Office of Research and Engineering Safety Study Report: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft Study Overview Joseph Kolly

NTSB Research Mandate Title 49 United States Code, Chapter 11: The Board also shall carry out special studies and investigations about transportation t ti safety, including avoiding personal injury; 2

Why was this topic selected? Investigators began addressing accidents with glass cockpit-enabled airplanes Identified as an Emerging Technology Issue This study represents the Board s initial look into an important topic 3

The Traditional Cockpit Instrumentation 4

A New Light Aircraft Glass Cockpit 5

Light Aircraft Models Columbia Diamond Piper Cessna Mooney 6 Cirrus

A Narrow Window of Research Opportunity 7

The Research Questions Quantitative Analysis Has the introduction of glass cockpits made general aviation safer? Qualitative ti Analysis Has the general aviation industry been properly prepared for the glass cockpit technology e.g., are training and FAA oversight adequate? Case Study Review 8 What have we learned from the case studies of light aircraft glass cockpit accidents?

Organizations Providing Assistance to the Study Federal Aviation Administration General Aviation Manufacturers Association Cessna Aircraft Company Cirrus Design Corporation 9

Office of Research and Engineering Safety Study Report: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft Quantitative Analysis Results Loren Groff

Quantitative Analysis Goals Identify operational differences between two groups of aircraft Determine effect of glass cockpits on safety Comparisons Accident information Aircraft activity Accident rates 12

Study Aircraft Single-engine piston airplanes, built 2002-2006 with both conventional and glass cockpits Two cohorts identified by serial number and aircraft registry Conventional (2,848 aircraft) Glass Cockpit (5,516 aircraft) 13

Study Aircraft Makes/Models Cessna Aircraft Corporation - 172, 182, and 206 series Cirrus Design Corporation - SR20 and SR22 Diamond Aircraft - DA40 Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company - 300/350, and 400 Mooney - M20 series Piper Aircraft Inc. - PA-28-161 161, PA-28-181 181, PA-28-201 201, PA-32-301 301 series, and PA-46-350P Hawker Beechcraft Corporation - 36 series 14

Statistical Comparisons Accident Flights Accident severity Time of day, planned length, purpose, weather conditions, flight plan, phase and event details Accident Pilots Number of flight crew, age, highest certificate, instrument rating, flight hours 15

Accident Data, 2002-2008 NTSB accident investigation records for U.S. registered aircraft 266 total accidents Conventional = 141 total, 23 fatal Glass Cockpit = 125 total, 39 fatal Sufficient data to make statistical comparisons 16

100% Glass Cockpit Cohort, 2002 2008 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 17

2002-2008 Accident Data 100% Study Accidents Resulting in Fatality 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 16% 31% Conventional Glass Cockpit 18

2002-2008 Accident Data - Flights Conventional Glass Cockpit Purpose of flight Instructional Personal/business Planned length Local/shorter flights Longer flights Flight plan Visual/none More instrument 19

2002-2008 Accident Data - Flights Conventional More during ground phases like taxi, takeoff, and landing More loss of control on ground and hard landings Glass Cockpit 20 More during flight phases like climb, cruise, and approach More loss of control in flight, collision with terrain, and weather encounters

2002-2008 Accident Data - Pilots Conventional Glass Cockpit Flight crew More single pilot Pilot age Younger Older Pilot certificate More students More private pilots Instrument rating More instrument - rated Total flight hours Less More 21

Activity Data Manufacturing and registration records supplemented with FAA GAATAA Survey Data Subset of survey responses from study aircraft Activity data for 2006 and 2007 Used to calculate accident rates 22

2006-2007 Activity Data Glass Cockpit Fewer hours per aircraft Higher percentage of hours flown for personal/business Lower percentage of hours for instructional flights Higher percentage of hours flown in IMC 23

2006-2007 Accident Rates 5.0 2.5 4.0 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 Fatal Accidents Accidents per 100,000 per 100,000 Flight Hours 371 3.71 377 3.77 1.03 043 0.43 Conventional Glass Cockpit 24

Summary of Results Lower total accident rates for glass cockpit cohort Higher fatal rate for glass cockpit cohort Accidents reflect differences in aircraft use that might explain differences in accident severity Pattern of results does not show a safety benefit for glass cockpit group during the studied period 25

Office of Research and Engineering Safety Study Report: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft Qualitative Analysis Results Loren Groff

Safety Issues Identified Training requirements Pilot information about system failure modes Equipment-specific training and resources Equipment malfunction and service difficulty reporting 28

Issue 1: Training Manufacturers Provide training that includes aircraft systems Included in purchase price of new aircraft Insurance providers Vary by pilot and company Typically exceed regulatory requirements 29

Issue 1: Training FAA 30 Developed FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS) in response to new advanced aircraft Included generic glass cockpit avionic information in manuals and handbooks Did not include specific training i or testing ti requirements Has not yet updated knowledge tests Staff has proposed recommendations in this area

Issue 2: System Failure Modes Luna, NM: April 9, 2007 Pilot reported loss of airspeed and altimeter readouts on PFD Subsequent loss of control Ballistic parachute recovery 31

Issue 2: System Failure Modes Airspeed 32

Issue 2: System Failure Modes Airspeed Altitude Vertical speed 33

Issue 2: System Failure Modes Aircraft flight manual (AFM) is required to include information about equipment malfunctions The AFM supplement did not include system input failure information Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area 34

Issue 3: Equipment-Specific Training Wide variation in glass cockpit avionics system design and operation between manufacturers Software-based systems can be modified 35

36 Conventional Attitude Indicator

Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS) 37

Issue 3: Equipment-Specific Training Experience with conventional instruments and/or generalized training do not adequately prepare p pilots to operate glass cockpit avionics Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area 38

Simulator Training Not possible or prudent to demonstrate all failure modes in the aircraft Approved flight simulators may not be available to all GA pilots 39

PC-based Trainer 40

Simulator Training Software applications or procedural trainers could be used for equipment- specific avionics training Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area 41

Issue 4: Tracking Equipment Reliability Coconut Creek, FL: Jan. 15, 2005 Loss of control in IMC Pilot reported unspecified avionics problem Multiple prior PFD replacements 42

Tracking Equipment Reliability FAA requires manufacturers to report select equipment problems FAA Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) System Required for Parts 121, 135, and 125 Not required for General Aviation No SDR records for the accident aircraft 43

Tracking Equipment Reliability FAA is reviewing Part 23 certification FAA/Industry process study cited SDR reporting deficiencies Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area 44

Summary Anticipated safety improvements were not evident in the study Additional equipment information, training, and malfunction reporting are needed 45