AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

Transcription

1 AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY A STUDY OF MARITIME SECURITY IN A POST 9-11 WORLD PAPER SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR SINE MARITIME LOGISTICS CLASS NW550-KA BY JAMES ALBANI STUDENT # February-2004

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 2. NEW FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS A. The IMO and the USGC address Maritime Security. B. Enforcement of the new security regulations. C. What these regulations set out to accomplish. 3. SHIPBOARD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ISPS CODE: SECURITY LEVELS, ASSESSMENTS, PLANS & OFFICERS A. Ship security levels. B. The ship security assessment, (SSA). C. The ship security plan, (SSA) an overview. D. Major points of the ship security plan, (SSP). E. The ship security officer, (SSO). 4. SHIP MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO MEET THE SECURITY PLAN A. The ship security alert system. B. The automatic identification system, (AIS). C. IMO Hull numbering requirements. D. Additional possible modifications: CBR-D decontamination stations, deep shelter, etc. E. Considering access limiting modifications. 5. WHAT PRICE SECURITY? A. Financial considerations. B. Added crew workload, fatigue and stress. C. The Guardian Mariner program. D. The cost of non-compliance. 6. SOME PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SHIPBOARD SECURITY A. Controlling access. B. Controlling lighting. C. Establishing perimeter, zones, and barriers. D. Considering small arms for defensive purposes. E. Foster an awareness and vigilance in the ships crew. 7. CONCLUSION 8. SOURCES CONSULTED 2

3 1. INTRODUCTION From its beginning as a nation, the United States has always been faced with organizations, or factions that wished us harm. From religious fanatics who saw us as the great Satan, or as a result of foreign policy decisions made by one administration or the other, there has never been a shortage of groups wishing us harm. Until recently, most Americans were for the most part unaware how deep some of this hatred ran. All that changed with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. We as a nation were stunned by this new reality. A reality that showed just how much of a soft target, segments of our society are. Since September 11 th, we have seen a myriad of government plans and programs enacted in an effort to minimize our nation s vulnerability to terrorism. Some of these solutions that have been instituted seem to be more of a knee jerk result of political expediency, with questionable anti-terrorism value at best. While other security programs are more realistic in terms of what they hope to accomplish and how they hope to accomplish it. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 falls into the latter category. Congress, recognizing how shipping is our economic lifeblood, tasked the United States Coast Guard as part of the recently formed Department of Homeland Security, with developing a comprehensive plan that looks at, and addresses security weaknesses in our maritime infrastructure. From ship and cargo security, to port and terminal security, The Marine Transportation Security Act encompasses it all. Since shipping is inherently international in nature, the Coast Guard quickly realized that a national approach to maritime security would be futile. To that end they worked with the International Maritime organization, (IMO) to develop comprehensive maritime security measures. This resulted in the creation of the IMO s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). This code along with some associated IMO amendments is global in scope. The United States, as a signatory to IMO, helped in formulating the ISPS Code. Apart from some additional regulatory reporting requirements, the U.S. Coast Guards Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, essentially mirror s the IMO code. It s worth mentioning at this time, that all IMO member nation vessels must meet the IMO codes as a baseline, they are free to add additional requirements, as is the case with the Coast Guard requiring some additional reporting requirements. As previously mentioned the ISPS Code and the USCG s Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 essentially mirror each other. In the area of shipboard security requirements they are identical. Since that ISPS Code is global in scope, I chose to focus on that code. Both the MTSA and the ISPS Codes are all encompassing, covering facility, port and terminal security as well as shipboard security. My research looks at the shipboard aspects of these new security regulations only. Perhaps at a later date, I will study the security aspects on the other side of the pier head. One cannot understand the needs of shipboard security without looking at the ISPS Code requirements, specifically 3

4 the various elements required of a ship security plan. To that end, the first section of this paper will briefly outline the Ship Security Plan, (SSP) requirements. Instituting these regulations aboard ship should help foster an awareness in the ships crew of the need for the vessel to be able to protect herself against unlawful acts that may threaten her on the world s oceans. The latter half of this report will look at other additional aspects of shipboard security, the more nut and bolts type of stuff from access control, lighting, training, drills, and arming of crewmembers, etc. I believe it is these latter security measures that will determine of your ship and her crew can repel an attack if they are ever called to do so. Finally, I will end my report with some additional insights and predictions for the future of shipboard security. Since the new ISPS Code and MTSA regulations will not be enacted till several months after this research is submitted, it is not possible to look at any actual shortcomings to these new regulations. They have to be given time to test their effectiveness. However, I am going to take the liberty and address what I see as possible inadequacies, and areas for improving shipboard maritime security. 2. NEW FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS A. The IMO and the USCG address maritime security. The attacks on the world trade center acted as a catalyst for change in the way the United States and much of the world looks at the terrorist threat. Two organizations that were forced to face security inadequacies that have long existed under their purview were the International Maritime Organization, (IMO) and the United Stated Coast Guard, (USCG). The IMO, which as a body of the United Nations, has long established many regulations and rules that focused on vessel and crew safety, such as the 1974 SOLAS Convention;(Safety of Life at Sea Convention). This convention set international safety standards that all signatories must meet. Similarly, as the world developed more of an awareness of the environmental impacts world shipping has on its oceans, IMO developed baseline requirements that ships must meet on the environmental front with amendments to the SOLAS Convention that address pollution and environmental issues. The United States, as a signatory to IMO falls under the rules and regulations that this organization develops. In many instances the United States will ad additional requirements on top of the IMO standards. The USCG, as the federal maritime agency is tasked with enforcement of these regulations. 4

5 After more than a years worth of intense work by the IMO s maritime safety committee, the IMO meeting at it s headquarters in London adopted a comprehensive maritime security measure know as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, (ISPS Code) on December 13, This code is set to enter into force in July 2004, and will apply to all ships over 500 gross tons. 1 The IMO has had reasons to be concerned of threats to shipping from terrorism, piracy, and other unlawful acts committed on the high seas. International shipping has always faced bandits, pirates and terrorist acts. In more recent years, one may recall the 1992 pirating of the English tanker, Valiant Carrier off of Malaysia s southern tip, 2 the 2002 bombing of the French Tanker Limburg, or the 1985 terrorist highjacking of the cruise ship Achille Laurio. These may seem like isolated incidents, yet they are not, since 1984 over 300 merchant ships have been attacked in the Persian Gulf Alone, and more than 200 crewmen have been killed. 3 Ship seizures, Piracy, and sabotage have occurred with alarming regularity for decades. Not much of a fuss is made about it overall, in fact the vast majority of these unlawful attacks and molestation of merchant ships goes unnoticed. Unless one is inclined to read some of the international shipping journals, one would assume these are isolated and rare incidents. The American media, being as it is, rarely mentions such incidents unless there is a US citizen, or National interest involved. As was the case of the Achille Laurio, in which an elderly American was taken hostage and murdered, or the latter in which the Limburg was attacked soon after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. B. Enforcement of the new security regulations. One might ask how is it that the IMO has any power to enforce the regulations and policies it implements? The answer is simple and effective. The IMO, as an organization is made up of the vast majority of the world s seafaring nations. These signatories, or contracting governments as they are called, are bound by these regulations and policies they as a group create. IMO members, recognizing the need for safety regulations as an example, abide by them. The real issues arise with the few maritime countries that are not signatories to the IMO. These remaining nations, although not signatories to IMO realize that their ships are still held to the same standard when their vessels are calling on the ports of IMO signatory countries. 1. American Bureau of Shipping, Security Bulletin, Ship Security and the ISPS Code, September 2003 [bulletin on-line], accessed 8 December 2003, available at 2. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002), Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 7. 5

6 As an example, the United States as an IMO member country, can deny a non- IMO members vessel entrance to it s ports, and/or can seize the ship depending on the severity of violations to the IMO Regulations. That is not to say non-imo member nations are denied access to American ports and by extension U.S. Markets, just that they are held to the same standard. In truth these nonsignatory ships are quite often scrutinized more. The ISPS Code has a mandatory part A and a suggested part B that contains added guidance. The Coast Guard however has issued interim rules (33 CFR Subchapter H) required by the MTSA of 2002 that all ships entering the United States comply with both parts A and B of the code. 4 The American Bureau of Shipping recently estimated that there are almost 43,000 ships and mobile offshore drilling units, in service worldwide that will need to comply with these requirements. 5 Presently the vast majority of ships calling on U.S. ports are from IMO member nations. Although the Federal Government has yet to say it, with the implementation of the IMO s International ship and Port Facility Code set to enter into force on July 1 st, 2004, I would not be at all surprised to see our government specify all ships calling on U.S. ports will be a party to IMO standards. The reason I am confident in saying this is the fact that the,.u.s Coast Guard under the Department of Homeland security, was tasked with developing a federal maritime security plan. The Coast Guard s Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 mirrors the IMO s ISPS Code. That said, if a ship calling on Boston for example, is not in compliance with IMO, then it is not in compliance with the U.S. Coast Guard. In this new security threat environment we face with yellow, orange and red alerts, I would not want to be a master of a ship calling on said port and not be in compliance, at the very least my port visit would be a most unpleasant one, if I am allowed to enter port at all. C. What these regulations set out to accomplish. The IMO s, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the USCG s, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, along with some minor amendments to SOLAS relating to terrorism and piracy, should go a long way to deterring all but the most determined. The regulations when properly applied, will better prepare the ships crew to deal with minimum threats. However these requirements will in no way guarantee the vessel is safe and free from all forms of molestation. If one thinks about it, there exist no vessel in the world that is so well protected that it s defenses cannot be penetrated. 4. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, vii, September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 12 December 2003, available at http// 5. American Bureau of Shipping, Security Bulletin, Ship Security and the ISPS Code, September 2003 [bulletin on-line], accessed 8 December 2003, available at 6

7 Consider the 2000 attack on the USS Cole as an example, a warship not a merchantman. To put it another way, no ship can ever achieve perfect 100% security, although they should aim for it SHIPBOARD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ISPS CODE: SECURITY LEVELS, ASSESSMENTS, PLANS & OFFICERS. General Shipowners are required under the code to perform a ship security assessment on each of their vessels over 500 gross tons. From the information gathered during the assessment, they develop and implement a ship security plan for each applicable ship in their fleet. If the ship is one of a class of ships of the same type, most components of the ship security plan can be adopted to all ships in the same class. Upon the implementation of the ship security plan, an onboard audit is conducted by the flag states member government, or other recognized security organizations, such as Lloyds of London or the American Bureau of Shipping, for example. If the audit verifies that the ship is complying with the ISPS Code, the vessel with be issued an International Ship Security Certificate that is valid for 5 yrs. 7 The aforementioned issuing of an international ships security certificate by member governments or by a recognized security organization is one of the sticking points of the new code. The Coast Guard has emphatically stated that it does not want foreign flagged ships to submit security plans to it for review. One of the reasons is the shear volume of work involved in reviewing and auditing even a small percentage of the estimated 40,000 required foreign flagged ship security plans. 8 As is often the case, congress piles on additional major new missions, but fails to provide adequate funding and personnel needed to accomplish it. The House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation has challenged the Coast Guard repeatedly over what appears to be an inconsistency. The USCG is unwilling, and quite honestly unable to audit foreign flag security plan. 6. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 88, , September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 12 December 2003, available at http// 8. Dennis Bryant, At Sea with U.S. Maritime Security, Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, November 2003, 23. 7

8 According to one of the principle authors of the MTSA of 2002, Representative Oberstar (D-MN), that is what the MTSA of 2002 requires. He summed up his feelings on the house floor on April 2, 2003 saying: We {Congress} did not intend the security of the Nation to be placed in the hands of flag of convenience registers. We expect the Coast Guard to review the plans firsthand. 9. I submit the good Congressman has a point, but as the saying goes; show me the money. A. Ship security levels. The ISPS Code approaches the security requirements facing a ship at any particular time with three different security levels. Part A of the code defines threes security levels for international use. They are as follows: -Security level 1, normal; the level at which ships and port facilities normally operate; 10 -Security level 2, heightened, the level applying for as long as there is a heightened risk of a security incident; 11 and -Security Level 3, exceptional, the level applying for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident. 12 The setting of these various security levels depends on a variety of factors, from such things as the ships registry, it s cargo, the routes in which it operates, the political and economic stability in the region or lack of it, a known history of security incidents in the region, intelligence information indicating a possible security threat, etc. All factors must be considered when setting security levels. The setting of such levels is the responsibility of Contracting Governments. When a ship is at a port or proceeding to a port of a contracting government, the Contracting Government has the right, under provisions of regulation XI-2/9, to exercise various security control and compliance measures with respect to the ship. 13 To be more succinct, the U.S Government (as an IMO Contracting Government) through the USGC can dictate any security level it deems appropriate for vessels calling on its ports. Additionally it can require additional measures above and beyond. 9. Dennis Bryant, At Sea with U.S. Maritime Security, Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, November 2003, American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 76, 2.1.9, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 12 December 2003, available at http// 11. ibid, 76, ibid, 76, ibid, 99,

9 One only has to look at LNG ships calling on Everett, Massachusetts Distri-Gas Facility to witness this first hand what some of these additional measures look like. These massive vessels discharge cargo approximately twice a week at this facility. Well in advance of the ships arrival, over 50 federal, state, and local agencies working together perform various security checks, etc. Before the ship arrives at it s berth, the State Police Dive team performs an underwater sweep of the dock and surrounding waters. As the ship transits from the sea buoy up the Mystic River to the Distri-Gas Berth, a moving heavily armed security perimeter, made up of USCG ships and helicopters, Massachusetts state police and helicopters, Boston Fire and Police Boats, etc. escort it along the way. Hidden sharpshooters line the shores of the mystic river, keeping a watchful eye out. About a half mile from the ships berth in must go under the Tobin Bridge. Before the Ship passes under the bridge, the bridge is shut down to all vehicle and pedestrian traffic, thus preventing someone from dropping an explosive or other device from the bridge onto the ships deck. This last point perhaps of all of them shows how seriously these agencies view this particular ships security. The Tobin bridge is the main northern artery out of Boston, deciding to shut it down to enhance an LNG Tankers security while it passes underneath could not have been made lightly. If you are accustomed to Boston drivers, you will understand what I mean. My work brings me to ExxonMobils Everett, Massachusetts terminal, where I perform safety and environmental vetting of refined product tankers before they discharge their cargo. This terminal is only yards away from the LNG Terminal. As you can imagine, ExxonMobils terminal and ships calling on it, have instituted new security measures based on the new realities we face today. The ISPS Code and MTSA have sections that apply to terminals, the security improvements I have witnessed at this terminal, are a direct result of this legislation. Although we have heavy security at this petroleum terminal, it pales in comparison to the LNG terminal for obvious reasons. A security incident at the ExxonMobil terminal could do tremendous damage to the immediate local area. However, some computer simulations have shown that a major security incident at the Distrigas LNG facility could wipe out much of the greater Boston area. The detonation of 125,000 cubic meters of LNG has been estimated to be the equivalent of a nuclear blast larger than the one that destroyed Hiroshima. 14 As Americans we can liken these ships security levels to the color code security levels that the Department of Homeland Security issues from time to time, Yellow, orange, etc. The average citizen may not be aware of it, but when the security threat code increases, many actions occur, mostly behind the scene, to improve security throughout society. 14. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989),

10 When a security threat color code change is issued by the department of Homelands security, it will have a direct impact the action that vessels calling on U.S. ports must take, such as raising the ships security level from one to level two for example. B. The ship security assessment, (SSA) As it s name implies a ship security assessment, looks at all security aspects aboard ship. Each shipping company designates a company security officer, (CSO) who is tasked with performing these assessments aboard ship. The company security officer does not necessarily have to personally perform the assessments, but he is ultimately responsible to see that they are performed. 15 My years at sea have taught me that those best suited to assess the security of a particular ship are those that know the ship the best; the officers and crew who sail her. I can see utilizing the ships officers to formulate the security assessment for their ship. Recognizing the time constraints already imposed on those aboard ship, perhaps the senior relieving ships officers; (master, first mate, chief engineer and first Engineer) could be tasked to help with the assessment when they are shore side, during there time off ship. The assessment should address several areas that have a direct bearing on vessel security; these are but a few of the major ones that are applicable to all ships. Taking into account the general layout of the ship, they should address physical security, ways to restrict or minimize access to the vessel, or to restricted areas of the vessel such as machinery spaces and the navigation bridge. The location and function of the various access points aboard ship should be reviewed, with an critical eye toward how potential intruders might utilize each to breach security. A review of the vessel structural integrity should be conducted, with an eye toward utilizing such structures as potential barriers to intruders. For example, saboteurs, having gained access on deck can hopefully be stopped from gaining access to the house, (i.e.: accommodation spaces, engineering spaces and bridge). 15. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 111, 8.1 September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 19 December 2003, available at http// 10

11 The assessment should look at current procedural policies regarding ships in it s fleet. Faced with an unlawful boarding or attack, most of the world s ocean carriers have a policy of non-resistance. Many company managers still believe it is better to peaceably succumb to a piratical attack than to oppose it. 16 Unfortunately such policy decisions can be fatal to the crews who have to follow it out. Another aspect of this assessment should look at personnel protection systems, i.e. Small arms for vessel defense. For most vessels this is non existent, except for perhaps a pistol locked in the masters safe, but this pistol usually is intended more to keep an unruly crewmember in line should the need arise, not for defense against piracy. Most shipping companies traditionally have been loath to the though of arming their crews, but that to is slowly changing. Historically, the only defense one had against unauthorized boarders was a charged fire hose; personally, I would much prefer a loaded firearm. Radio and telecommunication systems should be evaluated, including computer systems and networks. As in other shipboard emergencies, the vital link to the out side world should be evaluated for their suitability during security incidents, whether in be a rocket propelled grenade attack from a swift boat, or an attempted boarding at sea. Additionally, one should also access the vulnerability of such systems to unauthorized use or tampering. Finally as mentioned previously each ship should be reviewed for particular areas of weakness that if breached, damaged or used for illicit use, would pose a risk to the ship, her cargo or her crew. 17 Once the assessment is completed, a report is generated outlining how the assessment was performed, descriptions of any weaknesses found in the vessels security are included, as well as methods and procedures that will be instituted to rectify these security shortcomings. 18 It should be pointed out that all contracting governments and Recognized security Organizations (the USCG and ABS for example) have guidelines on preparing such assessments, that are much more in-depth than what I mentioned above. It is not the intent of this author to regurgitate these guidelines but merely emphasize some of their important points. 16.Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 112, , September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 12 December 2003, available at http// 18. ibid, 114,

12 C. The ship security plan, (SSP) an overview. Based on the findings and information detailed during the work up of the Ships Security Assessment, the Ship specific security plan can be developed. The plan when it appears in it s final form should consider all shipboard activities, from pier side cargo operations, at sea-speed steaming, lightering at anchor, etc. Additionally, these particular evolutions must be considered in the context under which the ship operates. While a threat may exist to one degree or another, the degree to which a ship is exposed to a particular threat determines its risk. I.e.: considerations when a VLCC is at anchorage in Valdez, Alaska would be vastly different from the same ship anchoring off the island of Singapore. The same security threat exists (unauthorized boarding) in both anchorages, however the risk associated with the latter port is considerably higher. 19 As mentioned above, the ship security plan is derived principally from what was learned in the assessment stage, and it should be understood that a large component of the assessment requires analyzing and considering various scenarios involving differing degrees of risk to the ship, her cargo and crew. As such, the security plan even though not explicitly spelled out, involves a certain amount of risk analyzes and assessment. With the thought of risk analyses in mind, It s worth looking at existing standards regarding unauthorized access, once certain ship perimeters are breached. With most shipping companies worldwide, the corporate policy is one of nonresistance against pirate attacks, armed boarding s, etc. This was the company policy when I was a ships officer in the Exxon/Esso fleet in the 1980,s and 1990 s and it still is today. 20 Many ships that traverse waters known for such attacks post placecards throughout the accommodations that emphasize the point to the crew: REMEMBER THAT THE BEST DEFENCE AGAINST PIRATE ATTACK IS VIGILANCE. IF YOU ARE THREATENED BY ARMED MEN, IT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO RESIST THEM. IF PIRATES SUCCEED IN ENTERING THE ACCOMODATION DO NOT PLACE YOURSELF OR OTHERS IN FURTHER DANGER BY RESISTING OR ANTAGONIZING THE ATTACKERS Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), Captain Mark Neeson, Master of the Exxon Tankship S/R Puget Sound, interview by author, personal interview, New Orleans, 20 January John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002),

13 Such direct signage does not leave much for interpretation. As a crewmember you would be going against company policy if you defended yourself, your shipmates or your ship. It almost seems absurd to think that is the approach the managers in the office want those on board to take. The whole premise of such logic is based on the assumption that those unauthorized boarders, do not want to harm the ships officers and crew, perhaps they only want to pirate the ship, or they want to commandeer it, or who knows maybe they just hopped aboard to share a nice hot cup of tea and a biscuit with the crew. It is not my intention to make light of a deadly subject, because it is deadly, just ask the 241 civilian mariners who where either killed, maimed or held hostage in 2001 alone. 22 These were seafarers, simply going about their business, doing their lonely, difficult and often dangerous job. The company managers will point to statistics to back up their policies. Perhaps, but consider for a moment if the ships officers and crew were trained in small arms, defensive tactics and the use of deadly force. The statistics might show a completely different picture. Ken Hawkes a renowned maritime security advisor suggested just that to an LNG shipping company he was advising on ship security. Concerned, as they should be for the security of their vessels, Mr. Hawkes suggested firearms and associated training of the crew be required on board as part of the security plan. The shipowners rejected the proposal because they considered their crews to be placed at an unacceptable risk if asked to defend their vessels against hijackers and saboteurs. Strangely enough, they did not consider their crews unacceptably at risk if the hijackers or saboteurs were successful 23 I feel these corporate policies of non-resistance will begin to change in the years ahead if the trend of maritime piracy and terrorism continues to increase as it has for the last 20 years or so. The reason I say this is that historically shipping companies have treated piracy as part of the cost of doing business. However, if those cost continue to sharply rise, other considerations will come into play. In certain parts of the globe, it is not unusual for a ship to disappear from the ocean with its entire cargo and crew, only to reappear months or years later with different crew, (the original crew most likely murdered and thrown overboard.), different flag, etc. The underwriters of the ship will indemnify the company for its loss. It s bad enough if it s a bulk ore freighter with Pakistani officers and crew costing the insurer $100,000,000 in claims for example. It s a whole different story if the ship is a modern LNG or VLCC Tanker with European officers and crew. Now, lets take the latter ship and add to the mix an environmental catastrophe or the possible blocking of one of the worlds major shipping choke points, the Suez canal for example. 22. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002), Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989),

14 The possible scenarios are endless. The possible liabilities could be endless if such scenarios occurred as a result of shipboard terrorism. The maritime industry has not reached that point yet, but eventually the price will be to high to maintain this passive approach. If this policy change does not come from the underwriters, then perhaps it will come as a result of today s ever changing global political climate. Already, many shipping companies that ship a high value, high target cargo employ some sort security detail, most likely a private armed maritime security force that rides the ship as supercargo. The Military Sealift Command; MSC when it charters a U.S. civilian crewed merchant ship to move DoD cargo, will usually employ a maritime security force known as the Guardian Mariner program. This security force is made up of members of the Puerto Rican National Guard trained in shipboard defense and security tactics. They ride the vessel as supercargo ensuring shipboard security. In fact at the time of this writing I am on navy orders and earlier in the day trained the civilian mariners of just such a ship in CBR-D refresher training. This ship, at it s load port, just had a security detail of Guardian Mariners assigned to it. D. Major points of a ship security plan, (SSP). If you had to distill the key facet of ship security down to a few succinct words or phase, then it would have to center around controlling access. Except perhaps for RPG s, missiles, or other incendiary devices fired at a vessel from a distance, the vast majority of threats to shipping require the boarding of the ship by the perpetrators. Whether the act is piracy, hijacking, sabotage, or other acts of terrorism, they all require access to the ship for them to succeed. As such, the focus of a shipboard security plan must be centered on preventing unauthorized access to the ship. 24 Access ladders, gangways, ramps, doors, mooring lines, etc must all be accounted for in the ships security plan. Depending of the security level, access control might consist of checking visitor identification at the gangway, or it may involve securing all access points, gangways, etc. and denying access to everyone, and confining the crew to the ship. Additionally, the plan should identify the appropriate locations where access is restricted or prohibited commensurate with each security level Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 116, 9.10, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 12 December 2003, available at http// 14

15 While stevedore crews certainly need to have access to cargo holds, and the main deck, there is no reason they would require access to the accommodation or engineering spaces and therefore access should be denied. Restricted or prohibited areas include the obvious accommodation, bridge and machinery spaces. However, the plan should also include spaces containing security and surveillance equipment systems and their controls as well as lighting systems and their controls. One may also want to consider limiting access to spaces that house to HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) equipment as well as spaces that allow access to potable water tanks. 26 The latter two spaces being a consideration in the purposeful contamination of the ships ventilation and water with biological or chemical agents. Access can be restricted in a variety of ways, from guards or sentry s, to locks, intrusion alarms, and surveillance equipment monitoring the area. A critical component of limiting and controlling access is that of developing an effective identification system. This is something that is usually implemented company wide and will most likely be handled by corporate shore staff or the ships agents. A means of recognition must be instituted with the issuing of identification cards allowing for both permanent and temporary identification cards for ships personnel and visitors respectively. 27 With this consideration in mind, it should be pointed out that the best identification is positive identification, i.e.: the ships gangway watch most likely knows every crew member well enough to visually identify him or her, having sailed with them for some time aboard ship. The International Maritime Organization, (IMO), recognizing the present lack of any good global seafarer and related port worker identification program is investigating the feasibility of developing a seafarers identify document, which include a document for professional purposes, a verifiable security document and a certification information document. 28 The development of such a global identification system would certainly help in identifying those persons who may be entitled access. To create a credible and verifiable identification system on a global scale is a daunting task, but is certainly something that merits further investigation. 26.American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 119, ,.4, September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed December 2003, available at http// 27.ibid, 116, International Maritime Organization, IMO adapts comprehensive security measures, 4, June 2002 [bulletin on-line] accessed 28 November 2003, available at http// 15

16 Those new crew members or other personnel requiring access to the ship during a port visit should be listed by the ships agent along with the reason to visit the ship on some form of a ships visitor register. This register should be received by the vessel prior to its entry into port, and must be verified by the ships master. I.e.: The agent has listed a radar repair contractor on the register to visit the ship, but the radars are working fine and no request by the ship was made for such a visit. The example just sighted should be given further consideration. It may be the radar tech is simply visiting as part of an annual maintenance check. If that s the case, a phone call to the company will clear up the issue. Once the ship is in port it is the duty of an aware gangway to identify all those seeking access to the ship, and confirming that he or she is listed on the ships visitor register. If the person is not on the register, he should be denied access until such time that his identity and reason for gaining access can be confirmed. Additionally, if possible all visitors accessing the ship should be escorted to their destination aboard by one of the crew. We had a situation occur last year at the ExxonMobil Terminal that I work at in which four USCG inspectors where denied access to a vessel they intended to perform a surprise security check on. The gangway watch, undaunted by their uniforms and government identification denied these gentlemen access, until their identity could be confirmed by USCG Group Boston Headquarters. Since it was an unannounced visit, they were not on the visitor register. This might seem extreme, but it is this kind of vigilance that all ships should strive for. Just months before, in Seattle, a USGC automobile was broken into and several uniforms, id s, etc were stolen. The ship security plan should contain the detailed organizational structure of security for the ship. 29 It will consist of the basic security measures to be taken based on the security level the ship is faced with, i.e.: level one, two, etc. All duties and responsibilities will be clearly spelled out with respect to shipboard personnel security roles. While this task sounds somewhat daunting, it is in reality something that all mariners are accustomed to whether in the merchant marine or naval service. Everyone aboard ship has a station bill that dictates there duties during an emergency, fire or abandon ship scenario. In the event of a fire, for example, the station bill for the master of a VLCC, is overall in charge on the bridge, while the job of the second engineer may be as a team leader, hose team one. All naval personnel are assigned similar duties, as during general quarter for example. As mariners we are used to thinking like this. Instituting a security bill that dictates the role that ships personnel play during various security levels should not be that difficult. 29. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 115, 9.2.1, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed December 2003, available at http// 16

17 That same second engineer may be a member of the ships security rapid reaction force, trained and equipped to respond to an unauthorized intrusion to the vessel, just as he has been trained and equipped to respond to a fire aboard his ship. An important requirement of the ship security plan, is the procedures and safeguards needed to assure communication requirements are met at all times. 30 Again, citing the above VLCC example, just as the master on the bridge of the ship is in communication with the second engineer hose team one leader via handheld radio (walkie-talkie) fighting a fire aboard his vessel, he is also in communication with the outside world, perhaps requesting additional resources at the same time. If the ships security was compromised, the master could be in communication with the gangway watch or the ships security rapid reaction force via handheld radio and also in communication with resources outside the ship. Additional requirements dictate the type and level of training required of all crewmembers regarding shipboard security duties. Some crew members may only need occasional refresher and awareness training regarding basic security measures, controlling access, identification of personnel seeking access to the ship, etc. while other members of the crew may require, more advanced security measures such as physical shipboard security tactics, small arms training, rapid reaction force training, etc. The ships master and second engineer may have gone to advanced firefighting training for tank ships, while the ships messman is trained to proficiently handle a portable fire extinguisher. The objective of drills and training is to ensure that the crews are proficient in their assigned security duties at all different security levels. How the company management and shipboard senior staff approach security training and readiness will have a profound effect on how capable a ships crew is in responding to a security threat. They must instill a sense of vigilance at all levels, and the importance of these measures, noting that in the extreme, these measures may determine whether the ship and her crew will survive. This security thinking must be fostered and nurtured from the top down. Just as shipboard safety, drug or alcohol awareness programs find their home onboard, it is how management fosters and maintains these programs that determine whether they bear results or simply languish due to a half hearted or noncommittal effort on the part of management. Do you see a pattern developing here? There are many similarities in the way trained crews respond to emergencies aboard ship and the way they should respond to security incidents as well. 30. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 115, 9.7.2, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed December 2003, available at http// 17

18 E. The ship security officer, (SSO). The ship security officer (SSO), or anti-terrorism officer as he or she is referred to aboard MSC contracted ships is that person tasked with implementing the ship security plan. This person can be any senior officer aboard ship; master, first mate, chief engineer or first engineer. In the past it was not unusual to assign such duties to the first mate. However, recognizing that on many ships the mate is already tremendously burdened with other ancillary duties, such as being the medical officer, safety officer, etc. It is not unusual to find a senior engineering officer tasked with the added role of ship security officer. Recognizing this, the nations largest marine engineers union, the Marine Engineers Benevolent Association, (MEBA) has formally developed ship security officer, (SSO) training for their senior level officers. 31 The important point here, know matter who is assigned the role of SSO is that they must be formally trained by a recognized training organization. Whether from a union school such as the MEBA, or from various programs now being offered by the federal or state maritime academies. The role of ship security officer is an important one and should be treated as such. The officer must have adequate training and knowledge of the ships security plan; in fact ideally the SSO was involved in the development of the ships plan. He must know the layout of the ship; it s potentially weak or vulnerable access points. He must be familiar with conducting security inspections, physical search methods used to search personnel, baggage, cargo, etc. The SSO must be able to recognize when and how to carry out emergency security procedures. To sum it up the ship security officer is the go to guy or contact person in all matters regarding vessel security. He of course works in conjunction with other department heads and crew to reach the stated goal. The SSO s job would of course involve the regular periodic training of this ship in all matter relating to ship security. The ISPS Code requires a minimum of one security drill a quarter, however that is just a minimum. If the ship is serious about it s security, and sails internationally as most ships do. That minimum requirement is inadequate. A more realistic training and drill scenario would most likely be monthly. Fire and boat drills are required monthly by the USCG and the ship or it management may want to consider bringing the frequency of security drills up to a monthly level. Again, one has to look at the threat level. If a ship has been sailing coast wise on the U.S. west coast for several years the security plan and commensurate training will not likely have to be as robust as if the same ship was sailing regularly on a liner service through the Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean. 31. Mr. Barry Van Vechten, Ship Security Officer Class Instructor, MEBA Engineering School, interview by author, personal interview, New Orleans, 20 January

19 The training and drills should be made as interesting as possible. Setting up scenarios, role-playing, and the regular operation of defensive security equipment should be utilized in the course of the drills and training. A technique used very successfully at Exxon was in addition to the practical drill; a crewmember or two would be assigned the task of instructing the rest of the ship on a particular piece of safety equipment. It may be something as simple as having one of the AB s give instructions on the use of a foam monitor or fire extinguisher. Perhaps the cook could explain the proper donning of an SCBA. I have seen recalcitrant shipmates realizing they are going to have to be able to intelligently discuss a piece of safety equipment in front of their shipmates at the next drill, become experts on that piece of equipment. Looking good and professional in the eyes of your shipmates is a big motivator, or perhaps put another way, peer pressure works. 4. SHIP MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO MEET SECURITY PLAN REQUIREMENTS A. The ship security alert system. One of the measures adopted under IMO, as a part of SOLAs, Chapter XI-2, Special measures to enhance maritime security is the requirement that all ships over 500 gross tons be fitted with a ship security alert system by 1 July The ship security alert system shall upon activation transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the administration (SOLAS chapter XI-2-special measures to enhance maritime security, regulation 6 2.1) In other words, the system could transmit to the company security officer ashore or to another responsible party. The alert will identify the ship, its location, and indicate the ship is under threat or attack. At this point, the company security officer would notify the appropriate maritime security force, the USCG for example, etc. for possible response. The system is designed to be discrete, it does not raise any sort of alarm aboard ship, nor does it alert any other ship directly. The system will continue it s alert until it is manually deactivated or reset. The security alert system must be capable of being activated from the bridge and at a minimum, one other location. B. The automatic identification system, (AIS) Ships of over 300 gross tons will be required to be fitted with an automatic identification system, (AIS) The AIS is designed to provide information about a particular ship automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft John O Malley, Yards Prep for Security Refit Blitz, Marine Security Sourcebook, October 2003, ibid, 6. 19

20 However, unlike the ship security alerts system, it does not indicate the nature of any shipboard emergency. It is solely a tracking device. C. IMO hull numbering Another new regulation soon to be implemented is the requirement that the ships identification number be permanently marked either on the ships hull, (port & starboard, or aft) or super structure. The identification number must be a minimum 200mm in height and the outline of the numbers are to be constructed of a raised welded bead, cut groove or center punched. Additionally, passenger ships are required to have their identification number on a flat horizontal surface of the ship plainly visible from the air. The regulation also requires that the ships number be permanently marked on a ships transverse bulkhead internally as well utilizing the same methods approved on the exterior of the ship, in such places as the engine room, pump room or hatchways. 34 D. Additional possible modifications: CBR-D decontamination stations, deep shelter modifications, etc. Certain ships under direct or indirect government control are being given consideration in regards to chemical, biological and radiological defense, (CBR- D). These are ships that are owned or operated by Military Sealift Command, (MSC), the Maritime Administration, (MARAD) or are civilian owned, but under long term contract to the DoD. All the ships in these categories face the possibility of CBR exposure in the course of their work. Because of the military cargo they carry and the fact that many times they are entering hostile environments or wars zones, they face the same possible CBR threats that American forces working in the theater of operation face. While some of these ships carry the USNS designation, those owned by MSC, they are all crewed by civilian mariners. These ships whether government owned or contracted, have not been constructed with the features needed to defend against CBR threats. The vast majority of the MSC and MARAD ships though now government owned, began their lives as merchant ships, and as is typical of a merchantman, chemical, biological and radiological defense is rarely if ever considered during construction. Certain features are being considered on a ship-by-ship basis as each particular ship faces it next shipyard overhaul. 34. John O Malley, Yards Prep for Security Refit Blitz, Marine Security Sourcebook, October 2003, 6. 20