PBN and airspace concept 07 10 April 2015
Global Concepts Global ATM Operational Concept Provides the ICAO vision of seamless, global ATM system Endorsed by AN Conf 11 Aircraft operate as close as possible to 4D trajectories Global Air Navigation Plan Strategy to achieve the vision Endorsed by AN Conf 12 Supports performance based transition to operational concept Assists in establishment of performance objectives Assists in implementation of ATM operational improvements PBN one of the ICAO top priorities 2
ICAO GLOBAL ATM CONCEPT Airspace Concept COM NAV SUR ATM NAVIGATION APPLICATION NAVIGATION SPECIFICATION PBN NAVAID INFRASTRUCTURE RNAV RNP 3
Components of PBN Concept Navigation Application NAVIGATION APPLICATION The APPLICATION (use of) the Navigation Specification and Navaid Infrastructure For example: ATS Routes based on RNAV and RNP Specifications (these rely on the Navaid Infrastructure); For example: SIDs/STARs based on RNAV and RNP Specifications; For example: Approach procedures based on RNP Specifications 4
Components of PBN Concept Navigation Application NAVIGATION APPLICATION Link to Airspace Design Separation minima in procedural airspace ATS routes spacing (incl. SID/STAR/IFP) Determined, among other factors, by area navigation system performance (accuracy, integrity, continuity) Free Route Airspace implementation 5
Airspace Concept General Vision or Master Plan for an airspace Assumptions: CNS/ATM/MET/AGA Traffic figures plus forecasts LoA s Traffic regulations CDO/CCO/PM Flexible Use of Airspace Airspace classification Airspace design (ATS routes, volumes, sectorisation) 6
Airspace Concept Addressing Enablers and/or Limiting Factors Communications VHF? HF? Two Way? Navigation NAVAIDs? Primary/Reversionary? Aircraft and Operator Capabilities? Surveillance Radar? Non Radar? Air Traffic Management ATC Procedures? Workload? ATM System Automation? 7
Airspace Concept Airspace Concept development requires the combined efforts of ANSPs Regulators Airspace Users (AOs, GA, Military) PANS OPS Specialist Procedure Designers to identify and prioritize the overall objectives, considering the entire CNS/ATM environment 8
Limits Performance is prescribed to ATS Routes ICAO Annex 11 provisions DCT tracks are excluded Performance cannot be ascribed to a route which is not an ATS route Designated ATS routes are packed into the NAV database and NAV performance is ascribed to the route NAV data is essential to PBN 9
ICAO Doc 9992 The purpose of the ICAO manual is to provide step by step guidance on the application of performance based navigation (PBN) in a development of an airspace concept. The manual supplements existing provisions in : Procedures for Air Navigation Services Air Traffic Management (PANS ATM, Doc 4444) Procedures for Air Navigation Services Aircraft Operations (PANS OPS, Doc 8168) Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426) Performance based Navigation (PBN) Manual (Doc 9613) Manual on Required Communication Performance (RCP) (Doc 9869) Quality Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure Design (Doc 9906) Volume 1 Flight Procedure Design Quality Assurance System This manual also serves as an overlying and unifying reference document for the: Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) Manual (Doc 9931); and Continuous Climb Operations (CCO) Manual (Doc 9993). 10
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Process 1 Identification of NAV specifications for implementation 12
Starting Point Requirements arise from: Needs of airspace users Consider all users (military/civil, commercial aircraft operator + business + aerial work + general aviation, etc) Constraints on Service Providers ATM requirements (e.g. airspace planners, ATC) Policy directives (e.g. environmental mitigation requirements, noise vs. emissions/air quality vs. fuel burn) Balancing of the overall environmental, capacity and efficiency requirements of an implementation CHALLENGE: Requirements often conflict 13
Who Needs to be Involved Airspace Concept is best developed by multidisciplinary team Air Traffic Controllers Airspace planners (from the ANSP) Operators, AOC, pilots, avionics specialists Flight procedure design specialists Avionics specialists Flight standards Airworthiness regulators ALL airspace users 14
Airspace User Requirements Addresses all users (military and civil aviation (both IFR and VFR)) Overall safety, capacity and efficiency requirements Primary and alternate means of meeting requirements should be considered Transition implications cost v benefit Implementation timing implications 15
Identification of: Airspace Requirements Current traffic and expected growth Traffic flows and composition Transition airspace integrating operations across airspace boundaries and national borders Required ATS Route spacing based on the overall safety, capacity and efficiency requirements Surveillance and communications infrastructure Navigation infrastructure Minimum navigation functions needed to support operational requirement 16
What are your Operational Requirements? Reduce the distance required between laterally separated parallel ATS routes 17
Example Functions Turns Turn Waypoint Turn performance 90 Fly By 90 r r Nominal Turn Boundary Fly Over ß < Min ( /2, 30 ) Turn Waypoint 18
Operational Requirements Need for increase in predictability of path flown Efficiency benefits: Enable routes where terrain or environmental impact demand increased accuracy 07 25 Sensitive area Sensitive area 19
Operational Requirements Improved turn performance including containment of large angle changes flown Capacity benefits: Place routes where needed Enable reduced route spacing Environmental benefits: Design routes more efficiently to meet environmental requirements 07 25 Sensitive area 20
Existing Navigation Equipage What aircraft are operating in Airspace: Registered in States concerned Entering from other Areas/Regions Navigation Equipage: Existing Natural trends (e.g. replacement aircraft) Cost for upgrades NB: Cost of re-equipage (including certification & ops approval) could be higher than value of aircraft 21
CNS/ATM Infrastructure NAV Aids Rate of equipage with GNSS in Area Existing ground based network (DME/VOR) Renewal needs for existing ground system Implication on RNAV reliance if ground infrastructure not replaced Role of ground system to back up GNSS Note: Nav System (airborne and infrastructure) failure modes and effects together with available mitigations have significant impact on route spacing 22
CNS/ATM Infrastructure Communications and Surveillance Reliance upon Nav Integrity to be considered (e.g): ATS Surveillance gaps Communications gaps May place additional integrity requirements on Nav could potentially require RNP 23
CNS/ATM Infrastructure ATM Systems What is being enabled by Navigation developments Do existing tools need to be changed Are new tools needed Alerts Automation Flight planning Support requirements to enable mixed mode operation 24
Identify necessary navigation performance and functional requirements Basic requirements accuracy, integrity, continuity, availability Specific functional requirements leg transitions/path terminators, parallel offset capabilities, holding patterns navigation data bases) Complexity of RNAV procedures envisaged The number of waypoints needed to define procedure The spacing between waypoints The need to define how a turn is executed Operations below Minimum Vectoring Altitude 25
Process 2 Validation and Implementation 26
Purpose of Validation Validation of Safety of the Airspace Concept Can also identify viability/non viability of efficiency, effectiveness, etc. of alternatives Validation Means should be outlined in the Safety Assessment Plan Validation can involve the use of various means to determine if safety requirements are met PBN Manual outlines 4 potential methods Validation process may identify additional requirements that will require adjustments to the Airspace Concept before it can be implemented 27
Airspace Modeling Computer programs Can eliminate non viable alternatives Quick evaluation of alternatives, changes to proposed routes, sectors etc Fast Time Simulation Computer simulations of air traffic can be used to conduct safety risk assessments Safety risk assessments provide information concerning risks based on input from subject matter experts and statistical analyses of simulation model output TMA design: Paris arrivals / departures Risk Assessment Probability per Aircraft 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 Minimum Distance (NM) Atlanta TRACON Chicago TRACON Denver TRACON Dallas TRACON Houston TRACON New York TRACON SoCAL TRACON 28
Airspace modelling Advantagesflexible, simple, allows to test a number of scenarios using real ATC traffic data Disadvantagessubjective, basic aircraft performance, simplified, no MET representation, no ATC interventions Pros and Cons Fast Time Simulation Advantagesflexible, quality data, used to assess sector capacity and for safety case, evaluate TLS Disadvantagessimplified, limited aircraft performance and MET data, no active ATC interaction, only statistical data 29
Real Time Simulation Most realistic means to validate an Airspace Concept Simulators realistically replicate ATM operations Require controller and pseudo pilot participants Real Time Simulation Live ATC trials Generally used to validate the most complex procedures or practices Example: RNP/AR (Authorization Required) Approach flight 30
Pros and Cons Real Time Simulation High quality data, ATC and pseudo pilot involvement, assess HF, unlimited scope, no direct influence on live operations Training Simulators Limited aircraft performance, limited scope and HMI, no post simulation evaluation tools Live Trials Most accurate, but safety aspect due to influence on live operations, limited flexibility Flight Simulators could link tor RTS, confirm design aspects (fly ability, MET impact), high quality 31
Formulate: Safety Plan What you will assess, How you will assess (methodology) and When (at what points in the process) you will assess the safety of your planned implementation 32
Safety Assessment ICAO Annex 11 and PANS ATM require safety assessment when implementing a navigation specification Simple airspace changes may not require extensive safety validation Consult ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual ICAO PBN Manual Volume II, Part A, Chapter 3 on Safety Assessment provides some detailed considerations for Aircraft Performance Aircraft RNAV System Failure NAVAID Environment Failure Air Traffic Surveillance, Communications Failures 33
Annex 11 Air Traffic Services Section 2.27 Any significant safety related change to the ATC system, including implementation of a reduced separation minimum or a new procedure, shall only be effected after a safety assessment has demonstrated that an acceptable level of safety will be met and users have been consulted. When appropriate, the responsible authority shall ensure that adequate provision is made for post implementation monitoring to verify that the defined level of safety continues to be met. Note 1. When, due to the nature of the change, the acceptable level of safety cannot be expressed in quantitative terms, the safety assessment may rely on operational judgment. 34
ICAO Doc 4444 Procedures for Air Navigation Services-Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM) ATS Safety Management (Chapter 2, Section 2.6) 2.6.1.1 A safety assessment shall be carried out in respect of proposals for significant airspace reorganizations, for significant changes in the provision of ATS procedures applicable to an airspace or an aerodrome, and for the introduction of new equipment, systems or facilities a) a reduced separation minimum to be applied within an airspace or at an aerodrome; b) a new operating procedure, including departure and arrival procedures, to be applied within an airspace or at an aerodrome; c) a reorganization of the ATS route structure; d) a resectorization of an airspace; e) physical changes to the layout of runways and/or taxiways at an aerodrome; and f) implementation of new communications, surveillance or other safety significant systems and equipment, including those providing new functionality and/or capabilities 2.6.1.2 Proposals shall be implemented only when the assessment has shown that an acceptable level of safety will be met. Note 2. When, due to the nature of the change, the acceptable level of safety cannot be expressed in quantitative terms, the safety assessments may rely on operational judgement 35
ICAO Doc 9689 Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima Guidance to quantify effects of separation minima on air traffic safety Two Methods: Target Level of Safety Acceptability criteria in assessing collision risk Expressed as a statistical probability (e.g. 5 x10 9 fatal accidents per flying hour) Comparative Assessment Can be used to analyze the differences between the existing and proposed systems 36
ICAO Doc 9613 Manual on PBN Volume II, Part A, Chapter 3 Guidance on Safety Assessment provides a more detailed overview of the process Key areas: Aircraft performance RNAV system failures Infrastructure failures (e.g. failure of NAVAID environment, or ATS surveillance and communication).. 37
Training and Implementation Preparation for the implemention ATC system upgrade, clear mixed mode operations, stakeholder engagement, promulagtion of benefits Training and Raising the awareness ATC Training Aircrew Training Information/Awareness campaign to fully understand the new procedures/operations Implementation Post implemntation review and continuous monitoring/improvements (utilisation rates, incidents, etc...) 38
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