A320 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING

Transcription

1 A320 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING Q1 & Q2 2016

2 Contents: 1 Introduction & review of approval changes relating to the A320 2 A320 Airworthiness Directives 3 A320 Maintenance Related MOR s 4 A320 Puncture to aircraft s fuselage 5 A320 Worn avionic blower fan bearing

3 1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval The A320 approval is still currently inactive having previously been suspended last year due to the civil unrest in Libya and the line station established there in the summer of There are no other A320 approvals at this time. However in order to maintain knowledge of the type, the following information has been formulated and presented for this purpose. Engineers that currently have this on their PAC, need to prove 6 in 24 on renewal. If recency cannot be demonstrated on renewal, then this will be removed from your PAC or annotated as passive.

4 2 A320 Airworthiness Directives EASA AD No.: R1 ATA 57 Wings Outer Wing Main Landing Gear Support Rib 5 Fitting Inspection / Modification Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), except those having embodied Airbus modification (mod) in production. Several cases of corrosion of the main landing gear (MLG) support Rib 5 fitting lug bores have been reported on A320 family aeroplanes. In some instances, corrosion pits caused the cracking of the forward lug (sometimes through its complete thickness). This condition, if not detected, may lead to the complete failure of the fitting, possibly affecting the structural integrity of the MLG installation. To address this unsafe condition, EASA issued AD to require, for pre-mod aeroplanes, repetitive inspections of the MLG support Rib 5 fitting forward lugs and, as terminating action, the embodiment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A After that AD was issued, a case of Rib 5, ruptured at the 4 o clock position, was discovered on an aeroplane on which Airbus SB A had already been embodied. Investigation of that case revealed that corrosion damage and cracking that should have been removed by repair machining was below the level of detectability of the Non Destructive Test (NDT) technique that cleared the surfaces prior to bush installation. Continued...

5 EASA AD No.: R1 Continued Prompted by these findings, EASA issued AD , partially retaining the requirements of EASA AD , which was superseded, and to require the same actions for all aeroplanes on which Airbus SB A has been embodied in service, or on which Airbus SRM or individual adapted approved Airbus Repair Instructions had been applied. That AD also reduced the Applicability by excluding A318 aeroplanes, since Airbus mod is embodied in production on both left-hand (LH) and righthand (RH) wings for all A318 aeroplanes. After EASA AD was issued, three cases of corrosion of Rib 5 were discovered on aeroplanes on which Airbus mod had been embodied in production. Investigations revealed that the unsafe condition addressed by AD could occur or develop on those aeroplanes as well. For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD , retaining the requirements of EASA AD , which was superseded, expanding the Applicability to all aeroplanes, and to require the same actions for post-mod aeroplanes. Since that AD was issued, Airbus has developed mod that improves the corrosion protection and constitutes terminating action for the required repetitive inspections. For in-service aeroplanes, this solution can only be introduced through a dedicated repair. This AD is revised to exclude post-mod aeroplanes from the Applicability and to confirm the availability of the optional terminating action, upon request from Airbus.

6 EASA AD No.: R2 ATA 27 Applicability: Flight Controls Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Ballscrew Lower Splines Inspection / Replacement Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Some Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuators (THSA), Part Number (P/N) fitted on A330/A340 aeroplanes were found with corrosion, affecting the ballscrew lower splines between the tie bar and the screw-jack. The affected ballscrew is made of steel and anti-corrosion protection is ensured, except on both extremities (upper and lower splines) where Molykote is applied. The results of the technical investigations identified that the corrosion was caused by a combination of contact/friction between the tie bar and the inner surface of the ballscrew leading to the removal of Molykote (corrosion protection) at the level of the tie bar splines, humidity ingress initiating surface oxidation starting from areas where Molykote is removed, and water retention in THSA lower part leading to corrosion spread out and to the creation of a brown deposit (iron oxide). The results of the technical investigations also concluded that the ballscrews of THSA P/N XXX (where XXX stands for a specific numerical value), installed on A320 family aeroplanes, might be affected by this corrosion issue. This condition, if not detected and corrected, may lead, in case of ballscrew rupture, to loss of transmission of THSA torque loads from the ballscrew to the tie-bar, prompting THSA blowback, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane. Prompted by these findings, EASA issued AD (later revised to exclude a new THSA P/N , which is not affected) to require repetitive detailed inspections of the ballscrew lower splines of the affected THSA to detect corrosion and, depending on findings, the accomplishment of applicable corrective actions. Continued...

7 EASA AD No.: R2 Continued Since EASA AD R1 was issued, new P/N THSA have been developed by UTC Aerospace Systems (UTAS, formerly Goodrich) that are not affected by the corrosion issue addressed by this AD. Airbus issued SB A to provide corresponding aeroplane modification instructions. Consequently, this AD is further revised to include a full list (Appendix 1 of this AD) of affected THSA. Installation of any other P/N THSA not listed in appendix 1 constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD: at the issue date of the revision 2 of this AD, the THSA P/N , P/N , P/N and P/N are certified and known to be not affected by the corrosion issue addressed by this AD. EASA AD No.: R1 ATA 32 Landing Gear Main Landing Gear Door Actuator Monitoring / Inspection / Replacement / Modification Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Some operators reported slow operation of the main landing gear (MLG) door opening/closing sequence, leading to the generation of ECAM warnings during the landing gear retraction or extension sequence. Investigations showed that the damping ring and associated retaining ring of the MLG door actuator may deteriorate. The resultant debris increases the friction inside the actuator which can be sufficiently high to restrict opening of the MLG door by gravity, during operation of the landing gear alternate (free-fall) extension system. This condition, if not corrected, could prevent the full extension and/or down locking of the MLG, possibly resulting in MLG collapse during landing or rollout and consequent damage to the aeroplane and injury to occupants. Continued...

8 EASA AD No.: R1 Continued EASA AD (later revised) was issued to require repetitive inspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door in order to identify the affected actuators, and to introduce as an optional terminating action Airbus production Modification (mod) and associated Service Bulletin (SB) A , which incorporates an improved retaining ring, located on the piston rod's extension end, and a new piston rod with machined shoulder to accommodate the thicker section of the modified retaining ring. After in-service introduction of the new MLG door actuator, Part Number (P/N) (Post-mod SB A ), several operators reported failures of internal parts of the MLG door actuator. Investigations confirmed that these failures could result in slow extension of the actuator rod, delaying the MLG door operation, or possibly stopping just before the end of the stroke, preventing the door to reach the fully open position. EASA AD (later revised), which superseded EASA AD R1, was issued to require amendment of the applicable Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), repetitive checks of specific Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) messages, repetitive inspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door actuator and, depending on findings, corrective action(s). Since EASA AD R1 was issued, Airbus introduced a reinforced MLG door actuator P/N (mod ). Airbus issued SB A containing instructions for in-service replacement of the affected MLG door actuators, or modification of the actuators to the new standard. In addition, following an occurrence with a gear extension problem, the result of additional analyses by Airbus revealed that the CFDS expected specific messages may not be generated and as a result, repetitive checks of messages are not effective for aeroplanes fitted with landing gear control interface unit (LGCIU) interlink communication ARINC 429 (applied in production through Airbus mod 39303, or in service through Airbus SB A ), in combination with LGCIUs or in both positions and at least one MLG door actuator pre-mod (pre-airbus SB A pre-general Electric (GE) SB ) installed. Prompted by these findings, EASA issued Emergency AD E to require identification of the affected aeroplanes to establish the configuration and, for those aeroplanes, repetitive inspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door actuator and, depending on findings, replacement of the MLG door actuator. That AD also provided an optional terminating action by disconnection of the interlink for certain LGCIUs, or in-service modification of the aeroplane through Airbus SB A (equivalent to Airbus production mod ). Continued...

9 EASA AD No.: R1 Continued Since those ADs (EASA AD R1 and EASA AD E) were issued, analyses performed by Airbus have revealed that the MLG door opening sequence inspection interval needed to be reduced, and that the (previously optional) terminating action needed to be made mandatory. Prompted by these findings, EASA issued AD , retaining the requirements of EASA AD R1 and EASA AD E, which were superseded, but with reduced inspection intervals, and to require replacement or modification, as applicable, of the affected MLG door actuators as terminating action to the monitoring and repetitive checks and inspections. Following introduction of post-mod MLG door actuators on in-service aeroplanes, it has been observed that, in case the removed pre-mod MLG door actuator has internal damage, contamination of the hydraulic system could have occurred. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in performance degradation (damping degradation) of the post-mod MLG door actuator. Testing performed with a new actuator tested in heavily contaminated hydraulic system did not show abnormal hydraulic restriction/blockage. It is thus not requested to perform this "flushing procedure" on aircraft already retrofitted with std-14 actuators. In addition, since EASA AD was issued, the applicable AFM was revised and repetitive checks of specific CFDS messages are no longer considered to be required, due to the reduced intervals required by EASA AD For the reasons described above, this AD partially retains the requirements of EASA AD , which is superseded, introduces improved wording for clarification and requires, in addition to the revised operational (AFM) procedure, hydraulic flushing prior to any installation of a post-mod MLG door actuator. This AD is revised to provide additional optional terminating actions.

10 EASA AD No.: ATA 53 Fuselage Cabin / Cargo Compartment Parts Inspection / Replacement [Wrong Material] Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 3586, 3588, 3589, 3590, 3595, 3604, 3608, 3614, 3615, 3620, 3632, 3634, 3638, 3647, 3651, 3657, 3660, 3661, 3663, 3671, 3675, 3680, 3683 to 3687 inclusive, 3689, 3691, 3694, 3700, 3702, 3704, 3705, 3710, 3720, 3727, 3728, 3733, 3735, 3742, 3744, 3746, 3754, 3757, 3759, 3763, 3768, 3770, 3772, 3774, 3775, 3779, 3788, 3790, 3794, 3797, 3799, 3801, 3803, 3808, 3810, 3818, 3822, 3824, 3826 to 4329 inclusive, 4331 to 6051 inclusive, 6053 to 6061 inclusive, 6063 to 6072 inclusive, 6074 to 6100 inclusive, 6102 to 6115 inclusive, 6117 to 6126 inclusive, 6128 to 6136 inclusive, 6138 to 6143 inclusive, 6145 to 6150 inclusive, 6152 to 6159 inclusive, 6161 and Following an Airbus quality control review on the final assembly line, it was discovered that wrong aluminium alloy were delivered by a supplier for several structural parts. The results of the investigations highlighted that 0.04% of the stock could be impacted by this wrong material. Structural investigations demonstrated the capability to sustain the static limits loads, and sufficient fatigue life up to a certain inspection threshold. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A and SB A to provide inspection instructions. For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time Special Detailed Inspection (SDI) of certain cabin and cargo compartment parts for material identification and, depending on findings, replacement with serviceable parts.

11 EASA AD No.: ATA 53 Fuselage Cabin / Cargo Compartment Parts Inspection / Replacement [Improper Heat Treatment] Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 4895, 4903, 4911, 4919, 4929, 4938, 4942, 4944, 4946, 4948 and 4951, MSN 4956 to 5541 inclusive, MSN 5544, 5547, 5550, 5551, 5553, 5556, 5559, 5561, 5562, 5563, 5565, 5566, 5570, 5572, 5576 and Following an Airbus quality control review on the final assembly line, it was discovered that aluminium alloy with inadequate heat treatment were delivered by a supplier for several structural parts. The results of the investigations highlighted that 1% of the stock could be impacted by this wrong material. Structural investigations demonstrated the capability to sustain the static limits loads, and sufficient fatigue life up to a certain inspection threshold. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the aeroplane structural integrity following fatigue load. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued Service Bulletins (SB) A , SB A and SB A to provide inspection instructions. For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time Special Detailed Inspection (SDI) of certain cabin, cargo compartment and frame parts and, depending on findings, replacement with serviceable parts.

12 EASA AD No.: ATA 71 Power Plant Forward Engine Mount Bolts Inspection / Replacement Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Applicability: Airbus A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. A review of the maintenance instructions revealed that an incorrect torque value with wrong unit for the four forward engine mount pylon bolts was included in task A01, Installation of the power plant with Engine Positioner TWW75E, of the A320 family (CFMI) Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), revision dated May It was determined that this AMM inconsistent torque unit affected the A319/A320 aeroplane equipped with CFM56-5A engines only. Subsequently, AMM task A01 was corrected to include the correct values in the August 2015 revision. During the period between these two AMM revisions, incorrect torque values may have been applied. This condition, if not corrected, and if combined with induced maintenance damage, could lead to forward engine mount failure, possibly resulting in engine detachment and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane, damage to the aeroplane and/or injury to persons on the ground. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued Alert Operators Transmission (AOT) A71N (hereafter referred to as the AOT in this AD), to provide instructions to check the torque values of the forward engine mount bolts. For the reasons described above, this AD requires identification of CFM56-5A engines that were installed by using the incorrect torque data, verifying the proper torque value of the all four forward engine mount pylon bolts and, depending on findings, accomplishment of corrective action(s).

13 EASA AD No.: ATA 52 Doors Main Landing Gear Door Tie Rod Assembly Inspection Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) as listed in Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A A production quality issue was identified concerning tie rod assemblies, having Part Number (P/N) starting with D or D , which are installed on the main landing gear (MLG) hinged fairing assembly. This quality issue affects the cadmium plating surface treatment which was inadvertently omitted from the rod end threads of the assembly. The absence of cadmium plating reduces the corrosion protection scheme. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to galvanic corrosion of the tie rod end threads, possibly resulting in rod end failure, loss of a MLG door, and consequent injury to persons on ground. To address this unsafe condition, Airbus identified the affected MSN and issued SB A to provide inspection instructions. For the reason described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of the affected MLG hinged fairing tie rod assemblies, and, depending on findings, replacement of the affected tie rod assembly.

14 EASA AD No.: R1 ATA 71 Powerplant Aft Engine Mount Retainers Inspection / Replacement Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers During in-service inspections, several aft engine mount inner retainers, fitted on aeroplanes equipped with CFM56-5A/5B engines, have been found broken. The results of the initial investigations highlighted that two different types of surface finish had been applied (respectively bright and dull material finishes), and that dull finish affects the strength of the retainer with regard to fatigue properties of the part. The pins which attach the engine link to the aft mount are secured by two nuts, which do not have a self-locking feature; this function is provided by the retainer brackets. In case of failure of the retainer bracket, the locking feature of the nuts of the inner and outer pins is lost; as a result, these nuts could subsequently become loose. In case of full loss of the nuts, there is the potential to also lose the pins, in which case the aft mount link will no longer be secured to the aft engine mount. The same locking feature is used for the three link assemblies of the aft mount. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to inflight loss of an aft mount link, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and/or injury to persons on the ground. To address this potential unsafe condition, EASA issued AD to require a detailed inspection (DET) of the aft engine mount inner retainers and the replacement of all retainers with dull finish with retainers having a bright finish. Since that AD was issued, inspection results showed that the main cause of crack initiation remains the vibration dynamic effect that affects both retainers, either with "dull" or "bright" surface finishes. The nonconforming "dull" surface s pitting is an aggravating factor. Consequently, EASA issued AD , retaining the requirements of EASA AD , which was superseded, and requiring repetitive DET of all aft engine mount inner retainers and, depending on findings, their replacement. Continued...

15 EASA AD No.: R1 Continued Since that AD was issued, a production quality deficiency was identified by Airbus and UTAS (formerly Goodrich Aerostructures, the engine mount retainer manufacturer) on the delivery of the inner retainer, Part Number (P/N) , installed in the three Link assemblies of the engine mount fitted on CFM56-5A/5B engines. Airbus issued AOT A71N and SB A providing a list of affected parts and applicable corrective actions. Consequently, EASA issued AD , retaining the requirements of EASA AD , which was superseded, and in addition requiring the identification and replacement of all nonconforming aft engine mount inner retainers. Since that AD was issued, AOT A71N was revised, removing errors and reducing the list of affected parts. For the reason described above, this AD is revised, adding reference to the revised AOT, and removing AD appendixes, which content is included in the referenced Airbus documentation. This AD is still considered to be an interim action, pending development and availability of a final solution.

16 EASA AD No.: ATA 53 Fuselage Door Stop Fitting Holes Inspection / Repair Applicability: Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which Airbus modification (mod) has been embodied in production. During an A320 fatigue test campaign, it was determined that fatigue damage could appear at the door stop fitting holes of fuselage frame (FR) 66 and FR68 on left hand (LH) and right hand (RH) sides. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could affect the structural integrity of the airframe. Two inspections, Airworthiness Limitations Item (ALI) tasks and , were introduced in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) Part 2 with the April 2012 revision and with some compliance time changes with revision 3 of this ALS part 2 of October Since these ALI tasks were implemented, a significant number of reports was received concerning non-critical damage and early crack findings. Consequently, Airbus published Service Bulletin (SB) A and SB A , providing inspection instructions to improve damage management and modification instructions. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive rototest inspections of the affected door stop fitting holes and, depending on findings, repair of any cracked area(s).

17 EASA AD No.: ATA 32 Applicability: Landing Gear Main Landing Gear Side Stay Assemblies Replacement / Modification Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries) Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. During studies for a new landing gear design, it was discovered that the single-locked upper and lower cardan joints of the Main Landing Gear (MLG) do not comply with the certification specifications of (CS, formerly JAR) Part This condition, if not corrected, could lead to MLG side stay locking failure that, during take off and landing, may result in damage to the aeroplane and detrimental effect on safe flight. To address this potential unsafe condition, the MLG manufacturer developed a modification to change the single-locked MLG joint into a double-locked one. This modification is available for in-service application through Messier-Bugatti-Dowty (MBD) Service Bulletin (SB) or SB , or Airbus SB A For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification or replacement of the MLG side stay assemblies to introduce the double locking of the MLG upper and lower cardan joints.

18 EASA AD No.: ATA 26 Applicability: Fire Protection Optical and Ambient Smoke Detectors Identification / Replacement SIEMENS S.A.S. Part Number (P/N) PMC , P/N PMC and P/N GMC smoke detectors, having a date of manufacture (DMF, in digits as MMYYYY, e.g , see Appendix 2 of this AD) between November 2010 to January 2013 inclusive, and certain repaired units, as identified by P/N and serial number (s/n) in Appendix 1 of this AD. in service by Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) modification on certain Airbus A319 and A320, During a maintenance operation, some smoke detectors P/N PMC failed an acceptance test, due to a significant degraded optical sensitivity. Investigation results concluded that light-emitting diodes (LED) were abnormally degraded, affecting specific batches where changes occurred in the LED manufacturer production process. Further investigation has determined that the affected LED have been installed on smoke detectors manufactured between November 2010 and January 2013, and on certain repaired units. This condition, if not corrected, will generate an abnormal ageing of the smoke detector, leading to a decrease of the light intensity capability, possibly resulting in failure to detect smoke and consequent risk of an on board uncontrolled fire. Prompted by these findings, Siemens published Service Information Letter (SIL) PMC and SIL PMC (hereafter collectively referred to as the applicable SIL in this AD), providing instructions to identify the affected smoke detectors for repair action. For the reasons described above, this AD requires identification and removal from service of all affected smoke detectors.

19 EASA AD No.: ATA 72 Engine Low Pressure Turbine Rear Frames Inspection / Replacement Applicability: CFM INTERNATIONAL S.A. CFM56-5B1, CFM56-5B1/P, CFM56-5B2, CFM56-5B2/P, CFM56-5B3/P, CFM56-5B3/P1, CFM56-5B4, CFM56-5B4/P, CFM56-5B4/P1, CFM56-5B5, CFM56-5B5/P, CFM56-5B6, CFM56-5B6/P, CFM56-5B7, CFM56-5B7/P, CFM56-5B8/P and CFM56-5B9/P engines, all serial numbers. The design approval holder performed an analysis of the service lives of certain turbine rear frames (TRF), part number (P/N) and P/N , installed on the low-pressure turbine (LPT) frame assembly of CFM56-5B engines. This resulted in the need to correct the lives of those parts. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure of a TRF on the LPT frame assembly, possibly resulting in engine separation, with consequent reduced control of the aeroplane and injury to persons on the ground; or damage to the engine, with consequent damage to the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition. CFM International S.A. (CFM) issued CFM56-5B Service Bulletin (SB) No (hereafter referred to as the SB in this AD) to provide inspection instructions. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive inspections of affected TRFs and, depending on findings, replacement with serviceable parts.

20 EASA AD No.: ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings Buffet and Galley / Trolley Compartments Modification Airbus Applicability: Airbus A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers 1479, 3096, 3693, 3713, 3739, 3791, 3896, 3902, 3907, 3931, 3949, 3969, 4030, 4045, 4049, 4059, 4066, 4077, 4083, 4124, 4146, 4158, 4188, 4198, 4206, 4209, 4218, 4235, 4255, 4264, 4304, 4321, 4371, 4374, 4395, 4411, 4417, 4431, 4485, 4492, 4502, 4528, 4541, 4548, 4592, 4595, 4638, 4651, 4669, 4703, 4724, 4737, 4746, 4770, 4780, 4783, 4826, 4827, 4860, 4863, 4865, 4902, 4934, 4945, 4951, 4952, 4971, 4996, 5023, 5029, 5042, 5088, 5095, 5132, 5159, 5164, 5171, 5175, 5192, 5210, 5227, 5241, 5247, 5251, 5275, 5277, 5297, 5306, 5340, 5343, 5348, 5356, 5366, 5370, 5385, 5387, 5392, 5396, 5400, 5407, 5418, 5427, 5438, 5456, 5458, 5469, 5495, 5517, 5555, 5624, 5674, 5678, 5698, 5699, 5709, 5714, 5791, 5704, 5745, 5753, 5761, 5781, 5786, 5788, 5789, 5798, 5804, 5810, 5821, 5827, 5842, 5874, 5882, 5889, 5903, 5907, 5916, 5924, 5958, 5984, 5994, 6000, 6004, 6054, 6080, 6107, 6166, 6176, 6234, 6266, 6293, 6335, 6344, 6365, 6430 and 6444 inclusive. Following in-service experience and further analyses, it was ascertained that the galley 5 without kick load retainers on external position could not withstand the expected loading during several flight phases or in case of emergency landing. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to galley / trolley detachment and collapse into an adjacent cabin aisle or cabin zone, possibly spreading loose galley equipment items, compartment doors or leaking fluids, blocking an evacuation route, and consequently resulting in injury to crew or passengers. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued 6 Service Bulletins (SB) to provide modification instructions for the affected aeroplanes. For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification of galley 5 trolley compartments to install kick load retainers.

21 EASA AD No.: ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings Escape Slide Rafts Modification / Replacement Applicability: Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Two occurrences were reported on Airbus A320 family aeroplanes where the escape slide raft inflation system did not deploy when activated. This was due to the rotation of the cable guide in a direction, which resulted in jamming of the inflation control cable. Additionally, one case was reported where the system did not deploy properly due to a cracked inflation hose fitting. Investigation conducted by Air Cruisers Company, the slide raft manufacturer, showed that the hose fitting could be subject to a bending moment, if improperly packed. Consequently, the hose fitting could separate from the reservoir and the inflation of the slide raft would be impaired. This condition, if not corrected, could delay the evacuation from the aeroplane in case of emergency, possibly resulting in injury to the occupants. To address this potential unsafe condition, DGAC France issued AD F , to introduce an inflation hose retainer preventing an incomplete inflation of emergency escape slides, which could delay passenger evacuation, and EASA issued AD (later revised twice) to require modification of the affected slide rafts or replacement thereof with modified units. Since EASA AD R2 was issued, Air Cruisers developed a modification of the slide and slide/raft, part of the escape slide pack assemblies, to improve its deployment. Modified slides and slide/rafts are identified by a different Part Number (P/N); consequently, also the escape slide pack assemblies are identified by a different P/N. For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of DGAC France AD F (EASA approval ) and EASA AD R2, which are superseded, and requires installation of modified escape slide pack assemblies. Continued...

22 EASA AD No.: Continued Appendix 1 of this AD provides a comprehensive list of escape slide pack assemblies P/N that, at the issue date of the AD, are not approved for further installation on any aeroplane. EASA AD No.: ATA 71 Applicability: Power Plant Fan Cowl Door Latch with Key and Flag, IAE engines Modification Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Fan Cowl Door (FCD) losses during take-off were reported on aeroplanes equipped with IAE V2500 engines. Prompted by these occurences, DGAC France issued AD (B), mandating FCD latch improvements. This AD was later superseded by AD (B), requiring installation of additional fan cowl latch improvement by installing a hold open device. Since that AD was issued, further FCD in flight losses were experienced in service. Investigations confirmed that in all cases, the fan cowls were opened prior to the flight and were not correctly re-secured. During the pre-flight inspection, it was then not detected that the FCD were not properly latched. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in-flight loss of a FCD, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and/or injury to persons on the ground. Prompted by these recent events, new FCD front latch and keeper assembly were developed, having a specific key necessary to unlatch the FCD. This key cannot be removed unless the FCD front latch is safely closed. The key, after removal, must be stowed in the flight deck at a specific location, as instructed in the applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manual. Applicable Flight Crew Operating Manual has been amended accordingly. After modification, the FCD is identified with a different Part Number (P/N). For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of DGAC

23 EASA AD No.: ATA 27 Applicability: Flight Controls Spoiler Elevator Computer Software update Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.. Following the introduction of new Spoiler and Elevator Computer (SEC) hardware C Part Number (P/N) B372CAM0100 with software (SW) standards 122, 124 and 125 (identified by P/N B372CAM0101, P/N B372CAM0102 and P/N B372CAM0103, respectively, and hereafter referred to as an affected SEC SW standard in this AD), some airlines reported receiving maintenance messages, e.g. SEC OR WIRING FROM L or R ELEV POS MON XDCR and/or SEC OR WIRING FROM G or Y ELEV POS XDCR, which are associated with servo control or elevator transducer monitoring. Such messages are triggered by a short data inconsistency due to power transients, when the engines are started. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an undetected loss of redundancy during flight if an affected SEC cannot control the related elevator servo control(s), possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, EASA issued AD to require amendment of the applicable Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the flight crew procedure necessary to recover full SEC redundancy. Since that AD was issued, to fix the software deficiency, SEC software standard 126 (identified by P/N B372CAM0104) was developed, which is embodied in production through Airbus modification (mod) (installation of SEC software standard 126), and introduced in service through Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A For the reason described above, this AD retains the AFM change requirements of EASA AD , which is superseded, and requires the removal and/or upgrade of SEC.

24 EASA AD No.: ATA 71 Applicability: Power Plant Fan Cowl Door Latch with Key and Flag, CFM engines Modification Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Fan Cowl Door (FCD) losses were reported on aeroplanes equipped with CFM56 engines. Investigations confirmed that in all cases the fan cowls were opened prior to the flight and were not correctly re-secured. During the pre-flight inspection, it was then not detected that the FCD were not properly latched. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to in-flight loss of a FCD, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and/or injury to persons on the ground. Prompted by these events, new FCD front latch and keeper assembly were developed, having a specific key necessary to unlatch the FCD. This key cannot be removed unless the FCD front latch is safely closed. The key, after removal, must be stowed in the flight deck at a specific location, as instructed in the applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manual. Applicable Flight Crew Operating Manual has been amended accordingly. After modification, the FCD is identified with a different Part Number (P/N). For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification and re-identification of FCD.

25 EASA AD No.: ATA 78 Applicability: Exhaust Thrust Reverser Pivot Fitting Inspection Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Several operators reported finding cracks, during an unscheduled inspection, on the 3 o clock and 9 o clock pivot fittings of a CFM56 engine s thrust reverser (T/R). Investigation results revealed that these cracks were caused by a combination of stress and fatigue effects. Further analysis determined that only aeroplanes fitted with CFM56-5A or CFM56-5B series engines could be affected by this issue. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to T/R malfunction and, in a case of rejected take off at V1 on a wet runway, a consequent runway excursion, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and injury to occupants. For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD , requiring repetitive inspections of the T/R pivot fittings at the 3 o clock and 9 o clock positions and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s). Since that AD was issued, it was determined that the list of part numbers (P/N) of affected T/R pivot fitting, as identified in that AD, was incomplete. For the reason stated above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD , which is superseded, but expands the list of affected fitting P/Ns.

26 EASA AD No.: ATA 05 Applicability: Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Airworthiness Limitations Section Part 3 Certification Maintenance Requirements Implementation Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. The airworthiness limitations for Airbus A320 family aeroplanes are currently defined and published in Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321 Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) documents. The airworthiness limitations applicable to the Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR), which are approved by EASA, are published in ALS Part 3. The instructions contained in the ALS Part 3 have been identified as mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. Failure to comply with these instructions could result in an unsafe condition. Previously, EASA issued AD to require accomplishment of all maintenance tasks as described in ALS Part 3 at Revision 01. The new ALS Part 3 Revision 03 (hereafter referred to as the ALS in this AD) includes new and/or more restrictive requirements. For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD , which is superseded, and requires accomplishment of all maintenance tasks as described in the ALS.

27 EASA AD No.: ATA 05 Applicability: Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Airworthiness Limitations Section Part 4 System Equipment Maintenance Requirements (SEMR) Implementation Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. The airworthiness limitations for Airbus A320 family aeroplanes are currently defined and published in Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321 Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) documents. The airworthiness limitations applicable to the System Equipment Maintenance Requirements, which are approved by EASA, are specified in ALS Part 4. The instructions contained in the ALS Part 4 have been identified as mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. Failure to comply with these instructions could result in an unsafe condition. Previously, EASA issued AD to require accomplishment of all maintenance actions as described in ALS Part 4 at Revision 01. The new ALS Part 4 Revision 03 (hereafter referred to as the ALS in this AD) includes new and/or more restrictive requirements. ALS Part 4 Revision 03, issue 02, has been released to include editorial changes. For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD , which is superseded, and requires accomplishment of the actions specified in the ALS.

28 EASA AD No.: ATA 53 Applicability: Fuselage Cabin Floor Beam Junction - Inspection Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Following the results of a new full scale fatigue test campaign on the A321 airframe in the context of the A321 extended service goal, it was identified that cracks could develop in the cabin floor beam junctions at fuselage frame (FR) 35.1 and FR 35.2, on both left hand (LH) and right hand (RH) sides, also on aeroplanes operated in the context of design service goal. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the fuselage. Prompted by these findings, Airbus developed an inspection programme, published in Service Bulletin (SB) A , SB A , SB A and SB A , each containing instructions for a different location. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive detailed inspections (DET) of the affected cabin floor beam junctions and, depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair. This AD is considered an interim action, pending development of a permanent solution. Note: The grace period for the initial inspection has been modified from within Flight Cycles (FC) after the effective date of this AD (as anticipated during the consultation period of this AD) to within FC after the effective date of this AD. Further public consultation for this modified grace period has been deemed not in the interest of aeroplane operators.

29 EASA AD No.: ATA 53 Applicability: Fuselage Frame 35.2A - Inspection Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. Following a new full scale fatigue test campaign on the A321 airframe, in the context of the A321 extended service goal, it was identified that cracks could develop on holes at frame (FR) 35.2A between stringers (STR) 22 and STR 23 on right hand (RH) and left hand (LH) sides, also on aeroplanes operated in the context of design service goal. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could reduce the structural integrity of the fuselage. Prompted by these findings, Airbus developed an inspection programme, published in Service Bulletin (SB) A and SB A , each containing instructions for a different location. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive special detailed (rototest) inspections (SDI) of the affected holes and, depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair. This AD is considered an interim action, pending development of a permanent solution.

30 EASA AD No.: ATA 27 Flight Controls Flap Interconnecting Strut Identification / Modification / Replacement Applicability: Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN). The flap interconnecting strut is a safety device of the High Lift System which acts as an alternative load path from one flap surface to another in case of a flap drive system disconnection. In such a failure case, the installed proximity sensors provide information to the slat flap control computer (SFCC) and the operation of the flap drive system is inhibited. An engineering investigation showed that, when a certain combination of target/sensor serial number (s/n) is installed on a flap interconnecting strut, a "target FAR" signal cannot be detected when reaching the mechanical end stop of the interconnecting strut. This condition, if not corrected, could cause a flap down drive disconnection to remain undetected, due to an already-failed interconnecting strut sensor, potentially resulting in asymmetric flap panel movement and consequent loss of control of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A and SB A , to provide identification and replacement instructions for struts that have a certain target/sensor s/n combination installed. Aeroplanes on which modification (mod) had been accomplished in production were identified as not affected by the unsafe condition. Consequently, EASA issued AD to require accomplishment of these inspections and corrective actions. Since that AD was issued, Airbus has informed EASA about a batch of aeroplanes that were delivered with pre-mod Part Number (P/N) flap interconnecting strut(s) installed, but declared to be in post-mod configuration in the Aircraft Inspection Report. Airbus SB A has been issued to provide instructions to verify the interconnecting strut P/N, and to update aircraft documentation. In addition, to ensure that all pre-mod parts are checked and corrected as required, SB A was revised to include a wider range of P/N of affected interconnecting struts. Continued...

31 EASA AD No.: Continued For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD , which is superseded, expands the Applicability, changes the compliance time and requires an additional inspection for aeroplanes that have already been inspected.

32 EASA AD No.: ATA 28 Applicability: Fuel Fuel Vent Protector Inspection / Replacement Airbus Airbus A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A , A and A aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN). On each aeroplane wing, a NACA duct assembly is installed, including a Fuel Vent Protector (FVP) which is used as flame arrestor. This FVP is maintained in its NACA duct assembly by a circlip (also known as C-clip). Following a wing water pressure test, the FVP is removed and dried with heat. During an inspection after this test, several circlips were reported to be discoloured. Investigation revealed that a batch of circlips fitted on some FVP Part Number (P/N) have an increased risk of corrosion due to a manufacturing quality issue. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to circlip failure and consequent FVP movement, reducing the flame protector capability of the FVP cartridge, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane in case of lightning impact or fire on ground. Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A , providing instructions for identification by serial number (s/n) and removal from service of the affected FVP P/N , and EASA issued AD , later revised, to require those actions and to implement installation requirements for the FVP. After that AD was issued, one step in the FVP re-installation instructions was identified as missing. Consequently, Airbus revised SB A to provide instructions for sealant installation on some nuts and bolts on the NACA duct assembly. For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD R1, which is superseded, and requires additional work for aeroplanes already modified in accordance with Airbus SB A original issue or Revision 01.