PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY. Damage stability of cruise passenger ships: Monitoring and assessing risk from operation of watertight doors

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E MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 93rd session Agenda item 6 MSC 93/6/9 11 March 2014 Original: ENGLISH PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY Damage stability of cruise passenger ships: Monitoring and assessing risk from operation of watertight doors Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) SUMMARY Executive summary: This document provides a tangible output from the Cruise Ship Safety Forum related to monitoring and assessing risk from operation of watertight doors on board cruise ships and to enhance survivability after flooding. These proposed guidelines are intended to drive a step change in safety on new and existing cruise passenger ships. Strategic direction: 5.2 High-level action: 5.2.1 Planned output: 5.2.1.13 Action to be taken: Paragraph 26 Related documents: None Background 1 The Cruise Ship Safety Forum (CSSF) is a consortium of cruise ship operators, shipyards, classification societies, and the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) that began in 2002 to advance cruise ship safety in a coordinated and focused manner. 2 As part of the global cruise industry's ongoing efforts to review and improve safety measures, CLIA is pleased to inform the Committee that the CSSF has developed proposals related to damage stability of cruise ships, including solutions for newbuilding and existing ships, that can be used to promote industry-wide policies and drive a step change in safety on cruise ships. 3 Specifically, the CSSF has developed four outputs related to damage stability of cruise passenger ships that CLIA has submitted to the Committee for consideration under document MSC 93/6/6. This particular output, as laid out below, contains proposed draft

Page 2 guidelines for monitoring and assessing risk from operation of watertight doors on board cruise ships and to enhance survivability after flooding. Introduction 4 Effective use of watertight doors on passenger ships is essential for the safety of the ship, the passengers and the crew on board. Watertight doors have been installed for a purpose and will inevitably be used when the ship is in operation. The purpose of these guidelines is to establish procedures to be followed to assess and reduce risk related to the use of watertight doors on a specific ship or on a class of ships. Procedures 5 The procedure for monitoring and assessing risk from operation of watertight doors consist of the following steps:.1 monitor use of watertight doors on board;.2 analyse results; and.3 impose corrective actions as found necessary. 6 These steps should be reiterated on a regular basis on board a specific ship. 7 Analyses of results may take place ashore or could be done on board when the pre-calculated results (value of A for open doors) are available. 8 Reference is also made here to the proposed simplified calculation of the attained subdivision index A (MSC 93/6/8). 9 To ensure the proper functioning of the watertight doors at all times and to reduce the risk of injury to personnel, details of enhanced inspection of watertight doors on board are included. Step 1: Monitoring the use of watertight doors on board 10 For a minimum 2 week period, depending on the operational pattern of a ship, record the opening and closing of all watertight doors on board the ship, together with the operational area (hazardous condition), the weather conditions (significant wave height, wind speed) in addition to any other conditions or provisions that could have an impact on the assessment of the risk. Time of day/night when doors are open should also be recorded. 11 Any doors open for a period longer than the opening/closing time necessary for passing through (i.e. not less than 80 s for the purpose of this study) should be recorded and considered as open in the analyses. 12 Definitions of hazardous condition for operation should follow a standard definition as given below in figures 1 and 2, by defining green (low risk), yellow (medium risk) and red (high risk) condition depending on visibility, traffic density and distance to shore. A ship operator may select its own risk matrixes.

Page 3 Figure 1: Watch condition risk factors Figure 2: Risk analysis and watch condition matrix

Page 4 13 Additional risk elements such as operation under ice condition or in areas with unreliable depth soundings should also be taken in to consideration. Step 2: Analyse results 14 The records from step 1 should then be used to calculate the attained subdivision index A for all conditions where one or more doors have been open longer than it takes to open, pass through, and close, using the following assumptions:.1 only watertight doors open for a period longer than the opening/closing time necessary for passing through and consequent flooding through these doors without taking into account the effect of any door closed in an emergency;.2 refer to Proposed simplified calculation of the attained subdivision index A (MSC 93/6/8); and.3 final stage of flooding only. 15 More extensive calculations may be carried out subject to the availability of software tools. The same software and basic assumptions should be used for calculating attained subdivision index A for all doors closed and index A for open door conditions. Step 3: Assessments, evaluating and use of results 16 The analyses in step 2 should show the real use of watertight doors on board as a function of time and should provide the value of attained subdivision index A when one or more watertight doors are left open for a longer period of time than is necessary for the opening, passing through, and closing. 17 The following data should provide the output needed for further analyses:.1 identification of watertight doors frequently kept open for longer periods of time than necessary to pass through;.2 identification of watertight doors kept open for longest periods of time;.3 time of day/night when doors are kept open..4 actual mean value of index A during the measured period;.5 mean weighted value of index A in accordance with the risk elements, e.g. high/low weighting according to the green/yellow/red conditions as shown in figure 2 (weighting factors 10, 20 and 70% may be used);.6 minimum value of index A during recording period; and.7 other results required for decision making.

Page 5 18 Use of the results:.1 identification of the most critical watertight door(s):.1 the most critical door is not necessarily the door giving the biggest reduction to index A, if it is kept closed at all times; and.2 the most critical door will be a watertight door that if kept open will reduce index A significantly and in addition is frequently left open..2 analyse and suggest/implement change in operational procedures;.3 consider possible physical changes in order to drive improvement;.4 use results for increase awareness on board, e.g. the most critical door(s) and the effect on ship s survivability;.5 use results to formulate KPIs;.6 consider existing exemptions and categorizations; and.7 transfer experience to new ship designs. Enhanced inspection of watertight doors on board 19 The procedures described in this section identify risk elements related to functionality of the door in daily work, operation in an emergency and potential for injuries or fatalities. 20 The crew should be trained to ensure the safe operation and awareness of proper functionality of watertight doors. 21 It is commonly recognized that serious accidents are part of a chain of events. 22 A detailed inspection and testing programme beyond what is set forth by SOLAS regulation II-1/21 is described in the following and is intended to:.1 minimize probability for personal injury and fatality with emphasis on proper functioning of visual signals, alarms, local controls and the closing speed of the door; and.2 ensure closing of the watertight doors can take place even in case of loss of power and manual operation. 23 Inspect and test on a daily basis:.1 operation of all watertight doors, for each door:.1 alarms and indicators work as intended; and.2 closing speed is not less than 20 s and not more than 40 s.

Page 6 24 Inspect and test on a weekly basis, for each door: Conclusion.1 gaskets, including wear and tear (doors in frequent use may be subject to increased wear);.2 emergency closing by use of the hand-operated mechanism from either side of the door and above the bulkhead deck;.3 operation 3 times by independent electrical or hydraulic system; and.4 remotely closing. 25 Guidelines for monitoring and assessing risk from operation of watertight doors on board and to enhance survivability after flooding for cruise passenger ships are intended to enhance survivability for cruise passenger ships. CLIA requests MSC 93 to consider these outputs under agenda item 6 for passenger ship safety. Additional relevant outputs from the CSSF will be provided to the Organization, as appropriate. Action requested of the Committee 26 The Committee is invited to consider the details provided in this document and take action as appropriate.