Dodd-Frank for Foreign Banks. New Rules of the Road

Transcription

1 Dodd-Frank for Foreign Banks New Rules of the Road

2 Introduction On December 14, 2012, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a set of new prudential standards and early remediation requirements applicable to Foreign Banking Organizations (FBOs) 1 having significant presence in the United States. One primary effect of the proposed rules is the closing of current gaps in the supervision and regulation of FBOs, reflecting a shift from long standing country-bycountry supervision. The timing of the new proposed standards for FBOs may hardly come as a surprise, considering a series of banking reforms that have already been taken up by the Federal Reserve to revive the struggling U.S. economy, which is dealing with a continued volatile and uncertain banking environment and the legacy of some of the biggest failures and bailouts of large global banks in recent times. The proposed standards would have the effect of reducing systemic risks posed by the growing influence of the FBOs in the domestic market, due to their shift from traditional lending to more complex capital market activities. Systemic risks also include the complexity and interconnectedness of the FBOs U.S. operations and the risks associated with the manner in which cross-border banking, capital and liquidity management are currently being managed at a consolidated level. The new prudential standards and early remediation requirements of Sections 165 and 166 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd- Frank Act ), once adopted, would apply to the U.S. operations of FBOs based on the size of their consolidated global and U.S. assets. The requirements outlined for FBOs are broadly consistent with their treatment of domestic banking organizations. Some of the key elements in the proposal include: Establishment of a top-tier U.S. Intermediate Holding Company (IHC); increased risk-based capital and liquidity standards; overall risk management and risk committee requirements; counterparty credit limits; and stringent stress testing standards for FBOs. The proposal also has the effect of applying additional prudential standards, other than the IHC requirement, to foreign nonbank financial companies supervised by the board. 2 This new oversight regime has potentially significant implications for FBOs in terms of how they conduct their banking and nonbanking activities in the United States. It may also result in major changes to their current governance and legal entity structures, capital and liquidity management, counterpart credit and exposure management, overall risk management and regulatory reporting requirements. The proposal s comment period closes on March 31, With most of the statutory requirements requiring a proposed implementation timeline of July, 2015, this is a critical phase for the FBOs in terms of engaging with their peer groups for broader discussions around the new rules and actively communicating their comments and responses to the Board. FBOs might also want to internally assess the impact of these rules on their current business and operating models while at the same time maintaining a careful balance between over-implementation and non-compliance. 1

3 Why New Prudential Standards for FBOs? The United States has traditionally accorded foreign banks the same national treatment as domestic banks, which has often resulted in competitive and countercyclical benefits to U.S. markets. Over the last decade, the Federal Reserve Board has provided flexibility to FBOs within its stipulated guidelines, allowing them to decide the structure of their U.S. entities to promote maximum efficiency at the consolidated level. These included setting up of cross-border branching, direct and indirect subsidiaries and other entities. The Board also allowed well-managed and well-capitalized foreign banks to conduct a wide range of bank and nonbank activities in the United States under conditions comparable to those applied to U.S. banking organizations. However, this was at a time when FBOs had a less significant presence and their operations were less complex. Over the past few years, the concentration of foreign banks and the profile of their operations have changed substantially and such changes have made FBOs both structurally diverse and complex. Along with an increase in total assets, their U.S. operations have become increasingly concentrated and more interconnected than ever before (See Appendix A for the list of FBOs with total assets of $10 billion or more). Figure 1 depicts the change in FBOs share of U.S. third party assets from 1995 to The ten largest FBOs now account for roughly two-thirds of FBOs third-party U.S. assets, up from 40 percent in The broker-dealer assets at the 10 largest FBOs have increased from 13 percent of all foreign bank third party assets in 1995 to 50 percent in Five of the top ten U.S. broker-dealers are also currently owned by FBOs. 3 As these statistics demonstrate, FBOs have grown very large and are highly interconnected with the U.S. financial system. The lessons about financial stability learned during the crisis appear to have affected the regulatory emphasis so that it addresses weaknesses observed in the current framework for supervising and regulating the U.S. operations of such large FBOs. This is critical, as any failure of such large FBOs could pose significant financial stability risks to the U.S. economy. Additionally, the Congressional mandate included in the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Board to impose enhanced prudential standards on large foreign banking organizations. Figure 1: FBOs Share of U.S. Third Party Assets Are Concentrated in the Ten Largest FBOs 3 60% 33% Top 10 FBOs % 40% Others 2

4 Summary and Scope of Proposal The Federal Reserve has taken a tiered approach in framing the Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards and remediation framework applicable to FBOs. Essentially, the proposal has been structured with levels of regulation applicable to an FBO based on the size of its global and U.S. consolidated assets. The proposal seems to be particularly stringent in dealing with FBOs having U.S. consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. Figure 2 includes a brief description of the proposed rules, key requirements of these proposed rules, communication guidelines to be followed by the FBOs and the proposed implementation timelines. 3

5 Figure 2: Dodd-Frank New Prudential Standards for FBOs 3 Dodd-Frank New Prudential Standards Proposed Requirements Summary Communication Guidelines Proposed Implementation Timelines A U.S. Intermediate Holding Company (IHC) Requirement FBOs with consolidated global assets of $50 billion or more and consolidated U.S. assets of $10 billion or more would be required to form an IHC. FBOs with combined U.S. assets of less than $10 billion would not be required to form an IHC. Nonbank financial companies would not be needed to set up an IHC. FBOs would be required to notify the Federal Reserve within 30 days of establishment of a U.S. IHC. July 1, 2015 for FBOs that meet the asset threshold on or before July 1, 2014; 12 month implementation time for FBOs that meet the asset threshold after July 1, Risk-Based Capital and Leverage Requirements FBOs with total global assets of $50 billion or more. IHCs of FBOs would be subject to the same capital adequacy standards as applicable to U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) currently. IHCs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more would be required to comply with the Fed s capital-plan rule. Separate quantitative risk-based capital surcharges proposed to U.S. IHCs deemed to be domestic systemically important banking organizations (D-SIB). FBOs would be required to provide risk-based capital and leverage information on a consolidated basis to the Board. IHCs would be required to submit a Capital Plan to the Board for approval to pay dividends and other measures. July 1, 2015 for FBOs that meet the asset threshold on or before July 1, 2014; 12 month implementation time for FBOs that meet the asset threshold after July 1, U.S. IHCs that meet the asset threshold on July 1, 2015, would be required to submit their first Capital Plan on January 5, Liquidity Requirements FBOs with combined U.S. assets of $50 billion or more. Liquidity requirements based on Fed s SR Letter 10-6 referred to as Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk Management and would be consistent with U.S. BHC requirements. FBOs would be expected to conduct an internal liquidity stress test and report the results to the Board on an annual basis. July 1, 2015 for FBOs that meet the asset threshold on or before July 1, 2014; 12 month implementation time for FBOs that meet the asset threshold after July 1,

6 Figure 2: Dodd-Frank New Prudential Standards for FBOs 3 (continued) Dodd-Frank New Prudential Standards Proposed Requirements Summary Communication Guidelines Proposed Implementation Timelines Stress Testing Would apply to all U.S. IHCs, branch and agency networks of an FBO with varying degree of stringency (based on the size of an FBO/U.S. IHC). IHCs would be subject to the same stresstesting requirements as a U.S.- based BHC of the same size. IHCs (with assets of $50 billion or more) would be required to conduct two company-run stress tests per year. IHCs (with assets between $10 billion and $50 billion) would be required to conduct an annual company-run stress test, using scenarios provided by the Fed. FBOs would be required to publicly disclose, and submit to the Federal Reserve Board all stress test results. FBOs would be required to share annual stress test results by January 5 of each year and complete mid-cycle stress tests by July 5 of each year. October 2015 for U.S. IHCs that meet the $50 billion total consolidated asset threshold as of July 1, Single Counterparty Credit Limits Would impose a two-tier, single counterparty credit limit on FBOs: a) Would impose a 25 percent net credit exposure limit between a U.S. IHC or the combined U.S. operations of an FBO and a single unaffiliated counterparty. b) Would impose a net credit exposure limit between a U.S. IHC or an FBO with total consolidated assets of $500 billion or more and financial counterparties of similar size. As per December 2011 proposal, the limit has been proposed to 10 percent. Would except intraday credit exposure to a counterparty. FBOs would be required to submit a monthly compliance report demonstrating their daily compliance to the proposed rules. FBOs that meet the asset threshold of $50 billion/$500 billion by July 1, 2014, would need to be compliant by July 1, This timeframe would also cover U.S. IHCs to be setup on July 1, month timeframe for FBOs that meet the asset threshold after July 1, Risk Management and Risk Committee Any FBO with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets and publicly traded would need to establish and maintain a U.S. Risk Committee at the board level. Also would apply to FBOs with $50 billion or more in consolidated assets (with or without publicly traded stocks). FBOs with $50 billion or more in U.S. assets would be required to employ a U.S. CRO (Chief Risk Officer) with appropriate governance structure as defined by the Federal Reserve Board. FBOs would be required to certify to the Fed that the risk committee oversees the U.S. risk management practices of the company and has qualified members with appropriate risk management expertise. Risk Committee Certification Requirement: July 1,

7 Figure 2: Dodd-Frank New Prudential Standards for FBOs 3 (continued) Dodd-Frank New Prudential Standards Proposed Requirements Summary Communication Guidelines Proposed Implementation Timelines Debt-to-equity Limits If the Federal Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) determined at any point of time that FBOs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more pose a grave threat to U.S. financial stability and a leverage limitation is necessary to mitigate that threat then such FBOs would be required to maintain a debt-toequity ratio of less than or equal to 15:1 at the U.S. IHC level. For U.S. branch and agency network of the FBOs, there would be a 108% U.S. asset maintenance requirement. FBOs would receive written notification from the council if they pose a threat to U.S. financial stability. In such cases, leverage limitation would be required. Debt-to-equity ratio limitation would be effective on the effective date of the final rule. Within 180 calendar days from the date of receipt of the notice, the FBO would be required to come into compliance with the proposal s requirements. Early Remediation Would establish remediation triggers with an aim to minimize the probability of FBOs becoming insolvent. An FBO with combined U.S. assets of $50 billion or more that breaches an early remediation trigger would be subject to a set of non-discretionary remediation actions with the potential for discretionary remediation actions imposed on its U.S. operations. This framework would prescribe 4 trigger levels to be monitored by the Federal Reserve. Level 1 - Heightened Supervisory Review Level 2 - Initial Remediation Level 3 - Recovery The Federal Reserve Board has indicated an intention to notify the large FBO s home country supervisor, the primary regulators of its U.S. offices and subsidiaries and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the large FBO s U.S. operations enter into or change remediation levels. FBOs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more on July 1, 2014 would be required to comply with proposed early remediation requirements on July 1, month timeframe for FBOs that meet the asset threshold after July 1, Level 4 - Resolution Assessment The proposed triggers would be based on capital, stress tests, risk management, liquidity risk management, and market indicators. 6

8 Potential Implications for Foreign Banking Organizations The proposed prudential standards would have profound implications for the FBOs as they pose a direct challenge to their current business and operating models. However, the exact extent of the ramifications would be difficult to assess at this point as it would be different for each FBO and dependent upon each FBO s requirements. Impact on business model The proposed rules would have a significant impact on the FBOs current business models as they would be required to introduce more discipline and maturity in terms of allocation and holding of capital within their various U.S. legal entities, not just at the parent company level. This is something that FBOs generally have not been doing until now. FBOs might be forced to take up a host of new activities such as altering their current legal structures, scouting for potential new sources of capital to inject into their U.S. units, moving broker-dealer operations to other geographic areas, relocating activities from U.S. subsidiaries into their U.S. branch and agency networks, and undertaking regulatory arbitrage to avoid non-compliance and tax implications. FBOs with a smaller presence might also be forced to look into the option of pulling back from U.S. markets. Impact on operating model The proposed prudential standards might also have a significant impact on the FBOs current operating models. FBOs might be required to develop a more robust information management ecosystem that is much more flexible, keeping in mind that there could be additional new rules incorporated into the already complex FBO regulation landscape. There could be more focus on an enterprise-wide data management strategy that allows for easy access to both structured and unstructured data, along with shared access and rapid integration of both existing and new data sources. This could be especially relevant for the new data and reporting requirements under the Single Counterparty Credit Limits that propose sharing of monthly/daily compliance reports with the Board. Such new requirements might put enormous pressure on the FBOs current processes, tools and resources. However, the biggest challenge for FBOs could be to drive costs down, both by keeping a close eye on capacity constraints and by striking a fine balance between leveraging existing internal solutions and investing in new solutions. As seen in Figure 3 below, the impact of new rules on the FBOs varies based on their asset size. The potential impact analysis (No/Low Impact, Medium Impact and High Impact) performed is qualitative in nature and tries to assess the extent and scale of changes that might come into play based on the FBOs current business and operating models and infrastructure capabilities. It is evident that the largest FBOs those with both global and U.S. assets of $50 billion or more are the most affected. It is also clear that the proposal s most challenging aspect for the FBOs could be the formation of an IHC that meets the additional prudential standards. The creation of such IHCs could also have significant tax implications for the FBOs as profit after tax (PAT) figures and dividend payouts might be affected as well. The leverage ratio requirements mandated by the proposal would have important implications, especially for FBOs that have large U.S. broker-dealer subsidiaries, as these requirements have the effect of increasing the current capital requirements proposed by Basel III. Another potentially burdensome aspect of the proposal for the FBOs is the requirement to hold liquidity buffers at both the IHC and the U.S. branch and agency network levels. This would significantly alter the current liquidity buffers held and managed on a centralized basis. The U.S. branches and networks that have significantly contributed to the funding needs of the parent company and other non- U.S. affiliates in the past would now be required to demonstrate adequate capital resources to withstand stressful conditions on their own. FBOs could be required to look at alternate funding sources to meet their capital and expansion needs outside the U.S. FBOs could also find it challenging for their IHCs to maintain the 25 percent threshold of their capital in terms of their net credit exposure to any single unaffiliated counterparty. Public disclosure of stress tests as mandated by the proposed rules could also force FBOs and their U.S. IHCs to maintain more market discipline, as any asymmetry in the results could lead to markets reacting negatively and decreasing their market capitalization. Figure 4 summarizes some of the key implications for FBOs as a result of the enhanced prudential standards coming into play. 7

9 Figure 3: Potential Impact of New Rules on FBOs Global Assets Only ($10 B - $50 B) Global Assets > $50 B U.S. Assets > $50 B Global Assets > $50 B U.S. Assets < $50 B U.S. Intermediate Holding Company Risk-Based Capital and Leverage Requirements Liquidity Requirements Single Counterparty Credit Limits Risk Management and Risk Committee Stress Testing Debt-to-Equity Limits Early Remediation Framework No/Low Impact Medium Impact High Impact Source: Accenture Note: This is a qualitative assessment only based on Accenture s internal research on the impact of the proposed rules on an FBO s business and operating model. Figure 4: Potential Implications of New Prudential Standards Governance/Legal Entity Structure Regulatory/Reporting Requirements Operational Costs Data and Technology Potential Implications Review/restructure current legal entities. Create new IHCs that meet new prudential standards. Conduct new risk assessment criteria for the IHCs/restructured legal entities based on: Degree and type of regulation. Primary and secondary activities. Raise higher capital and hold it captive at U.S. IHC level to meet stress testing and failure scenarios. Comply with new regulatory reporting requirements in line with FR Y-7Q. Separate reporting requirements for U.S. IHCs. Significant impact on reporting requirements as daily/ monthly compliance requirements would need to be met (credit limits, credit exposures). Need for a new risk management and compliance infrastructure for U.S. entities could increase operational costs for FBOs. IHCs subject to the Fed s CCAR (Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review) which would mean deployment of new tools, processes and human resources thereby adding to operational costs. Changes to existing data management strategy due to increased focus on data quality, availability, storage and retention. Changes to Counterparty Exposure Calculation/ Management Systems. Discontinue maintaining liquid buffers at central level and introduce them at a more granular entity level. Source: Accenture 8

10 Next Steps for FBOs It is important to note that the Federal Reserve has provided sufficient time in terms of receiving comments on the additional prudential standards with a deadline of March 31, 2013 as well as an extended phase-in period until July 1, 2015 for implementing the proposed requirements. However, it is still critical that FBOs consider initiating the following activities early as part of their efforts to have a smooth path to implementation: Internal core committee Forming an internal core committee to perform a thorough assessment of the proposed rules and their impact on overall business strategy, examining areas such as the cost of the U.S. operations, exit strategy (if feasible) including relocation to other geographies, and product rationalization based on new cost structures. Prioritizing the proposed rules based on size of the organization, profile of U.S. business and entities, complexity of the activities and other elements. Establishing representation from LOBs (Lines of Businesses), Operations, Risk and Systems (IT) while agreeing on the next steps and taking key decisions. External communication Actively engaging in external communication with other FBOs, industry trade groups and forums. Developing a list of issues and concerns and engaging in dialogue with the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Providing responses to the FRB before the comment period ends March 31, Communicating with home country regulators concerning the possible implications. Final Words It seems unlikely that there will be any major modifications to the proposed standards in terms of regulating FBOs. Political pressures and the current situation of the U.S. economy seems to indicate that policymakers might not be keen to make any radical changes to the proposed rules. However, in recognition of the implications of the proposed rules on FBOs, the proposal includes more than 100 questions inviting comments from the banking community. The rules have so far drawn mixed responses from FBOs and trade groups. Whether the new rules mark a paradigm shift on the part of the Fed s policy goals or merely represent an act of over-regulation, only time will tell. 9

11 Appendix A List of FBOs with assets of $10 billion or more (Reporting Period - quarter ended September 30, 2012) # Name City State Type Total Assets (in $ billion) 1 DEUTSCHE BK AG NY BR New York NY USB CREDIT AGRICOLE CORPORAT NY BR New York NY USB BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA NY AGY New York NY USA BANK TOK-MIT UFJ NY BR New York NY USB MIZUHO CORPORATE NY BR New York NY USB SUMITOMO MITSUI BKG NY BR New York NY USB NORINCHUKIN BK NY BR New York NY USB CREDIT SUISSE NY BR New York NY USB BNP PARIBAS EQUITABLE TOWER BR New York NY USB BANK OF MONTREAL CHICAGO BR Chicago IL USB RABOBANK NEDERLAND NY BR New York NY USB TORONTO-DOMINION BK NY BR New York NY USB SOCIETE GENERALE NY BR New York NY USB BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA HOU BR Houston TX USB STANDARD CHARTERED BK NY BR New York NY USB BARCLAYS BK PLC PARK AVE BR New York NY USB BANK OF CHINA NY BR New York NY IFB ROYAL BK CAN THRE WRLD FNCL BR New York NY UFB UBS AG WM AVE OF THE AMERS BR New York NY UFB UBS AG STAMFORD BR Stamford CT USB SVENSKA HANDELS AB PUBL NY BR New York NY USB DEXIA CREDIT LOCAL NY BR New York NY USB NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BK NY BR New York NY UFB CANADIAN IMPERIAL BK NY AGY New York NY USA ROYAL BK OF SCOTLAND PLC NY BR New York NY USB NORDEA BK FINLAND PLC NY BR New York NY USB SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA NY BR New York NY USB SUMITOMO MITSUI TR BK NY BR New York NY USB PORTIGON AG NY BR New York NY USB MITSUBISHI UFJ TR & BKG NY BR New York NY USB DNB BK ASA NY BR New York NY USB NATIXIS 1251 AVE OF AMERS BR New York NY USB WESTPAC BKG CORP NY BR New York NY UFB BANCO DO BRASIL SA NY BR New York NY USB AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND NY BR New York NY UFB SWEDBANK AB NY BR New York NY USB NATIONAL BK OF CANADA NY BR New York NY USB COMMONWEALTH BK OF AUS NY BR New York NY UFB BAYERISCHE LANDESBANK NY BR New York NY UFB BANCO SANTANDER SA NY BR New York NY USB CREDIT INDUS ET CMRL NY BR New York NY USB INTESA SANPAOLO SPA NY BR New York NY USB LLOYDS TSB BK PLC NY BR New York NY USB Source: ibanknet, accessed at: 10

12 Author Amit Gupta Amit is a managing director - Capital Markets Risk Management. Based in New York, Amit has over 15 years of risk consulting and capital markets industry experience delivering strategic solutions in a wide variety of client situations. He has extensive experience in assessing market risk and credit risk capabilities and helping clients enhance their risk governance, risk processes, analytics and implementing risk systems. Amit helps clients in their efforts to increase their organizational focus on proactive risk measures and to better leverage their enterprise risk management capabilities. Luther Klein Luther is a managing director - North American Banking Risk & Regulatory Management, Risk Management. Based in Atlanta, Luther brings over 14 years of extensive experience in financial services leading complex risk management, compliance and analytics initiatives at large banking and capital markets organizations. With his technical experience in Dodd-Frank, Basel II, Basel III, Counterparty Credit Risk, ALLL, capital management, stress testing (CCAR), model governance, operational risk, and compliance, and in functional areas such as process re-engineering, operating model design, investment governance and M&A, Luther guides financial institutions on the road to high performance. Jeff Jamison Jeff is a senior manager Banking, Risk Management, and is based in Philadelphia. Jeff has over 9 years of consulting and industry experience in the financial services and the risk management space with clients across North America. His extensive experience leading strategic assessments of risk management functions, enhancing credit risk and compliance capabilities, defining business architecture and operating model strategy, and improving risk controls and governance helps executives and their firms become high-performance businesses. Copyright 2015 Accenture All rights reserved. Accenture, its Signature, and High Performance Delivered are trademarks of Accenture. Shiv Shankar Panda Shiv is a manager Financial Services, Risk Management. Based in Atlanta, Shiv has over 9 years of consulting experience in financial services and risk management with clients across North America. He brings extensive experience in leading business analysis and strategic assessments of risk management functions, including institutional credit modeling and exposure management, business architecture and operating model strategy, helping clients become high-performance businesses. About Accenture Accenture is a global management consulting, technology services and outsourcing company, with more than 323,000 people serving clients in more than 120 countries. Combining unparalleled experience, comprehensive capabilities across all industries and business functions, and extensive research on the world s most successful companies, Accenture collaborates with clients to help them become high-performance businesses and governments. The company generated net revenues of US$30.0 billion for the fiscal year ended Aug. 31, Its home page is About Accenture Management Consulting Accenture is a leading provider of management consulting services worldwide. Drawing on the extensive experience of its 16,000 management consultants globally, Accenture Management Consulting works with companies and governments to achieve high performance by combining broad and deep industry knowledge with functional capabilities to provide services in Strategy, Analytics, Customer Relationship Management, Finance & Enterprise Performance, Operations, Risk Management, Sustainability, and Talent and Organization. About Accenture Risk Management Accenture Risk Management consulting services work with clients to create and implement integrated risk management capabilities designed to gain higher economic returns, improve shareholder value and increase stakeholder confidence. References Frierson, R. d. (2012). Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Foreign Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies. Federal Reserve System. Accessed at: gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/fbo_fr_ notice_ pdf Polk, D. (2012). Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for Foreign Banking Organizations. Davis Polk. Accessed at: d955.../121712_prudential.pdf Thacher, S. (2012). New Regulatory Framework for Foreign Banks with U.S. Operations Accessed at: pub1555.pdf 1 International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C et seq.) and Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (12 U.S.C note). For purposes of this document, a foreign banking organization is a foreign bank that has a banking presence in the United States by virtue of operating a branch, agency, or commercial lending company subsidiary in the United States or controlling a bank in the United States; or any company of which the foreign bank is a subsidiary. 2 A foreign nonbank financial company supervised by the Board is a nonbank financial company incorporated or organized in a country other than the United States that the Council has designated for Board supervision. 3 Federal Reserve, Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Foreign Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies. Accessed at: federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/ FBO_FR_notice_ pdf Disclaimer This document is intended for general informational purposes only, does not take into account the reader s specific circumstances, and may not reflect the most current developments. Accenture disclaims, to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, all liability for the accuracy and completeness of the information in this document and for any acts or omissions made based on such information. Accenture does not provide legal, regulatory, audit or tax advice. Readers are responsible for obtaining such advice from their own legal counsel or other licensed professional