A ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING

Transcription

1 A ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING Q3 & Q4 2015

2 Contents: 1 EATL PROCEDURES REVIEW 2 A300 ENGINEERING TECHNICAL CIRCULARS 3 ACL ENGINEERING NOTICES 4 A300 MOR REVIEW 5 A300 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 6 EATL CONTINUATION TRAINING LETTERS 7 EATL AWOPS 8 EATL RVSM 9 ACL AWOPS 10 ACL RVSM 11 ACL DOCUMENTS ACCESS PORTAL CHANGES 12 SARS FUELING INCIDENT (HAZARD) 13 SARS INSECURE PROXIMITY MODULE 54GB

3 1 EATL Procedures Review For clear and precise instructions on how EATL require their Technical Logs to be completed, refer to the following: EATL CAME Rev 6, Part 1: Continuing Airworthiness Management Procedures; Section 1.1 Aircraft Technical Log Utilisation and MEL Application Section Instructions for Use Section Aircraft Technical Log Approval EATL003A: Engineering Procedure No. 003 AWOPS for the A300B4-622 All aspects of operator information can be found at your line station, so you can access the system to find the information you need. All read & signs should reflect this new revision. 2 A Engineering Technical Circular There were no relevant ETCs for the period of review. 3 Air Contractors Engineering Notices The following pages contain Engineering Notices as issued by Air Contractors, relevant to the A

4 4 Maintenance Related MOR The following are maintenance related extracts from the UK CAA MOR data base related to the A The information is protected by the UK CAA and the monthly digest are now strictly controlled by them. It is respectfully requested that with this in mind, the content of the following is not copied or distributed in any way. Airbus Transport International A Wrong de-icing fluid provided by de-icing team. Wing de-icing was requested by the crew. A/c was towed towards the de-icing position. About 10mn later, the de-icing fluid was still not hot enough. The de-icing staff informed the crew the fluid was type II. During the deicing operation, the crew noticed the colour of the fluid was green, which doesn't correspond to a type II fluid. In fact, it appears the fluid was ABC S plus type IV. Supplementary 21/01/15: SMS manager is investigating with the de-icing operator. 5 A Airworthiness Directives Below is a listing of A AD s issued for the first eight months of this year. If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website, to which you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there is no material change. AD No.: [Correction: 15 January 2015] ATA 05 Time Limits and Maintenance Checks Certification Maintenance Requirements ALS Part 3 Amendment Airbus A310 and A aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), and Airbus A300F4-608ST aeroplanes, all MSN. The airworthiness limitations for Airbus aeroplanes are currently published in Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) documents. The airworthiness limitations applicable to the A and A ST Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) were previously specified in the Airbus A CMR document referenced AI/ST5/829/85. DGAC France issued AD F (EASA approval ) to require compliance to the requirements as specified in this document. Since that AD was issued, the CMR tasks are now specified in Airbus A and Airbus A310 ALS Part 3 documents, which are approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). These documents introduce more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with the maintenance requirements contained in these documents could result in an unsafe condition. For the reasons described above, this new AD retains the requirements of DGAC France AD F , which is superseded, and requires the implementation of the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements as specified in Airbus A310 ALS Part 3 Revision 00 and A ALS Part 3 Revision 00, as applicable to the aeroplane type/model.

5 AD No.: ATA 53 Fuselage Aft Cargo Door Sill Beam Area Inspection Applicability AD Airbus A and A310 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus modification (mod) has been embodied in production, except aeroplanes on which Airbus mod has also been embodied in production During accomplishment of Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) task on an A aeroplane having accumulated more than flight cycles (FC) since aeroplane first flight, multiple fatigue cracks were found on the following parts: - Aft cargo door sill beam Part Number (P/N) A Lock fitting P/N A Torsion box plate P/N A Prompted by these findings, a stress analysis was performed during which it was discovered that there is no dedicated scheduled maintenance task to inspect the affected area for fatigue damage. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure of multiple lock fittings, possibly resulting in loss of the cargo door in flight and consequent explosive decompression of the aeroplane. To address this unsafe condition, Airbus issued Alert Operators Transmission (AOT) A53W providing instructions for inspection of the affected area. Consequently, EASA issued Emergency AD E to require repetitive ultrasonic (US) inspections or detailed inspections (DET) of the aft cargo door sill beam external area, and/or a one-time High Frequency Eddy Current HFEC) inspection of the aft cargo door sill beam internal structure and, depending on findings, accomplishment of corrective action(s). Since that AD was issued, the results of further analysis have indicated that repetitive HFEC inspections need to be introduced. ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings Portable Oxygen Cylinder in Overhead Stowage Inspection / Replacement A and A310 passenger aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers (except all-cargo aeroplanes), if equipped with one-frame overhead stowage compartments (OHSC). During maintenance, an operator found that one portable oxygen cylinder assembly (POCA) had slipped from its bracket inside a one-frame OHSC located near door L1. The investigation results indicated that the POCA had fallen behind the OHSC through a cut-out on the OHSC outboard panel and damaged some electrical wires, resulting in arcing, melted wires, partial burn stains on the POCA and on the inside of the fuselage This condition, if not detected and corrected, could possibly result in an uncontrolled fire in the affected area.

6 AD No ATA 05 Time Limits and Maintenance Checks Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items ALS Part 2 Amendment Airbus A300 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial numbers The airworthiness limitations applicable to the Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items (DT ALIs) are currently listed in the Airbus Airworthiness Limitations Sections Part 2. Airbus recently revised the A300 ALS Part 2 and this Revision 02 was approved by EASA. Airbus A300 ALS Part 2 Revision 02 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations, which have been identified as mandatory actions for continued airworthiness AD No.: ATA 27 Flight Controls Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Identification / Replacement Airbus A300 B4-601, A300 B4-603, A300 B4-620, A300 B4-622, A300 B4-605R, A300 B4-622R, A300 C4-605R variant F, A300 C4-620, A300 F4-605R, A300 F4-622R, A300 F4-608ST, A , A C, A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A , aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. During endurance qualification tests on a Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator (THSA) concerning another aeroplane type, a partial loss of the no-back brake (NBB) efficiency was experienced. Investigation results concluded that this partial loss of braking efficiency in some specific aerodynamic load conditions was due to polishing and autocontamination of the NBB carbon friction disks. This condition, if not detected and corrected, and in conjunction with the power gear not able to keep the ball screw in its last commanded position, could potentially lead to an uncommanded movement of the Horizontal Stabilizer, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane. For the reasons described above, this AD requires the removal from service of each affected THSA, with the intent of in-shop NBB carbon disk replacement

7 AD No.: R1 This AD revises EASA AD dated 16 th of May 2014 which superseded EASA AD dated 19 October ATA 05 Time Limits and Maintenance Checks Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items ALS Part 2 Amend Airbus A310 and A aeroplanes, Airbus revision of the A300 ALI Document New or more restrictive maintenance instructions and/or airworthiness limitations 6 Continuation Training Letters (EATL) For full instructions on the procedures required for the transport of DG please read the full document which can be found in EATL Company Procedures

8 7 EATL All Weather Operations See EATL 003A: Engineering Procedure No 003 All Weather Operations for A300B4-622R 8 EATL RVSM Operations See EATL 004B: Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) for A300B4-622R 9 Air Contractors CAT II & CAT IIIA (all weather) Operations See ACL website (See below) for ACL all weather operations procedures. ACL Engineering Procedure No. EP 27 and MEL refers. 10 Air Contractors RVSM Operations See ACL web site (See below) for ACL RVSM Operations Procedures. The RVSM capability is shown in Engineering Procedures Manual Engineering Procedure EP 58: All ASLI aircraft which operate above the current Reduced Vertical Minimum Separation (RVSM) altitude of 29,000 feet are approved for RVSM operations. See MEL for downgrading of RVSM capability. 11 ACL Documents Web Address (NB has recently changed) Web address: Username: AGLEJEng Password: alt8352lej

9 12. Defueling Hazard Identified by Safety Advisory & Reporting System Report (SARS) Aircraft A Location Hazard Identified Scenario Previous Instances Recommendations LEJ The Tank overflow and High level shut off systems are inhibited if De Fuel is accidently selected Engineer tasked with transferring fuel from the Centre Tank to the Wing Tanks of an A Whilst setting up the transfer conditions on the Re- Fuel Panel a selection of Defuel was accidently made instead of Refuel (this action inhibits the Tank overflow and High Level Shut-Off Systems) On selecting Fuel Pumps ON fuel filled the outer wings and then spilled into the surge tanks due to the condition identified above. Fuel then overflowed onto the ramp. It is estimated that approximately 200 to 300 Liters of fuel were involved in the spillage. The safety services, duty manager and MOC were informed and appropriate actions taken Other engineers at LEJ have confirmed that this is not the first time this has happened and others have confirmed they have come very close to making the same mistake. All personnel involved with fuel transfer management must be aware of this potential pitfall which although deemed to be of a very occasional nature could be catastrophic if not arrested in time.

10 13. S.A.R.S D-AEAR A Date 22 April 2015 Local time 2300 Location Bergamo Identified Hazard: Following information received from BGY MX: Upon D-AEAR's arrival at BGY this evening the crew verbally reported an ECAM warning when the gear was selected down, however the gear had functioned normally and the crew had stated the ECAM warning was too quick that they were unable to report on what message was displayed hence there was no tech log entry as an inaccurate report may have been more of a hindrance than help. It was decided to c/o a BITE check of the Proximity module 54GB to see if there were any stored / current faults, during this test it was noticed that the Proximity module knurled nuts and quick release fasteners were loose to the extent that the module may have jumped from the rack. The module was secured and the BITE test completed with no faults found. Later when investigating MDDR on D-AEAT a rack security check was carried out on 80 / 90 VU and it was found that the same proximity box was as loose if not looser in the rack and was also secured with a subsequent BITE test and no faults found. I, as a matter of course check this LRU whenever in the E&E bay as previous experience has proved this unit s security to be questionable. This potential problem only comes apparent when the LRU is positively pushed into the rack and could be missed by trying to tighten the knurled fixings alone. I believe there has been an instance where an A300-B4 has nearly over run the runway threshold and had only stopped when the ultimate braking was applied as the ground spoilers, thrust reversers and anti-skid etc. are all inoperative should this box become dislodged from the rack. My only suggestion is to carry out a fleet check of the E&E racks ASAP and possibly look at modifying the securing fixtures to a ratcheting /locking type as a long term fix. Please don t hesitate to contact me via the BGY office should you require any further information. SUBSEQUENT ACTION As a result of this report a fleet inspection of the E/E Compartment was carried out although no more cases of insecure proximity units were found. Well done to the engineer concerned whose vigilance spotted this potentially dangerous condition and although the SARS report is now closed it may be worthwhile keeping an eye on this unit in the future.