NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AIR CARGO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: 49 CFR 1540 ET AL. DOCKET TSA *rq3 COMMENTS OF BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC

Transcription

1 _I..c(- -,A DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY t :--. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINSTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. - < 7 b, > i.l * * _ X _ I 23 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AIR CARGO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: 49 CFR 1540 ET AL. DOCKET TSA *rq3 COMMENTS OF BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC January 10,2005 British Airways welcomes the opportunity to comment on the TSA s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding Air Cargo Security Requirements. British Airways participated in the Aviation Security Advisory Committee work group process that preceded the NPRM and, for the most part, supports the regulatory changes proposed in the NPRM. Additional benefits would result from increasing the clarity and specificity of the new requirements. As described in more detail below, further strengthening of the Known Shipper program should be a priority. Increasing consistency with existing U.S. security programs such as Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism ( C-TPAT ) should be a further priority. We believe these changes have the potential to be a valuable tool in creating international standards for air cargo security, inspection and screening. That potential would be even greater if TSA recognized existing international and EU requirements. Consistent with security priorities, financing of aviation security should primarily be borne by the government. TSA should minimize any additional costs allocated to carriers.

2 Page 2 British Airways has the following additional comments regarding the specific proposed regulatory changes. General Comments Security Threat Assessments for Air Cargo Workers TSA invites comment (page 65265) on requiring each person who boards for transportation on an aircraft under an all-cargo security program to submit to a security threat assessment. An STA should be required for each individual transported on an allcargo aircraft. Screening Cargo TSA invites comment (page 65266) on requiring physical inspection of 100% of all cargo on all aircraft or alternatively on passenger aircraft. British Airways agrees with the Department of Homeland Security s assessment that current technology does not realistically support 100% physical inspection of all cargo. As an alternative, and as discussed in more detail in connection with proposed Section , TSA should extend the regulatory regime to include Known Shippers and supplement the regime by authorizing the use of inspection procedures for unknown shipper cargo intended for transportation by air.

3 Page 3 All-Cargo Operator Standard Security Program British Airways requests clarity regarding the proposed mandatory All-Cargo Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program. Reference is made to the program including elements of the Domestic Security Integration Program ( DSIP ). It is unclear whether once these are incorporated into the new program, the DSP would be cancelled or remain. If the latter is intended this would give rise to two standards. British Airways would oppose this outcome and recommends treating all all-cargo operations equally.

4 Page 4 Regulatory Evaluation Summary Considering the significant economic burden already borne by aircraft operators in order to comply with current security programs, the DHS should review whether the apportionment of the proposed funding for these additional measures is appropriate. As currently allocated, the costs relating to the proposals fall disproportionately on air carriers; the estimated $758m air carrier allocation constitutes 90% of the total estimated $837m security costs. Part Civil Aviation Security: General Rules Section Indirect air carrier definition British Airways supports broadening the definition of an Indirect Air Carrier ( IAC ) as proposed in the NPRM. A consistent definition of an IAC (as well as consistent related terminology) in the United States and the European Union would enhance security by establishing widely acceptable international standards. Section Operating responsibilities 0 British Airways generally supports the proposal that individuals having unescorted access to air cargo in the United States undergo a Security Threat Assessment ( STA ). Section should be clarified to specify that each corporate entity (direct air carrier, indirect air carrier, ground transportation provider, or shipper) involved in cargo transportation be responsible for ensuring that each of its affected employees undergoes the required STA. Such clarification would maximize the chances that an STA had been obtained for each individual having unescorted access to air cargo and would therefore enhance security. TSA should exercise its enforcement authority accordingly.

5 Page 5 0 Section (a) unescorted access to cargo is too vague to allow for consistent compliance and should be clarified. Section Notification 0 For carrier planning purposes, Section should specify TSA s anticipated response time in providing authorization or initial denial to carriers submitted STAs. That response time should not exceed 10 working days. Section Security threat assessment fee 0 Section proposes a $39 fee to conduct an STA. This is properly a government responsibility that benefits all of society by materially improving U.S. homeland security. Given current adverse economic conditions, including the extraordinary recent fuel cost increases, as well as substantial existing security related expenses, carriers should not be required to pay STA costs. Part Foreign Air Carrier Security Section Persons and property onboard the all-cargo aircraft 0 Section should require an STA for each individual transported on an allcargo aircraft. Section Acceptance and screening of cargo Section (d) should specify what forms of inspection are acceptable to search for explosives, incendiaries, unauthorized persons, and other destructive substances. Section (e) is unnecessarily confusing as currently drafted. The word comparable could create uncertainty and should be deleted. Alternatively, Section (e) should state that each foreign air carrier may accept cargo the United States as provided in its security program. n Section (e) also should specify that foreign air carriers may accept cargo in the United States from shippers, other entities or individuals subject to compliance with applicable procedures as stated in the foreign air carriers TSAapproved cargo security program.

6 Page 6 Section (f), which addresses acceptance of cargo outside the United States, is overbroad and should be amended to clarify that it applies only to cargo loaded outside the United States and destined for the United States. Section (f) also fails to recognize that many foreign air carriers already operate pursuant to established cargo security programs developed in compliance with homeland requirements, which routinely require security procedures at least as rigorous as those proposed in the NPRM. Consistent with the discussion in Section XI11 of the preamble regarding international compatibility, which references US obligations under the ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Section (f) should be further amended to specify that foreign air camers may accept cargo destined for the United States from any lawful entity subject to a compatible National Aviation Security Program administered by its homeland government. Also, TSA should extend its coordination efforts with host governments to identify and remedy any perceived deficiencies to build upon and improve existing standards as opposed to requiring foreign air carriers to implement new procedures. Section STAs for cargo personnel in the United States 0 Section (a)(3) should provide additional clarification regarding what is meant by Another Security Threat Assessment approved by TSA. Section (a)(3) should specify the criteria and procedures that would be used pursuant to that option. Alternatively, that provision could be included in foreign air carriers individual security programs.

7 Page 7 Part Indirect Air Carrier Security Section Approval, amendment, annual renewal, and withdrawal of approval of the security program 0 British Airways supports the proposed IAC security program renewal requirements. TSA should also exercise its authority to withdraw approval between renewals if circumstances arise that warrant such action. Section Acceptance of cargo 0 British Airways supports the provisions directing the IAC to prevent carriage of unauthorized items on board aircraft and directing the IAC to refuse to offer any cargo for which the shipper does not consent to search or inspection.

8 Page 8 Section Training and knowledge for individuals with security-related duties British Airways supports the proposal to require specified training for individuals performing security related duties before they are approved to undertake such duties on behalf of the IAC. Section Security coordinators 0 British Airways supports the proposal to require IACs to designate security coordinators available on a 24-hour basis. Section Security threat assessments for individuals having unescorted access to cargo Consistent with its previous comments regarding (a), British Airways supports the proposal to require an STA or a criminal history records check for each individual who has unescorted access to cargo. Section Security directives and information circulars 0 British Airways supports the proposed procedures pursuant to which the TSA will issue Information Circulars to notify IACs of security concerns.

9 Page 9 As noted at the outset of these comments, British Airways generally supports the changes proposed in the NPRM. However, and as explained in more detail above, additional benefits would result from: Strengthening the Known Shipper program Increasing the clarity and specificity of the proposed new requirements Increasing consistency with existing U.S. programs Increasing harmonization with existing international and EU standards The foregoing would significantly enhance the NPRM s security benefits. Thank you for your consideration of the foregoing comments. British Airways looks forward to continuing to participate in the rulemaking process and to continuing to work with the TSA to further develop air cargo security procedures and standards. Please feel free to contact the undersigned if you have questions regarding these comments or if British Airways can be of any further assistance. John Edwards Security Manager (Cargo) j 0hn.m. edwards@britishairways. com

10 t,,._ r--.73 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINSTRATION - - WASHINGTON, D.C. ; Tb,5Tinf] NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AIR CARGO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: 49 CFR 1540 ET AL. DOCKET TSA COMMENTS OF BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC January 10,2005 British Airways welcomes the opportunity to comment on the TSA s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding Air Cargo Security Requirements. British Airways participated in the Aviation Security Advisory Committee work group process. that preceded the NPRM and, for the most part, supports the regulatory changes proposed in the NPRM. Additional benefits would result from increasing the clarity and specificity of the new requirements. As described in more detail below, further strengthening of the Known Shipper program should be a priority. Increasing consistency with existing U.S. security programs such as Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism ( C-TPAT ) - should be a further priority. We believe these changes have the potential to be a valuable tool in creating international standards for air cargo security, inspection and screening. That potential would be even greater if TSA recognized existing international and EU requirements. Consistent with security priorities, financing of aviation security should primarily be borne by the government. TSA should minimize any additional costs allocated to carriers.

11 Page 2 British Airways has the following additional comments regarding the specific proposed regulatory changes. General Comments Security Threat Assessments for Air Cargo Workers TSA invites comment (page 65265) on requiring each person who boards for transportation on an aircraft under an all-cargo security program to submit to a security threat assessment. An STA should be required for each individual transported on an allcargo aircraft. Screening Cargo TSA invites comment (page 65266) on requiring physical inspection of 100% of all cargo on all aircraft or alternatively on passenger aircraft. British Airways agrees with the Department of Homeland Security s assessment that current technology does not realistically support 100% physical inspection of all cargo. As an alternative, and as discussed in more detail in connection with proposed Section , TSA should extend the regulatory regime to include Known Shippers and supplement the regime by authorizing the use of inspection procedures for unknown shipper cargo intended for transportation by air.

12 WRM: Air Cargo Security Requirements Page 3 All-Cargo Operator Standard Security Program British Airways requests clarity regarding the proposed mandatory All-Cargo Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program. Reference is made to the program including elements of the Domestic Security Integration Program ( DSIP ). It is unclear whether once these are incorporated into the new program, the DSlP would be cancelled or remain. If the latter is intended this would give rise to two standards. British Airways would oppose this outcome and recommends treating all all-cargo operations equally.

13 Page 4 Regulatory Evaluation Summary Considering the significant economic burden already borne by aircraft operators in order to comply with current security programs, the DHS should review whether the apportionment of the proposed funding for these additional measures is appropriate. As currently allocated, the costs relating to the proposals fall disproportionately on air carriers; the estimated $758m air carrier allocation constitutes 90% of the total estimated $837m security costs. Part Civil Aviation Security: General Rules Section Indirect air carrier definition British Airways supports broadening the definition of an Indirect Air Carrier ( IAC ) as proposed in the NPRM. A consistent definition of an IAC (as well as consistent related terminology) in the United States and the European Union would enhance security by establishing widely acceptable international standards. Section Operating responsibilities British Airways generally supports the proposal that individuals having unescorted access to air cargo in the United States undergo a Security Threat Assessment ( STA ). Section should be clarified to specify that each corporate entity (direct air carrier, indirect air carrier, ground transportation provider, or shipper) involved in cargo transportation be responsible for ensuring that each of its affected employees undergoes the required STA. Such clarification would maximize the chances that an STA had been obtained for each individual having unescorted access to air cargo and would therefore enhance security. TSA should exercise its enforcement authority accordingly.

14 Page 5 Section (a) unescorted access to cargo is too vague to allow for consistent compliance and should be clarified. Section Notification 0 For carrier planning purposes, Section should specify TSA s anticipated response time in providing authorization or initial denial to carriers submitted STAs. That response time should not exceed 10 working days. Section Security threat assessment fee 0 Section proposes a $39 fee to conduct an STA. This is properly a government responsibility that benefits all of society by materially improving U.S. homeland security. Given current adverse economic conditions, including the extraordinary recent fuel cost increases, as well as substantial existing security related expenses, carriers should not be required to pay STA costs. Part Foreign Air Carrier Security Section Persons and property onboard the all-cargo aircraft 0 Section should require an STA for each individual transported on an allcargo aircraft. Section Acceptance and screening of cargo -. Section (d) should specify what forms of inspection are acceptable to search for explosives, incendiaries, unauthorized persons, and other destructive substances. Section (e) is unnecessarily confusing as currently drafted. The word comparable could create uncertainty and should be deleted. Alternatively, Section (e) should state that each foreign air carrier may accept cargo in the United States as provided in its security program. 0 Section (e) also should specify that foreign air carriers may accept cargo in the United States from shippers, other entities or individuals subject to compliance with applicable procedures as stated in the foreign air carriers TSAapproved cargo security program.

15 Page 6 Section (f), which addresses acceptance of cargo outside the United States, is overbroad and should be amended to clarify that it applies only to cargo loaded outside the United States and destined for the United States. Section (f) also fails to recognize that many foreign air carriers already operate pursuant to established cargo security programs developed in compliance with homeland requirements, which routinely require security procedures at least as rigorous as those proposed in the NPRM. Consistent with the discussion in Section XI11 of the preamble regarding international compatibility, which references US obligations under the ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Section (f) should be further amended to specify that foreign air carriers may accept cargo destined for the United States from any lawful entity subject to a compatible National Aviation Security Program administered by its homeland government. Also, TSA should extend its coordination efforts with host governments to identify and remedy any perceived deficiencies to build upon and improve existing standards as opposed to requiring foreign air carriers to implement new procedures. Section STAs for cargo personnel in the United States 0 Section (a)(3) should provide additional clarification regarding what is meant by Another Security Threat Assessment approved by TSA. Section (a)(3) should specify the criteria and procedures that would be used pursuant to that option. Alternatively, that provision could be included in foreign air carriers individual security programs.

16 Page 7 Part Indirect Air Carrier Security Section Approval, amendment, annual renewal, and withdrawal of approval of the security program 0 British Airways supports the proposed IAC security program renewal requirements. TSA should also exercise its authority to withdraw approval between renewals if circumstances arise that warrant such action. Section Acceptance of cargo British Airways supports the provisions directing the IAC to prevent carriage of unauthorized items on board aircraft and directing the IAC to refuse to offer any cargo for which the shipper does not consent to search or inspection.

17 Page 8 Section Training and knowledge for individuals with security-related duties 0 British Airways supports the proposal to require specified training for individuals performing security related duties before they are approved to undertake such duties on behalf of the IAC. Section Security coordinators 0 British Airways supports the proposal to require IACs to designate security coordinators available on a 24-hour basis. Section Security threat assessments for individuals having unescorted access to cargo.- Consistent with its previous comments regarding (a), British Airways supports the proposal to require an STA or a criminal history records check for each individual who has unescorted access to cargo. Section Security directives and information circulars British Airways supports the proposed procedures pursuant to which the TSA will issue Information Circulars to notify IACs of security concerns.

18 ~ -_ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINSTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. - I c -,--XI '-7,,'A t r - - # -13 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AIR CARGO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: 49 CFR 1540 ET AL. DOCKET TSA COMMENTS OF BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC January 10,2005 British Airways welcomes the opportunity to comment on the TSA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding Air Cargo Security Requirements. British Airways participated in the Aviation Security Advisory Committee work group process that preceded the NPRM and, for the most part, supports the regulatory changes proposed in the NPRM. Additional benefits would result fi-om increasing the clarity and specificity of the new requirements. As described in more detail below, further strengthening of the Known Shipper program should be a priority. Increasing consistency with existing U.S. security programs such as Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism ("C-TPAT") should be a hrther priority. We believe these changes have the potential to be a valuable tool in creating international standards for air cargo security, inspection and screening. That potential would be even greater if TSA recognized existing international and EU requirements. Consistent with security priorities, financing of aviation security should primarily be borne by the government. TSA should minimize any additional costs allocated to carriers.

19 Page 2 British Airways has the following additional comments regarding the specific proposed regulatory changes. General Comments Security Threat Assessments for Air Cargo Workers TSA invites comment (page 65265) on requiring each person who boards for transportation on an aircraft under an all-cargo security program to submit to a security threat assessment. An STA should be required for each individual transported on an allcargo aircraft. Screening Cargo TSA invites comment (page 65266) on requiring physical inspection of 100% of all cargo on all aircraft or alternatively on passenger aircraft. British Airways agrees with the Department of Homeland Security s assessment that current technology does not realistically support 100% physical inspection of all cargo. As an alternative, and as discussed in more detail in connection with proposed Section , TSA should -* a - extend the regulatory regime to include Known Shippers and supplement the regime by authorizing the use of inspection procedures for unknown shipper cargo intended for transportation by air.

20 Page 3 All-Cargo Operator Standard Security Program British Airways requests clarity regarding the proposed mandatory All-Cargo Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program. Reference is made to the program including elements of the Domestic Security Integration Program ( DSIP ). It is unclear whether once these are incorporated into the new program, the DSIP would be cancelled or remain. If the latter is intended this would give rise to two standards. British Airways would oppose this outcome and recommends treating all all-cargo operations equally.

21 NF RM: Air Cargo Security Requirements Page 4 Regulatory Evaluation Summary Considering the significant economic burden already borne by aircraft operators in order to comply with current security programs, the DHS should review whether the apportionment of the proposed funding for these additional measures is appropriate. As currently allocated, the costs relating to the proposals fall disproportionately on air carriers; the estimated $758m air carrier allocation constitutes 90% of the total estimated $837m security costs. a Part Civil Aviation Security: General Rules Section Indirect air carrier definition 0 British Airways supports broadening the definition of an Indirect Air Carrier ( IAC ) as proposed in the NPRM. A consistent definition of an IAC (as well as consistent related terminology) in the United States and the European Union would enhance security by establishing widely acceptable international standards. - - ~ Section Operating responsibilities 0 British Airways generally supports the proposal that individuals having unescorted access to air cargo in the United States undergo a Security Threat Assessment ( STA ). Section should be clarified to specify that each corporate entity (direct air carrier, indirect air carrier, ground transportation provider, or shipper) involved in cargo transportation be responsible for ensuring that each of its affected employees undergoes the required STA. Such clarification would maximize the chances that an STA had been obtained for each individual having unescorted access to air cargo and would therefore enhance security. TSA should exercise its enforcement authority accordingly.

22 ~ Department of Homeland Security Page 5 Section (a) unescorted access to cargo is too vague to allow for consistent compliance and should be clarified. Section Notification For carrier planning purposes, Section should specify TSA s anticipated response time in providing authorization or initial denial to carriers submitted STAs. That response time should not exceed 10 working days. Section Security threat assessment fee Section proposes a $39 fee to conduct an STA. This is properly a government responsibility that benefits all of society by materially improving U.S. homeland security. Given current adverse economic conditions, including the extraordinary recent fuel cost increases, as well as substantial existing security related expenses, carriers should not be required to pay STA costs. Part Foreign Air Carrier Security Section Persons and property onboard the all-cargo aircraft Section should require an STA for each individual transported on an allcargo aircraft. Section Acceptance and screening of cargo ~~ Section (d) should specify what forms of inspection are acceptable to search for explosives, incendiaries, unauthorized persons, and other destructive substances. Section (e) is unnecessarily confusing as currently drafted. The word comparable could create uncertainty and should be deleted. Alternatively, Section (e) should state that each foreign air carrier may accept cargo in the United States as provided in its security program. Section (e) also should specify that foreign air carriers may accept cargo. in the United States from shippers, other entities or individuals subject to compliance with applicable procedures as stated in the foreign air carriers TSAapproved cargo security program.

23 Page 6 0 Section (f), which addresses acceptance of cargo outside the United States, is overbroad and should be amended to clarify that it applies only to cargo loaded outside the United States and destined for the United States. Section (f) also fails to recognize that many foreign air carriers already operate pursuant to established cargo security programs developed in compliance with homeland requirements, which routinely require security procedures at least as rigorous as those proposed in the NPRM. Consistent with the discussion in Section XI11 of the preamble regarding international compatibility, which references US obligations under the ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Section (f) should be further amended to specify that foreign air carriers may accept cargo destined for the United States from any lawful entity subject to a compatible National Aviation Security Program administered by its homeland government. Also, TSA should extend its coordination efforts with host governments to identify and remedy any perceived deficiencies to build upon and improve existing standards as opposed to requiring foreign air carriers to implement new procedures. Section STAs for cargo personnel in the United States 0 Section (a)(3) should provide additional clarification regarding what is meant by Another Security Threat Assessment approved by TSA. Section (a)(3) should specify the criteria and procedures that would be used pursuant to that option. I Alternatively, that provision could be included in foreign air carriers individual security programs.

24 Page 7 Part Indirect Air Carrier Security Section Approval, amendment, annual renewal, and withdrawal of approval of the security promam 0 British Airways supports the proposed IAC security program renewal requirements. TSA should also exercise its authority to withdraw approval between renewals if circumstances arise that warrant such action. Section Acceptance of cargo British Airways supports the provisions directing the IAC to prevent carriage of unauthorized items on board aircraft and directing the IAC to refuse to offer any cargo for which the shipper does not consent to search or inspection.

25 Page 8 Section Training and knowledge for individuals with security-related duties 0 British Airways supports the proposal to require specified training for individuals performing security related duties before they are approved to undertake such duties on behalf of the IAC. Section Security coordinators 0 British Airways supports the proposal to require IACs to designate security coordinators available on a 24-hour basis. Section Security threat assessments for individuals having unescorted access to cargo 0 Consistent with its previous comments regarding (a), British Airways supports the proposal to require an STA or a criminal history records check for each individual who has unescorted access to cargo. Section Security directives and information circulars British Airways supports the proposed procedures pursuant to which the TSA will issue Information Circulars to notify IACs of security concerns.

26 Page 9 As noted at the outset of these comments, British Airways generally supports the changes proposed in the NPRM. However, and as explained in more detail above, additional benefits would result from: Strengthening the Known Shipper program Increasing the clarity and specificity of the proposed new requirements Increasing consistency with existing U.S. programs Increasing harmonization with existing international and EU standards The foregoing would significantly enhance the NPRM s security benefits. Thank you for your consideration of the foregoing comments. British Airways looks forward to continuing to participate in the rulemaking process and to continuing to work with the TSA to further develop air cargo security procedures and standards. Please feel free to contact the undersigned if you have questions regarding these comments or if British Airways can be of any further assistance. John Edwards Security Manager (Cargo) john.m.edwards@britishainvays.com