SIGNALS. Ship Security

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1 SIGNALS SPECIAL SIGNALS SPECIAL ISSUE 8 JANUARY 2003 the Loss Prevention newsletter for North of England Members Ship Security ISPS CODE BRIEFING Seafarers and ships have faced threats to their security ever since sea trade began. Over the past few years, robbery and piracy incidents have continued to occur and are very common in some parts of the world, such as off the coasts of Indonesia and Somalia. Lack of security in port areas has also made it difficult for ships to prevent stowaways or the theft of cargo. Until 2001, ship operators and seafarers were often left to LIMBURG Aladin Abdel Naby / Reuters / Popperfoto face these problems alone with little help from the authorities ashore. Terrorism was not seen as a significant maritime threat, especially to cargo ships. The terrorist attacks that did occur against merchant ships were generally directed against passenger or cruise ships, such as the attacks on the Achille Lauro off Egypt in 1985, and the City of Poros in Greece in Following the Achille Lauro incident, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a set of security guidelines, which were published in MSC Circular 443 in These provided recommendations and comprehensive guidance for the security of passengers and crews. However, no legislation was produced and it was generally left to individual countries, ports or shipping companies to develop their own security provisions. The situation changed completely in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th Various countries, particularly the United States, concluded that it was likely that terrorists would either use ships as weapons, or to carry weapons or terrorists into a target country, or that they would attack ships to cause chaos in international trade and the international economy. This theory appears to have been confirmed by a number of subsequent terrorist attacks on merchant ships, such as the US Coast Guard attack on the Limburg off Yemen in October 2002 by a small boat containing explosives. The IMO has provided the main international forum for the development of measures to meet this threat by increasing the security of ships and ports. The introduction of many of these measures was approved at a diplomatic conference held at the IMO in London in December At the centre of the new security provisions are amendments to the SOLAS Convention and a new security code, known as the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code. The majority of the changes will come into force in July 2004 and will fundamentally affect every shipowner who operates ships that trade internationally. This Signals Special highlights the main provisions of the new international regulations and provides some practical guidance to ship operators about the steps they should now be taking to implement them. It will also look at some of the unilateral measures being introduced by the United States, as well as addressing some of the practical concerns and commercial implications of the new rules. Many of these concerns have arisen because of the relatively short time it has taken to formulate and introduce the rules. INSIDE: Page 2 Page 4 Page 6 Page 8 Page 10 Page 12 ISPS Code Amendments to SOLAS Practical advice US measures to ship operators Commercial implications P&I cover See page 7 for an action plan for Members

2 2 ISPS CODE International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code At the heart of the new IMO ship security measures is the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code. This applies to port facilities serving ships on international voyages, to all passenger ships on international voyages and to all other ships over 500 GT on international voyages. The ISPS Code is being introduced by an amendment to Chapter XI of the SOLAS Convention and has two parts. Part A contains the mandatory requirements and Part B provides guidelines on how to meet them. Although Part B of the Code is not mandatory, it does provide port facility operators, ship operators and seafarers with a comprehensive guide to the requirements of the ISPS Code. As with all such official guidance, failure to follow its provisions might be seen as a failure to exercise due diligence and Members should therefore take all reasonable steps to comply with Part B as well as Part A of the Code. Some of the main features of the ISPS Code that affect ships are described on these pages, and some advice on the practical steps to implement the requirements is given on pages 6 and 7. Implementation date:1st July 2004 SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT The ISPS Code is intended to work on the basis that security measures are implemented in proportion to the potential risk to security, which may vary from time to time. The government of a country, or a Designated Authority within the government, will assess the likely security threat and set the security threat level required at each of its port facilities accordingly. Updated information about security threat levels and measures will then be provided to port facilities and ships. Governments also have to provide a point of contact through which ships can get advice or assistance, or report security concerns. As the security threat level increases, the measures taken to provide security within the port are increased appropriately from Level 1 through to Level 3. Likewise, the underlying security threat level applied to a ship will be set by the appropriate authority of the ship s flag. The effect on a ship visiting a port is that it must implement measures that provide the required level of security for the port facility, or the level set for the ship if it is higher. Consequently, a ship s security plan must contain measures that can be implemented for each of the three security levels - as the required security level increases, the measures taken to provide security on the ship are also increased. Part B of the Code contains guidance about the factors that a government, or their Designated Authority, take into account when setting a security threat level for port facilities or ships. COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER (CSO) Every company has to designate a Company Security Officer (CSO) whose responsibility is to ensure that Ship Security Plans are developed and approved for the ships operated by the company. The Company Security Officer has to ensure that the Ships Security Plans are maintained, modified if necessary, and audited. He also has to ensure that security assessments are carried out, the appropriate level of security enforced and that effective communications are established with port security officers when ships are in port. Shipping companies already have a Designated Person, or persons, to administer and audit the ISM Code. As they will already have lines of communication in place, as well as the training and expertise to develop procedures and carry out audits, in some companies it might be appropriate to extend their area of responsibility to include security. SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT (SSA) At the centre of the measures required by the ISPS Code is the Ship Security Plan, which is specific to an individual ship and based on a security assessment of the ship. Detailed guidelines for carrying out a security assessment of a ship are provided in Part B of the Code. The assessment should include: Identification of existing security measures Identification of key shipboard operations requiring protection CONFIDENTIAL MV NEPIA SHIP SECURITY PLAN NEPIA LTD 2003 CONFIDENTIAL Identification of threats to the key shipboard operations and the likelihood of them occurring Identification of weaknesses in the ship s infrastructure and procedures. SHIP SECURITY PLAN (SSP) Following the security assessment a Ship Security Plan can be developed to include measures to: Identify the areas of the ship where access is to be restricted Appoint a Ship Security Officer and specify the security duties of shipboard personnel Prevent weapons and other dangerous devices being taken on board the ship Respond to a security threat or security breach and report incidents Interface with port security procedures Evacuate the ship in the event of a security threat Respond to government security instructions. The actions taken to meet the above requirements will need to become more thorough as the security level under which the ship is operating is increased. Part B of the Code provides guidelines on the measures to be taken at each of the three security threat levels, to control: Access to the ship Restricted areas on the ship Handling of cargo Delivery of stores The monitoring of security. RESTRICTED MV NEPIA SHIP SECURITY PLAN NEPIA LTD 2003 RESTRICTED The Ship Security Plan also has to contain provisions to ensure that the crew are trained, drills are carried out, records are kept, and the procedures audited.

3 ISPS CODE 3 The plan would of course provide essential information for anyone wishing to pose a threat to the ship, so it must be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure, including disclosure to officials in port. However there may be special circumstances in which authorised officials are allowed to look at the plan and verify that the ship security requirements have been met. To maintain security a ship should carry two versions of the plan, a confidential version and less restricted version. Only this latter version should be disclosed to port officials, and should not contain details of passwords, codes, or the location of certain items of equipment. The development and auditing of security plans is something that will be beyond the expertise of most shipping company staff. The Company Security Officer is therefore not expected to assess and develop security plans himself, but has the responsibility of ensuring that security assessments are carried out and plans developed by competent persons or security organisations on the shipowners behalf. SHIP SECURITY OFFICER (SSO) A Ship Security Officer is to be designated for each ship with the responsibility to ensure that the Ship Security Plan is properly implemented, the crew trained and drilled, and most importantly, that security awareness and vigilance are maintained. It will be up to each company to decide who to appoint as Ship Security Officer. Given the level of experience and seniority that may be required, the most appropriate choice is probably the chief officer, but the ISPS Code does not specify any particular person. DECLARATION OF SECURITY (D0S) When a ship is in port, a government may require that an agreement is reached between the ship and port authorities about the security measures to be taken at the interface between the ship and the port facility, which are the areas where people move between the ship and the shore, or where cargo is loaded. The agreement should specify who will be responsible for implementing the security measures. This agreement takes the form of a Declaration of Security, signed by the ship s master or Ship Security Officer and a representative of the shore-side authorities. US Coast Guard A Declaration of Security is unlikely to be required in every case, but a prudent master and Ship Security Officer should be prepared to implement an agreement on arriving at a port. A Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) or a ship can also request a Declaration of Security to be completed, for example if the ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility. TRAINING AND DRILLS The success of any management system and procedures depends on the motivation and familiarity of those carrying them out. Shore-side staff and seafarers have never been expected to be experts in security, so proper training and drills are essential to ensure success. The Company Security Officer, Ship Security Officers and other appropriate personnel will need to be given adequate training by a suitable security organisation. Seafarers also need to be familiar with their security duties and responsibilities under the security plan and to have practice drills for different security scenarios, such as a bomb threats, attacks, and other breaches of security. According to Part B of the ISPS Code, drills should be carried out at least every three months or after certain crew changes. RECORDS As with any other management system, records need to be kept for audit purposes and to show that due diligence has been exercised, as well as for inspection by authorised persons in port. The Ship Security Plan requires a number of records, including but not limited to: Records of training, drills and exercises Reports of security breaches and incidents Changes in the security level in operation A record of audits and reviews. Records may be kept in electronic format, but in all cases must be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure. INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE The ship s security system, equipment and plan are all subject to verification to ensure that they comply with the requirements of SOLAS and the ISPS Code. After a satisfactory initial verification, an International Ship Security Certificate will be issued. This certificate is valid for five years after which it will need to be renewed. The certificate also requires a satisfactory intermediate verification, and any additional verification required by the ship s Flag State, to remain valid. In some special cases the Flag State administration may issue an Interim International Ship Security Certificate, which lasts for up to 6 months, while the full certificate is being issued. RECOGNISED SECURITY ORGANISATION (RSO) The International Ship Security Certificate is issued by the ship s Flag State, but not all governments will be able to, or want to, carry out some of the duties under the ISPS Code themselves. The government or Designated Authority can appoint a Recognised Security Organisation to carry out duties such as approving Ship Security Plans, carrying out verification surveys and issuing International Ship Security Certificates on its behalf. The ISPS Code specifies that these Recognised Security Organisations must have the relevant expertise and knowledge in security, but should not carry out these duties if they have been involved in the related security assessment or drawing up the Ship Security Plan. Three Tier Security The security threat levels adopted by the International Maritime Organization are similar to those used in the United States, where they are known as Marsec (Maritime Security) Levels. The different levels advise of the extent to which a security threat is considered to be present and are used to trigger appropriate protective measures both onshore and on board ships in the port facility. LEVEL 1 - Low risk This is the level of threat for which normal security measures are sufficient and is the minimum level that should be maintained at all times. LEVEL 2 - Medium risk At Level 2 there is an heightened threat of a security incident. Additional protective measures are required and may have to be sustained for prolonged periods while there is a increased risk of a security incident. LEVEL 3 - High risk Level 3 means that there is an exceptional threat and that a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify a specific target. Further intensified protective and preparatory measures are required, but these are not intended to be sustained for significant periods of time.

4 4 AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS Changes to Ship s Equipment A number of changes will be needed to ships and their equipment to meet the latest security requirements for ships trading internationally. These have been introduced following amendments to Chapter V and Chapter XI of the SOLAS Convention, which were adopted at an IMO diplomatic conference in December 2002.To provide some guidance and information to ship operators, the main features of these measures, and their implementation dates, are summarised on this page. AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS (AIS) An automatic identification system fitted to a ship provides shore stations and other ships with information that includes its identity, type, position, course and speed. The system must also be able to receive similar information from other ships in the vicinity. The original intention of AIS was to increase navigational safety by providing information about a ship to shore stations and other ships in the vicinity to enable them to identify, monitor and track it. This would obviously also be a useful security measure as shore stations and defence organisations would be able to identify and monitor ships in their waters more easily. Amendments to Chapter V of SOLAS will therefore speed up the timetable for installing AIS on existing ships. However there are some major concerns about the proposals. One is that the earlier implementation dates will not allow any technical problems in the new systems to be sorted out, or allow many countries time to install receiving equipment in shore stations. There may also be a problem in meeting the demand for ship s units within the reduced implementation period - Member s are advised to order their equipment early. A more serious worry is that the information transmitted by a ship s AIS, including the ship s identity, course and speed, will be available to anyone with suitable receiving equipment. This would include terrorists, pirates and belligerent nations wanting to intercept and board or attack a particular ship. Implementation date: For existing ships that did not previously have to comply until after 1st July 2004, by the first safety equipment survey after 1st July 2004 or by 31st December 2004, whichever occurs first. SHIP IDENTIFICATION NUMBER Every ship has a unique IMO number, which remains unchanged during the ship s life regardless of any other changes such as to the ship s name, flag or owner. Knowledge of the IMO number therefore provides a straightforward means of identifying a ship and finding out about its history. The IMO is thus making identification easier by requiring the IMO number to be easily visible from outside the ship. It is to be permanently marked in a contrasting colour in specified places on the ship, such as on the stern, above the load line on either side, on the front of the superstructure, or on either side of the superstructure. Some passenger ship operators have expressed concern about the aesthetics of displaying the number. Implementation date: By the first scheduled dry dock after 1st July SHIP SECURITY ALERT SYSTEM The concept of the security alert system is that a ship should be able to alert the company and authorities ashore by activating an alert from the bridge, or from at least one other place on the ship, if there is a security threat. When the administration of the ship s flag, or the state whose waters the ship is in or near, receives an alert they have to advise each other. The regulations specify that no alarm should be raised on the ship itself or on any other ship. However, the actual method of sending the alert and the method by which receipt of an alert will be confirmed is not specified. The amendments to SOLAS only require that ships should be able to send an alert and that authorities ashore should be able to receive them. The response that should be taken by a Flag State or other country is not specified, leading to uncertainty as to how this measure will actually work in practice. Implementation date: 1st July 2004 for new ships. By the first radio survey after 1st July 2004 for existing passenger ships, tankers and bulk carriers. By the first radio survey after 1st July 2006 for other existing cargo ships. LONG RANGE TRACKING Another security measure that has been discussed at the IMO is the fitting of transmitting equipment on ships that will use Immarsat C to provide information about the ship and allow it to be tracked at long range. The security advantage of long-range tracking seems obvious, as it would allow the appropriate authorities ashore to identify and track particular ships worldwide. However, there are a number of serious security and commercial implications. The ability to access the information could allow a state, a state sponsored organisation, or anyone else capable of intercepting the information, to track particular ships or groups of ships. The system might therefore allow specific ships or groups of ships to be targeted worldwide, and would enable organisations with access to use the information, or pass it on for commercial advantage. Implementation date: The IMO has not adopted any legislation but has urged individual governments to implement measures to enable long-range identification and tracking ships EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY ISPS CODE Most ships will need to be fitted with additional security equipment, such as door locks and screening equipment, to comply with the ISPS Code. The practical implementation of the ISPS Code is considered on pages 6 and 7. Implementation date: 1st July 2004

5 AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS 5 Changes to Management Systems Changes to the ships equipment are relatively easy to understand and introduce, even if there is an obvious cost implication. When it comes to management systems, things are not always so straightforward. Some of the amendments to Chapter XI of the SOLAS Convention require the introduction of additional management systems designed to make many aspects of the ownership and operation of a ship more transparent. The main features of these requirements, and their implementation dates, are summarised below. Many also have commercial implications, which are considered on pages 10 and 11. RESPONSIBLE PERSONS Authorised officials in countries that a ship visits may need to contact the relevant persons in the shipping company directly to request or verify information for security purposes. The ship will need to have up-to-date documentation on board to identify the Company Security Officer (see page 2) and also: The persons in the shipping company who appoint the crew The persons in the shipping company who decide the employment of the ship The parties to any charterparties the ship is employed under. Implementation date: 1st July 2004 CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD (CSR) Another measure intended to provide a complete history of the ship, and hence identify anything in it s past that might present a security threat, is the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR). This will provide an on-board record of the ship s history and any changes. The information includes, but is not limited to, details such as: Ship s name IMO number Flag State Registered owner s name and address Classification Society Organisation issuing ISM certification Organisation issuing ship security certification. Although it is the ship operators responsibility to keep the information up to date, the Flag State administration actually issues the CSR. The CSR should be kept on board and made available to any authorised person for inspection, and a copy is held by the Flag State. If the ship changes flag, copies of existing CSR documents are to be retained on board and the old Flag State sends copies of its records to the new Flag State. The process is intended to prevent the history of the ship being falsified in any way. Any changes to relevant ship s details have to be notified to the Flag State, which in turn has three months to issue a revised CSR. A potential problem with this is that a Flag State might not have the administrative capability to deliver a new CSR document to the ship within the required time, in which case the master or company will be authorised and required to amend the CSR on board. In the meantime this could lead to problems for the ship during port calls. Implementation date: 1st July CONTROL AND INSPECTION OF SHIPS IN PORT Ships need to be able to meet security requirements at a number of different levels depending on the security threat determined to exist for the particular ship and the port being visited. These security threat levels, ranging from 1 (lowest threat) to 3 (highest threat), were described on page 3. When a ship visits a port, the authorities of that country may require information to be provided before the ship is allowed to enter port, or to inspect the ship, to ensure that it can meet the level of security required. Appropriate records need to be kept from the last 10 ports visited. If the ship does not have a valid International Ship Security Certificate, or there are clear grounds that a ship is a security threat, the authorities could deny the ship entry into port or enforce their own security requirements and detain, restrict operations, or even expel the ship. Part B of the ISPS Code gives some examples of clear grounds, such as evidence of deficiencies in security equipment, evidence that the master and ship s crew are not familiar with shipboard plans, or that security exercises and drills have not been carried out. Other instances may occur if the ship is considered to present a security threat, for example, if persons who have been rescued at sea are on board the ship. Implementation date: 1st July 2004.

6 6 SECURITY MEASURES - PEOPLE PRACTICAL ADVICE TO SHIP OPERATORS 7 Security of People on Ships Probably the most crucial security measures are those used in the employment and identification of ships crew, as well as identification of other persons allowed to board a ship in port. The security measures for ships crews are to prevent anyone who could be a security threat from becoming a member of the crew or impersonating a crew member. Ships security measures in port should only allow persons who do not pose a security threat, and have proper identification, to board a ship. There are a number of issues being discussed internationally to ensure that these requirements are met. CREW IDENTIFICATION Representatives from a number of organisations under the lead of the International Labour Organization (ILO) have been meeting in an attempt to develop an internationally acceptable form of seafarers identification. The possibilities range from a smart card incorporating some form of biometric identification, to a simpler conventional identification containing a photograph and personal details to accompany the seafarer s passport. The issue of persons with any sort of criminal record still has to be resolved, as a reference to their record could be included on the seafarers identification. From the security viewpoint it might make sense to refuse port entry to any person with a criminal or terrorist record or background of any sort. However, in most countries a person who has been convicted and served their sentence would normally be eligible to work at sea. For example, under the proposed system Nelson Mandela might not be able to go to sea, even if he wanted to! Implementation date: Any recommendations are expected to be adopted at the 91st session of the International Labour Conference in June PRE-EMPLOYMENT CHECK Under the STCW Convention ship operators are required to ensure that seafarers have the appropriate qualifications, and are also required to maintain full employment records of their sea staff. Ship operators are also required to ensure that seafarers are medically fit, and many organisations, including P&I Clubs, strongly recommend instituting a system of suitable pre-employment medicals for this purpose. Members should consider extending this exercise of due diligence to incorporate an appropriate security check on seafarers backgrounds before employment commences. MASTERS POWERS Under SOLAS Chapter XI-I Regulation 8 ships masters are allowed to make decisions regarding the security of the ship regardless of constraints imposed by the company, charterers or anyone else. The regulation also makes it clear that a master s first responsibility is for the safety of the ship. Masters may deny access to persons or refuse to load cargo, if they judge it necessary in order to maintain the security of the ship. Moreover, the company is required under the ISPS Code to emphasise the master s authority and provide assistance to him if requested. However, masters are not allowed to refuse access to a person duly authorised by a government. Although Part B of the ISPS Code encourages governments to ensure that officials are issued with appropriate identification documents, there is no internationally recognised requirement for authorised persons to carry suitable identification, such as an identification card containing a photograph, or for there to be a procedure to verify them. This could result in the bizarre situation of a master getting into trouble for refusing access to a person who turns out to be an authorised official, even if that person did not carry any reasonable identification. Another problem relates to a master s practical ability to identify cargo posing a security threat to the ship, for example within the cargo on a 6,500 TEU container ship. SAFE MANNING Up until now safe manning levels have only related to the safe navigation of a ship. Part B of the ISPS Code advises Flag States to consider the additional workload that may result from implementation of new security measures when setting the statutory safe manning levels of ships. US Coast Guard Practical Advice to Ship Operators Part B of the ISPS Code gives comprehensive guidance about the measures that ship operators and seafarers should take to make their ships secure. Practical advice on how to assess, plan and implement these measures is not given in the ISPS Code, as these are subjects about which ship operators should obtain specialist advice. However, the following paragraphs highlight examples of the sort of measures ship operators might need to implement in three key areas of ship security - access, searches and restricted areas. ACCESS At any level of security, access to the ship should be tightly controlled. Initially this means establishing the ways by which access can be gained, for example using mooring ropes and cargo equipment, as well as by accommodation ladders, gangways and ramps. The approved access route, usually the accommodation ladder, should be permanently manned and only persons who have a proper reason should be allowed to board. All persons boarding should be positively identified by an appropriate means of identification, such as an identity card or boarding pass including a photograph, which can be verified. Having established controls on the authorised access routes, the unauthorised routes should be guarded. This can be achieved by closing and locking ship-side doors, removing over-side ladders, fitting guards on mooring ropes or anchor cables and ensuring that the deck and over-side areas are well lit. The deck areas need to be patrolled regularly and the patrols also need to observe the land and sea approaches to the ship. Closed circuit television cameras could also be used. As security threat levels are increased, restrictions imposed on persons authorised to board, and the number and frequency of patrols will need to be increased appropriately. SEARCHES Anyone travelling by air is used to having a routine search of their person and their baggage. Similar precautions, in liaison with the port facility, may now be required for anyone boarding a ship and inspection areas may need to be set up - manned by suitably trained ship and/or port staff. The inspections will look for prohibited weapons and explosives on persons, and in carry-on luggage and baggage. Inspections will also need to be extended to ship s stores and spare gear. The extent of the inspections will depend on the level of security required. In addition to physical examination, equipment such as metal detecting wands, X-ray machines and explosives vapour detectors might have to be used. RESTRICTED AREAS Although access to the ship is controlled, there is still a possibility that unauthorised persons may get on board, or that authorised persons such as stevedores may try to enter spaces where they are not allowed. The second line of defence on the ship is to designate restricted areas to which no one has access except authorised members of the crew. Anyone else, such as a surveyor or Port State inspector, will need to obtain permission and should always be accompanied. Examples of restricted areas are the bridge, machinery spaces, crew accommodation, cargo spaces and stores spaces. Fitting suitable locks, surveillance monitoring equipment and devices that detect intruders automatically, can protect these. Restricted areas should also be patrolled regularly, and guarded in times of heightened security. Action Plan Amendments to SOLAS Chapter V and Chapter Xl and the publication of the ISPS Code Parts A and B bring mandatory security requirements, which will effect all ships over 500 GT sailing in international waters and all port facilities that handle such ships. The Association is grateful to Brigadier (Retired) BAH Parritt CBE who has advised on the contents of this Special and has also provided the following practical checklist to help Members prepare to meet the new requirements: 1 Hold a senior executive level briefing / seminar, where the senior managers who cover all aspects of management are informed of the unprecedented implications of the new maritime security legislation. 2 a) Select and appoint a Company Security Officer (CSO) - a person of senior status who will be responsible for all aspects of company security. They must be of senior enough level to be able to take or recommend company security policy decisions. b) For companies with a large number of different types of vessels, it may be convenient to appoint a senior Company Security Officer responsible for overall company security policy and then a number of additional Company Security Officers, who are specifically responsible for certain categories of ships, for example chemical carriers or bulk carriers. 3 Train the Company Security Officer(s) and selected senior managers, for example the Head of Human Resources. A three day course. 4 Decide which officers are to be Ship Security Officers (SSO s), that is the person on each ship who will have legal responsibilities for security. Experience has shown that the most appropriate rank is the Chief Officer. 5 Train all designated Ship Security Officers. A one to two day course. 6 Inform all Masters of the changes in legislation and seek their co-operation for the numerous organisational and physical changes that will have to be made on their vessels. 7 Arrange for a security assessment / survey of the ships by a credible maritime security organisation. This can be done individually or by category of vessel. A two to three day visit to the ship will be required. 8 Carry out a review (headed by the Company Security Officer) of the assessment / survey reports and formulate a corporate ship security policy. 9 Produce a Ship Security Plan (SSP) for each vessel and forward this to the Designated Authority or Recognised Security Organisation (RSO) for validation, in order to obtain the necessary International Ship Security Certificate. 10 Send a validated Ship Security Plan and International Ship Security Certificate to each ship and the Flag State. 11 Arrange on-board training for crew members in security duties. 12 Purchase specific maritime security equipment, including: a) Access Control System This can range from a simple Visitors Book and Visitors Pass Pack to a sophisticated photo / biometrics system. b) Screening equipment for individuals For example hand-held metal detectors. c) Screening equipment for baggage and stores For example X-ray machines and Explosives Vapour Detectors. d) Miscellaneous security equipment Such as the IMS Sus-Pack Kit for the remote management of suspect packages, the IMS Search Kit, Blast Suppression Blankets, security seals / labels and alcohol and drug test kits. Brigadier Parritt served for thirty-seven years in the British Army, culminating in five years as Director of the Intelligence Corps. He has been involved in maritime security since 1986, as Chairman of International Maritime Security (IMS) and as a consultant to the IMO. IMS, tel: +44 (0) , fax: +44 (0) , intmarsec@clara.co.uk, website: intmarsec.co.uk

7 8 US MEASURES Vessel Security in the United States - Recent Developments Although the United States had been taking a leading role in the promotion of international security measures at the IMO and the World Customs Organisation, it has also introduced comprehensive unilateral requirements. The Association is grateful to Charles Whited of Murphy, Rogers & Sloss law firm in New Orleans for explaining some of these measures. The tragic events of September 11th have impacted upon virtually all aspects of life in the United States (US), not least of which is the movement of people and goods within, and to and from, this country. It follows that the maritime industry, a principal means by which cargo is transported to and from the US, has been affected by stringent new security measures, and the enforcement of existing US laws and regulations. The focus of this article is on those steps taken by the US government to ensure that oceangoing vessels, along with their crews, and cargoes, trading to this country do not pose a threat to US security. In this regard, we will briefly discuss those issues which have had, and will have for the foreseeable future, the most immediate consequences for the international maritime community. Due to space constraints, our comments will be limited to the most basic elements / aspects of these issues. VALID US VISAS FOR CREWMEMBERS It has long been required by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that foreign crewmembers serving onboard vessels trading to the US have valid US Visas in their passports, or alternatively, appear on a valid Visa Crew List, in order to disembark their vessels at US ports. This requirement predates the events of September 11th, and is being strictly enforced. The failure to comply can have adverse consequences, principally financial, and the likelihood that the crew will be detained onboard the vessel while it is in US waters. It has been our recent experience that foreign US Coast Guard crewmembers serving on vessels trading to the Mississippi River who do not have valid US Visas in their passports, or do not appear on a valid Visa Crew List, will at the very least be deemed detainees by the INS, and not allowed to leave their vessels. It is our further understanding that the crewmembers country of origin is not a determining factor in deciding detainee status - the mere fact that the foreign crewmembers are not properly visaed will be enough to detain them onboard the vessel while the vessel is in the US. The situation becomes more complicated, as we discuss more fully in the section entitled Security Guard Requirements, when the US Coast Guard (USCG) decides for national security reasons, to order security guards for certain crewmembers. The failure of a crewmember to have a valid US Visa in his / her passport can have ramifications beyond just being detained onboard a vessel. It can, for example, prevent or delay the routine repatriation of a crewmember, and it can even complicate the medical treatment of a crewmember who needs to go ashore for a medical procedure. We are aware of incidents where security guards have been required to accompany ill crewmembers ashore for treatment, remain with them until the treatment is completed, and escort them back to the vessel. In order to avoid the various problems that can arise, and the possible onerous consequences, when a crewmember does not have a valid US Visa in his/her passport, we strongly recommend that all crewmembers serving onboard a vessel that trades to the US, obtain and keep current valid US Visas in their passports. While it is our understanding that the mere presence of a valid US Visa in a crewmember s passport will not automatically permit the crewmember to go ashore, and it will not guarantee that the USCG will not order security guards for the vessel, having it should go a long way in avoiding / minimizing the problems associated with the failure to have a valid US Visa. Furthermore, vessel interests can no longer rely on obtaining a Visa Crew List on short notice, as it has become increasingly difficult to procure this document quickly from overseas US diplomatic sources, due in part to the thorough investigations that the US consulate or embassy must conduct prior to issuing / approving the Visa Crew List. SECURITY GUARD REQUIREMENTS An issue that has caused considerable controversy in the international maritime community is the USCG requirement that certain vessels trading to the US hire armed security guards while the vessel is in US waters. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent detained crewmembers from leaving the vessel, either when the crewmembers are considered to be a desertion risk, and / or they are deemed a threat to national security. While the criteria used by the USCG in ordering security guards are not published, it is our understanding that the following factors are considered when making the decision: 1) the crew s nationality or nationalities, 2) the vessel s flag, 3) the vessel s beneficial ownership and management, 4) the size of the crew, 5) the number of nationalities represented by the crew, 6) the vessel s previous ports of call, 7) whether or not the crewmembers have valid US Visas in their passports, or alternatively, whether or not the crew is listed on a current / valid Visa Crew List, 8) the vessel s desertion history, and 9) the desertion history of the crew s nationality or nationalities. There may be additional unknown or classified criteria used by the USCG when deciding whether or not security guards will be required for a particular vessel. Importantly, the USCG decision whether or not to order security guards for a particular vessel can vary from US port to US port as the security needs of the many US ports are diverse, and do differ. For example, the distance from S.W. Pass, Louisiana, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, is about 230 river miles, and a large part of the Mississippi River between these two locations is rural and difficult to closely guard, thus allowing much easier entry into the US than from a guarded fenced / gated facility located in a port, for example, adjacent to the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, and the US Gulf of Mexico. It has been our experience that a vessel calling in the Mississippi River, and where the crew is not properly visaed and considered a security threat by the USCG, can be required to hire six to eight armed security guards, while the same vessel on the same voyage may only be required to employ one security guard, or even no guards, at another US port or ports. It is our understanding that a crew that is considered too large for a particular sized vessel,

8 US MEASURES 9 and / or that is a mixture of too many nationalities, and / or has a prior history of deserting, can raise red flags and thus result in the ordering of security guards. As we discussed in the previous section, a crew that is properly visaed can offset the INS and the USCG s concerns regarding the crew s size, makeup, and origin. While a valid US Visa in a crewmember s passport may not eliminate detainee status in all cases, it should hopefully prevent the need for security guards. It is our further experience during the last several months that security guards have not been ordered for vessels trading to the Mississippi River where the crewmembers have had valid US Visas in their passports, or in the absence of valid individual US Visas, the vessels have arrived in the US with a current Visa Crew List listing all crew onboard the vessel. MINIMIZING THE COST OF THE SECURITY GUARD REQUIREMENT The ordering, by US authorities, of security guards can result in delays to the vessel, and unanticipated costs for vessel interests. While the costs can sometimes be as small as the cost of one guard while the vessel is at berth for only a few hours, they can also result in security guard and water taxi invoices, and related expenses totalling several tens of thousands of US dollars. For example, if a vessel calls in the Mississippi River and anchors at one of the several anchorages, the USCG requires many guards who must travel to and from the vessel using one of the local water taxi services, and the USCG mandates that the guards must remain on the vessel until it sails. We were made aware of an incident at another US port where the local INS office ordered the vessel s Master deported because he did not have a valid US Visa in his passport, and he was not listed on a current Visa Crew List. Consequently, the vessel could not sail until vessel interests replaced him with a properly visaed Master, thus resulting in considerable delay to, and costs for the vessel. In another case, not involving a Mississippi River port, a vessel was not cleared to enter a US port because the vessel s owners would not agree to the order that security guards be hired. As a result, the vessel returned to its foreign load port, disembarked those crewmembers without valid US Visas, replaced them with visaed crewmembers, and returned to the original US discharge port, all at considerable expense to the vessel s owners. Since the costs associated with the hiring of security guards are typically for the vessel s owners account, we raise the possibility that a charterparty fixed for the carriage of cargo to and / or from US ports should contain a suitable clause, such as a BIMCO US Security Clause, that provides for the burden to be shared with charterers. The rationale behind such a clause would be that the charterers ordered the vessel to a US port or contracted with the vessel s owners to carry a cargo to or from a US port. SHIP SECURITY PLANS While some vessels have had to submit Crew Control Security Plans in the last several months to the USCG Captain of the Port for the New Orleans area where the crews have been deemed a threat to port security, the recent passage by the US Congress of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 will result, when implemented, in the need in the US for a Ship Security Plan ( SSP ) for a vessel where the USCG perceives a transportation security incident. The purpose of the SSP is to prevent such a security incident, and it must be approved by the USCG. Like OPA 90 and its Vessel Response Plan, the SSP will include the name of the individual who can implement the security plan. It will also contain, among several other items, the security measures to be used in the event of a transportation security incident. 24-HOUR RULE FOR CARGO MANIFEST INFORMATION A topic generating considerable interest in the maritime community is the new US Customs Service regulation that carriers and / or automated nonvessel operating common carriers (NVOCC s) submit accurate Cargo Manifest information - a Cargo Declaration - to Customs 24 hours or more prior to the loading of certain cargoes at foreign ports. The main purpose of this requirement is to prevent the smuggling into the US of weapons of mass destruction, and failure to comply in a timely and correct manner can result in penalties and / or the delay or refusal by Customs to permit the noncomplying cargo to be discharged at a US port. Importantly, the new regulation is directed primarily at containerised cargo, while bulk shipments such as oil, grain, coal, ore, bricks, pig iron and lumber, are exempt from the 24 hour rule. According to Customs, break bulk cargoes, that is cargo that is not containerised, but which is otherwise packaged or bundled, can be exempt from the 24 hour rule, but such a determination will be made on a case-by-case basis. CSI AND C-TPAT Briefly, CSI is an acronym for the Container Security Initiative launched by Customs in January 2002 to protect cargo shipped in containers from the threat of terrorism. Numerous ports throughout the world, including Vancouver, Singapore, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hong Kong, and Tokyo, have joined Customs in the CSI program. According to Customs, CSI s four core elements are 1) using automated information to identify and target high-risk containers; 2) pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive at US ports; 3) using detection technology to quickly prescreen high-risk containers; and 4) using smarter, tamper proof containers. Implementation of these core elements is in part performed by onsite US Customs inspectors at the foreign loading ports. While the initial focus of CSI has been on container ports that ship a high volume of containers to the US, it will eventually be expanded to other strategic ports. Customs has indicated that the CSI principles can be applied to all ports that ship containerised cargo to the US. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, is, according to Customs, a cooperative endeavour between the trade community and US Customs Service to develop, enhance, and maintain effective security processes throughout the global supply chain. C-TPAT was introduced by Customs in November 2001, and its participants include importers, licensed customs brokers, air / sea / rail carriers, and air freight consolidators / ocean transportation intermediaries, and NVOCC s. THE NEW HOMELAND SECURITY ACT / DEPARTMENT, AND THE ROLE OF THE INS, THE USCG, AND CUSTOMS Congress recently passed the Homeland Security Act of As a result, the USCG, Customs, and portions of the INS will come under the new Department of Homeland Security ( Homeland Security ). The changes are expected to take place on or about the 1st of January 2003, and Homeland Security will employ about 170,000 individuals working in 22 Federal agencies. This new department represents the largest federal government reorganization in more than 50 years, and should further facilitate communication / efforts among the various US agencies in preventing any terrorist incident. Cooperation among the INS, USCG, and Customs, already considerable, should increase. As discussed above, the last year has resulted in new US laws and regulations meant to prevent terrorism in this country, and the strict enforcement by the INS, the USCG, and Customs of previously enacted provisions. In order to ensure, as much as possible, the smooth sailing of vessels to and from the US, we recommend that vessel interests make every effort to comply with all existing US laws and cooperate fully with all US agencies. Charles L Whited is a partner of Murphy, Rogers & Sloss, tel , fax: , cwhited@mrsnola.com.

9 10 COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS The ISPS Code - Commercial Considerations The new ISPS Code will inevitably have commercial implications, many of which will not have been foreseen by the regulators who drafted it. In this article Eamon Moloney of Eversheds law firm considers some of the commercial and legal effects of the ISPS Code. Some people are closing their minds to the ISPS Code because, they say, It is just another scare, like ISM and the Millennium Bug. People foretold unimaginable consequences but nothing came of them. We managed ISM and we will manage this. Well maybe. We had 1,000 years to prepare for the Millennium Bug and even the ISM Code had a tenyear lead-in, including five years for consultation and consideration. Conversely, the ISPS Code has already been approved at a diplomatic conference with very few people knowing much about it and it will be law on 1st July This rushed implementation is because the ISPS Code is a response to political imperatives not related to the shipping and port industries. The Code is an issue of State security, not ship safety and for this reason it is driven by a political impetus which does not recognise the commercial considerations of the international trade sector. One aspect of this political impetus is the speed of implementation - which may be as short as 18 months. Many ship owners have already fixed their vessels or chartered-in tonnage on 5 year plus contracts but how many considered the financial implications of Code compliance or the allocation of associated port charges between owners and charterers when they did so? Many of the provisions of the Code are matters of detail and the Code itself has been designed to operate alongside an ISM system. Many Designated Persons will soon be starting a new life as Company Security Officers and many security consultants will soon be offering their services to the industry. Owners, however, should not see Code compliance as simply an extension of their ISM system and leave it with their operations team. The Code has implications for commercial operations, long term fixtures, insurance and relations with charterers and cargo owners. Let me talk you through these issues in a rough, chronological order:- CHARTERPARTIES (1) - THE ALLOCATION OF COST AND RISK On a voyage charter, the owner pays the majority of charges associated with port entry and on a time charter, the charterer pays the majority. The Code is likely to have a significant effect on the time and the cost involved in getting ships into and out of ports, including:- additional security measures both onboard and ashore. extended loading and discharging times. delays in getting contractors, surveyors and supercargo onboard. additional port and Flag State inspections and drills. Some of these expenses will be foreseeable but many will not, especially the additional costs of moving from one security level to another. When fixing ships on time charters, especially longterm charters, the allocation of these costs between owners and charterers should be provided for. There are several ways in which this might be done:- by identifying and allocating to owners those expenses which are directly related to the ship and to charterers those which relate primarily to the port and / or the cargo. by stating expressly in the charterparty that owners provide the vessel on the basis of ISPS Security Level 1 (normal security) for the ship and for any ports that she visits and that charterers are responsible for all expenses associated with higher security levels. by incorporating a regulation change clause whereby the vessel is fixed and expenses allocated on the basis of all applicable laws as at the date of the fixture and a mechanism is specified for allocating any expense directly caused by changes to laws and regulations coming into effect after the fixture. BIMCO have specimen regulation change clauses which members can access on their website. CHARTERPARTIES (2) - THE CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD Under the code, every ship must maintain a Continuous Synopsis Record (described on page 5). Providing most of this data will not present a significant problem for most shipowners except, possibly, naming each and every charterer. However, the totality of this information will give an invaluable database which will be used by Port States for a range of reasons beyond immediate security measures. It is easy to see how this information could be applied for commercial advantage and there is no doubt that the security agencies of major powers will collect and collate this data assiduously. However, further information required to be available under the Code may present Owners with real problems:- CHARTERPARTIES (3) - THE IDENTIFICATION OF PRINCIPALS The Code requires that the master must have continuous access to the following information:- who appoints the crew, the parties to any charterparty, and who decides the employment of the ship. The first issue that arises from this requirement is whether the Code requires the name of an individual or the name of a company. The Code is unspecific on this point but the wording and the general intention to stress accountability, suggest that authorities may be looking for the names of individuals as well as the companies they work for. It should not be too difficult to identify the person who decides which seamen are signed on and off, although it is quite possible that the crew will have been appointed by a number of companies and individuals. There may be practical difficulties for cruise ships, ferries and any other operations with a large hotel function. Equally, it should not be difficult to identify the parties to any charterparties but care must be taken to ensure that information on all parties to all charters is available onboard at all times. Where a head charterer has liberty to sub-charter, ship owners must ensure there is a charterparty requirement for immediate notification of all subcharterers. And remember that this obligation also goes up the chain to include any bareboat charterers that might form part of the ownership / lease / financing arrangements.

10 COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS 11 The third requirement is going to be a real problem for many shipowners. The Code is looking for the person...who decides the employment of the ship.... It is clear that this is not the person who signs the charterparty on behalf of the ship, so one presumes that the Code is looking for someone nearer to charterers and/or to cargo. For a voyage charter this should not be too difficult for so long as the discharge port is specified at the time of the fixture - in which case the required name will, presumably, be that of the charterer. Making an identification for a ship under time charter or for a tramping ship or for a cargo which is traded during a voyage will be much more difficult. The person to be identified is the person who decides the employment - so for an oil tanker fixed to carry one or more parcels of oil to an unspecified destination and which are traded during the voyage, this will be a difficult task. One consolation is that the Code will generally be enforced in port, by which time owners should know who ordered them there. What is clear is that charterparties will have to be amended to provide for this information to be available and updated throughout the fixture and with an indemnity for non-compliance. CHARTERPARTIES (4) - ARRIVED SHIPS AND UNSAFE PORTS Armed forces have always known that ships are at their most vulnerable when they are at anchor because they are both exposed and unable to manoeuvre. It is safe to assume that this point will be recognised by all competent port authorities when they make their Port Security Assessments and their Port Security Plans. Clearly one of the easiest ways in which a port can reduce the risk of terrorist attack is by minimising the number of ships at anchor. It is perfectly feasible that at any heightened security state - for example at security Level 2 under the ISPS Code - port authorities will simply close their waiting anchorages and order ships to stand offshore until cargo facilities are immediately available. Whilst undoubtedly safe in security terms, such a course of action will impact on commercial operations:- Scheduling ship movements will be harder and slower. To be safe a ship may have to wait as much as 50 miles outside the port limits, thereby increasing the time required to call her into the port by hours if not days. There will be delay and expense which, under many current charterparties and contracts of carriage, could reasonably be attributed to force majeure or restraint of princes - in which case the loss would lie where it falls, i.e. upon ship owners. It is foreseeable that if a port authority closes the waiting anchorage for security reasons and requires ships to stand off and on until a cargo facility is immediately available, that there will be scope for argument as to just when a ship will have arrived. The scenario that I have outlined does not fit easily with the traditional definition of an arrived ship and, again, it may be necessary to amend charterparty definitions. Finally, the threat of terrorism is quite capable of making a port prospectively, physically and politically unsafe. It is virtually certain that a port at security Level 3 under the ISPS Code i.e. an exceptional risk of a security incident will be, by definition, unsafe. It is arguable that a port at security Level 2 i.e. a heightened risk of a security incident will also be unsafe. The current definition of an unsafe port is quite wide enough to include the operation of the ISPS Code and because the security level will be set by the Port State, there will not be much scope for argument about it. The primary, commercial implication for ship owners is that such declarations are likely to be made more frequently and in circumstances where, previously, Port States have kept silent about potential security threats. There will now be pressure upon Port States to be more open in their public announcements on the security threat. For example, in November 2002 the United Kingdom government announced that there had been intelligence to suggest a risk of terrorist activity directed at ro-ro traffic to the United Kingdom. At the time they made no public announcements other than don t panic and business as usual. In future and with the ISPS Code in place, there will be pressure on governments facing similar situations to make a formal announcement of a higher ISPS security level. THE SHIP / PORT FACILITY INTERFACE The provisions of the ISPS Code apply whenever there is a ship-port facility interface i.e. whenever a ship arrives at port on an international voyage. The Code provides for ships and for ports to have broadly similar security measures to reflect each security level. However, practical problems are foreseeable when ships and ports are not at the same security level. Some ships may trade continuously at higher security levels because of, for example, their flag or their trade. Equally, some ports may always operate at higher security levels because of local politics or geography. Whilst the Code is intended to ensure that ships and ports are at the same security level, there will be difficulties and expense, when, for example, a ship at security Level 2 is ordered to a port which is only at security Level 1. In such a case, there will be a mis-match between the security requirements of the ship and the port, with the resulting expense almost inevitably for the ship owners account. UNEVEN APPLICATION - ABUSE AND PROTECTIONISM The Code will be mandatory for ship owners by way of amendment to SOLAS. Ship owners will have to comply with the Code in order to trade their vessels. The same imperatives do not apply to ports, where the Code can only be implemented and enforced once it is made part of the domestic law of the Port State. This will lead to delay. There is also doubt as to who will be the Recognised Security Organisation for ports. This role may be taken by:- The Port State. The port authority, or An independent body, such as a classification society. The Code permits associated ports to have combined security plans and it is quite conceivable that the provisions of the Code could be abused by Coastal and Port States in the interests of protectionism and/or uncompetitive practices. INSURANCE Code compliance will almost certainly be a requirement for valid insurance. Whilst claims on hull policies are unlikely to arise unless and until there is damage caused directly by a terrorist attack (and maybe not even then depending upon the extent of cover), it is more likely that assistance will be required under P&I and FD&D policies as and when disputes arise. CONCLUSIONS Ship owners are strongly advised to consider the potential risks and liabilities and address these in advance by suitable additional clauses in charterparties etc. This is particularly the case where the obligations of the Code require liaison and exchange of information between owners and charterers - for example in identifying the person who orders the employment of the ship. There is no doubt that the Code will be introduced and implemented unevenly around the world, with the major, driving force being the United States of America and her allies. It is impossible to forecast the true effect of the Code but forethought, planning and preparation will certainly assist ship owners deal with problems as and when they arise. Eamon Moloney is a partner of Eversheds and leader of their Admiralty Law Team. He is also a specialist in port and harbour law. Tel: +44 (0) , fax: +44 (0) , website

11 12 P & I C O VER P&I Cover for Terrorist Acts - Frequently Asked Questions A number of questions are regularly asked about the P&I cover available for terrorism and other claims involving the security of ships. The most frequently asked questions are answered below: P&I RULES 2003/2004 DOES P&I PROVIDE BASIC COVER FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS? No - Claims arising from war risk type incidents, which include terrorist acts, have always been excluded from normal P&I cover. The P&I Club Directors retain a right to decide whether or not any act constitutes an act of terrorism. Members should obtain cover for terrorism under a separate war risk policy, available from commercial war risks insurers in the marine insurance market or from a small number of mutual insurers. The risks covered by these policies should include protection and indemnity risks insurance for P&I type risks. DOES P&I PROVIDE TOP-UP COVER FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS? Yes - P&I Clubs in the International Group of P&I Clubs provide additional cover for war risks, including acts of terrorism, provided that a Member has suitable underlying cover provided by war risks insurers. If a war risk claim exceeds the underlying war risks market cover, P&I Clubs in the International Group provide additional cover to a Member of up to US$200 million per claim. Because of this provision, P&I Clubs in the International Group require their Members to have separate standard hull war risks insurance for loss or damage to the ship. They also require the hull war risks insurance to be at least to the proper value of the entered ship and to contain a P&I inclusion clause, which provides cover for P&I type liabilities mentioned above. DOES P&I PROVIDE COVER FOR PIRACY INCIDENTS? Yes - Piracy is violent robbery committed at sea, which, unlike a terrorist act, is committed for personal gain and has no political motive. Cover is provided for P&I liabilities that have arisen as a result of a piracy incident. For example, if crew members have been injured, cover will be provided according to the same criteria as in a similar personal injury claim not involving piracy. WHAT IS A WAR RISK AREA? In a time of war or conflict, the areas where war risks apply are defined and published by the Joint War Risks Committee in the London market. In that case war risk insurers may declare the area to be an additional premium area, and basic war risks cover may be cancelled and reinstated at a higher rate. ARE P&I PREMIUMS INCREASED IN WAR RISK AREAS? Not usually - P&I Clubs in the International Group of P&I Clubs do not generally impose extra premiums because the primary P&I type risks are covered elsewhere and the Clubs involvement is restricted to provision of the top-up cover described previously. If necessary, the International Group of P&I Clubs may declare prohibited areas, as a result of which the additional top-up cover may be terminated. DOES P&I COVER MEMBERS INCREASED COSTS AND EXPENSES AS A RESULT OF HAVING TO PROVIDE EXTRA SECURITY PRECAUTIONS? No - These are operational matters and the costs and expenses are not recoverable from P&I. Security precautions may be required by international legalisation, such as the ISPS Code, or local rules. For example, security guards may be required in the United States on ships where not all the crew members meet visa requirements. Members should consider increasing their commercial rates to pass on some of the burden to shippers and charterers. Consideration should also be given to incorporating suitable clauses in charterparties, such as the United States Security Clauses for voyage and time charterparties published by BIMCO. DOES P&I PROVIDE COVER FOR FINES ARISING FROM A FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY REGULATIONS? Perhaps - Members P&I liabilities for fines are covered providing that a Member has taken reasonable steps to avoid the event giving rise to the fine. This includes taking proper steps to be aware and comply with security regulations. National regulations, such as the 24-hour manifest rule imposed by the US Customs Services for goods being imported to the United States, may oblige the carrier to provide information about cargo being carried and describe the cargo precisely in cargo manifests and bills of lading. A failure to comply can result in fines and / or the delay or refusal by customs to permit the non-complying cargo to be discharged. If the authorities refuse to allow cargo to be discharged, cover for a Member s resulting liabilities, costs and expenses will be considered by the Association on a case-by-case basis and any claims arising may be subject to the discretion of the Association s Directors. Members requiring further information about the terms of P&I insurance cover should contact the Underwriting Department at the Association. Members requiring further information about BIMCO charterparty clauses should contact BIMCO, tel , fax: , website: In this publication all references to the masculine gender are for convenience only and are also intended as a reference to the female gender. Unless the contrary is indicated, all articles are written with reference to English Law. However it should be noted that the content of this publication does not constitute legal advice and should not be construed as such. Members with appropriate cover should contact the Association s FD&D dept. for legal advice on particular matters. The purpose of the Association s loss prevention facility is to provide a source of information which is additional to that available to the maritime industry from regulatory, advisory, and consultative organisations. Whilst care is taken to ensure the accuracy of any information made available (whether orally or in writing and whether in the nature of guidance, advice, or direction) no warranty of accuracy is given and users of that information are expected to satisfy themselves that the information is relevant and suitable for the purposes to which it is applied. In no circumstances whatsoever shall the Association be liable to any person whatsoever for any loss or damage whensoever or howsoever arising out of or in connection with the supply (including negligent supply) or use of information (as described above). Signals is published by North of England P&I Association Limited The Quayside Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 3DU UK Tel: +44 (0) Fax: +44 (0) loss.prevention@nepia.com Website: