 25. Table 1: Heathrow s share of passenger numbers (millions) at UK airports Passengers at all UK airports Passengers at Heathrow Heathrow passengers as a percentage of all passengers 33% 35% 23% 4.17 Forecasting future nitrogen dioxide levels at Heathrow depends on forecasts of future passenger demand. But forecasting passenger demand is not an exact science. For example, BAA informed the Terminal 5 public inquiry that with five terminals in operation Heathrow would handle 80 million passengers by But both editions of the Consultation Document state that with two runways and five terminals in full operation Heathrow would handle 77 million passengers by 2015 and 89 million passengers by 2030, with the possibility of a further 12 million (i.e. 101 million in total) 26. Most recently, BAA has indicated that it expects 87 million passengers to use Heathrow by The Consultation Document asks consultees to accept its noise forecasts as a reliable indicator of the effect of a third runway on nitrogen dioxide levels based on the following set of propositions: A third runway must be built to enable Heathrow to handle passenger demand up to Passenger demand at Heathrow - assuming that the airlines continue to be exempt from fuel duty and VAT - will increase to 126 million in 2015 and to 202 million in The two existing runways could handle 101 million passengers, with the third runway handling only 15 million (116 million in total). 10 million additional passengers who will want to use Heathrow in 2015 and 85 million additional passengers who will want to use Heathrow in 2030 would not be able to do so HACAN finds it difficult to accept the Consultation Document forecast that passenger numbers at Heathrow with a third runway would peak at 116 million in 2015 and would not increase by 2030, given that the Consultation Document forecasts demand to reach 126 million in 2015 and 202 million 20 Page 31, paragraph Page 39, unnumbered table. 22 Page 51, Table 7.1 (first edition); and page 25, unnumbered table (second edition). 23 Bearing in mind that Terminal 5 will increase capacity by million and that the airlines are complaining about the increase in airport charges to pay for the construction of Terminal Page 49, paragraph 7.7. According to press reports in March 2003, the airlines are already lobbying for more intensified use of the two existing runways. 25 See footnote 33 above. 26 Page 49, paragraph 7.7.

13 in On that basis of those forecasts and the history of continued expansion at Heathrow, HACAN considers that the Government should have explained how the additional passenger demand would be prevented from using Heathrow; and should have published forecasts of the levels of nitrogen dioxide from transporting 126 million and 202 million passengers in 2015 and Forecasts Ignore Children and Vulnerable Adults 4.20 Neither edition of the Consultation Document considers the effect of a third runway on the exposure to nitrogen dioxide emissions of children or adults with breathing problems. The Deputy Prime Minister, in his introduction to the Governments White Paper on air pollution 27, said that air pollution hits the young and the old hardest, particularly those suffering from asthma and heart and lung diseases. Directive 1999/30/EC states that its limit values are the minimum requirements to protect human health and the environment, and that Member States may set more stringent limit values to protect vulnerable groups such as children Hillingdon Community Health Council, in evidence to the Terminal 5 public inquiry about nitrogen dioxide exposure, reported that surveys of 1456 people in two localities had found that 258 people (17.5 per cent of those surveyed) had breathing difficulties, including 60 children In view of the recognition by the Government and the Directive that some sections of the population are more vulnerable to air pollution than the general population and the evidence to the Terminal 5 public inquiry that 17.5 per cent of the population in an area near Heathrow has breathing difficulties, HACAN considers that Directive 85/337/EEC requires the Government to identify the number of children and the number of adults with breathing difficulties who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels above, and close to exceeding, the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. Forecasts Ignore Work Place Exposure 4.23 Neither edition of the Consultation Document says whether people working at or near Heathrow would be exposed to levels of nitrogen dioxide not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC with two or three runways. If, as both editions of the Consultation Document forecast, the nitrogen dioxide levels around Heathrow in 2015 will exceed the levels permitted by the Directive with two and three runways, it must follow that people working at or near Heathrow (particularly people working in the open air) would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by the Directive Although Directive 1999/30/EC excludes air in the work place from the definition of ambient air, it does not follow that people at work may be exposed to daily levels of nitrogen dioxide not permitted by the Directive. Directive 96/62/EC on ambient air quality states that measures to ensure compliance with air quality values shall not contravene legislation on the protection of the safety and health of workers at work. HACAN therefore considers that Directive 85/337/EEC requires the Government to assess the health implications for workers at or near Heathrow of exposure to high levels of nitrogen dioxide during work time. Forecasts May Under-State Population in Exposed Areas 4.25 Neither edition of the Consultation Document says whether the forecast exposure numbers are based on the population census for 1991 or The 2001 census would include people living in houses built since 1991 at infill sites in areas forecast to experience levels of nitrogen dioxide not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. That is to say, the Consultation Document forecasts may understate the number of exposures if the forecasts were based on the 1991 census. Exposure at Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris Airports 4.26 Both editions of the Consultation Document lays great emphasis on the expansion of the airports in Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris as the reason why Heathrow should have a third runway. But the Netherlands, Germany and France are all Members of the European Union, so the Governments of 27 National Air Quality Strategy: Working Together for Clean Air, 2000: Air pollution hits hardest the most vulnerable in our society. The old and the young, in particular those suffering from asthma and heart and lung diseases.

14 those countries are under the same legal obligation as the UK Government to comply with Directive 1999/30/EC. HACAN considers that the Consultation Document, in making comparisons between the leading airports in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and France, should have compared the impacts of the four airports on nitrogen dioxide pollution as well as the alleged competition between the four airports. New EC Exposure Limits 4.27 Directive 1999/30/EC requires the European Commission to make a proposal to confirm or modify the limit value in the Directive for nitrogen dioxide for the protection of human health. The Commission is also required to examine the hourly limit value in the Directive for nitrogen dioxide in the light of the most recent World Health Organisation guidelines, and to consider whether the limit value in the Directive should be confirmed or altered. It may therefore be that the permitted levels of nitrogen dioxide will become more stringent in future, which would add to the challenge the Government faces in ensuring that the air quality around Heathrow complies with the Directive, with two and three runways. Conclusions on Exposure 4.28 Both editions of the Consultation Document state that a third runway could not be authorised unless the Government is confident that the levels of nitrogen dioxide around Heathrow would not exceed the levels permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. Table 2 below summarises the gaps in information about the number of people living around or working at Heathrow who are currently exposed or who are likely to be exposed in future to levels of nitrogen dioxide not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC, with and without a third runway. Table 2: Exposure to levels of nitrogen dioxide not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC Residents Children and people with breathing difficulties Workers Conservative estimates Aggressive estimates Conservative estimates Aggressive estimates Conservative estimates Aggressive estimates 2001/ 2002?????? 2015 no 3 Rd runway 14,000????? 2015 with 3 rd runway 35,000 5,000???? 2030 no 3 rd runway?????? 2030 with 3 rd runway 33,000????? 4.29 HACAN ClearSkies considers that the Consultation Document understates by a wide margin the nitrogen dioxide levels in 2015 and 2030 by assuming that: Aircraft in 2015 and 2030 would be significantly less polluting than at present, without producing any firm evidence that this would be the case. Heathrow would handle no more than 116 million passengers in 2015 and 2030, despite the Consultation Document forecasts that passenger demand would reach 126 million in 2015 and 202 million in HACAN ClearSkies considers that the Consultation Document further understates by a wide margin the impact of nitrogen dioxide levels in 2015 and 2030 if a third runway is built by failing to: Identify the number of and long-term effect on children living or attending school near Heathrow, adults with breathing difficulties living near Heathrow, and people working at or near Heathrow who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC. Identify the number and location of properties around Heathrow exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC that industry would have to purchase, or the number of people who would be affected. Use the 2001 Census for the most recent information about the number of people who would be exposed to nitrogen dioxide levels not permitted by Directive 1999/30/EC.

15 4.31 HACAN ClearSkies considers that the failure by the Consultation Document to address the matters listed in paragraphs 4.30 and 4.31 is a serious omission from the Government s assessment of and consultation on the effect of a third runway on the air quality around Heathrow and is a breach of the Government s obligations under Directive 85/337/EEC.