Marine Incidents in Victoria Investigation of an incident between Frigate WARRAMUNGA & Tugs STOCKTON & VITAL Public Report No. 1 27 October 2000
Contents Summary... 4 Sources of Information... 5 NUSHIP WARRAMUNGA... 5 BRIDGE TAPE RECORDER... 5 TUG STOCKTON... 5 TUG VITAL... 5 Acknowledgments... 5 Narrative... 6 Comment & Analysis... 7 WARRAMUNGA... 7 UNDOCKING MANOEUVRE... 7 DAMAGE TO TUG STOCKTON... 8 REPORTING OF INCIDENT... 8 MASTER S QUALIFICATIONS - WARRAMUNGA... 8 Conclusions... 9 PRIMARY FACTOR...9 SECONDARY FACTORS... 9 Ship Particulars... 10 NUSHIP WARRAMUNGA... 10 Tug Particulars... 11 STOCKTON... 11 VITAL... 11 Lessons Learned... 12 PRE DEPARTURE MEETINGS... 12 QUALIFICATIONS... 12 BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT... 12 MANDATORY PILOTAGE... 12 QUALIFIED SEAMEN... 12 METHOD OF SECURING TUG S TOWLINES... 12 VESSEL/ TUG COMMUNICATIONS... 13 OFF LIMIT AREAS... 13 2
Nuship Warramunga
Summary On the morning of 27 October 2000 Nuship 1 Warramunga departed from Nelson Pier East to proceed into Port Phillip Bay via the Williamstown and Port Melbourne Channels, to conduct builder s trials. To assist with the manoeuvre tug Vital was made fast on the port bow and tug Stockton was made fast on the port side, aft. Both tugs used their own lines. The Master was stationed alone on the bridge top (with the rest of the bridge team positioned in the wheelhouse and adjacent bridge wings). He had a handheld portable VHF radio to use for communicating with the tugs and a hand-held wandering-lead microphone to relay his helm and engine orders to the bridge. Replies to these orders were heard through adjacent fixed loud speakers. The manoeuvre of Warramunga backing out from Nelson Pier east and swinging head to port to line up the Williamstown Channel was routine until Warramunga started to gather head-way to transit the channel. Shortly thereafter, with the tug lines still made fast, Stockton became quickly girded, heeling to an angle of between 60 and 70 degrees to port, causing the tug to take water over the port gunwale, into the galley and into the auxiliary fuel tank through the deck breather pipe. This condition continued until the tug s towline parted, causing the tug to violently right itself. As a consequence, three of the crew entered the sea. The crewmembers were subsequently rescued from the sea by the tug Stockton. Both tugs returned to their berth at Ann Street. Warramunga resumed its passage down the Williamstown Channel. 1 Nuship is a term used by the RAN to designate a new ship under construction, before commissioning. 4
Sources of Information Nuship Warramunga Master Nav. Officer Chief Engineer Quartermaster A/Foscle Officer Q deck Comms Written Statements / verbal interviews Bridge Tape Recorder Tug Stockton Master Engineer Deckhands Written Statements / verbal interviews Tug Vital Master Engineer Deckhand Written Statements / verbal interviews Acknowledgments The inspector acknowledges the cooperation of the Warramunga s Master and crew. The inspector acknowledges the cooperation of the Stockton s Master and crew. The inspector acknowledges the cooperation of Vital s Master and crew. The inspector acknowledges the cooperation of Tenix s Test and Trials Manager and Occupational Health and Safety Manager. Photographs and data of Warrumunga obtained from the RAN s Warrumunga website. Images depicting girding of Stockton provided by Tenix Defence Systems. 5
Narrative At 0857 on 27 October 2000, Warramunga departed from Nelson Pier East, Williamstown, and proceeded to back out and swing head to Port to line up the Williamstown Channel. Warramunga proceeded on sea trials with a hybrid crew consisting of a Trials Master contracted to Tenix Defence Systems, a Navigator currently serving with the RAN, an Engineering Officer employed by Tenix and focsle and quarterdeck parties composed of Tenix employees. The Passage Plan was prepared by the Navigating Officer and approved by the Master. Prior to sailing, the Master briefed the Focsle and Quarterdeck Officers of the intended undocking manoeuvre, and established VHF radio (channel 2) as the tug/ship working channel. An initial problem with the Master s handheld VHF was rectified prior to departure. The principal members of the Bridge Team at the time of the incident consisted of the Master (positioned alone on top of the bridge roof) and the Navigating Officer and the Quartermaster on the Bridge. The tug Vital was made fast on the port shoulder. The tug Stockton was made fast on the port quarter. Both used tug s lines. Shortly after departing the berth, and prior to the incident, Warramunga had a minor malfunction on the follow up system of the starboard propeller, while using Bridge Control. This problem was quickly resolved when the engine control was switched over to the Machinery Control Room. By 0903 Warramunga had commenced steaming down the Williamstown Channel to depart the Port of Melbourne. At 0904 both tugs were urgently ordered to slip. At this stage Warramunga was building up speed to approximately 11 knots. Vital managed to slip, albeit with some difficulty after twice asking Warramunga (by VHF) to slow down. This request was not acknowledged. Stockton, although steaming full astern on both engines, was unable to be slipped from Warramunga and the towline subsequently parted. This occurred 28 seconds after the order to slip (ie. approximately 1 minute and 43 seconds after both main engines were ordered to 40% ahead). At the time of the towline parting, Stockton was in a fully girded attitude (being pulled sideways by the towline) at a list of between 60 to 70 degrees. 6
Comment & Analysis Warramunga Warramunga is an Anzac Class Frigate of 3800 tonnes full load displacement with an overall length of 118 metres. The warship was built by Tenix Defence Systems Pty Ltd, Williamstown, Victoria for the Royal Australian Navy. Warramunga was departing on builder s sea trials at the time of the incident. Undocking Manoeuvre The technique used to manoeuvre the Warramunga from Nelson Pier East to the Williamstown Channel is a basic and standard procedure that has been used by Tenix for all ship trials during the past 10 years. Up until Warramunga started moving ahead down the Williamstown Channel, there was no indication of anything untoward with the manoeuvre. Shortly thereafter, however, it became apparent that a serious situation was developing - the tug Stockton was being girded by Warramunga at an angle of 60 to 70 degrees. Before Warramunga could take any corrective action, the tug s towline broke, causing the Stockton to violently right itself and causing three of the crew to enter the sea. These men were subsequently rescued by Stockton, after which the tug returned to its berth at Ann Street Williamstown. The Warramunga resumed steaming down the Channel. Figure 2: Girding of Stockton 7
Damage to Tug Stockton One crewmember sustained a minor injury to the left side of his head. A towline was broken. The tug s galley sustained minor water damage. Minor fuel contamination was caused when water entered into the auxiliary fuel tank through the breather pipe situated on the main deck, port side. The tug s accommodation sustained minor water damage. The Chief Engineer lost his wallet and mobile telephone whilst he was in the water. Reporting of Incident It is a statutory requirement for owners and Masters of commercial vessels in Victorian Waters to report a marine incident. The incident was not reported in a timely fashion. Stockton reported the incident to Harbour Control three hours after the event Warramunga failed to report the incident altogether. Master s Qualifications - Warramunga At the time of the incident the Master did not hold a valid certificate of competency as a Master Class 1 as required by the Marine Act 1988 and Marine Regulations 1999. The Master s qualifications were below the requirements needed by the Master of an Australian Registered Merchant Ship (with a valid Master Class 1 Certificate of Competency) to obtain a Port Phillip Pilotage Exemption Certificate, under the Marine Act 1988. 8
Conclusions These conclusions identify the factors contributing to the incident, and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Primary Factor Warramunga commenced steaming ahead (both engines placed at ahead position at 40%) for 1 minute and 15 seconds before the Master ordered the tugs to be slipped. At this stage, Warramunga s speed would have been approaching 11 knots. Secondary Factors The Master isolated himself from the rest of the Bridge Navigating Team by positioning himself alone on the Bridge top. This action contravenes established Bridge Resource Management procedures, and it had the undesirable result of effectively isolating the Master from the other members of the Bridge Team. The Focsle and Quarterdeck parties had relatively little experience in tughandling operations. These persons are seconded from various parts of the Dockyard and act as seamen whilst the ship is on trials. Although these persons are trained by Tenix to a basic seamanship level, they are not professional seamen and cannot be expected to act, think and perform as such, particularly when handling ship s and tug s lines in an emergency. The investigation revealed that Warramunga s hand-held VHF radios, used for tug and ship communications, were insufficient for the task. Tug Vital 9
Ship Particulars Nuship Warramunga Built By Tenix Defence Systems Pty Ltd Keel Laid July 1997 Launched 23 May 1998 Length 118m Beam 14.8m Full Load Displacement Speed Range at 18 Kts Complement Machinery 3,800 tonnes >27 knots >6,000 nautical miles 164 officers and ratings CODOG (combination diesel or gas turbine system) Twin MTU diesels for cruise and one LM 2500 gas turbine for speed Twin controllable pitch propellers 10
Tug Particulars Stockton Gross Tonnage Length Breadth Draft Engine Bollard of Pull 70 Tons 15 Metres 6 Metres 1.5 (F) 2.6 (A) 2 x Caterpillar 300 Kilowatts 10 Tons Number of Crew 4 Vital Gross Tonnage Length Breadth Engine Bollard of Pull N/A 21.21 Metres N/A 2 x Caterpillar 289 Kilowatts (each) 10 Tons Number of Crew 4 11
Lessons Learned One of the most important facets of incident investigations is to promulgate the resulting outcomes, implemented or recommended, to prevent a recurrence. This section lists some of the outcomes following the investigation of this incident. Pre Departure Meetings Prior to preceding on sea trials, newbuild Naval ships should convene a tool-box meeting involving the Pilot, ship and tug masters and key deck personnel, to plan the logistics of the intended operation. Qualifications A review of the qualifications required to act as Master of a vessel such as the Warramunga should be done prior to proceeding on sea trials. Bridge Resource Management The Master should command the ship from the vessel s bridge, in accordance with current Bridge Resource Management procedures. This would have allowed the Master to act in a fully integrated manner with the Bridge Team to coordinate the operation of the vessel. In this way errors and omissions are more likely to be noticed and corrected before escalating into a serious incident. Mandatory Pilotage There must be a licensed Pilot or Pilot- Exempt Master on board advising the ship s Master at all times while the vessel is navigating within the designated Pilotage Waters of Victoria. Qualified Seamen Seamanship duties during Sea Trials should only be performed by experienced seafarers. This could be achieved by having additional advanced training and testing programs both within Dockyards and on board the vessel to be trialed. Method of Towlines Stockton Securing Tug s When towing over the stern the towline should not be made fast on the tug s H bits, but instead placed on the towing hook to allow the line to be readily slipped in an emergency. Because sea trials of this vessel class are performed frequently, consideration should be given to having a specially designed towing line made up to the required length with an eye on each end. This would allow the eye to be placed on the tug s towing hook. Warramunga The eye of the towline should be preferably secured to a quick release slip, or turned up on a bollard with the eye forming a loose tail. 12
Emergency Axe An axe for emergency use should be readily available on both the ship and tugs when mooring lines and towlines are being handled. Vessel/ Tug Communications It is important that inter-ship / tug VHF communications be appropriately established and tested prior to sea trials being conducted. In addition, a back-up system of intership / tug whistle signals should be devised for use in an emergency. Off Limit Areas As an additional precaution against incidents occurring, the ship s Bridge, Focsle, Quarterdeck and Machinery Control Room should be designated by signage and policy as Off Limit Areas to all personnel other than those authorised for safe navigation. 13